

*Value Transformation,
Education, and Culture*

Civic and Uncivic Values in Poland.

EDITED BY

*Sabrina P. Ramet,
Kristen Ringdal, and
Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak*

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Edited by

SABRINA P. RAMET, KRISTEN RINGDAL,
and KATARZYNA DOŚPIAŁ-BORYSIK



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*For Fr. José Rubio,
Kristen's wife, Gerd Inger,
and Katarzyna's grandparents*

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Preface

Among the eleven postcommunist countries admitted to the European Union between 2004 and 2013, Poland has the largest area, the largest population, and the largest GDP—larger, indeed, than the GDPs of second-place Czech Republic and third-place Romania combined. The population is 99.5% literate, and the government allocates 7.5% of GDP to health expenditures, and 5.1% to public education. Poland, thus, is a pivotal country in postcommunist Central Europe. Yet the country faces a number of challenges. In the economic sphere, 10.6% of the population lives below the poverty line. The unemployment rate was recorded at 9.7% of the economically active population in September 2015, though for young adults between the ages of 25 and 34, this figure rose to 27.4%.¹ Organized crime is also a problem; it has been reported that Polish gangs have links with the Columbian Cali Cartel,² while Poland is now one of the largest producers of amphetamines in Europe (alongside the Netherlands, Belgium, Estonia, and Latvia).³ In the cultural sphere, the anti-Semitic radio station run by Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk is continually able to mobilize people

1 The foregoing statistics were all taken from the CIA World Factbook, accessed online on 6 May 2013; and *Bezrobocie rejestrowane I-III kwartał 2015 r.* (Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2015), 22, 26 [accessed on 18 January 2016].

2 Kelly Hignett, "Organised Crime in East Central Europe: The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland", in *Global Crime*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 2004), 75–76.

3 *Drug Reporter* (9 July 2014), at http://drogriporter.hu/en/Poland_drug_routes [accessed on 18 January 2016].

onto the streets. And in the political sphere, as a result of the October 2015 elections, the right-wing Law and Justice Party is the strongest party in the parliament, with 235 seats in the lower house (the Sejm) and 61 in the Senate; the centrist Civic Platform currently has 128 seats in the Sejm and 34 in the Senate. In the 2011–2015 parliament, the Civic Platform was the strongest party, with 207 seats in the Sejm and 63 in the Senate.

The report filed by *The Economist's* Intelligence Unit (2015) ranked Poland the 48th most democratic country in the world, out of a total of 167 countries. Within postcommunist Europe, Poland was, thus, ranked below the Czech Republic in 25th place, Estonia in 29th, Slovenia in 36th, Lithuania in 38th, Latvia in 42nd, Slovakia in 43rd, and Bulgaria in 46th place.⁴ But democracy—or at least liberal democracy—is under threat in Poland in the wake of the October 2015 elections. The Law and Justice Party (PiS) immediately set about raising the bar for constitutional court rulings, requiring a two-thirds majority with thirteen justices present, instead of a simple majority among nine justices present.⁵ The Polish parliament also adopted two laws undermining the independence of the media, laying the groundwork for the dismissal by July 2016 of more than 160 journalists who were critical of the new government. Commenting on the situation in Poland as of December 2015, *The Economist* described the ruling PiS party as “a motley coalition of social conservatives, Catholic nationalists, Eurosceptics, anti-corruption zealots, conspiracy theorists, protectionists and agrarians.” The magazine also charged that PiS mixed “illiberal foreign and cultural policies with statist and short-sighted economics.”⁶ Concerned about these developments, the European Commission began consultations in January 2016 to discuss a response to these new laws, which represent no less than a frontal assault on civic values. But the ambitions of the Law and Justice Party may be gauged from the fact that, by summer 2016, it was hard at work on a new constitution for Poland.

4 “Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety”, *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, at <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015> [accessed on 2 March 2016].

5 *The Guardian* (23 December 2015), at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/23/polands-government-carries-through-on-threat-to-constitutional-court> [accessed on 17 January 2016].

6 *The Economist* (5 December 2015), at <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21679470-new-government-poland-has-made-awful-start-europes-new-headache> [accessed on 3 August 2016].

The importance of civic values has long been well understood. Jean-Jacques Rousseau addressed this theme in his *Considerations on the Government of Poland*, and the theme was brought into mainstream political science discourse in 1963 by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's landmark volume, *The Civic Culture*. Yet surprisingly there has been no systematic, book-length treatment of this theme in the context of Poland, a country with nearly 40 million inhabitants. Our volume is the *first* volume to undertake this task in a systematic and comprehensive way.

We distinguish between civic values (the rule of law, individual rights, tolerance, respect for the harm principle, equality, and neutrality of the state in matters of religion) and uncivic values (the rule of a dictator or dictatorial party, contempt for individual rights, bigotry, disrespect for the harm principle, treatment of people as unequals whether through discrimination or through exploitation, and state favoritism of one religion over others).

This project was born in the course of a faculty exchange between the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim and the University of Łódź, funded by Erasmus, a grant from EEA/Norway Grants (<http://eeagrants.org/>) with the topic "The Role of Scandinavia in the World Politics: Norway's concept of solidarity and internationalism," and a grant from the Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU) from 2010 to 2014. Thanks to these programs, Sabrina Ramet was able to visit Łódź in October 2013 (Erasmus & NTNU) and Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak was able to visit Trondheim in June–September 2010 and again in June 2014 (EEA/Norway Grants and NTNU). We are grateful to the Erasmus program, Norway Grants, and NTNU for their support of our exchange.

The editors
17 January 2016

CHAPTER 1

Civic and Uncivic Values: An Introduction

SABRINA P. RAMET

This is a book about values—specifically about civic and uncivic values in Poland. It is not a book about democracy, although values are certainly important for democracy. Nor is this volume intended to provide a complete overview of Polish society; thus, there are no chapters on the car industry, shipping, or the police. Our focus is on values. *Why values?* The answer is that values are not only those things that matter to people (such as the rule of law and freedom of religion) but also the norms which people accept, reject, or perhaps even take for granted. Examples of such norms could include tolerance of minorities and treating other people as equals. *Civic values* (rule of law, respect for individual rights and human equality, tolerance, respect for the harm principle, and neutrality of the state in matters of religion) promote harmony and stability. *Uncivic values* (rule by a dictator, contempt for individual rights, discrimination in favor of some groups and against others, bigotry, readiness to harm and exploit other people, and state engagement in promoting one particular religion or denomination) promote civil strife and instability. Thus, to the extent that one cares about civil harmony, stability, and the possibility for people to cooperate democratically to promote the common good, the study of values is both relevant and useful.

Values change over time. They change in response to crises or to significant changes in the makeup of the population (as through migration) or under the influence of religious organizations, political parties, changes in education, the media, and cultural products (including the news media,

films, and even to some extent the rock scene), as well as coming as a result of value systems promoted by an occupation regime. Alternatively, occupation may provoke resistance and reaffirmation of the society's core values, as occurred to a large extent in Poland during the 123-year period from 1795 to 1918, when the country was divided between the Habsburg Empire, Hohenzollern Prussia/Germany, and Romanov Russia.

Why Poland? Although the study of civic and uncivic values is relevant for all societies,¹ Poland may be counted as especially interesting for several reasons. First, in common with all postcommunist countries, there has been a radical shift since the 1970s, not only in politics and the economy, but in all spheres of life, including values. Indeed, with the appearance of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity in summer 1980, a struggle began between forces demanding pluralism and the communists, who hoped to keep any pluralization to a bare minimum; this struggle was, among other things, a struggle over values. Second, there is the presence of the Catholic Church, which claims the (nominal) allegiance of about 90% of the population and which, in communist times, energetically promoted the values of pluralism, freedom of religion, and, during the papacy of John Paul II, independent trade unionism. Moreover, since 1989, the Church has been especially active in fighting what it calls "gender ideology,"² and in securing a highly restrictive law on abortion and the introduction of Catholic religious instruction in state schools. Third, Poland has a highly educated society, whose members are well prepared to defend those values they hold dear; here one may count the presence of various NGOs, such as the Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Polish Humanitarian Action, the Campaign against Homophobia (founded in 2001 by Robert Biedroń, who was a member of

-
- 1 See, for example: *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the post-Milošević era*, ed. Ola Listhaug, Sabrina P. Ramet, and Dragana Dulić (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2011); *Civic and Uncivic values in Macedonia: Value transformation, education, and media*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet, Ola Listhaug, and Albert Simkus (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013); *Bosnia-Herzegovina since Dayton: Civic and uncivic values*, ed. Ola Listhaug and Sabrina Ramet (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2013); and *Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: Value transformation, education, and media*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet, Albert Simkus, and Ola Listhaug (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015).
 - 2 See Jonathan Luxmoore, "Polish Church declares war on gender ideology," OSV Newsweekly, January 29, 2014), <https://www.osv.com/OSVNewsweekly/Story/TabId/2672/ArtMid/13567/ArticleID/13990/Polish-Church-declares-war-on-gender-ideology.aspx> [accessed on September 16, 2015].

the Sejm from November 2011 until December 2014, when he was elected Mayor of Słupsk), and the Federation for Women and Family Planning (formed in 1991). And fourth, during the 1980s, Poland had one of the most active civil societies in Europe, with independent activists publishing and circulating an independent press, staging cultural events free of regime control, funding research fellowships for scholars and so forth.³ The energy which went into civil society in the 1980s has now been channeled into the NGO sector⁴ and into the political parties which have emerged since the Great Transformation of 1989.

It may be helpful to say a few words about each of these values; I shall assess them in pairs. To begin with, *the harm principle* was the first to be codified in law, through Hammurabi's Code—"an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth"—proclaimed in 1754 BCE. The harm principle, *when honored*, provides a minimal protection of people's physical, mental, and even financial well-being. When paired with *the principle of tolerance*, first developed in the religious sphere by French jurist Jean Bodin (1530–1596) and English philosopher John Locke (1632–1704), the result is that discrimination against people on the basis of religion, ethnicity, race, sexual orientation, or such disabilities that do not impede one's work is proscribed. Recognition of the harm principle and of the principle of tolerance is fundamental to liberal society, while the self-righteous embrace of intolerance and rejection of the harm principle underpin political and religious extremism of all stripes, from Nazis and neo-Nazis to the neo-Islamic⁵ ISIS. Within Poland, the Catholic Church and the political allies it has had may be counted as intolerant of sexual minorities, although the Church is by no means comparable to ISIS.

The rule of law is likewise crucial to the harmony and stability of any society, because it is the assurance of predictability and of either equality under the law, or at least forms of inequality clearly set out in law. The more democratic a society, the more the rule of law will mean equality under the law. The rule of law is also the precondition for *individual*

3 See Marta Toch, *Reinventing Civil Society: Poland's Quiet Revolution, 1981–1986* (New York: Helsinki Watch, 1986).

4 See "Polish NGOs—with sense and sensibility," *Human Rights House*, <http://human-rightshouse.org/Articles/13198.html> [accessed on September 16, 2015].

5 In characterizing ISIS as "neo-Islamic," I mean that the organization betrays fundamental tenets of Islam.

rights—a broad concept which includes not only freedom of thought and speech,⁶ but also freedom of religion, the right to choose one's own spouse, freedom to travel, artistic freedom, and freedom of scientific inquiry. In fascist systems, by contrast, the rule of law is replaced by the rule of the leader and there is no recognition of individual rights, which means, among other things, no freedom to travel, no artistic freedom, and no freedom of scientific inquiry. Democratic rule of law is a crucial foundation for a civilized society.

The principle of equality has been interconnected with each of the foregoing four principles and, indeed, implicit in each of them. Equality does *not* mean that all people are rewarded equally, any more than it could be stretched to mean that everyone should be licensed on an equal basis to perform brain surgery. Equality entails equal rewards for equal merit or equal work, but the principle of equality, properly understood, requires also proportionality. This may be explained quite simply. Let us say that two lumberjacks of equal skill and equal seniority are out chopping down trees. They are paid an equal wage at the end of each day. But one week, one of the lumberjacks decides that he will work only four hours per day, instead of eight hours, while the other lumberjack continues to work the full eight hours. Proportionality dictates that the lumberjack working eight hours daily that week should be paid twice as much, during that week, as the lumberjack who worked only four hours per day.

The principle of equality is also related to the liberal requirement that the state maintain strict neutrality where religion is concerned. *The neutrality of the state in matters of religion* is, in a word, critical to people's equal enjoyment of freedom of religion. Conversely, a state which imposes its particular interpretation of one religion on all its citizens is considered neither liberal nor democratic.

Civic values, thus, are principles which may be honored, promoted, and even codified by the government. By contrast, there are also *civic virtues*, which are the virtues of individuals. I shall mention five here. The first of these is *reasonableness*, which John Rawls has defined as the will-

6 These freedoms, together with freedom of religion, were first championed by Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677). On Spinoza, see: Steven Nadler, *A Book Forged in Hell: Spinoza's Treatise and the Birth of the Secular Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011); Lewis Samuel Feuer, *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964; 2nd printing, 1966); and Stuart Hampshire, *Spinoza and Spinozism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

ingness to justify one's views, combined with open-mindedness and even a willingness to change one's views if presented with convincing arguments and/or evidence.⁷ The second is *civility* or courtesy, which entails treating other people with respect and observing the rules of etiquette prevalent in the society in which one lives. Stephen Carter has argued that civility is a duty.⁸ The third civic virtue on my list is *empathy*, which is to say sensitivity to the sufferings of others and sharing in their victories and joys.⁹ Fourth is *truthfulness*, which I have defined elsewhere as "the commitment to tell the truth insofar as one knows it, while respecting at the same time the harm principle and norms of civility; where telling what one knows can cause irreparable harm, the harm principle sets a limit"¹⁰ to what may be disclosed, and silence or obfuscation may be a duty. The fifth and final civic virtue on my list is *trust*, which has been defined as "confident reliance on or belief in the integrity, veracity, justice, friendship, power, protection etc., of a person or thing."¹¹ Trust is a basic building block of society. As Georg Simmel put it,

Without the general trust that people have in each other, society itself would disintegrate, for very few relationships are based entirely upon what is known with certainty about another person, and very few relationships would endure if trust were not as strong as, or stronger than, rational proof or personal observation.¹²

7 John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 48–54.

8 Stephen Carter, *Civility: Manners, Morals, and the Etiquette of Democracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), 279–83 and *passim*. See also Peter Johnson, "Talking with Ya-hoos: Collingwood's Case for Civility," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 16, no. 3 (2008): 598.

9 See Nancy E. Snow, "Empathy," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 37, no. 1 (January 2000): 65–78; and Michael E. Morrell, *Empathy and Democracy: Feeling, Thinking, and Deliberation* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010).

10 Sabrina P. Ramet, "Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: An Introduction," in *Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo*, ed. Ramet et al., 7.

11 *The Cassell Pocket English Dictionary* (London: Arrow Books, 1991), 885.

12 Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 178–79, as quoted in Jack Barbalet, "A characterization of trust, and its consequences," *Theory and Society* 38, no. 4 (July 2009): 367. See also Tom Christensen and Per Lægred, "Trust in Government: The Relative Importance of Service Satisfaction, Political Factors, and Demography," *Public Performance & Management Review* 28, no. 4 (June 2005): 487–511.

In sum, the *civic values*—respect for the harm principle, tolerance, the democratic rule of law, individual rights, recognition of the dual principle of equality and proportionality, and the neutrality of the state in matters of religion—are essential ingredients in a liberal-democratic state and are conducive to domestic harmony and socio-political stability. By contrast, the *uncivic values*—contempt for the harm principle, bigotry, authoritarian rule, disrespect for individual rights, the embrace of the notion of inherent inequality (whether on account of race or religion or some other factor), and the engagement of the state apparatus to favor or impose one particular religion—are the hallmarks of an illiberal, undemocratic regime and are conducive to disharmony and instability. Where *uncivic vices* are concerned, the damage is equally obvious. Whether one speaks of persistent unreasonableness, rudeness, lack of empathy, deceitfulness, or distrust of other people, in each case the result is to erode the fabric of society and to make cooperation for the common good more difficult.

What of the Catholic Church in Poland? Much has changed since the Holy See issued its explicitly anti-liberal “Syllabus of Errors” in 1864,¹³ but no one would consider today’s Church a champion of classical liberalism. The situation is not black and white. On the one hand, some, at least, of the Catholic Church’s doctrines are generally accepted and may even be characterized as common sense. Proscriptions against murder, lying, stealing, and adultery are completely in tune with civic values and most certainly promote domestic harmony and social stability. On the other hand, Church teachings regarding homosexuality consign gays and lesbians to the class of sinners, thus treating them unequally and with disrespect. The Catholic Church’s active pressure to obtain a reference to God in the preamble of the Polish constitution, its successful quest to obtain a highly restrictive law on abortion, and its success in seeing Catholic religious instruction introduced in state schools, suggest that for the Church, secular law must respect divine law, and even incorporate into the body of positive law strictures and prescriptions derived from divine law as interpreted by Church elders. And these priorities also lead to a repudiation of liberal understandings of individual rights, human equality, and,

13 Although see Russell Shaw, “Syllabus of Errors still relevant 150 years later,” OSV Newsweekly, November 25, 2014, <https://www.osv.com/OSVNewsweekly/ByIssue/Article/TabId/735/ArtMID/13636/ArticleID/16503/Syllabus-of-Errors-still-relevant-150-years-later.aspx> [accessed on September 16, 2015].

in certain contexts, the harm principle. In this way, the Church slides into advocacy of uncivic values and becomes, in the post-1989 setting, a factor for disharmony, even though in the 1980s it was a powerful force in bringing the nation together against communist rule. There are, of course, many kind, generous, loving priests and Catholic lay persons, as well as liberal members of the Dominican Order in Cracow. But all the aforementioned factors bring a certain baggage. Some of them are able to set this baggage aside or even decide to reject it, but for the more conservative prelates and laity, this does not even come into question.

With sexuality currently so prominent in Polish debates, the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), based in Warsaw, conducted a survey among Poles in 2010, which found that Poles were generally more liberal regarding sexual matters in 2010 than they had been in 2005. Specifically, CBOS found “increased acceptance of divorce, homosexuality, cohabitation, euthanasia and premarital sex. Disapproval [of] contraception, abortion and offering gifts has declined.”¹⁴ In other words, the Catholic Church appeared, at that time at least, to be losing its influence among Poles in the sphere of sexuality. This decrease in influence is reflected, *inter alia*, in a decline in the number of Poles attending Mass regularly (41.5% in 2009) and in the number of Poles aged 24–34 who say that they hope to remain faithful to Catholic values (just 3% in 2009).¹⁵

The chapters in Part One provide an overview of the political system. This section opens with a chapter by Aleksander Zdravkovski, which surveys the major issues and controversies in Poland from the collapse of communism in 1989 to the watershed elections of October 2015. Among other things, he notes the discussion about entry into the European Union (to which some Catholic bishops were opposed) and NATO, the controversy surrounding privatization, and the arduous effort to obtain passage of a new constitution for postcommunist Poland. Michał Słowikowski and Michał Pierzgański continue the analysis of Poland’s political system with a chapter on party system and voting behavior. They argue that Polish

14 “Polish values: what is important, what is permitted, what must not be done,” *Polish Public Opinion* (July 2010), http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2010/07_2010.pdf [accessed September 16, 2015].

15 Sabrina P. Ramet, “The Catholic Church in Postcommunist Poland: Polarization, Privatization, and Decline in Influence,” in *Religion and Politics in Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 27, 42.

parties have not helped people to understand the rules underpinning democratic systems. In other words, they have failed as vehicles of socialization. They further note that political parties are widely distrusted, and conclude that this negative attitude vis-à-vis the parties “increases the negative perception of democracy as a form of government.” The final chapter in this section is devoted to the theme of European values in Poland, with a special focus on ethnic and national minorities. Authors Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak, Michał Klonowski, and Agata Włodarska-Frykowska begin with some historical background into the interwar Second Republic (1918–39) and the communist Polish People’s Republic, and note that the communist regime engendered social attitudes which have persisted into the postcommunist era. But as work on framing a new constitution got underway, legislators were conscious of the need to remove the formulations, assumptions, and axioms associated with communist thinking from that document and to replace them with formulations and axioms appropriate to democracy, in the process embedding civic values. Among the values honored in the new Polish constitution, the authors note, are “the right to information, religious freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and economic, social, and cultural rights.”

Part Two focuses specifically on values, with chapters on social class, religion, tolerance of homosexuality, anti-Semitism, and civic values. The role of the Catholic Church is foregrounded in several of these chapters. Part Two opens with Kristen Ringdal’s chapter devoted to an examination of civic values after the end of the communist era, and is based on longitudinal data from the European Values Study (EVS). Ringdal identifies electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law as elements in the first tier of civic values vital to a liberal democracy. Other civic values, Ringdal continues, include modern gender roles, tolerance, and a culture of trust. EVS data show that both social tolerance and political tolerance have been high in Poland, relative to other postcommunist countries. Indeed, where political tolerance—measured in terms of the acceptance of left-wing and right-wing extremists as neighbors—is concerned, Poland ranked as the most tolerant country in the region in 1990, and remained so in 2008. Poles remain very traditional where gender roles are concerned, relatively low on trust of other people, but “relatively satisfied” with the state of electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law—which is to say, democracy.

This is followed by Maciej Potz’s chapter on religion in public life. Potz writes that “[t]he Church’s assertion of its right to speak out on moral

issues...[is] widely accepted by the society, even if the majority of Poles do not agree with some of the episcopate's particular stances." But so successful has the Church been in seeing its values reflected in legislation (for example regarding religious instruction in public schools and abortion law), that Potz quotes Ryszard Małajny to the effect that Poland has become a "quasi-confessional state." In the initial postcommunist years, the Church tried to wield influence through explicitly Catholic parties. But when these parties waned in strength, the Church adopted new, more subtle strategies, eventually behaving much as an interest group.

The next chapter, written by Ewa Golebiowska, points to the limits to the Church's influence where same-sex relations are concerned. Specifically, while the Church has consistently equated homosexuality with sin, some changes have taken place which suggest gradual improvement for Poland's gays and lesbians. In 2010, for instance, a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute was adopted, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Such protection is enshrined also in the country's labor code. Making use of multivariate analysis, Golebiowska concludes that "general tolerance of gay and lesbian rights, measured with questions about willingness to allow gays and lesbians to show their sexual orientation in public, have sex, marry, enter into civil unions, rally, and adopt children, is affected most strongly by respondents' conceptions of the family, opinions about Poland's membership in the European Union, age, religiosity, and ideological self-identification."

The final chapter in Part Two is Ireneusz Krzemiński's study of the correlation between Catholic religiosity and anti-Semitism in Poland. Based on surveys conducted in 1992, 2002, and 2012, Krzemiński finds that openly declared anti-Semitic attitudes declined between 1992 and 2012. At the same time, however, there was a significant increase in responses suggestive of anti-anti-Semitism. The study also revealed "a very strong correlation between declared religiosity and religious practices on the one hand, and anti-Semitism on the other." It also turned out that persons with only elementary education were the most likely to nurture anti-Semitic attitudes.

Values are expressed, transmitted, and reinforced not only by political leaders, religious organizations, and schools, but also by various other agents. Part Three is, thus, devoted to examining these vehicles of socialization. Opening Part Three is Renata Siemieńska's discussion of civic education. While taking into consideration the role of the family, the Church,

and members of one's peer generation in transmitting values, the author devotes special attention to the part played by schools and textbooks in the socialization process. As she notes, there are various groups, including ethnic communities, religious associations, and feminist groups that seek to influence or control the content of textbooks. Inevitably, history textbooks have been at the center of interest for educational reform since 1989. Indeed, more recent textbooks have introduced "a new narrative philosophy of history, including, in particular, the pluralism of truths." Siemieńska also pays attention to images of women and men in textbooks, noting that "[i]n textbooks, gender stereotypes tend to be much sharper than in reality." After briefly touching on the influence of the Church in school curricula, the author cites recent research showing that the overwhelming majority of 19-year-old Poles have no interest in politics and that 20% of young Poles "did not see anything wrong with a non-democratic political system."

Chapter 10 examines history textbooks in greater depth. Authors Sylwia Bobryk and Thomas Strobel discuss how history textbooks published since 1989 differ from those published in the communist era, and how the values enshrined in the textbooks have changed since the collapse of the communist system. They show that the earliest impetus to reforming the communist-era history textbooks came in 1981, but the proposal brought forward by opposition representatives in October of that year was shelved when martial law was declared two months later. The history textbooks were changed after 1989, again in 1999, and yet again, amid considerable controversy, in 2009. Marshal Józef Piłsudski, portrayed until the mid-1960s as a fascist, was recast as an "authoritarian" in the 1970s and 1980s, but is now presented in a favorable light. The massacre of 22,000 Polish detainees (including 8,000 army officers and 6,000 police officers) by the Soviet NKVD in Katyń forest in 1940, ignored or denied in the communist era, is now freely admitted. Among other changes, perhaps the most controversial concerned the way in which the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 would be presented. In the 1990s, textbooks "portrayed it either as an attempt on Jaruzelski's part to rescue Poland from a possible Soviet intervention—or as a brutal defense of the socialist system against the wishes of society." More recently, Poland's textbooks have cast martial law in a negative light. Bobryk and Strobel close by observing that—at least until the end of 2015—Polish governments have not tried to impose a specific vision

of the past on textbook authors, leaving them free to reach their own conclusions.

This is followed by my own chapter, devoted to an examination of lyrics sung in the Polish rock and punk scene. The proclamation of martial law on December 13, 1981 proved to be a watershed for Polish rock or punk bands such as Manaam, Cool Kids of Death, Kazik, T. Love, Sweet Noise, and others, which now took up political themes. From then until the end of the 1980s, Poland's rockers sang lyrics which variously mocked, satirized, or criticized the communist regime (albeit within limits). After the collapse of communism, politically conscious rockers identified a new "enemy"—capitalism—but there were other political themes as well. The most stridently anticapitalist band is probably Dezerter, which has also taken on the Catholic Church as well as consumerism. Also prominent in the Polish rock scene are death metal and satanic rock bands, where one may encounter songs of despair, such as Vader's song "Abandon All Hope," released in 2014. A blackened death metal band, Behemoth—led by the charismatic Adam "Nergal" Darski—sings lyrics which variously satirize and mock the Catholic Church, with videos mimicking Church rituals in quasi-satanic garb. There have also been Christian bands, such as 2Tm2,3, a band committed to spreading the Christian Gospel and singing some of its songs in Aramaic and Hebrew. As these examples illustrate, the Polish rock scene remains a battleground where the struggle over values continues.

In chapter 12, Elżbieta Durys analyses film and values, taking as her premise the Poles' orientation toward—perhaps even fixation on—the past. In Polish cinema, this has been reflected in a flood of historical films, taking up such subjects as the defense of Warsaw in 1920, the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, the career of Solidarity priest Fr. Popiełuszko, and the life and career of Poland's first postcommunist president, Lech Wałęsa. Through her chapter, Durys reveals the Polish film industry self-identifies as a producer of a specifically *national* cinema. As for the content of these historical films, Durys finds that they celebrate and perpetuate the romantic paradigm, while maintaining a "staunchly patriarchal" tone.

The mass media likewise play a crucial role in presenting certain behaviors, actions, and attitudes as "normal" and others as "abnormal" or deviant, in this way shaping the values of society. In her chapter on the Polish media, Jane Curry argues that the mass media, by making use of their new freedom to report on scandals and corruption, inadvertently contributed to diminishing the status of the new postcommunist regime

in the nineties. However, since then, the media have been less interested in shocking their readers and more committed to providing useful information. The Polish media scene today includes transformed media, recently launched secular media (some of it foreign-owned), and a visible Catholic presence, with 43 religious radio stations currently operated by different regional groups. After the October 2015 elections, as Curry relates, the Polish media came under pressure as the incoming Law and Justice-dominated parliament passed a law ending the public status of Polish Radio and Television and granting the government the right to appoint the directors of Polish Radio and Television, as well as of other state-owned media. The move triggered nationwide protests.

Finally, in the postscript to this volume, I discuss the significance of the October 2015 elections and their fallout, noting how the victorious Law and Justice party immediately set about establishing its control of the courts and endeavoring to muzzle the press. It is striking that a number of observers have construed the current strongman, Jarosław Kaczyński, as the political reincarnation of the authoritarian-nationalist Roman Dmowski (1864–1939), who, in the interwar era, was marginalized by Marshal Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), the *de facto* head of Poland for the last nine years of his life. Whether the comparison to Dmowski is fair or not, Kaczyński's ambition to rewrite the constitution, rewrite the rules under which the Constitutional Tribunal functions, and, by his own declaration, set up an "illiberal" system following the model of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, suggests that the Kaczyński regime may want to take Poland down the path to authoritarianism. However, as I note in the postscript, "Dmowski's political 'map' is not the only available model from the past, which might guide Poles in the future. And whether Poles choose to look to past politicians such as Piłsudski or to the heroism of living political figures such as Wałęsa, or to chart new paths without referring to past political models and examples, it is clear enough that the struggle to defend democracy in Poland is just beginning."

PART ONE

THE SYSTEM

CHAPTER 2

Polish Politics, April 1989–October 2015

ALEKSANDER ZDRAVKOVSKI

Ever since the Round Table Talks which took place during the first half of 1989, Poland has been witnessing a constant, tangible dynamic of social, political and economic changes as part of the wider process of integration with the West. In this context, Polish society has undergone a process of radical and profound transformations. This is especially palpable in the sphere of values. Arguably, Poles are becoming more liberal and tolerant towards sexual minorities, foreign cultures and non-traditional lifestyles. Undoubtedly, this is partly a consequence of the fact that Poles are becoming wealthier and more emancipated, and are able to travel more frequently and acquaint themselves with other peoples and civilizations. Furthermore, the accession of Poland to the EU in 2004 kick-started a slow process of convergence between the Polish value landscape and the one present in the West. Currently, Poles have become more tolerant than they once were with regard to divorce, same-sex partnerships, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and other moral matters.

Women have become much more visible in the political process, are now present in the highest echelons of power, and in the economic sphere they play a key role in many important enterprises. In the wake of the *October elections*, Poland boasts a female Prime Minister, Beata Szydło, from the right-wing Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS). During the 2015 parliamentary elections, the then-opposition PiS, the ruling Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), and the United Left (Zjednoczona Lewica, ZL) coalition had all put forward female politicians

as candidates for prime minister. In academia, the role of women is currently far greater than before the transition.¹ In 2013, Poland had the third lowest gender pay gap in the EU, and the country continues to make strides in this regard.² Presently, Poland is witnessing a tangible rejuvenation of the Jewish community and culture which were virtually destroyed by Nazi Germany during the Holocaust. Moreover, anti-Semitic incidents in Poland are much rarer than in other established liberal democracies, such as Sweden, Germany, or the Netherlands.³

Although Poland has achieved commendable success and made remarkable strides in all spheres of public life, the country still has considerably lower standards of living than Germany, the United Kingdom, and other developed economies. The political scene is dominated by two major parties with meager prospects for smaller contenders. Urgent reforms are required in the pension and healthcare systems. Members of sexual minorities occupy important posts in both public institutions and private companies, yet a comprehensive framework for the protection of this community has still not been implemented. These are some of the reasons why a survey of the most important political dynamics since 1989 is useful for any comprehensive study of postcommunism in Poland.

This chapter will attempt to tap into the following topics: the economic transformations ushered in by Leszek Balcerowicz; the constitutional reforms; the process of integration with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the relations of Poland with Germany and the Russian Federation. I have chosen these two countries due to the fact that Germany is Poland's number one economic partner, while Russia is still perceived by many Poles as the biggest regional threat to stability and peace in the country. This chapter will also outline the most significant political dynamics in the country, and serve as a background for analysis related to the promotion of civic and uncivic values in the country. Has Poland experienced a genuine form of political pluralism after 1989? Have the citizens of Poland benefited from economic

1 "Polska 1989–2014," *Główny Urząd Statystyczny*, Warsaw: 2014, 46.

2 "Women earned on average 16% less than men in 2013 in the EU," *Eurostat news release*, March 5, 2015; this can be explained by the fact that Polish women work, on average, four hours less than men per week. See "Kobiety i mężczyźni na rynku pracy," *Główny Urząd Statystyczny*, Warsaw: 2014, 9.

3 "Antisemitism: Overview of data available in the European Union 2004–2014," *European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights*, 2015, 68–69.

reforms and transformations? Which political parties have exhibited proclivities towards an authoritarian style of governance? Are corruption and clientelism problems for the whole political landscape, or is this pernicious phenomenon an attribute of only one side of the political spectrum? These are some of the questions that this chapter will try to answer.

For the purpose of this study, I have made use of several sources. First and foremost, the Central Statistical Office offers precise data regarding the economic outlook in Poland. In addition, secondary sources (such as newspaper articles and book chapters) contain valuable information, both for this topic and others. Thirdly, an important trove of interviews, debates, and lectures is available on the Internet; I have looked into these sources as well. Official reports and documents constitute a further source for the analysis in this chapter.

“Shock Therapy”

The 1980s were marked by an unprecedented economic slump, both in Poland and in the wider Soviet sphere of influence. Spiraling prices of goods, inflation, a slowdown in industrial development and increases in foreign debt convinced opposition activists, and some members of the political establishment, that an urgent and groundbreaking restructuring of the Polish economy was urgently needed.⁴

During the autumn of 1989 the deputy prime minister of Poland, Leszek Balcerowicz, and a group of experts crafted a comprehensive plan with an aim to transform Poland into a liberal, market-based economy and to usher in widespread reform of public enterprises. This entailed abandonment of the illusory and disingenuous communist commitment to foster economic equality, in favor of capitalist values of prosperity and individual economic freedom. In 1990⁵ and 1991, the country underwent a very tangible course of transformations which resulted in a rise in unemployment, a recession, triple digit inflation, and other challenges. Only in 1991 did the gross domestic product (GDP) begin to grow, as other macroeconomic indicators showed that Poland was on the road to recovery. Furthermore,

4 “Polska 1989–2014,” 6–7.

5 Ibid., 7–11, 56.

foreign investment propped up the economy and sent a clear message, both domestically and abroad, that the plan was working.⁶

The reforms of Leszek Balcerowicz were heavily criticized, for both their real and alleged shortcomings during the 1990s by politicians, academics and ordinary citizens.⁷ Currently, these macroeconomic transformations are still assessed for their downsides;⁸ however, the overall consensus is that these transformations were painful but necessary for the Polish economy. Presently, Poland boasts a much more competitive and developed economy than before the implementation of “shock therapy”. In addition, the country has managed to integrate with the EU and create fertile conditions for the utilization of available funds from this supranational organization. The best barometer of the economic development of Poland after 1989 involves comparison with the case of neighboring Ukraine. In 1990, Ukraine had higher a GDP than Poland, while in 2014 Poland had a GDP almost three times the size of the Ukrainian one.⁹

Constitutional reforms after 1989

In parallel with the economic transformations, the Polish political elite embarked on a slow process of constitutional reforms. The atavistic communist constitution which had been adopted in 1952 did not provide the necessary legal and political framework for the integration of the country with the West.

One of the stipulations of the agreements forged by the Polish opposition and the ruling communist elite during the Round Table Talks was

6 For a comprehensive information on the main macroeconomic indicators see Ibid., 14–19, 27–28, 61, 76.

7 *Balcerowicz: Gra o wszystko*, HBO2 (Warsaw), 2009.

8 For example: Rafał Woś, “Plan Balcerowicza I terapia szokowa w polskiej gospodarce: Czy naprawdę mamy być z czego dumni?”, *Gazeta Prawna* (Warsaw), January 2, 2015, accessed April 22, 2017, <http://biznes.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/844687,plan-balcerowicza-i-terapia-szokowa-w-polskiej-gospodarce-czy-naprawde-mamy-byc-z-czego-dumni.html>.

9 “The other battleground,” *The Economist* (London), May 23, 2015, accessed April 22, 2017, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21651819-west-should-do-much-more-help-ukraines-economy-other-battleground>; also “Poland vs. Ukraine,” IndexMundi.com, accessed August 1, 2015, <http://www.indexmundi.com/factbook/compare/poland.ukraine/economy>.

a revamp of the constitutional framework in the country. The painstaking process of constitutional reform began in April 1989, when a set of amendments was adopted by the legislature. In line with the provisions of these revisions, the Polish parliament was transformed into a bi-cameral institution and the office of President was introduced.¹⁰ Furthermore, free and democratic elections were introduced for the first time since 1938. The polls which took place in June 1989 ushered in an era of genuine political pluralism and showed unambiguously that the hitherto ruling communist party had not enjoyed the overwhelming support of the citizens, as members of the ruling party had claimed, but rather that it was the pro-democratic political parties and their programs that enchanted the majority of voters. In the elections for the upper house of parliament—the Senate—the Solidarity Citizens' Committee won 99 out of 100 seats.

Subsequent amendments to the constitutional framework of Poland were passed in December 1989. The transitional parliament adopted a set of laws, among the most important of which were those providing for the introduction of political pluralism, freedom of economic activity and protection of private property.¹¹ Nevertheless, the reforms of 1989 proved insufficiently bold to satisfy the thirst of Polish society and political parties for modernization of the state and emancipation of its citizens.

For these reasons, in August 1992 the so-called Small Constitution was adopted by the Polish parliament and signed into law by the President, Lech Wałęsa, in October that year. This constitution served as a provisional set of fundamental rules and regulations regarding the relationship between the executive and legislative branch. In addition, this provisional document defined the competences and responsibilities of local (municipal) governments and institutions.¹² Although criticism of the Small Constitution was widespread, it appears that this document paved the way for the adoption of the currently binding Polish constitution which was adopted in 1997. Moreover, the provisional constitution of

10 "Ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej," *Dziennik Ustaw 1989* (Nr 19–101), 317–21.

11 "Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej," *Dziennik Ustaw 1989* (Nr 75–445/446), 1147–48.

12 "Ustawa Konstytucyjna z dnia 17 października 1992 r. o wzajemnych stosunkach między władzą ustawodawczą i wykonawczą Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz o samorządzie terytorialnym," *Dziennik Ustaw 1992* (Nr 82–426), 1477–83.

1992 served the country rather smoothly during a very turbulent time of radical socio-economic transformations.

Following the adoption of the 1992 Constitution, the Polish political elite and civil society began debating and working on the creation of a new constitution. This process ended in early 1997 when the official text of this document was published and subjected to consideration by lawmakers, politicians, and the wider public. In April that year the Polish parliament, in a joint session of the upper and lower house, overwhelmingly approved the new Constitution.¹³ In May, a referendum was organized in which the majority of voters (52.7%) voted "yes,"¹⁴ and by this token the new constitution was given the green light by the citizens of the Republic.

The 1997 Constitution is an example of a political compromise reached after long, often difficult discussions and debates between the left-wing and right-wing political parties in the country. For example, although the preamble references the Christian legacy of Poland, it also guarantees the equal treatment of believers and non-believers. In the following articles, the state is defined as democratic and unitary, and provides for the supremacy of the rule of law. The text of the 1997 Constitution also emphasizes that the state is neutral in terms of its world-view. This document was amended twice: in 2006 and in 2009.

The process of constitutional reforms in Poland had proven very complicated, and was often marred by constant bickering between the left-wing parties that generally advocate more democracy, more checks and balances, a weaker executive branch and so forth, and the right side of the political spectrum which advocated a more pronounced and potent role for the executive branch. Although these fundamental disagreements persist even today, it appeared that up until 2015, the Polish political elite had been able to forge difficult but necessary compromises.¹⁵

13 "Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r.," *Dziennik Ustaw* 1997 (Nr 78–483), 2413–70.

14 "Obwieszczenie Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 8 lipca 1997 r. o skorygowanych wynikach głosowania i wyniku referendum konstytucyjnego przeprowadzonego w dniu 25 maja 1997 r.," *Dziennik Ustaw* 1997 (Nr 75–476), 2354.

15 For a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional reforms in Poland after 1989 see George Sanford, *Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics Since 1989* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

Table 2.1

Representation of Poland's Political Parties in the Lower House of Parliament, as a Result of the 2011 and 2015 Elections

	2011	2015
Law and Justice (PiS)	157	235
Civic Platform (PO)	207	138
Kukiz '15	—	42
Modern	—	28
Polish People's Party	28	16
Palikot Movement	40	0
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	27	0
German minority	1	1

Donald Tusk of the centrist Civic Platform (PO) had served as prime minister from 2007 to 2014, with his PO as the largest party in the Sejm as a result of both the 2007 and the 2011 parliamentary elections. But in October 2015, 37.58% of the Polish electorate voted for the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS), while the PO's share of the vote shrank to 24.09%. As a result, the PiS became the largest party in the lower house (see Table 2.1). Moreover, for the first time in postcommunist Polish history, one political party enjoys an absolute majority of the MPs and controls the presidency. It is possible that the ruling elite will be tempted to try and use this position of political strength to dismantle some of the basic democratic principles and pillars of political pluralism. For example, in January 2016 the government of Beata Szydło made serious attempts to exert deeper control over the public media in the country. This move caused uproar, both domestically and in the wider EU. In the Polish capital and other major cities, large rallies were organized by opponents of the government.¹⁶

¹⁶ "Polish media laws: Nationwide protests are staged," BBC, January 9, 2016, accessed January 30, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35272542>.

The integration of Poland with the European Union

The crumbling of the Soviet bloc and the keen enthusiasm of the citizens of former Warsaw Pact countries to radically change their way of life sent shockwaves throughout Europe. The first multi-party elections in Poland and the Round Table Talks in Hungary encouraged the European Communities (EC) to create a political and economic framework which would serve as a tool to prop up the Polish and Hungarian economies. In July 1989, the EC introduced the PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies) program. This was a project which initially covered just these two countries, but it was subsequently extended to other postcommunist states. In September of the same year, Poland signed the first agreement with the EC regarding trade and economic cooperation.

Comprehensive and sometimes difficult political negotiations between representatives of the EC and the Polish government commenced in 1990; in December 1991, a detailed and in-depth association agreement between the two sides was reached in Brussels.¹⁷ It is significant that the text of the "Europe Agreement" underlined that the signatories of the document shared "common values" and that this framework would allow "Poland to take part in the process of European integration."¹⁸ The agreement additionally recognized the "significant achievements of the Polish people in the process of fast transition to a new political and economic order based on the rule of law and human rights, including the legal and economic framework for market economy and a multiparty system with free and democratic elections."¹⁹ Lastly, the preamble of the agreement highlighted the fact that the EC wanted "to provide decisive support for the implementation of reform and to help Poland cope with the economic and social consequences of structural readjustment."²⁰

17 *Europe Agreement: establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of [sic] the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of [sic] the other part*, Brussels, 16 December 1991. Document accessed April 22, 2017, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1492864961890&uri=CELEX-21993A1231\(18\)](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1492864961890&uri=CELEX-21993A1231(18)).

18 *Ibid.*, 1.

19 *Ibid.*, 1–2.

20 *Ibid.*, 2.

In the following parts of the text, the more technical aspects of the agreement were elucidated. First and foremost, the aim to create an “appropriate framework for political dialogue,” “to promote the expansion of trade and harmonious economic relations,” “to provide a basis for the Community’s financial and technical assistance to Poland,” and “to provide an appropriate framework for Poland’s gradual integration into the Community” were listed.²¹ The subsequent parts of the “Europe Agreement” explained in detail the nature of cooperation in the agricultural, fisheries, and service sectors. Lastly, aspects of financial assistance were elaborated. The agreement came into force on February 1, 1994. Similar agreements were signed by the EC with other postcommunist states; among these, the most important agreements were those signed with Hungary and Slovenia.

These novel political and economic dynamics in the relations between the aspirant member countries and the EC forced the latter to forge a comprehensive set of rules that would provide a framework for assessing whether a particular state was suitable to join the EC/EU. In June 1993, at the European Council summit in the capital of Denmark, these standards were laid out in the document commonly referred to as the “Copenhagen criteria.” According to this document, any would-be member has to meet the following standards when applying for membership in the EU:²²

- Stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for the protection of minorities;
- A functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU;
- The ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.²³

21 Ibid., 2–3.

22 The European Union for was formally established in November 1993 when the Treaty of Maastricht came into force.

23 *European Commission: European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations-Conditions for Membership*, accessed September 9, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index_en.htm.

The adoption of the “Copenhagen Criteria” by the European Council sent a strong signal to the East Central European countries that integration with the EU was a feasible but challenging task, both for the EU and the candidate states. In Poland, both the political elite and the civil establishment worked hard on convergence with the EU, both economic and political, which would eventually yield positive results in all aspects of Polish statehood. Bilateral talks between representatives of the EU and Poland continued, ultimately resulting in the publication of the “White Paper”²⁴ in May 1995 by the European Commission. This document did not specifically target the Polish case but rather treated the broader region of East Central Europe. However, it is important to state that the “White Paper” text underlined that progress had been made in the fields of taxation, customs, implementation of non-discriminatory laws regarding treatment of foreign actors, harmonization of industrial standards, agriculture, and other sectors.²⁵

Table 2.2
Prime Ministers of Poland since 1989

Name	Political affiliation	Term in office
Tadeusz Mazowiecki	Solidarity	1989–1991
Jan K. Bielecki	Liberal Democratic Congress	1991
Jan Olszewski	Center Agreement	1991–1992
Waldemar Pawlak	Polish People’s Party	1992
Hanna Suchocka	Democratic Union	1992–1993
Waldemar Pawlak	Polish People’s Party	1993–1995
Józef Oleksy	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland	1995–1996
Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz	Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland	1996–1997

24 *White Paper: Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of the Union*, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, May 3, 1995, accessed August 15, 2015, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PL/TXT/?qid=1433420196688&uri=CELEX:51995DC0163>.

25 *Ibid.*, 27–28.

Name	Political affiliation	Term in office
Jerzy Buzek	Solidarity Electoral Action	1997–2001
Leszek Miller	Democratic Left Alliance	2001–2004
Marek Belka	Democratic Left Alliance	2004–2005
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz	Law and Justice	2005–2006
Jarosław Kaczyński	Law and Justice	2006–2007
Donald Tusk	Civic Platform	2007–2014
Ewa Kopacz	Civic Platform	2014–2015
Beata Szydło	Law and Justice	Incumbent

As the East Central European countries were making progress in the harmonization of their legal frameworks with the *acquis communautaire* of the EU, the European Council, during its December 1997 summit, decided to start negotiations with membership candidates, including Poland. The government of Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek in Warsaw created a special Negotiations Group which was staffed by members of different ministries. The negotiations with the EU continued unabated after the change in government which took place in 2001 (see Table 2.2). The left-wing government headed by Prime Minister Leszek Miller prioritized integration with the EU and in December 2002, all negotiation chapters were closed. In April 2003, the European Council and European Parliament gave the green light for the accession of ten new member states into the EU, including Poland. Poland formally joined the EU on May 1, 2004. Since March 2008, Polish citizens can travel without restrictions within the Schengen area.

Following the official accession of Poland to the EU, the country has been playing a constructive role in this pivotal international organization. Generally speaking, the left-wing governments of Leszek Miller (2001–2004) and the centrist one headed by Donald Tusk (2007–2014) proved to be excellent partners with Brussels. On the other hand, the right-wing government of 2005–2007 did create some avoidable problems in its relationship with the EU. Nevertheless, in 2009 the President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, signed the Lisbon Treaty and by extension Poland ratified this agreement. Poland has been a strong advocate of tightening relations between the EU

and the Eastern European countries, especially Ukraine and Georgia. As part of this effort, in 2009 the EU Eastern Partnership program was launched at the Prague summit of the European Summit. This is one of the tools used by the EU to spread democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the eastern part of Europe and to draw these countries closer to the West. Radosław Sikorski, who served as foreign minister from 2007 to 2014, was one of the pivotal architects of the Eastern Partnership.²⁶

The integration of Poland with the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)

As with the EU, Poland undertook a challenging task in integrating with NATO. The reasons behind the enthusiasm of the Polish citizens and political elite to apply for membership in the military alliance were manifold. First and foremost, most Poles saw the threat from Russia as real and menacing; only membership in NATO guaranteed that Polish sovereignty would not be infringed by Moscow and its allies. Secondly, NATO provided a unique feeling of robust stability and military strength which simultaneously reassured foreign financiers that Poland is a safe country in which to invest. Last but not least, the prospect of NATO membership rendered the chances for modernization of the decrepit Polish army very high. During Poland's membership of the Kremlin-controlled Warsaw Pact, the overwhelming majority of armaments and ammunition were provided by other communist states, most importantly the Soviet Union. Most of this hardware was obsolete and often dysfunctional. Furthermore, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact rendered the purchasing of parts and ammunition much more difficult than during the communist era. Only membership in NATO could guarantee a genuine and robust modernization of the Polish military forces.

Following the crumbling of the Soviet bloc, NATO faced a real incentive for enlargement which came from most East Central European states, including Poland. The Polish democratic governments expressed their willingness to join NATO on a number of occasions during the early 1990s. Although Poland maintained cordial, high-level relations with the

26 Joanna Kaminska, *Poland and EU Enlargement: Foreign Policy in Transformation* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 141–86.

defense organization, a clear legal framework for cooperation was missing.²⁷ For this reason, NATO created the Partnership for Peace program in January 1994 with the aim of building and strengthening the ties between aspiring countries and the military alliance.²⁸ Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, who held the office from 1993 to 1995, signed the Partnership for Peace agreement in February 1994. Although the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, expressed his government's displeasure with the prospect of former Warsaw Pact states joining NATO,²⁹ Russia itself joined the program later that year.³⁰

One of the most important aspects of the integration of Poland and the wider Central European region with NATO was the necessity to put military forces under civilian control. In addition, aspiring countries were required to modernize their military hardware in order to meet the high standards promoted by NATO. For these reasons, in 1995, NATO created the "Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process" program. The main goal of this political tool was to increase "interoperability with Allied forces" and to support the process of reform, both in the defense sector and beyond.³¹ As part of this new connection, Poland dispatched a contingent to Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the SFOR (Stabilization Force) peacekeeping mission.

In June 1998, the Polish Minister of National Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, stated that the Planning and Review Process introduced by NATO was an "extremely useful" instrument and that Poland's integration

27 "Rozmowa z Stanisławem Sebelkim o programie, kosztach i o tym co daje Polsce program 'Partnerstwo dla Pokoju'. Audycja z cyklu 'Sygnały dnia,'" *Polskie Radio* (Warsaw), February 2, 1994, podcast available online, accessed August 1, 2015, <http://www.polskieradio.pl/39/156/Artykul/1229557,Partnerstwo-dla-pokoju---poczatek-drogi-do-NATO>.

28 More information on this program can be found at: *North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Partnership for Peace Programme*, accessed September 4, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm.

29 СЮЖЕТ ЗАСЕДАНИЕ СОВЕТА НАТО. [Syuzhet zasedaniye soviet Nato] (1994), СЮЖЕТ 1, Net Film: Russian Archive of Documentary Films and Newsreels, accessed September 19, 2015, <http://www.net-film.ru/film-23160/>.

30 William E. Schmidt, "Russia Tells NATO it Is Ready to Join Peace Partnership," *The New York Times*, May 25, 1994, electronic version of the article available, accessed on August 1, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/25/world/russia-tells-nato-it-is-ready-to-join-peace-partnership.html>.

31 For an in-depth explanation of this tool, see: *North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process*, accessed August 28, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68277.htm.

with the alliance was going as planned.³² Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were the first postcommunist countries to join the NATO alliance, being formally admitted to membership in March 1999.

NATO membership was ratified by the left-wing President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, at a ceremony in the Polish capital. The president delivered a speech in which he spoke about the rationale behind the military alliance's enlargement. According to him:

We are returning to where we belong, because the Alliance is a common force in the name of common values. Our peoples were able to advocate for these values repeatedly, even during the dark post-Yalta system, Polish October, during the Budapest tragedy in 1956, during the Prague Spring in 1968, and during the insurrection of the Polish "Solidarity" in 1980.³³

Ever since Poland's accession to NATO membership, governments in Warsaw, both left-wing and right-wing, have maintained very close relations with the other member countries, particularly the United States. Poland has also been a keen participant in NATO operations, beginning with the manpower and military hardware it provided to the KFOR (Kosovo Force). Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, Poland has been a stalwart supporter of the "War on Terror". Polish troops were dispatched to Afghanistan and took part in the Enduring Freedom mission, and the left-wing government of Leszek Miller also supported the US-led coalition in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Privatization in Poland after 1989

The Round Table Talks in 1989 marked the beginning of in-depth economic transformation in Poland. The ruling communist elite understood that the centrally planned economy had failed completely, both in Poland

32 NATO, *Remarks by H.E. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Minister of National Defence of Poland*, accessed September 20, 2015, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980612h.htm>.

33 "15 lat Polski w NATO," *Polskie Radio* (Warsaw), March 12, 2014, accessed September 9, 2015, <http://www.polskieradio.pl/39/156/Artykul/1060540,15-lat-Polski-w-NATO>.

and in the wider communist bloc. The necessity for modernization of the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors was obvious and palpable. For these reasons, the governments of Poland embarked on a program of intensive privatization of state run monopolies.

One of the first crucial steps taken by the free-market oriented government in 1990 was the creation of a special Ministry of Ownership Transformations. This arm of the Polish government was directly involved in overseeing the privatization of public enterprises. During the period between 1990 and 1996, this governmental unit played a crucial role in the process of privatization and transformation. In July 1990, the Polish Sejm passed the bill on privatization of state enterprises. This regulation expounded in great detail the central position of the Ministry of Ownership Transformations and its minister, Janusz Lewandowski, in the privatization matrix. The bill also clarified the modalities of privatization and transformation in Poland.³⁴

The Polish government took a two-pronged approach to the transformations of state-run enterprises. The first method was to privatize the capital of those sizable public companies that were financially robust. These entities were subsequently transformed into businesses whose stocks were offered to a wide range of non-state actors. The second scheme involved liquidation of financially weak and non-profitable public enterprises. These companies' assets (such as infrastructure, machines, know-how, and so forth) were subsequently sold either to employees of these entities or to external actors.³⁵

The privatization and transformation of state-run enterprises in Poland came across many obstacles during the first couple of years, especially during 1991. First and foremost, the managing of these companies was "anachronistic" and marred by chaotic ownership relations. One of the side-effects of the so-called "shock therapy" was a transitory impoverishment of the population, with an associated lowering of demand for products and services, making the prospect of investing in Poland less attractive. The value of state-run companies was also negatively affected by the

34 "Ustawa z dnia 13 lipca 1990 r. o prywatyzacji przedsiębiorstw państwowych," *Dziennik Ustaw* 1990 (Nr 51/298), 695–700.

35 Małgorzata Wiśnicka-Hińczka, "Prywatyzacja przedsiębiorstw państwowych w Polsce," *Kancelaria Sejmu-Biuro studiów i ekspertyz: Wydział analiz ekonomicznych i społecznych*, Report Nr. 27, November 1992: 1–3.

recession. The liquidation of many entities slowed down the process of transformation, while the difficult economic conditions further worsened the situation of employees.³⁶

Between January 1990 and June 1992, 21.1% of the public enterprises were transformed or privatized. Most of these were liquidated or leased to private companies but remained managed and staffed by their original employees.³⁷ On the other hand, the biggest budget revenues came from privatizing the capital of profitable businesses.³⁸ In December 1992, the Minister of Ownership Transformations, Janusz Lewandowski, addressed the Polish Sejm, and claimed that at the end of 1992, the Polish economy was "half-private." Furthermore, the Minister noted that these transformations had created more than two million new jobs. Lewandowski stressed the fact that out of 1800 privatized companies, more than 800 were transformed by the "employee leasing" scheme, meaning they were leased to the employees for a certain number of years.³⁹ In 1996, the left-wing government created the Ministry of State Treasury and abolished the Ministry of Ownership Transformations. Since its formation, this ministry oversees the privatization of state-run enterprises independently from the Ministry of Finance.

Although the privatization process in Poland is generally accepted by experts and decision-makers as a success, this period in Polish contemporary history was marred by corruption, nepotism, and various other kinds of irregularities. For example, in 1999 the Sejm adopted a special bill according to which it could create ad-hoc Parliamentary Investigation Commissions.⁴⁰ Indeed, one such commission would be created in 2005, relating to an act of privatization six years earlier.⁴¹ In 1999, the right-wing government of Jerzy Buzek gave the green light for the sale of 20%

36 "Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 5 czerwca 1992 r. w sprawie podstawowych kierunków prywatyzacji w 1992 r.," *Monitor Polski* (Nr 30–206), 314.

37 Wiśnicka-Hińczka, "Prywatyzacja...", 5.

38 Ibid., 6.

39 1 Kadencja, 32 posiedzenie, 4 dzień (29.12.1992), 4 punkt porządku dziennego: Pierwsze czytanie podstawowych kierunków prywatyzacji w roku 1993 wraz z raportem o stanie prywatyzacji w Polsce (druki nr 628 I 629), Sejm, December 29, 1992, accessed August 13, 2015, <http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata1.nsf/main/52A7A614>.

40 "Ustawa z dnia 21 stycznia 1999 r. o sejmowej komisji śledczej," *Dziennik Ustaw* 2009 (Nr 151–1218), 1–10.

41 Agata Nowakowska and Dominika Wielowiejska, "Komisja śledcza ds. Prywatyzacji PZU już gotowa," *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Warsaw), January 22, 2005, accessed August 1, 2015, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,2506298.html>.

of shares in the General Institute of Insurance (Powszechny Zakład Ubezpieczeń, PZU) to a Dutch–Portuguese consortium, “Eureko.” Following its analysis of this deal, the Parliamentary Investigation Commission tried Buzek’s former Minister of State Treasury, Emil Wąsacz. According to the indictment, the Ministry artificially lowered the price of shares and value of the PZU. At the time of writing, no final decision has been taken in this case.⁴² Subsequently, an official report suggested that the former minister should be brought to the Polish State Tribunal, a body designed to investigate potential crimes from high-ranking state officials. However, the institution was not able to finalize this trial. The PZU scandal was one of the reasons why the right-wing parties lost spectacularly to the left-wing coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) and the Labor Union (Unia Pracy, UP) in the 2001 parliamentary elections.

Relations with Germany

Germany is arguably Poland’s most important neighbor, and one of the most powerful European nations. Due to historical reasons, the interactions between Poles and Germans have been difficult and complex. The horrors of World War Two and the Holocaust left deep scars on the relations between these two nations. The three great powers during the Yalta conference of 1945 agreed on territorial modifications and population transfers in Central Europe, including Poland and Germany. Although during the interwar period Poland had been inhabited by a sizeable and thriving German community, presently only 0.4% of Polish citizens declare themselves German. Nevertheless, the Polish constitution currently guarantees German children education in their own language, while the community also has guaranteed seats in the Polish Sejm.

During the turbulent November of 1989 which was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Poland. There he met with the Polish Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, with whom he attended a symbolic mass in the village of Krzyżowa, where

42 Witold Gadowski, “Prokuratura ściga Emila Wąsacza za prywatyzację PZU,” *Gazeta Wyborcza Biznes*, December 30, 2013, accessed April 22, 2017, http://wyborcza.biz/Gieldy/1,122116,15204179,Prokuratura_sciga_Emila_Wasacza_z Prywatyzacje_PZU.html.

local Germans had conspired against Hitler and his regime during World War Two.⁴³ Although in 1990, 68% of Polish citizens feared the prospect of German unification, the pro-democratic Polish government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki was the first foreign government to openly support the merger of the two German states, which eventually took place in October 1990. Contrary to the viewpoints of France and the United Kingdom, which opposed the fusion of East Germany with its prosperous Western counterpart, Poland saw this unification as an additional nail in the coffin of communism and Soviet imperialism. The Polish democratic parties deemed that the spread of democracy in Germany would serve as a catalyst for the wider Soviet sphere of influence. After long and frequent discussions, the German government accepted the permanent status of its eastern border with Poland on the Odra (Oder) and Nysa (Neisse) rivers. The final agreement between the two governments was signed in November 1990.⁴⁴

During the 1990s, Poland and Germany nurtured cordial diplomatic relations. Germany became one of the most salient proponents of Poland's integration with the EU and NATO. The stream of investments into Poland continued, with Germany playing a key role. According to some estimates, since the democratic changes in Poland, Germany invested a staggering €27.5 billion in its eastern neighbor. Moreover, Germany remains Poland's most important trade partner, accounting for 26% of its foreign trade; in 2014 the value of this exchange amounted to €83.7 billion.⁴⁵ Importantly, the trade relationship between the two countries is growing steadily. In 2014, Germany exported goods and services to Poland worth more than €47.7 billion, substantially greater than its exports to Russia, for instance, which amounted to €29.3 billion.⁴⁶

43 TVP (Warsaw), November 12, 1989.

44 TVN 24 (Warsaw), Horyzont, October 25, 2010; also Mateusz Wojtalik, "Zjednoczenie Niemiec a sprawa Polska," *Newsweek Polska*, October 3, 2012, accessed August 2, 2015, <http://swiat.newsweek.pl/zjednoczenie-niemiec-a-sprawa-polska,96722,1,1.html>; also "Polacy z obawą popierali zjednoczenie Niemiec," *DW Polish Service*, October 3, 2010, accessed August 10, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/pl/polacy-z-obaw%C4%85-popierali-zjednoczenie-niemiec/a-6070413>.

45 "Deutsch-polnische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen," *Deutsche Vertretungen Polen*, accessed August 8, 2015, <http://www.polen.diplo.de/Vertretung/polen/de/09-wirtschaft-verkehr/03-dt-poln-wirtschaftsbeziehungen/0-dt-poln-wirtschaftsbeziehungen.html>.

46 "Foreign trade: Ranking of Germany's trading partners in foreign trade," *Statistisches Bundesamt* (2014), 2.

In the political sphere, Germany and Poland have cooperated in many different contexts. As mentioned before, Germany's support for Poland's accession into the EU remained rock-solid throughout, and with virtually no strings attached. The relations became exceptionally good during the premierships of Leszek Miller in Warsaw (2001–2004) and Gerhard Schröder in Berlin (1998–2005). In one interview, the former Polish Prime Minister went as far as to say that the path of Poland to the EU "went through Germany—in every sense!" Miller added that Schröder also supported the campaign for compensation for the suffering of Polish slave laborers in the Third Reich. Nevertheless, Poland and Germany disagreed on some important issues. For example, Germany (rightfully) opposed the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq which began in 2003. On the other hand, Poland expressed concern over the building of the Nord Stream gas pipeline⁴⁷ (correctly) fearing the financial bolstering of Putin's regime and deepening the EU's dependence on supplies from an increasingly neo-imperialist Russia.

The recent migrant crisis has once more complicated relations between Berlin and Warsaw. Whereas the Polish governments have expressed skepticism about the feasibility of the German project of a centrally-planned distribution of refugees illegally entering the EU, Germany (with the circuitous backing of France) is trying to impose this plan on the rather reluctant Central European states and societies. Needless to say, this latest worrisome dynamic plays well in the populist, far-right milieu, both in Poland and in other EU countries. It seems that currently, an honest, open debate on an equal basis is urgently needed between the elites and societies of the two countries. The current developments will probably give an answer to the age-old question of whether EU citizens are going to live in a "German Europe" or interact with a "European Germany". The coming to power of the PiS in Poland and the internal political squabbles over the migrant crisis in Germany are certain to lead to further complications in the relations between Warsaw and Berlin.

47 "Leszek Miller: Schröder's role in Polish-German relations 'underestimated'", *DW*, May 1, 2013, accessed August 2, 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/leszek-miller-schr%C3%B6ders-role-in-polish-german-relations-underestimated/a-16782684>.

Relations with Russia

The political relations between Russia and Poland after the collapse of the Soviet bloc can perhaps be labelled as "cold peace." Although the economic cooperation between the two countries tangibly developed as a consequence of free-market reforms in both countries, the constant disagreements over politics have marred interactions between the two. Another layer in the sphere of conflicts between Warsaw and Moscow are disagreements regarding pivotal historical events, such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the root causes of World War Two, and the Katyń massacre of Polish officers. To put it simply, in historical and political contexts, Poland and Russia were, and still are, poles apart.

The first serious disagreements between Warsaw and Moscow took place in the context of the withdrawal of Russian forces, numbering 62,000–66,000, who were stationed in Poland under the Warsaw Pact military alliance. While the Polish authorities were promoting their prompt departure, Moscow was advocating a more gradual process. In May 1992, the Polish President and former Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa visited Moscow, and signed an agreement with his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin regarding the withdrawal of the Russian troops; the last soldiers ultimately left Poland in September 1993.⁴⁸ Wałęsa stated that on the day when the last Russian troops left his country, the Poles were witnesses of "historical justice."⁴⁹

The year 1993 was also marked by the signing of an agreement on the construction of the Yamal–Europe gas pipeline, which crosses from Russia to Germany via Polish territory. The centrist government of Hanna Suchocka saw this project as a way of thawing relations with Moscow, while also improving the dilapidated energy infrastructure in the country. The relations soured in 1994 when the Yeltsin government decided to invade Chechnya, which had been a de facto independent republic since 1991. Although relations in the economic sphere were improving, in the

48 "22 lata temu Polskę opuściły wojska radzieckie," *Polskie Radio*, September 16, 2015; also "Imperium się rozpadło, w Polsce nikt ich nie chciał. 20 lat bez rosyjskich wojsk," *TVN24*, September 17, 2013.

49 "Oficjalne pożegnanie wojsk rosyjskich - fragm. przemówienia Lecha Wałęsy," *Polskie Radio*, September 17, 1993.

political realm Poland and Russia held diametrically opposed opinions on many issues, most notably the enlargement of NATO to Central Europe and the prospect of Poland joining the EU. While the Polish governments saw these dynamics as an organic consequence of the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the fall of communism, officials in Moscow interpreted these events as a threat to their perceived national interests and security. The relations were additionally tainted by the unwillingness and procrastination of Moscow in declassifying documentation regarding the grisly events in Katyń. Even on more peripheral matters, such as the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later Kosovo, the Polish and Russian governments strongly disagreed with each other.

Following the departure of Boris Yeltsin from the Kremlin in December 1999, the relations between the two countries faced new challenges. The new President of the Russian Federation, ex-KGB agent Vladimir Putin, took a more confrontational approach to relations with the West. One of his first steps was to consolidate power in the country by waging a new war in the Caucasus. Secondly, his regime embarked on a slow but steady process of transforming Russia into an authoritarian state, where the activities of civil society organizations are stifled, and journalists face threats and intimidation. As one would expect, these internal dynamics tangibly worsened the relations with the EU and, by extension, Poland. The new war in the Caucasus created another wave of refugees, some of whom were given asylum by the Polish authorities.

In December 2001, the Polish Prime Minister visited Moscow. There he met representatives of the Russian government, including his counterpart Mikhail Kasyanov. Both sides agreed that much more needed to be done in the context of bilateral economic relations, particularly with regard to trade. In addition, the two leaders spoke about advancement in energy sector cooperation, especially in the natural gas industry.⁵⁰

Following the US-led intervention and occupation of Iraq, the relations between Russia and the US allies deteriorated, and Poland was no exception. In September 2004, the Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski visited Moscow, where he met with a number of officials, most importantly Russian President Putin. The visit was labelled as "cold"

50 "Rosja: Leszek Miller z wizytą w Moskwie," *Interia.pl* (Warsaw), December 19, 2001, accessed September 10, 2015, <http://fakty.interia.pl/swiat/news-rosja-leszek-miller-z-wizyta-w-moskwie,nld,788410>.

by the media. Russian officials had expressed grievances over reporting on the Beslan massacre of schoolchildren by Chechen terrorists. On the other hand, the Russian President was unwilling to discuss some topics with his Polish counterpart, such as the ongoing war in the Caucasus, the deteriorating democracy in Russia, and similar issues.⁵¹

As mentioned before, Poland protested the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea. This project further deepened the crisis in relations between Moscow and Warsaw. The coming to power of the PO in Poland reinvigorated previously moribund hopes for a rebuilding of relations between Moscow and Warsaw. However, in April 2010 a Polish airliner carrying the Polish President, politicians, and other dignitaries crashed in Smolensk. The subsequent investigation conducted by the Russian authorities exculpated the Russian side of any direct blame. However, the Polish authorities officially requested that the wreckage of the plane be brought back to Poland for additional analysis and investigations, a request which Moscow flatly and repeatedly denied. The Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the war in the Donbass contributed to the further decline in relations between the two countries. Considering that the conservative PiS party won the October parliamentary elections in Poland, it should be expected that the relations could potentially deteriorate even further in the near future.

Political Dynamics after the EU Accession in 2005

Following the victory of the social democrats in the 2001 elections, the new left-wing government focused on the accession of Poland to the EU and worked hard on implementing the necessary economic reforms. In 2004, together with nine other countries, Poland officially joined the EU. Notwithstanding the integration successes, progress and economic development, the government in Warsaw was marred by corruption scandals, nepotism, and incompetence. The unambiguous support of the Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller for the US-led invasion of Iraq further bolstered anti-government sentiments among the electorate.

51 "Chłodna wizyta Kwaśniewskiego w Moskwie," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, September 28, 2004, accessed August 1, 2015, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,2310384.html>.

It came as no surprise that, in 2005, the PiS swept to power, winning both the parliamentary and presidential elections. The governance of this party was marked by two contrasting characteristics. On the one hand, the PiS showed a strong willingness to fight corruption, but at the same time outright state capture became a real threat. However, the new governing coalition proved very unstable. The two minor parties, Self-Defense and the League of Polish Families, were not able to build solid cooperation with the PiS and in 2007, the Polish Parliament was dissolved. In October, parliamentary elections were held and the PO won a majority. As a consequence of the April 2010 airplane crash near Smolensk and the death of the Polish President Lech Kaczyński, new presidential elections were held. The PO-backed candidate, Bronisław Komorowski, edged out the candidate of the PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński, and was inaugurated as president of Poland in August that year. The centrist government headed by Donald Tusk continued with its economic reforms, which at first glance appeared successful; Poland was the only EU member state aside from Estonia which did not suffer a recession as a result of the financial crisis that swept Europe.⁵² However, it is important to emphasize the fact that, following the accession to the EU, the Polish economy was financially propped up with massive amounts of aid. Thus, the economic success of the country was not just the result of sound domestic policy, but also the effect of the generous EU programs.

After eight years in power, the PO lost both the presidential and parliamentary elections to the PiS, which won the vote by a landslide and is currently governing Poland independently. This novel political dynamic is menacing, as members of the PiS have exhibited proclivities towards authoritarian and populist policies repeatedly. Furthermore, the party has shown a negative attitude towards progressive ideas and methods, such as IVF. Although the party's leader Jarosław Kaczyński has spoken out against intolerance of sexual minorities, the PiS and its members have repeatedly demonstrated homophobia and prejudice towards various minorities.

52 Marcin Piatkowski, "Four ways Poland's state bank helped it avoid recession," *Brookings Institute*, June 12, 2015.

Conclusion

This analysis has provided a brief sketch of the most salient political and economic developments in Poland from 1989 to the present. As readers have seen, the last 25 years of Polish history have been full of important events and developments. Currently, Poland is one of the most inspiring cases for any developing country that needs groundbreaking economic and political reforms. The Polish example encapsulates all the necessary assets of a young and vibrant democracy: a stable political system where decision-makers are willing to take hard decisions and iron out difficult compromises, a robust and agile economy which easily adapts to the ever-changing reality of globalization, and lastly an energetic civil society and intellectual elite which serve as guardians of the political and economic liberties of the citizens.

Nevertheless, Poland still faces difficult times. For example, institutions of higher education and the health service in the country continue to lag behind their Western equivalents. The aging population, combined with a long-lasting brain drain, will undoubtedly provoke extensive reforms which will not be popular among the electorate. With the rise of populist parties in the EU countries, the stability of the market and political systems will be brought into question. Furthermore, the challenges and hazards related to climate change will force the Polish authorities to pump much more money into energy sector restructuring and reform, with an emphasis on renewable sources.

With regard to values, it remains to be seen whether the new government of the PiS will dedicate considerable time and resources to counter the liberalizing trend in Poland. The presence of a robust NGO sector and platform for dialogue in the media and universities should serve as a bulwark against any attempts to stifle this process in a top-down fashion. It is my belief that the Polish society will continue to evolve, becoming more exposed and open to new ideas and lifestyles. Due to Polish historical peculiarities, it is very important that this process takes place in an organic environment, without pressure from external political actors. Poland has its own tradition and culture. Thus, one should not expect that Polish society will perfectly emulate the socio-political dynamics in other European countries. If Poland is to become more prosperous and tolerant, it must do so in an authentic and Polish way.

(The political situation following the October 2015 elections, with special attention to the controversies concerning the media, the Constitutional Tribunal, and how the past is remembered, is described in detail in the post-script to this book.—eds.)

CHAPTER 3

The Party System and Voting Behavior in Poland

MICHAŁ SŁOWIKOWSKI and MICHAŁ PIERZGALSKI

Democratization requires a competitive and institutionalized party system. It requires that the party system is characterized by the following attributes: stable patterns of interparty competition; parties strongly rooted in society; the strong legitimacy of parties and elections; and well-structured and organized political parties.¹ As Samuel Huntington has stated, “institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability.”²

Andrzej Antoszewski, a Polish political scientist who has studied political transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, claims that the institutionalization of a party system is a necessary condition for democratic consolidation. Institutionalized competitive party systems require that: there are no party actors whose legitimacy is questioned by other actors; that there are no relevant political parties that want to change democratic procedures (or that such parties are marginal at best); that no relevant political party is permanently isolated; that alternation of power occurs regularly and corresponds with the will of voters; that voters’ support for

1 Scott Mainwaring, “Rethinking Party Systems Theory in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Importance of Party System Institutionalization,” University of Notre Dame, Kellogg Institute, Working Paper no. 260, October 1998, accessed May 4, 2015, <https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/260.pdf>.

2 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.

the main political parties does not change drastically; and that patterns of party competition in quantitative terms is stable over time.³

When it comes to the Polish party system, we can conclude that, especially in the first decade of socioeconomic transformation (that is, 1989–1999), the level of party system institutionalization did not correspond with progress in other areas of the process of democratization, such as the electoral process. In the following fifteen years of the party system evolution, we can notice significant progress in the process of institutionalization of the Polish party system in the quantitative dimension (see Table 3.1), but when it comes to the qualitative dimension, it seems that the system is still not yet established. Specifically, Polish political parties' behavior does not help to increase the level of approval for democracy in society. This is the reason why there is no clear association between the institutionalization of the party system and increasing trust in democracy.

Political parties should help other institutions to teach citizens what democracy means and how it should work. Unfortunately, Polish political parties fail to help people understand the rules of democratic engagement. A very low level of voter participation, a decreasing level of interest in politics, and a low rate of party membership support the hypothesis stated above. Moreover, the manner in which Polish political parties compete, along with an increasing antagonism between the main political leaders, raise distrust both in politicians and in Polish democracy.

In this chapter, we want to answer the following questions: What are the rival values being championed by rival parties? What are the institutional and sociopolitical determinants of the Polish party system consolidation? What is the level of Polish party system consolidation in both quantitative and qualitative dimensions? What qualitative variables determine the negative attitude of Poles towards democracy? And is the low level of trust in Polish political parties associated with a negative attitude of Poles towards democracy?

Furthermore, our aim is to analyze the concept of ritual democratic participation that characterizes Polish society. It allows us to better understand the association between the distrust in political parties and the surprisingly low level of political participation, neither of which corresponds

3 Andrzej Antoszewski, "Ewolucja polskiego systemu partyjnego", in *Demokratyzacja w III Rzeczypospolitej*, ed. Andrzej Antoszewski (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2002), 140–42.

with the relatively high level of life satisfaction. The political participation of Polish citizens is regarded as ritual because most Poles believe that their involvement in political life is of negligible consequence.

The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, we list political parties with seats in the Sejm, followed by a summary of the values and policies championed by the parties with the largest number of seats in the 2011 and 2015 lower house elections. In the next section, we present the institutional and sociopolitical determinants that affect Polish party system consolidation; in doing so, we want to highlight the role of the Polish constitutional provisions, and the importance of historical cleavages rooted in the communist past.

In the third section, we discuss quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the Polish party system, shedding some light on the reasons why political parties are not firmly anchored in Polish society. Moreover, we examine why, within collective social consciences, parties are even regarded as harmful to the common good. Finally, we will try to explain the phenomenon of the so-called ritual political participation of Poles.

The Values and Policy Preferences of the Chief Parliamentary Parties

In the general election to the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament), which took place on 9 October 2011, five political parties managed to cross the 5% threshold and were thus allowed to participate in the process of seat apportionment. These were the following parties: the Civic Platform (207 seats), Law and Justice (157), the Palikot Movement, which later changed its name to Your Movement (40), the Polish People's Party (28), and the Democratic Left Alliance (27).

In the wake of the parliamentary election of 2015, all of those parties, except the Democratic Left Alliance and Your Movement, still remain relevant,⁴ that is, they exhibit the so-called coalitional potential or the blackmail potential. The decline of the Democratic Left Alliance is related to the low popularity of cultural liberalism and parties espousing "progressive" views among Polish voters. The median Polish voter is rather con-

4 Giovanni Sartori, "Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis" (Cambridge University Press, 1976).

servative, and even those voters who support typical left-wing views—namely, the idea that the state needs to provide economic security, and should work to reduce income inequality—prefer Law and Justice, which is a right-wing (conservative) Catholic socialist party.

Below we present a short description of the most relevant Polish political parties today. In writing about the main political parties in Poland, we try to avoid the concepts of *Left* and *Right* (instead we apply a two-dimensional political spectrum, see Figure 3.7 and 3.8), because these may be misleading when applied to the Polish party system and voting behavior. Positioning themselves on the left-right scale, Polish voters predominantly focus on moral and cultural values rather than on differences in the role of the state in the economy.

The largest party in the parliamentary term 2011–2015 was the conservative-liberal Civic Platform (PO). The party was established in January 2001 by the so-called three tenors, the independent Andrzej Olechowski, Donald Tusk of the Freedom Union (Unia Wolności/UW), and Maciej Płażyński of Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność/AWS). Tusk was its chairman from 2003 until 2014. In 2014, when he was elected President of the European Council, Ewa Kopacz replaced him as chairwoman of the PO, whereby she also “inherited” the position of Prime Minister.

The party’s birth was a consequence of the reconfiguration of the party system after the 2000 presidential elections. The new party absorbed much of the liberal wing of the UW, as well as elements from the AWS.⁵ The party aimed to mobilize new activists who had not been previously engaged in politics. From the very beginning, the party supported the free-market, liberal economy, private enterprise, privatization, and accession to the EU. Much of its attraction lay in its novelty, albeit with the familiarity of some well-known leaders.⁶ The PO combines ordoliberal stances on the economy with moderate social conservatism.

The PO is not interested in promoting a more liberal agenda aimed at young, well-educated people, who live in big cities and typically hold pro-European and secular views. The party seems to be reluctant to support

5 Ben Stanley, “Poland”, in *The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe*, ed. Sten Berglund (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 179.

6 Frances Millard, “Poland: Parties without a Party System, 1991–2008,” *Politics & Policy* 37, no. 4 (August 2009): 790.

the liberalization of anti-abortion laws, the legalization of same-sex marriage, soft drug decriminalization, or the removal of crosses and other religious symbols from public places such as schools.

Opinion polls conducted before the national parliamentary elections scheduled for the fall of 2015 showed that the PO was gradually losing its former supporters. Furthermore, the PO's candidate for the 2015 presidential elections, the incumbent Bronisław Komorowski, was defeated by the Law and Justice candidate Andrzej Duda.

To the foreign observer, the decline in support for the PO may seem unusual, not least because the Polish economy, according to a number of important macroeconomic measures, had fared rather well in the period of PO government. Indeed, the Polish economy continued to grow year by year, even in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The inflation rate is very low and for the year 2015, the National Bank of Poland even predicted a minor deflation of around -0.4%.

The main problem for the PO was the stubbornly high rate of unemployment, which stood around 11% in 2015; youth unemployment figures are higher still. Furthermore, many Poles are dissatisfied with the poor condition of the public healthcare system, with low pensions, problems with the education system, the present level of the minimum wage, and relatively high real estate prices. People in Poland suffer from significant income inequalities that are decreasing too slowly for the common Pole.

The main political opponent of the PO is currently the conservative-socialist Law and Justice (PiS). As with the PO, the PiS, when it was born in 2001, was not an entirely "new" party. The rise of their political relevancy is associated with the concept of "the Fourth Polish Republic" elaborated in 1997 by Rafał Matyja—a conservative philosopher advocating moral revolution and political change.⁷ Both parties in the general election campaign of 2005 resorted to the rhetoric of the Fourth Polish Republic, trying to oust remnants of the postcommunist successor party, Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), from the political system. They took to blaming the SLD for

7 In 2014 Matyja returned to the concept of the Fourth Polish Republic with bitter conclusion that the time for political changes, including the streamlining of state institutions and the construction of a new state doctrine outside political cleavages, was lost; current conflicts, intellectual mindsets and social demands rendered it impossible. See Rafał Matyja, "Największe zaniedbanie elit" *Nowa Konfederacja*, August 21, 2014, accessed June 11, 2015, <http://nowa.konfederacja.salon24.pl/601711,rafal-matyja-najwieksze-zaniedbanie-elit>.

all the pathologies haunting the Polish state since 1989, while advocating comprehensive reconstruction of Polish politics and administrative mechanisms. The PO and PiS were even openly discussing the idea of establishing a PO-PiS coalition government that, at the time of writing (summer 2015), seems to be at least unlikely.

Law and Justice (PiS) was created in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins, Lech and Jarosław. The party was created from elements of Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), merging with the Christian Democratic Centre Agreement to form the new party's core. PiS refers explicitly to doctrines of Catholic social teaching. The party combines conservative, traditional sociocultural values with a support for economic interventionism and a social market economy, along with a mild Euroskepticism. The party appeals to those who have not benefited from economic transformation in Poland and are suspicious about the economic and sociocultural consequences of Poland's membership of the European Union.

The party has combined a strong emphasis on law and order with a radical attitude to decommunization, a conservative stance on social issues including restrictions on abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex marriage, a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards gay rights which depends on the party members' individual stances (though the dominant position is that providing gays with equal rights is unwelcome), and a propensity for economic interventionism (though at its foundation, the party was more pro-market).⁸ Because of its eclectic ideology, which draws inspiration from Christian-Democratic, national-Catholic, patriotic, conservative and socialist beliefs, the PiS received different political labels from students of Polish political parties, including conservative, Christian-Democratic, social-conservative, and national-conservative.⁹

Your Movement (TR) was founded on 6 October 2013 and seems to be a classic example of a patronage party as it emerged from a social movement—the Palikot Movement set up in support of Janusz Palikot, a rebel from the Civic Platform party. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, the party failed to win any seats.

Your Movement is a center-left party headed together by Janusz Palikot and Barbara Nowacka. The party offers a mix of social liberalism,

8 Stanley, "Poland," 179.

9 Andrzej Antoszewski, *System Polityczny RP* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2012), 251.

cultural libertarianism, and anticlericalism.¹⁰ TR is not a classic left-wing or social-democratic political party focusing primarily on socioeconomic issues. Instead, the party appeals to the so-called New Left ideology/movement and is interested in issues such as civil rights, LGBT rights, abortion access, and so forth. The party aimed to cater for a growing niche in Polish politics and hoped to obtain support from the growing number of Poles who are pro-European, socially tolerant, skeptical of the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in political life, and dissatisfied with the politics pursued by existing parties. The party positions itself on the left flank of the Polish political spectrum; what is difficult to reconcile with a typical conception of leftist thought is Palikot's critical approach to state control of business and the excessive involvement of bureaucrats in the functioning of the state. The party skillfully exploited the fears and interests of those who are angry at the PO for failing to curb the influence of the nationalist right-wing and the Catholic clergy on social and political life (for instance, in parliament, abortion laws and the school system), along with those afraid of being marginalized because of their sexuality.¹¹

Robert Biedroń, a former member of the party, was the first openly gay member of the Sejm. In 2014, he was elected mayor of the city of Słupsk. Furthermore, Anna Grodzka, elected to the Sejm in the 2011 parliamentary elections as a candidate for the Palikot Movement, was the first openly transgender Member of Parliament in Poland. Grodzka concisely summarized the program of the party: "We are a new left that appeals to atheists, gays, transsexuals, and those excluded by capitalism."¹²

TR is a proponent of a secular state which would stop financing catechism from public money, terminate the Concordat and replace it with ordinary law equalizing rights for all religious associations, and remove religious symbols from public spaces in Poland,¹³ while the party also proposes a state that is modern and friendly towards its citizens. TR supports the idea of establishing a more transparent model of fiscal control for private business and removing extensive rights for tax police, while

10 Ben Stanley, "Poland," 193.

11 Jan Cieski, "Palikot movement gives voice to Polish diversity," *Financial Times*, January 17, 2012, accessed June 11, 2015, <https://www.ft.com/content/681003bc-355a-11e1-84b9-00144feabdc0>.

12 Ibid.

13 "Świeckie państwo," *Twój Ruch*, accessed June 11, 2015, <http://twojrucho.eu/swieckie-panstwo-2/>.

opening avenues for illegal actions including extortions; votes for more democracy at local level, including social consultations and furthering the concept of the civil budget; proposals to simplify legal wording and quicken the process of courts' decision making; the digitization of public services; and the promotion of a level playing field for both Polish and international businesses.¹⁴

It is a "new party" in that it is not a successor to any preexisting political party. As such, its senior officials feature no previously significant political figures, who seek to highlight new issues omitted in the mainstream parties' agendas.¹⁵ Additionally, TR was born outside the dominant in Poland's *polis* (historical) sociopolitical cleavage.

The Polish People's Party (PSL) was formed in May 1990. It is the successor to the United Peasant Party (ZSL) of the communist period. The party belongs to the agrarian family of political parties, while also referring to the ideas of Christian democracy. In the European Parliament it is part of the European People's Party (EPP).

The PSL is in favor of the welfare state and supports economic interventionism. At the same time, the PSL is quite conservative on social and ethical issues as it represents farmers in rural constituencies and supports the idea of closer cooperation with the Catholic Church.¹⁶ As such, its positions on issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage/civil unions, soft drug decriminalization, euthanasia, and the death penalty is almost identical to that of the two post-Solidarity right wing parties, namely the PO and the PiS.

From 2007 until 2015, it participated in a coalition government with the PO. From the perspective of coalition formation politics in Poland after 1989, this seemed to bring an end to the period of the so-called "closed" pattern of government formation, where post-Solidarity parties entered coalitions only with other post-Solidarity parties.

The PSL is firmly associated with the name of its long-time leader Waldemar Pawlak, who was the president of the party for nearly fourteen years. Before the 2015 elections, the party was led by Janusz Piechociński,

14 "Nowoczesne Państwo," Twój Ruch, accessed June 11, 2015, <http://twojruch.eu/nowoczesne-panstwo/>.

15 Maciej Marmola, "Ciągłość czy zmiana?—o szansach nowych partii w Polsce," *Political Preferences* 8 (2014): 76–77.

16 Ryszard Herbut, "Parties and the Polish Party System," in *Poland and the European Union*, ed. Karl Cordell (London: Routledge, 2000), 92.

who served as Deputy Prime Minister of Poland from December 2012 to November 2015.

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) was one of the weakest political parties in the Sejm after the elections of 2011, and no longer has any representation in that house. The SLD is the organizational successor of the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) which ruled Poland until 1989. The leader of the party is excommunist Leszek Miller. The SLD was created on 15 April 1991, prior to the parliamentary elections that year, as an alliance comprising Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SDRP), the All-Poland Trade Unions' Federation (OPZZ), and several other minor left-wing groupings. The SDRP had been founded after the dissolution of the former ruling communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). The party abandoned former communist ideas and now espouses a social democratic program.

In the aftermath of the most recent parliamentary elections in Poland, in October 2015, the Polish party system significantly changed. The SLD, one of the most historically relevant political parties after 1989, failed to win any seats. Two new political parties entered the parliament—Kukiz'15, which gained 8.87% of the vote, and Nowoczesna, which gained 7.6%.

Kukiz'15 is a right-wing political party led by rock musician Paweł Kukiz. Kukiz's primary issue is the replacement of Poland's proportional representation electoral formula with the first past the post (FPTP) voting system. The party program is dominated by a patriotic, national-conservative agenda. Kukiz'15 calls for an amendment to the Constitution and the introduction of a presidential regime in Poland, based on the American model. The party also utilizes anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Nowoczesna (Modern) is a liberal political party founded in 2015 by the economist and bank manager Ryszard Petru, known for being an advisor to economist and politician Leszek Balcerowicz. The party supports a free-market economy and individualism, alongside democratic and liberal values. The party's motto is "without a strong economy there is no strong (civil) society, and without a strong society, there is no strong state."¹⁷ Nowoczesna predominantly concentrates its efforts on

17 Łukasz Rogojsza, "NowoczesnaPL – w pułapce biznesu i dużych miast," *Newsweek Polska*, June 1 2015, accessed July 6, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/nawoczesnapl-ryszarda-petru-czy-nowoczesnapl-ma-szanse-na-sukces-,artykuly,364259,1.html>.

the economy, instead of debates concerning sociocultural issues such as in vitro fertilization, same-sex marriages, or what the party considers “red herrings” such as the Smolensk air crash, or the postcommunist vs. post-Solidarity cleavage. The main elements of Petru’s party manifesto include the lowering of tax rates for people entering the labor market, making business set-up clearer and more transparent, a reduction in restrictions concerning labor legislation, and breaking the “glass ceiling”. Furthermore, the party aims to change some essential characteristics of the Polish political system, including the introduction of the German model of voting system and internet voting, restriction of deputies’ terms in office to only two sequential possible terms, a reduction in the total number of seats in parliament, and the elimination of the upper house of parliament, the Senate.¹⁸

Critics perceive Nowoczesna as “Civic Platform 2.0”, or as a lifeboat for Civic Platform members, but this metaphor seems to be unfair, considering that few of these migrating members stood for election from Nowoczesna’s list.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the party attempts to continue work on the “liberal front” started many years ago by the Civic Platform but later abandoned. Interestingly, the Civic Platform faces an outflow of voters to Nowoczesna. Those voters—almost three-quarters of them—who once voted for the Civic Platform changed their minds and supported Nowoczesna during the recent parliamentary election. The party has astonishingly few new voters—only around 10%.²⁰ Nowoczesna, as was initially predicted, has been most popular among young, educated, urban voters. The target group of the party, bankers and businessmen, is arguably its main weakness; currently, its constituents form a rather small group, are viewed with suspicion by many citizens, and are sometimes contemptuously referred to as “banksters.” In general, liberal policies are not popular in Poland; for instance, Leszek Balcerowicz is perceived by many Poles as the “devil incarnate”, because of his libertarian views on economy and the memory of the so-called shock therapy. Rather than pursuing economic liberalism, the most popular policies among Poles include

18 “Polska teraz. Nowoczesność, wolność, rozwój, zaangażowanie, odpowiedzialność. Nowoczesne - kierunki programu. Lipiec 2015,” Nowoczesne, accessed July 6, 2016, <http://nowoczesna.org/nasz-program/>.

19 Juliusz Skibicki and Wojciech Szacki, “Kim są ludzie Nowoczesnej. Debiutanci,” *Polityka*, December 7, 2015.

20 Ibid.

narrowing the gap between rich and poor, reaching towards the standard of living of the older EU countries, regaining sovereignty, and nurturing national sentiment. It is, perhaps, rather naïve to expect support for Nowoczesna from graduates working on so-called junk contracts.

Nevertheless, the trend of voters deserting the Civic Platform in favor of Nowoczesna is likely to continue, as the Civic Platform is suffering from an interregnum and continues its "civil war". For a long time the party struggled to decide on a new leader, as its members searched in vain for a sufficiently charismatic head to replace Donald Tusk. Moreover, the Civic Platform is "pinned down" by such PiS proposals as the 500+ Program, which gives parents of two or more children extra money every month. Finally, the Civic Platform failed its liberal voters by showing its conservative face; the Mayor of Warsaw Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, a prominent member of the Civic Platform, has refused to accept an Honorable Patronage over the so-called Parada Równości (LGBT Parade). The Mayor of Warsaw did not offer even symbolic support for LGBT rights.

Currently, one of the most significant political movements in Poland is the so-called Committee for the Defense of Democracy (Polish: Komitet Obrony Demokracji, KOD), a Polish civic organization founded in November 2015 during the Polish constitutional crisis, during which the Law and Justice party aimed at changing the law regulating the organization of the Polish constitutional court, the Constitutional Tribunal. In February 2016, it declared that it had no intention to transform itself into a political party. The organization is formally independent of all parties, but is closely tied to the liberal opposition led by Nowoczesna and the Civic Platform. Under the leadership of Mateusz Kijowski, it is opposed to the government led by the Law and Justice party. The main slogans of KOD, upon which all participating members agreed, are as follows: respect for European values; a return to the constitutional order breached by PiS; protest against the hijacking of the state; and zero tolerance for hate speech resulting in deep divisions within society.²¹

Some opinion polls have shown that, as a political movement, KOD is currently more trusted by Poles than any other political party, including

21 Renata Grochal and Sebastian Kluziński, "Koalicja demokratów bez Platformy Obywatelskiej i Partii Razem," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, May 6, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,20026531,koalicja-demokratow-bez-platformy-obywatelskiej-i-partii-razem.html>.

not only PiS but also all members of anti-PiS opposition parties.²² The movement portrays itself as continuing the work of prior democracy movements. The writer Krzysztof Łoziński proposed to found the Komitet Obrony Demokracji, referring to the tradition of the Komitet Obrony Robotników (KOR), which was formed after June 1976 in order to protect workers' rights in communist Poland. This watchword was then popularised by Mateusz Kijowski.²³ The Facebook page of the KOD was joined by 25,000 people within three days, as it became a spontaneous civil movement, functioning outside any political party format. Those Poles who joined its ranks and participated in its protests declare that they are afraid Poland is turning away from its democratic path. They claim to be worried by the disregard for law and democratic customs, alongside the rise of authoritarian practices, and repudiate the politics of hate and revenge.

Mass support for KOD's concept and significant popular participation in its actions demonstrate not only a fear of PiS's (mis-)interpretation of the Westminster system of parliamentary government but, as claimed by Jarosław Makowski, something even more important. In his opinion, Poles are tired of being indifferent to changes and standing by as passive observers of politics; they are fed up with being mere consumers of goods and wish instead to become citizens.²⁴ Makowski suggests we should bear in mind that KOD's demonstrations are not only about current politics, but also about true, spontaneous solidarity, long forgotten, almost buried by neo-liberal culture. Finally, those who congregate at the KOD's demonstrations show a readiness to cooperate with others. This cooperative approach is refreshing, keeping in mind the fact that, in Poland, the idea of cooperation was almost entirely substituted by rivalry during the period of postcommunist transformation.²⁵

22 Agnieszka Kublik, "KOD mocniejszy od partii," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, April 15 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, <http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19921230,kod-mocniejszy-od-partii.html>.

23 Krzysztof Łoziński, "Krzysztof Łoziński: Trzeba założyć KOD," *Studio Opinii*, November 18, 2015, accessed July 6, 2016, <http://studioopinii.pl/krzysztof-lozinski-trzeba-zalozyc-kod/>.

24 Jarosław Makowski, "Cztery uwagi po manifestacjach KOD," *Newsweek Polska*, January 10, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.pl/opinie/demonstracje-komitetu-obrony-demokracji-dlaczego-kod-manifestuje,artykuly,377060,1.html>.

25 Ibid.

Thus far, the leader of KOD has rejected any possibility of transforming the organization into a political party, mindful of the negative attitude of Poles towards political parties. In an open letter, its leader wrote that "KOD is never going to become a political party and participate in elections. We are a civil movement, devoted to screening the government's actions, protesting against the infringement of democratic laws and procedures and the constitutional order. We want to monitor the Polish political system—not to participate in politics. At the same time, we are open to and welcome cooperation, as a civil movement (not as a rival political party), with political parties that share our values, no matter their parliamentary status."²⁶

Fractures on the left of the Polish political spectrum resulted in the rise of a new left-wing party, called Razem (Together). The party was founded in May 2015, on the eve of the recent parliamentary elections and as a response to unification efforts by other left-wing parties. The leaders of Razem decided that there is no place in the party for such persons such as Leszek Miller or Janusz Palikot, who compromised leftist ideas through their involvement in communist-era politics. According to Razem's founders, the postcommunist left-wing parties must disappear, so that a new, modern, European left party can reclaim the leftist vote. The party failed to cross the 5% electoral threshold for single parties, but, as a party that emerged just before the election, its electoral result (3.62%) was better than expected. Importantly, crossing the 3% threshold grants the party a state subvention.²⁷ By way of comparison, the United Left, a coalition of major Polish left-wing parties (including the postcommunist Democratic Left Alliance) ended up with only 7.55% support²⁸ and, consequently, without any seats in the parliament, having fallen short of the 8% threshold required for coalitions to gain seats.

The program of Razem is built upon the idea of the welfare state. Its priority is to protect Polish workers, both blue-collar and white-collar. They see the Polish economic model as predatory and unjust for many cat-

26 "Oświadczenie KOD w sprawie partii politycznych," *KOD. Komitet Obrony Demokracji*, February 15, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, <http://www.ruchkod.pl/oswiadczenie-kod-sprawie-partii-politycznych/>.

27 "Kongres Partii Razem," *Przegląd Socjalistyczny* 1–2, nos. 52–53 (2016), 165–166.

28 "Wybory do Sejmu i Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2015," Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, accessed July 6, 2016, http://parlament2015.pkw.gov.pl/349_Wyniki_Sejm.

egories of employees; as such, the party has proposed some far-reaching modifications to it. These include raising the minimum wage to around fifteen złoty (approx. \$4) per hour gross pay; the introduction of a 35-hour workweek; a socially just taxation policy, incorporating a 75% tax rate for those with the highest income; and a “state-guaranteed civil pension”, ensuring pension equality for all senior citizens.

As far as the normative component of Razem’s program is concerned, *Polityka* columnists have pointed out that it is not entirely dominated only by a classic leftist doctrine. While they sympathize with LGBT rights, they consider that economic conditions are key to resolving normative issues. They perceive same-sex marriages or the abortion law through the prism of material conditions, and believe that the rights of women and sexual minorities would be better protected if certain economic conditions were achieved.²⁹

Razem could be positioned as a far-left political party, but it is not revolutionary, communist or anti-systemic. Its members like to see it as a Polish equivalent to Podemos, a people’s party open to all professions.³⁰ The party also features a unique organizational trait, namely the lack of one single leader. Razem’s Charter features no mention of a chairman or chairmanship, while its members have suggested that they do not want to follow the paths of other Polish parties, known for the authoritarian tendencies of their leaders. Instead, the party is led by a nine-person collegiate body, known as the Country Committee. The party was founded and is currently run by three young leftists, Marcelina Zawisza, Adrian Zandberg, and Maciej Konieczny.

Institutional and Sociopolitical Framework of the Polish Party System Consolidation

In Poland, the belief that democracy is synonymous with party democracy is widespread. As in many other countries, in Poland, modern democracy could not work in the absence of political parties. Political competition at the national level is almost completely dominated by competition

29 Anna Dąbrowska and Agata Szczerbiak, “Nowa partia lewicowa: nie potrzebują znanego lidera,” *Polityka*, June 23, 2015.

30 Ibid.

between the formally registered political parties.. It is almost impossible to win a seat standing as an independent, non-partisan candidate.

In the Polish case, we can notice that the sociopolitical dimension prevails over the institutional one as far as the development of the party system is concerned. The so-called postcommunist cleavage, emerging from a dispute between radically different approaches towards the communist past, is still of paramount significance.³¹ Today, there remain significantly divergent attitudes towards the communist legacy in Poland.³²

Mirosław Czech, a former Polish MP, explained the role of political parties in Poland very well: "The logic of the Polish constitution indicates that the existence of political parties is the necessary condition for democracy. Political parties play a crucial role in politics. Obviously, non-party political actors are also allowed to participate in political life, for example, [so-called] civil electoral committees. However, political parties play the essential role."³³

Starting in 1989, the principle of political pluralism replaced one-party dominance. In December 1989, the constitution of the Polish People's Republic was amended to incorporate the principle of political pluralism.³⁴ The Constitution of the Republic of Poland was adopted by the National Assembly on 2 April 1997. In Article 11, the Constitution highlighted the idea of political pluralism: "The Republic of Poland shall ensure freedom for the creation and functioning of political parties. Political parties shall be founded on the principle of voluntariness and upon the

31 Mirosława Grabowska, *Podział Postkomunistyczny. Społeczne podstawy polityki w Polsce po 1989 roku* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004), 256–257.

32 Of course, there were many different, alternative approaches to the problem of dominant sociopolitical cleavages in Poland after 1989 among students of Polish transformation. Noteworthy is the concept of six major dimensions which cut across Polish parties, elaborated by Wesołowski: 1. nationalism vs. universalism; 2. confessionalism vs. secularism; 3. authoritarianism vs. democracy (presidentialism vs parliamentarism); 4. laissez-faireism vs. interventionism; 5. elitism vs. populism; 6. communism-purging vs. communism-forgiving. See Włodzimierz Wesołowski, "The formation of political parties in postcommunist Poland," in *Stabilizing Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham and Paul Lewis (London: Routledge, 1996), 239–241.

33 Mirosław Czech, "Finansowanie partii politycznych," in *Biuletyn Biura Studiów i Ekspertyz Kancelarii Sejmu* (Warszawa 2000), accessed May 4, 2015, http://biurosejmu.sejm.gov.pl/teksty_pdf_00/kis-34.pdf, 12.

34 "Ustawa z dnia 29 grudnia 1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej," *Dziennik Ustaw 1989 Nr 75 poz. 444, zm. 1995 Nr 150 poz. 730*.

equality of Polish citizens, and their purpose shall be to influence the formulation of the policy of the State by democratic means.”³⁵ It is of great importance for the civil community that Article 11 guarantees political pluralism, freedom of creation and functioning of political parties, voluntary party membership, equality among parties, democratic influence on formulation of the state policy, and financial transparency of parties.³⁶ Building on the provisions of Article 11, Article 100 envisages a special role for political parties in the electoral process. Candidates for deputies and senators may be nominated by political parties or voters.

With regard to party system development in Poland, Article 13 of the Constitution is also important. It states that “political parties and other organizations whose programs are based upon totalitarian methods and the modes of activity of Nazism, fascism, and communism, as well as those whose programs or activities sanction racial or national hatred, the application of violence for the purpose of obtaining power or to influence the State policy, or provide for the secrecy of their own structure or membership, shall be prohibited.”³⁷ The Article opened a heated debate about the legality of such parties as the Polish Communist Union “Proletariat”. Interpreting Article 13, politician and political scientist Jerzy W. Wiatr wrote that the Constitution does not ban political parties trying to implement the ideas of communism, but only parties that support a totalitarian vision of the state.³⁸

The first law to provide a legal framework under which political parties could operate was enacted on 28 July 1990, while the law on political parties that is currently in force was passed by the Polish parliament on 27 June 1997. The first legislation was liberal. The act prescribes that a party should consist of at least fifteen members and gives political parties many privileges, allowing them, for example, to run their own businesses. The act stimulated the rapid development of political parties.

35 “The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997,” in *Dziennik Ustaw* no. 78, item 483, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Jerzy J. Wiatr, “Narodziny i przemiany systemu wielopartyjnego,” in *Demokracja Polska 1989–2003*, ed. Jerzy J. Wiatr, Jacek Raciborski, Jerzy Bartkowski, Barbara Frątczak-Rudnicka, and Jarosław Kiliński (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2003), 181.

At the end of October 1990, there were 154 officially registered political parties. As the first law on political parties was intended to facilitate the process of building new political parties, this proliferation can be considered a success.³⁹ The law on political parties of 1997, however, is more restrictive. For example, in order to apply for registration, a party must collect one thousand signatures from adult citizens. Moreover, political parties are prohibited from engaging in any economic activities.

Unlike the Constitution, the Act on Political Parties of 27 June 1997, in Article 1, not only defines the concept of a political party but also determines its function. Article 1 of the Act of 1997 states that "A political party is a voluntary organization acting under a specific name with a view to participating in public life by exerting influence, through democratic methods, on the shaping of the state's policy, or exercising public power."⁴⁰

The Act also explicitly imposes some limitations on political parties in Poland. For instance, Article 6 states that "Political parties may not perform tasks reserved by the provisions of law for public authorities or substitute for those authorities in performance of such tasks." In Chapter 2, Article 8 we can find the following regulation: "Political parties shall develop their structures and rules of operation in accordance with the principles of democracy, specifically by ensuring transparency of those structures, appointing the party's governing bodies by election, and by adopting resolutions by majority vote."

From the beginning of the Polish transformation until 2002, when the Rywin affair, also known as Rywingate, broke,⁴¹ the most important

39 "Ustawa z dnia 28 lipca 1990 r. o partiach politycznych," *Dziennik Ustaw* z 1990 r. Nr 54, poz. 312, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=W-DU19900540312>.

40 "Ustawa z dnia 27 czerwca 1997 r. o partiach politycznych," *Dziennik Ustaw* z 2011 Nr 155, poz. 924, accessed May 4, 2015, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/partiepol/partiepol.htm>.

41 The scandal was named after Lew Rywin, a successful film producer who participated in the production of such films as Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* and Roman Polański's *The Pianist*. Rywin tried, on behalf of a so-called group holding power associated with prominent SLD officials, to extract a bribe from the publishers of the premier daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* for favorable changes to the pending media bill. Adam Michnik, editor-in chief, taped the conversation with Rywin and his "indecent proposal". The Rywin affair was never clarified, but this affair and a series of other corruption allegations in which SLD officials were involved, ruined the party's image and popularity. See Millard, "Poland: Parties without a Party System," 788.

factor that influenced the mechanism of the multiparty system in Poland was that of the postcommunist cleavage discussed above. That cleavage formed the Polish perception of the left-right political spectrum. In general, political parties comprising members of the former communist elite were perceived as left-wing parties, whereas political parties which emerged from the heritage of "Solidarity" were regarded as right-wing parties. At that time, Polish political parties could be grouped into two broad families.

The first group, the family of postcommunist parties, was composed of parties which had close ties with the formerly ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR); for instance, the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland, transformed in 1999 into the Democratic Left Alliance, which was the main successor party to the PZPR. Some of the communist-era satellite parties, such as the United People's Party/United Peasants' Party (later the Polish People's Party/Polish Peasants' Party), played a pivotal role in coalition building processes. The party was involved in coalition governments both with postcommunist and post-Solidarity parties.

The second group, the family of parties with their roots in the Solidarity movement, brought together anticommunist organizations, connected with the first independent trade union of the same name in the Communist Bloc. Outside this generic historical cleavage between post-Solidarity and postcommunist parties were many anticommunist parties which were created outside the Solidarity movement, such as the Union for Real Politics, the Christian National Union or the Confederation of Independent Poland.⁴²

The postcommunist cleavage weakened its impact on Polish politics when the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), the successor party to the PZPR, lost much of its political relevance following a number of corruption scandals associated with SLD members. The postcommunist cleavage, as a dominant factor influencing the format and mechanism of the Polish party system at that time, was replaced by a new cleavage between "liberal Poland" (liberal referring predominantly to the economic dimension but also to cultural questions, such as attitudes towards abortion, and the place of the Catholic Church) and "solidary Poland" (solidary

42 Wojciech Sokół, "Zmiany w systemie partyjnym III Rzeczypospolitej," in *Demokracja w Polsce po 2007 roku*, ed. Danuta Plecka (Katowice: Towarzystwo Inicjatyw Naukowych, 2014), 69.

here meaning traditional, conservative and aiming toward a more equal society, with less liberal economics and strong state influence on the economy).⁴³

Commenting on this cleavage, Krzysztof Jasiewicz writes that one end of the populist–liberal continuum, described by him as Euroskeptic, is relatively well defined and represents a traditional system of values, defining Polish national identity in terms of ethnic nationalism, strong attachment to Catholic dogmas, and the argument that communism constituted a virtual negation of those values.⁴⁴ Voters on that side of the division have sometimes been pejoratively called “moherowe berety” (mohair berets), named after the woolen berets worn by elderly religious women who are thought to make up the traditionalist and fervent voter base of the PiS. The other end of the populist–liberal axis, perceived by Jasiewicz as pro-European and liberal, is characterized “more by rejection of this nationalistic-Catholic ‘imagined community’ than by any positive features.”⁴⁵ Members of the so-called pro-European and liberal side are sometimes termed “lemmings” by their political opponents, as they feel they blindly and thoughtlessly follow the political leaders representing this cleavage, interested mostly in supporting the existing political status quo and supply of consumer goods.

In the aftermath of the parliamentary election in 2005, the Civic Platform and Law and Justice dominated the parliament. Those parties continue to prevail in the Polish party system and have different visions of state and society. While the Civic Platform believes that Poland’s socio-economic transformation was a success, Law and Justice claims that the results of the transformation are unsatisfactory, alleging that the Polish economy has been destroyed, and that the ideas of the Solidarity movement have been betrayed.

The mutual relations between those two major political parties became more hostile after the presidential plane crash in Smolensk in 2010. Some advocates of Law and Justice suspect that the Polish president was assassinated. They believe that even if there was no bomb explosion

43 “Wraca podział na Polskę solidarną i liberalną? Idea neoliberalna uległa dewiacji,” *Polska*, *The Times*, November 14, 2010.

44 Krzysztof Jasiewicz, “‘The Past is Never Dead’: Identity, Class, and Voting Behavior in Contemporary Poland,” *East European Politics and Societies* 23, no. 4 (Fall 2009), 491.

45 *Ibid.*

in the plane before the crash, the Civic Platform is to be blamed for the badly organized presidential trip to Katyń that resulted in the crash.

Instead of applying the traditional one-dimensional left-right model, it is more appropriate to place Polish political parties in, at least, a two-dimensional ideological space (see Figures 3.7 and 3.8). The traditional model analyzing the alignment of political parties based on socioeconomic issues is not sufficient to explain the voting behavior and the party system in Poland. Those areas of political analysis are significantly affected by historical and cultural variables.⁴⁶

The success of the Polish democratic transformation is evident. However, the role of Polish political parties in the newly democratic landscape is ambiguous. On the one hand, political parties in Poland have embodied the competitive nature of democracy, but on the other hand they arouse mutual hatred between social groups and cause different people, with different political beliefs, to treat each other not so much as competitors, but as enemies. Moreover, Polish parties promote a confrontational model of interparty competition, regularly utilize populist rhetoric, refuse their opponents' legitimate right to rule, and accuse each other of treason for reasons of political expediency.

Thus far, political parties have been unable to exert any great influence in society. Poles find themselves confused when asked about their ideological-political preferences. This results in a very low level of political participation and party membership.

Institutionalization of the Polish Party System— The Quantitative Dimension

The Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*, PO) won the most votes in the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2011. However, because the party did not obtain an absolute majority of seats in the lower house, it had to build a coalition government with the Polish Peasants' Party/Polish People's Party (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, PSL). These two center-right political parties ruled in Poland from 2007 until 2015. Of the opposition parties

46 Jacek Raciborski, "Wybory i wyborcy", in *Demokracja Polska 1989–2003*, ed. Jerzy J. Wiatr, Jacek Raciborski, Jerzy Bartkowski, Barbara Frątczak-Rudnicka, and Jarosław Kilias (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2003), 230–232.


during this period, the largest was Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS), today the dominant party in the Sejm, while Your Movement (*Twój Ruch*, formerly known as the Palikot Movement, or *Ruch Palikota*, RP) and Democratic Left Alliance (*Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, SLD) made up the other opposition parties in the Sejm of 2011–2015.

After the elections of 2015, the largest party in the parliament is now Law and Justice (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in both houses of the Polish parliament. Today, there are four opposition parties with representation in the Sejm, namely PO, Kukiz'15, Nowoczesna, and the PSL. The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Your Movement (*Twój Ruch*) decided to run in the recent election as a coalition (United Left - ZL), together with some smaller left-wing parties, but failed to pass the threshold.


Figure 3.1a and 3.1b show the summary of the results of the 2011 and 2015 parliamentary election in Poland. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the ideological profiles of the main Polish political parties after the 2011 and 2015 elections.

Figure 3.1a

Parliamentary election 2011—results for the lower house (Sejm)



Source: Based on data from: <http://pkw.gov.pl/>



Source: Based on data from: <http://pkw.gov.pl/>

We have placed the parties in a two-dimensional coordinate frame, where the horizontal axis refers to social and cultural views, and the vertical one represents economic policies. The ellipses around the points, that indicate political parties, are intended to show the ideological flexibility, or vagueness, of a party.

To better explain the characteristics of the Polish party system, we can use simple quantitative measures, such as the Laakso-Taagepera index of the effective number of parties. Table 3.1 presents the values of several indices that summarize the evolution of the Polish party system after the transition to multiparty democracy in 1989.

The values in Table 3.1 are primarily determined by the qualitative factors that we described in the previous section. However, we cannot neglect the institutional variables which have also determined how the Polish party system has evolved. Since the 1991 election, Poland uses a proportional representation system. The last row in Table 3.1 informs the reader concerning what type of the system was applied in an election. Inspecting the table, we can conclude that the Polish party system

Table 3.1*Party system change—quantitative summary*

Id	Indicator	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011
1	fractionalization index	0.93	0.90	0.78	0.78	0.83	0.70	0.73
2	Laakso & Taagepera 1 (election level)	13.86	9.80	4.59	4.50	5.86	3.32	3.74
3	Laakso & Taagepera 2 (parliamentary level)	10.45	3.88	2.95	3.60	4.63	2.82	3.00
4	Gallagher index	4.14	15.74	9.75	4.42	5.61	4.39	5.67
5	wasted votes index	8.37	34.44	12.41	9.37	10.93	4.12	4.12
6	the sum of votes for two largest parties (%)	24.31%	35.81%	60.69%	53.72%	51.13%	73.62%	69.07%
7	the sum of seats for two largest parties (%)	26.52%	65.87%	79.35%	61.09%	61.96%	81.52%	79.13%
8	the votes-votes ratio for the two largest parties	1.03	1.32	1.25	3.24	1.12	1.29	1.31
9	the seats-seats ratio for the two largest parties	1.03	1.29	1.22	3.32	1.14	1.26	1.32
10	voting system	Hare	d'Hondt	d'Hondt	Sainte-Lague	d'Hondt	d'Hondt	d'Hondt

Source: Radosław Markowski, Mikołaj Cześnik, "Wybory parlamentarne w 2011 roku - kontynuacja i zmiana," *Studia Polityczne* 29 (2012): 285–309.

has changed, especially when it comes to the (decreasing) level of fractionalization, as well as the (decreasing) level of the effective number of parties at the electoral level. Obviously, simple numerical measures cannot fully explain and describe the process of institutionalization of the Polish party system. However, the quantitative characteristic presented above is a good introduction.

Institutionalization of the Polish Party System Qualitative Dimension

The character of Polish political parties constitutes one of the biggest concerns of Polish democracy. Parties in Poland were unable to increase satisfaction with democracy among Poles. Moreover, parties failed in their aim of increasing voter turnout. The weakness and a bad image of political parties among the citizens resulted in strong antiparty sentiments in Polish society.

Many important social surveys such as Social Diagnosis prove that the attitude towards political parties in Polish society remains poor. Furthermore, the bad attitude toward political parties increases the negative perception of democracy as a form of government. Currently, anti-system political parties are not threatening Polish democracy, because they are not strong enough to undermine a social approval for the rules of democracy. However, one exception is the political movement created by the Polish rock singer Paweł Kukiz who received around 21% of votes in the 2015 presidential election. Kukiz built his political support advocating significant revisions of the Polish electoral system to the Sejm. He is a strong supporter of the plurality voting system (first past the post).

There are currently no parliamentary political parties in Poland that do not have the ability to initiate or enter into the process of building a coalition government.


To better understand the characteristics of Polish political parties and how Polish people perceive parties, we need to make two key remarks. Firstly, the attitude towards democracy in Poland depends on the attitude towards political parties and on voters' political preferences; and secondly, while acceptance for democracy is stable but remains at a moderate level, the same is true about acceptance of non-democratic alternatives and indifference towards the political system.

Figure 3.3 presents the attitudes of Poles towards democracy. It is based on the data from one of the most reliable social surveys in Poland, namely Social Diagnosis (2013 edition).

The results indicate that only around 25% of Poles agree that democracy is the best form of government. The figure proves that the attitude toward democracy in Poland is ambiguous.

Figure 3.2


Party identification in Poland in 2013, for men and women



Source: Based on data from Social Diagnosis, edition 2013, <http://www.diagnoza.com/index-en.html>

Figure 3.3

Attitude of Poles toward democracy




Source: Based on data from Social Diagnosis, edition 2013, <http://www.diagnoza.com/index-en.html>

When it comes to the level of trust in political parties, in the second edition of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2004/2005), Poland was ranked in last position among the 25 countries examined. Currently, the level of trust in political parties exceeds 10%, being higher than the mean level for Central and East European (CEE) countries. In the 5th round of the ESS, out of 26 countries examined, only six countries had a lower level of trust in political parties than Poland.

Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that the level of distrust in political parties and in politicians is still very strong.

The low level of party identification among Poles has a negative impact on voters' propensity to participate in elections. To examine the relationship between the probability of participation in an election and party identification, we applied a simple logistic regression model (estimated in R) with data from one of the most important and reliable general social surveys in Poland, Social Diagnosis.

Figure 3.4
Trust in political parties in Poland




Source: Based on data from the European Social Survey, Rounds 4, 5, 6, <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/>

The logistic regression model presented below (Model 1) includes just two variables: a dependent binary variable that indicates whether a voter participated in the last parliamentary election, and a categorical predictor that indicates the most preferred political party. This model proves that voters who express a lack of party identification are significantly less likely to vote in an election.

According to the model, we can conclude that voters who prefer the Civic Platform are the most likely to vote (estimated coefficient equals $\text{Intercept} + 0.52 = 1.91$), whereas for those voters who identify with Ruch Palikota (Palikot Movement), the probability of voting is lowest among those with a professed party affiliation ($1.39 - 0.68$). Notice that *Intercept* in the model represents Law and Justice (1.39). Law and Justice (PiS) has been omitted in the summary, while each party coefficient denotes the difference between the coefficient of PiS and the corresponding party.

Figure 3.5
Trust in politicians



Source: Based on data from the European Social Survey, Rounds 4, 5, 6, <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/>

However, the least likely to vote are those who do not identify themselves with any political party (None).

Model 1

Party identification and the participation in elections (estimated in R)

Coefficients	Estimate
Intercept	1.39292***
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Janusz Piechociński)	0.08760
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Leszek Miller)	0.14205
Polska Jest Najważniejsza (Paweł Kowal)	-0.13396
Solidarna Polska (Zbigniew Ziobro)	0.11926
Ruch Palikota (Janusz Palikot)	-0.68207***
Platforma Obywatelska (Donald Tusk)	0.52222***
Other	-0.05363
None	-1.05480***
Not sure	-0.74468***
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1	

Source: Model estimated on data from Social Diagnosis 2013, <http://www.diagnoza.com/index-en.html> (accessed on 4 May 2015)

When it comes to Poles' attitudes toward political parties, their roles and organizational capacity, most believe that parties are doing more harm than good; in 2001, 82% of Poles supported that statement with only 16% against, and in 2011, the attitude of Poles towards parties was left almost unchanged (83% for and 14% against).⁴⁷

These findings make it unsurprising that the term "partisan" in vernacular Polish, as well as in the discourse of elites, is an adjective evoking negative emotions. When suggestions are made to "de-party" many spheres of public life, the insinuation is often that they need to be "cured".⁴⁸

47 The Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), <http://www.cbos.pl/EN/home/home.php>

48 Adam Gendźwiłł, "Why do Poles (still) Dislike Political Parties? Some Survey Insights into Anti-Party Attitudes in Poland, 1995–2011," *Polish Sociological Review* 4, no. 184 (2013): 467.

Table 3.2*Opinions about political parties in Poland—distribution of responses*⁴⁹

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
Parties try to solve problems of ordinary people					
1995	3.0	24.6	41.8	17.0	13.2
2001	4.1	29.3	43.7	16.4	6.4
2011	2.2	22.7	50.0	19.0	6.0
Parties are cliques of politicians striving for power					
1995	45.7	32.5	6.6	0.8	14.2
2001	45.9	35.4	8.9	0.2	9.4
2011	41.3	44.4	6.4	0.9	6.6
Parties offer solutions for important problems of the country					
1995	12.0	45.1	22.6	5.8	14.4
2001	16.1	48.0	21.1	4.2	10.4
2011	11.3	53.8	20.7	4.7	9.4
Parties unite those people for whom the most important are their own ambitions					
1995	34.1	39.5	8.9	1.2	16.0
2001	38.2	40.0	8.2	1.1	12.4
2011	30.8	45.8	12.8	1.0	9.2
Parties collect voters' postulates and demands					
1995	20.8	43.4	16.4	4.2	15.1
2001	21.2	42.0	19.7	4.1	12.8
2011	16.0	44.1	23.4	5.7	10.6

49 Gendźwiłł, "Why do Poles (still) Dislike Political Parties," 474. IS (1995) Survey: Połacy o swoim kraju, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Center for Public Opinion Research.

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know
In fact, nobody knows what parties want					
1995	37.5	34.9	13.1	2.3	11.9
2001	35.1	29.3	18.5	5.8	11.0
2011	30.4	38.7	20.4	4.1	6.3
If parties were to abandon their activity it would be...					
	...destructive for Poland	...neutral	...beneficial	Don't know	
1995	43.0	16.2	17.8	22.7	
2001	53.5	15.8	9.8	20.9	
2011	40.7	19.2	23.2	16.6	

Table 3.2 summarizes the main results of the three social surveys conducted by the Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw (IS) in 1995, 2001 and 2011. The surveys refer to opinions on political parties in Poland.⁵⁰

Inspecting Table 3.2, we can conclude that most Poles believe parties are unable to solve the problems of ordinary people. Moreover, we can notice that a tendency to blame political parties for chaos and disorder is widespread in Poland, as is the opinion that parties are cliques of politicians striving for power, and serve predominantly to unite the politically ambitious. An increasing number of Poles are currently ready to accept the model of a political system without parties: indeed, there are many Poles who think that the lack of political parties would be beneficial or at least neutral for Poland.

In sum, most of the answers indicate that the general attitude toward Polish parties is negative in society. However, most Poles claim that, if parties were to abandon their activity, it would be destructive for the

⁵⁰ Institute of Sociology (IS) Survey (2011): Polacy o swoim kraju. Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Center for Public Opinion Research. IS Survey (2011), Part of the CBOS survey: Aktualne Problemy i Wydarzenia No. 257. Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw, Center for Public Opinion Research, Center for Public Opinion Research.

Table 3.3

*Relation between the attitude towards parties
and the attitude towards democracy*

Image of Polish political parties	Do you agree with the following statement?			
	Democracy is preferable to any other type of government	In certain circumstances an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic rule	For the ordinary people type of government has no practical meaning	Don't know
Parties are doing more harm than good	35	17	39	9
Parties are doing more good than harm	59	24	14	3
Pearson's Chi-squared test data: tb3 X-squared = 22.1152, df = 3, p-value = 6.173e-05				

Source: "Opinie o działalności partii politycznych," in *Komunikat z Badań CBOS*, BS/140 (Warszawa 2010), http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2011/K_140_11.PDF (accessed on 4 May 2015).

country; they also believe that parties offer solutions for some of the country's important problems. Of course, this belief does not mean that people accept or support those solutions.

We can apply a Chi-square test of independence to verify whether two categorical variables that form the contingency tables (Table 3.3 and 3.4) above are somehow related.

Both Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show a relationship between an attitude toward democracy and an opinion about Polish political parties. However, the response format is different when it comes to the question about the attitude towards democracy.

For both Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, as the p-value is lower than the .05 significance level, we can reject the null hypothesis that the attitude

Table 3.4

Relation between the attitude towards parties and the attitude towards democracy

Image of Polish political parties	What is Your attitude to Polish democracy?		
	Positive	Negative	Don't know
Parties are doing more harm than good	36	58	6
Parties are doing more good than harm	71	25	4
Pearson's Chi-squared test data: tb4 X-squared = 24.9691, df = 2, p-value = 3.785e-06			

Source: "Opinie o działalności partii politycznych," in *Komunikat z Badań CBOS*, BS/140 (Warszawa 2010), http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2011/K_140_11.PDF (accessed on 4 May 2015).

towards democracy is independent of the image of Polish political parties. Inspecting Tables 3.3 and 3.4, we can notice that those respondents who express a positive attitude towards democracy are more likely to have a positive opinion on the political parties.

Examining the case of Poland, one needs to study the historical process in which a new party system was created. This historical context is a heritage not only of the hegemonic communist party (and the widespread negative connotations with "the party" and partisanship), but also of the activity of post-Solidarity political elites during the first period of democratic transition. Their strategic decision was not to favor political parties and party democracy, and in many cases they were against parties. After 1989, Solidarity decided not to institutionalize itself as a strong political party. Even after the 1989 multiparty elections, its leaders fantasized about "partyless democracy".⁵¹

⁵¹ Ibid., 470.

Among other decisions, in 1990, Solidarity's leaders promoted the creation of local democracy based on an ideological opposition of "party interests" and "local interests" with the prominent participation of non-partisan activists from Civic Committees. These actions hampered the creation of local branches of national political parties.⁵²

As for the organizational dimension of Polish parties, we can notice that most of the Polish political parties were not able to pass all three stages of institutionalization (identification, organization, and stabilization). The organizational stage was the biggest stumbling block that only a few parties could successfully overcome. Those parties that did so remain politically relevant today. They managed to build an attractive programmatic platform (or convince their voter base to believe so), collect enough financial resources, and most importantly, find their political niche.

Problems with the processes of organization and stabilization predominantly affected parties emerging from the Solidarity bloc. Their problems were connected with an overtly elitist characteristic: specifically, they were not seriously interested in extending roots in society or gaining a new constituency, and their leaders were constantly arguing over programmatic issues largely incomprehensible to their supporters. Their political opponents were forced to take a different stance, but because of their communist legacy, they also had to face the dangers of decommunization. Parties of communist origin exploited the mass-party model to protect themselves from post-Solidarity foes, using their inherited party know-how, along with inherited material resources. Their program was quite easy to comprehend, because it was built as an alternative to the socioeconomic "shock therapy" sponsored by parties originating from Solidarity.

Jacek Raciborski, who studied Polish government elites between 1997 and 2005, pointed out certain elements of antiparty rhetoric both in the AWS (Solidarity Electoral Action) government between 1997 and 2001 and in the postcommunist SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) between 2001 and 2005.⁵³

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

Polish political parties appear disinterested in educating and motivating Polish citizens to be politically active. The neglect of these functions has resulted in low levels of electoral turnout and low rates of party membership. The percentage of people declaring party membership was 0.3% in 1998; in 2006 this rate was at the level of 0.6% and in 2007, at 0.7%. In the 1990s, the largest parties were the Polish People's Party, with approximately 150,000 members, and the Democratic Left Alliance, with 90,000 members in 2000.⁵⁴ According to estimates made by Wojciech Sokół in 2011, the most numerous parties a decade later were the Polish People's Party with 129,000 members, Self-Defence with 90,000 members, and the Democratic Left Alliance with 57,500 members.⁵⁵

The very low level of voter turnout proves that parties are not extending their roots within the society. In the most recent parliamentary election, Poland had the third lowest turnout in Europe.⁵⁶ The voter turnout in the election in 2015 was 50.9%. Average turnout in Polish parliamentary elections in the period 1991–2015 amounts to only 47.96%. Considering European countries, when it comes to the last parliamentary election (in the period 2012–2016), only in Switzerland, Romania, Kosovo, and Lithuania is the level of participation lower.

As mentioned earlier, a well-known problem is that Poles find it difficult to define their political preferences. In Table 3.5 one can see how Polish people placed themselves on the left-right dimension, according to the results of the European Social Survey. Not surprisingly, one can see that most Poles express political beliefs that are close to the center (for instance, in ESS6, 570 respondents indicated a centrist position). Moreover, many people were unable to indicate where they believe they are on the left-right scale, which may mean that a large number of Poles perceive the left-right spectrum as ambiguous and imprecise. Indeed, as we have discussed, it is not especially effective to try to locate Polish political parties on a one-dimensional, left-right axis. A slightly better, but still not perfect, approach is to apply the two-dimensional model that is presented in Figures 3.7 and 3.8.

54 Sokół, "Zmiany w systemie partyjny III Rzeczypospolitej," 74.

55 Ibid.

56 "Voter turnout," IDEA, accessed March 17, 2017, <http://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-view/521>.

Table 3.5***Placement of the individuals on the left-right scale in Poland***

Left (0) - Right (10) placement	ESS Round		
	4	5	6
0	27	35	53
1	30	32	31
2	43	55	56
3	75	96	112
4	88	115	106
5	451	501	570
6	170	165	139
7	162	180	149
8	156	175	172
9	60	57	82
10	85	87	138
88	271	253	288
99	1	0	2
88—Do not know; 99—No answer			

Source: Based on data from the ESS, <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/>

As mentioned earlier, in Figures 3.7 and 3.8, we placed the most relevant political parties in Poland in the coordinate frame that represents their position in the two-dimensional ideological space. In Poland, there is a tendency to use highly aggressive (“dirty”) political techniques to discredit political opponents. When the relevance of the postcommunist political party in Poland decreased significantly, the role of the parties rooted in the Solidarity movement rose (PO and PiS). However, it did not reduce a confrontational model of political competition. On the contrary, the political competition in Poland became even harsher.

Figure 3.6
Main Polish political parties—deological profile in 2011





Figure 3.7
Main Polish political parties—ideological profile in 2011




Conclusion: The Ritual Participation of Poles

Poles are dissatisfied with democracy in Poland mainly because they nurture a negative attitude towards political parties. The widespread sentiment is that the Polish political system could work better without parties. Additionally, Poland experiences a very low voter turnout. A large number of Poles believe that their votes do not make any difference, and that their influence on the political decision-making process is negligible. However, this apparent disenfranchisement does not necessarily equate to a more general malaise: indeed, people in Poland express a quite high level of satisfaction with life.

Figure 3.8

Satisfaction with life in Poland



Source: Based on data from the European Social Survey, Rounds 4, 5, 6, <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/>

Considering the data from social surveys conducted in Poland, together with modern theories on personal adaptation to the sociocultural systems,

we can talk about ritual participation in the case of political behavior in Poland since 1989.

According to Radosław Solarz, who applied Robert K. Merton's theory of the personal adaptations to anomie⁵⁷ (also known as "strain theory") to the Polish democratic political system after 1989, we can talk about ritualism when it comes to the Poles' voting behavior. Poles seemingly accept their social position, and consistently adhere to the organizational rules they are required to follow. They are generally satisfied with their private life and material status and avoid taking risk. They are not inclined to change the existing model of political relations, despite the fact that they are dissatisfied with political parties.⁵⁸ In 2012, despite a quarter of a century of democratic transformation including seven parliamentary elections and five presidential elections, an absolute majority of Poles (68%) claim that they have almost no influence on state affairs.⁵⁹

The success story of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy tells us that at least some Poles are ready to take a stand and defend democracy; they value its merits and want to have their voices heard in state affairs, but they still distrust political parties and question their devotion to democracy promotion and civil rights protection. Most likely this is the answer to the question of why so many Poles are such eager supporters of non-party, civil, and spontaneous movements. Some even claim that Poland and its democracy needed PiS's earthquake electoral victory, and its zeal for reform, to reenergize civil activity.

57 Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *American Sociological Review* 3, no. 5 (October 1938): 676.

58 Radosław Solarz, "Rytualna partycypacja? Opinie Polaków o polityce i partiach politycznych," *Political Preferences* 6 (2013): 30.

59 Ibid.; S. Kwiatkowski, Opinie o najważniejszych obecnie, i w przyszłości, problemach Polski i Polaków, „Biuletyn Badania Opinii Społecznej” 1987, nr 1, s. 17; Afilacje polityczne sprzed roku 1989 a stosunek do przemian ustrojowych i poczucie wpływu na sprawy publiczne, CBOS, Komunikat z badań BS/118/2012.

CHAPTER 4

European Values in Poland: The Special Case of Ethnic and National Minorities

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and AGATA WŁODARSKA-FRYKOWSKA

The values and behaviors of any nation do not just appear overnight. On the contrary, they develop over time, usually—albeit with changes along the way—over centuries. To understand Polish values today, one must understand that they began to take shape a long time ago. Perhaps the most pivotal period for the formation of Polish values today was the era of the Partitions, when the Habsburg Empire, Hohenzollern Prussia, and Tsarist Russia carved up Poland between themselves, erasing the country from the European map from 1795 to 1918. It was in these years that Poles came to see themselves as destined not only to restore their state but also, in some narratives, to set a model for all of Europe. It was also in these years that certain attitudes toward other nations crystallized. The values and behaviors learned in the era of the Partitions were, of course, modified during the years of the Second Republic (1918–1939) and again during the years of the communist People's Republic of Poland (1945–1989), and are once again in the process of modification.

Even though contemporary Poland seems to be nearly ethnically homogeneous, the country has quite a complicated history of relations with various ethnic and national minorities. On the one hand, its history is one of tolerance, with many examples of Poland granting refuge to Jews (beginning in the fourteenth century), and providing fertile ground for the Reformation movement. On the other hand, it has had some darker moments, including tense relations with Lithuanians and Ukrainians during the Polish Second Republic, or the anti-Semitism that spread throughout

Poland toward the end of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the borders of Poland have been changed a number of times, and, after the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the sixteenth century, it covered a large part of Eastern Europe. This led to a complicated ethnic mosaic which remained intact until World War II. Genocide during the war, processes of ethnic cleansing, population displacement, border changes, and post-war migrations led to the present situation, where 94.83% of the population is of Polish origin. If we add people who declare dual ethnic identity, that number rises to 97.1%.¹ Being one of the most homogeneous countries in Europe, Poland had to acknowledge and grant special rights to minorities that were historically closely interconnected on the basis of conflict but also amity with Polish society. This chapter discusses the problem of ethnic and national minorities seen from both historical and present perspectives, their history, legal status, political participation, and educational and cultural activity.

Historical Background

Taking into consideration the correlation between border changes and the ethnic and national composition of East Central Europe, one may notice one visible tendency. Beginning in the Middle Ages, the German people spread to the east, in turn leading to the migration of Polish people eastwards. In both an ethnic and a geographical sense, Poland's western borders moved from the Oder River to the Warta River. Considering eastern borders, it must be acknowledged that the Polish state also included territories inhabited by non-Poles. In 1569, a long-standing political association with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was cemented in the form of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The inhabitants of the First Polish Republic, exercising equal rights, can be described as a political community similar to those that were later established in North America and in Great Britain.

1 *Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011, Raport z wyników* (Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2012), accessed May 1, 2015, http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/lud_raport_z_wynikow_NSP2011.pdf.

Unfortunately for Poland, it lost its independence in 1795, and as such, the whole process of modern nation formation occurred without Poland having its own national state. Furthermore, in the three countries which annexed Polish territories (the Habsburg Empire, Hohenzollern Prussia, and Tsarist Russia), Poles were in the minority, desperately trying to sustain their language and customs. During that process, they suffered severe repressions, especially in the territories ruled by the Russian and Prussian states. The loss of sovereignty definitely contributed to the significant decrease in Polish tolerance toward its neighbors, and also stimulated nationalism as a means to retrieve statehood.

The Interwar Period (1918–1939)

With the restoration of independence in 1918, Poland found itself in a very complicated ethnic situation. After a couple of years of border wars, the Polish state came to encompass most of its core territories, along with vast parts of an Eastern borderland with highly significant Ukrainian (around 14%) and Belarusian (around 5%) minorities. In the West, there were lands which had been variously under Austrian, Prussian, or Polish control over the centuries.² Certainly, the western borderlands had been contested and even after the re-establishment of Polish control in Silesia, there remained a noticeable German minority of around 2%. The Jewish minority, around 9%, inhabited cities and villages across the whole Polish territory. During the interwar period, there was only one complete population census, conducted in 1931; however, no questions about national identity were asked, which allowed for political manipulation (see Table 4.1).

2 For example, Wrocław originated as a Bohemian town but was annexed to Poland by Mieszko I in 990, returned to the Kingdom of Bohemia in 1335 together with Silesia, came under Habsburg control in 1536, was taken by Prussia in 1741, remained under German control after the unification of Germany in 1871, and finally came, once again, under Polish control in 1945, six centuries after the Poles had lost the city to Bohemia.

Table 4.1
Language groups in Poland (1931)

Groups	Groups in thousands	Groups in % of the whole population
Polish	21,993.4	68.9%
Ukrainian	4,441.6	13.9%
Jewish	2,732.6	8.6%
Belarusian	1,698.1	5.3%
German	741.0	2.3%
Russian	138.7	0.4%
Lithuanian	78.4	0.3%
Czech	31.3	0.1%
Others	60.7	0.2%
Total	31,915.8	100.0%

Source: *Drugi powszechny spis ludności z 09.12.1931*, Warszawa 1933–1938.

According to newer estimates, the census of 1931 was not entirely accurate. The number of Poles was somewhat overestimated, while the minorities (especially the Ukrainian, Jewish, and Belarusian nationalities) had their numbers underestimated. However, most researchers agree that the Poles constituted about two thirds of the total population.³ This dominant position should have lent the Poles a feeling of security, as there was nearly no chance that they could lose their majority status. As such, one may ask why relations with minorities were so tense during the whole interwar period.

First of all, we should take into consideration the geopolitical situation. Throughout the entire interwar period, Poland had rather tense relations with all four of its land neighbors. Soviet Russia and Germany were considered great enemies (and, by 1939, proved to be so), relations with Lithuania were marked by the Polish occupation of Vilnius, and relations

3 Piotr Eberhardt, *Między Rosją a Niemcami* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 1996), 103–105.

with Czechoslovakia were undermined by unsolved border disputes (even though the territorial demands were small). Another factor influencing interethnic relations in Poland was pan-European anti-Semitism, which had emerged in the nineteenth century.

There were also a series of internal factors. Poland was a classic example of a young democracy, with all its characteristic inconveniences. The low level of political culture (both among the people and the elites), a highly fragmented political scene, lack of governmental stability, and over politicizing of the society all worsened the situation. Furthermore, the increased potential of the mass media allowed political leaders to have more influence on a poorly educated population. Newly regained independence, alongside the constant fear of an open conflict with one of their neighbors, stoked nationalistic ideology in the programs of most of the political parties. The Poles' striving to retain their ethnic majority in the fragmented and nationalistic political environment turned out to have disastrous effects. In December 1922, the Polish parliament elected the country's first President. Surprisingly, the victory went to an unexpected candidate—Gabriel Narutowicz—supported by the socialists, the agrarian parties, and the representatives of the national minorities. A hysterical campaign led by right-wing politicians culminated in the assassination of the President in a Warsaw street at the hands of an ultra-conservative activist.

This political murder was the culmination of the feverish instrumentalization of nationalism. Relations between the Polish majority and the minority groups remained tense, but the ethnically-based political violence never reached such a level again. However, ethnic issues were still subordinated to political ones, which can be seen in the administrative organization of the country. In order to gain international support for its territorial claims, Poland granted special autonomous status to two of its regions: Silesia, which had a significant German minority, and the Eastern part of Poland, with its considerable percentage of Ukrainians. In the latter case, autonomy never actually entered into force, which fueled violence between Ukrainians and Poles. In the hottest moments of the conflict, the disappointed and desperate Ukrainians began a campaign of armed resistance, while Polish soldiers responded with pacifications of Ukrainian villages.

The Nazi invasion in September 1939 gave the inhabitants of Poland a good opportunity to test the results of their efforts to build solid inter-

ethnic relations. With German troops, and later Soviet forces, advancing on Polish territory, most ethnic minorities showed more or less open support for the Polish state. The only visible exceptions were the Nazi-oriented elements of the German minority, and a considerable number of Ukrainians who joined the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, fighting to build an independent Ukrainian state.

The experiences during the Second Republic had far more influence on Polish views about non-Poles than the Nazi occupation during World War II. The overall demographic potential of the minorities stoked fears among some Poles that they could lose their majority status in their own country (although they had never been close to that point). Another lesson was linked directly with the Ukrainians, and showed that unfair treatment of a large minority may lead to an organized resistance and casualties on both sides. Even though there has never been a significantly strong minority in Poland since the end of the Second Republic, collective memories of this era still fuel xenophobic behaviors toward any aliens. Finally, the events of the 1930s and 1940s created an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust while, to a certain extent, stirring a desire for revenge between the Poles and Ukrainians, one which still has significant influence on bilateral relations.

Communist Times

World War II and its aftermath led to wholesale changes in East Central Europe, with the Polish experience emblematic of those changes. The country's borders were moved to the West, again to the Oder River. The ethnic composition of the state was totally altered. The Nazis had physically eliminated most of the Jewish population during the war, while most of the survivors tried to migrate to Palestine in the lead-up to the declaration of the State of Israel. The German inhabitants of the Western Polish borderland either fled in the last months of the war or were deported to the West by the new communist authorities. Other ethnic conflicts drove most of the Ukrainians to the Soviet Union, while the Polish nationals who inhabited the Eastern borderland (which was lost to the Soviet Union) were forced to move to the Western borderland. These massive population movements transformed Poland from the multi ethnic state of the interwar era to the ethnically homogeneous state it is

today. Moreover, very few of these changes were effected by the Poles; instead, the vast majority were the result of negotiations between the victors in World War II. The responsibility for the war crimes lay with the Nazi authorities, while the post-war expulsions were designed in Moscow rather than in Warsaw.

Such changes should, in theory, cause an increase in tolerance among the population of Poland. Surprisingly, this did not happen, or at least the process was slower than one might expect. Finding reasons for this is far more difficult than it was in earlier eras. First of all, the communist authorities were using a lot of nationalistic slogans which gained some support in the postwar period. Anti-German rhetoric, for instance, was present in official discourse until 1989. The educational process must also have contributed to the relatively high levels of intolerance in the first postwar generations, as it introduced to young people a clear division among the nationalities of the world. Of course, later generations had less and less understanding of the reasons behind this anti-German sentiment, so the manifestation of these ideas decreased over time. In the 1970s and 1980s, many Poles emigrated to the West, including to the Federal Republic of Germany, only to discover that there was much sympathy for those living under communist regimes. In this context, the sudden turn to nationalistic rhetoric by the communist authorities during the crisis of the early 1980s had nearly no influence on the population.

Moreover, the complicated and highly demagogical approach to Germans (of the Federal Republic) instilled by the government meant that conflicts between Poles and other nations of the Eastern bloc were purposely calmed down. In some cases, this turned out to be successful (specifically, where Czechs and Belarusians were concerned) while in others the conflicts arose again to some extent after 1989 (especially with regard to Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Russians).

The most complicated postwar phenomenon is anti-Semitism. World War II brought enormous suffering to the Jewish community in Europe. There was no European nation that was more aware of this suffering than the Poles, as many Nazi concentration camps were situated on Polish territory. The wartime picture in Poland was complex, as there were many Poles hiding Jews or helping them in other ways, but also some Poles who participated in the persecution of Jews. Surprisingly soon after the war, anti-Semitism resurfaced as a problem. In 1946, there was an infamous pogrom in Kielce where as many as 37 Jews were killed by a local mob.

It proved that the roots of anti-Semitism were far deeper than many had expected. One of the most plausible explanations for this was the relatively high percentage of Jews among the new communist authorities (up to 30% according to recent estimates). That overrepresentation was especially visible in the state security services. People might have linked that fact with the severe repressions that were triggered against the members of anticommunist guerilla forces. Some also suggest that the authorities participated in the inspiration of anti-Jewish actions, as part of an internal struggle for power within the new regime. A proclivity to violence may also be explained by the influence of the atrocities of World War II. During those six long years, people witnessed violence on a daily basis, and they began to consider it a normal element of life. With time that attitude decreased, but it never fully disappeared, even though the number of Jews in Poland decreased drastically (in 1954 there were as few as 70,000 Jewish people living in Poland).⁴ The last anti-Jewish actions took place in 1968 and resulted in the last massive migration of that group, mostly to Israel. This time the reasons were clear, as the weakened communist authorities did not want a Soviet military intervention and inspired mass anti-Jewish propaganda. Even after 1989, strong anti-Semitism has persisted among nationalist groups in society, even though the actual number of Jews in Poland exceeds no more than 7,000.

Democratic Changes

A wide introduction of axiological discourse to Polish public debate took place in the 1980s due to rise of the mass trade union movement Solidarity, which campaigned for the effective protection of human rights and civil liberties, although its leaders did not directly refer to national or ethnic minorities, who constituted 4% of the population.⁵ Even though Solidarity was dissolved with the introduction of martial law on December 13, 1981, the government could not stop the liberalizing drive in the late 1980s. Western-style institutions were introduced within existing socialist

4 Ibid., 127.

5 Stanisław Frankowski, "The Procuracy and the Regular Courts as the Palladium of Individual Rights and Liberties—The Case of Poland," *Tulane Law Review* 61, no. 6 (June 1987): 1307, 1310.

structures such as the Commissioner for Citizens' Rights, the Constitutional Tribunal, the High Administrative Court, and the Tribunal of State. They all played a very important role after the negotiated dissolution of the communist regime in 1989, as they ensured a relatively painless change of system.

However, more than four decades of communism left Poland, and all post-Soviet countries, with a heavy legacy. As Norman Davies has noted: "Everywhere, the social attitudes engendered by communism persisted. Embryo civil societies could not rush to fill the void. Political apathy was high; petty quarrels ubiquitous; residual sympathy for communism as a buffer against unemployment and surprises was greater than many [had] supposed."⁶

In such social surroundings, the construction of a democratic, cultural, and legal framework based on such European values as equality, liberty, human rights protection, and subsidiarity seemed to be a demanding task. One of the challenges for Poland's newly born democracy was its attitude towards ethnic and national minorities, especially in the context of foreign relations with its neighbors. Already in November 1989, there was a symbolic sign of peace between Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, bridging the Cold War-era bilateral divide. It was also a clear indicator that Poland wished to rejoin the European family of values.

Institutional Affiliation with International Structures

There was wide consensus on the need to integrate with European institutions as an effective means not only of safeguarding security, but also of stabilizing the newly established democratic order. After the first fully free parliamentary elections, Poland became a full member of the Council of Europe on October 26, 1991. This organization, which promotes cooperation between all countries of Europe in the areas of democratic development, human rights, legal standards, rule of law and the cultural sphere, was to Polish authorities a symbolic synonym for Western values. Full participation was perceived as a prestigious starting point on the long road

6 Norman Davies, *Europe: a History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1125.

to integration with other European structures. Moreover, ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1993 introduced systematic human rights protection based on European standards.

In 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe established a Warsaw branch, under the name Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). This was a means to acknowledge the Polish role in the fight for democracy in the region. The ODIHR soon used its location to influence former Soviet republics, together with many Polish NGOs and foundations, such as the Batory Foundation.

Undoubtedly, the most important impetus for democratic changes was the prospect of integration with the European Union (EU). Already in December 1993, EU ministers declared that “Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities...”—the so-called Copenhagen criteria.⁷ This meant that economic reforms should be combined with deep social transformation towards incorporating European values in all spheres of life. Although both Polish society and politicians accepted the validity of such values as minority protection and rule of law, some fears remained.⁸ There were concerns—typical for all “new-comers”—connected with the loss of political and economic sovereignty, along with a potential impact on national identity. However, these concerns were never focused on national and ethnic minorities living in Poland, but rather on the inflow of foreign capital and different moral standards. After more than a decade of membership, these fears turned out to be groundless and there is no major political or social power undermining the achievements of Poland’s European integration. The Polish population seems to be one of the most EU-friendly and optimistic, due to the visible increase in living standards and the feeling of having a real impact on the European agenda.⁹

7 *Presidency Conclusions, Copenhagen European Council—21–22 June 1993: Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe; The Associated Countries*, accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf.

8 The only European or universal value which has no support within Polish society is prohibition of the death penalty. This penalty had a considerable support of more than 70% of population in the 1990s and more than 60% in 2011. See “Poczucie bezpieczeństwa, zagrożenie przestępczością i stosunek do kary śmierci,” Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, Warsaw (May 2011), BS/60/2011, accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2011/K_060_11.PDF.

9 *Europeans in 2014*, Special Eurobarometer 415, Wave EB81.2—TNS Opinion & So-

The Legal Framework for Values—Constitution of 1997

Significant amendments to the 1952 Constitution were already passed in 1989, in order to create conditions for political and economic reform. The most important of these amendments restored a two-chamber Parliament and the post of President, and removed the privileged position of communist ideology, which was replaced by the democratic rule of law and freedom of economic activities. What may seem surprising, given the significance of the civic values championed by Solidarity, is that none of these changes introduced a bill of rights. It took law-makers, drowning in daily politics, eight years to prepare a final catalogue of rights and obligations defining the Polish axiological orientation in the form of a constitutional act.

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland was adopted by the National Assembly on April 2, 1997, approved by the Polish people in a referendum on May 25, 1997, and came into force on October 17, 1997. This lengthy document, consisting of 243 articles, was one of the last constitutions to be adopted in East Central Europe after the downfall of communism and the beginning of the socio-political transformation toward democracy. This long delay had obvious advantages—it allowed Polish democracy time to mature and understand the needs of civil society.

Despite many political debates, there was a wide consensus that the new Polish constitutional order had to be based on human rights and freedoms. These principles were incorporated in the Preamble which states that the constitution is “based on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation between the public powers, [and] social dialogue as well as on the principle of subsidiarity in the strengthening [of] the powers of citizens and their communities.”¹⁰ Moreover, Article 2 of Chapter I of the Constitution introduces principles of social justice modeled on the German *Rechtsstaat* principle, which maintain that positive law should be consistent with fundamental rules of equity, fairness, and justice. This

cial, accessed February 3, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_415_en.pdf.

10 “The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997,” *Dziennik Ustaw* 78, item 483, accessed February 3, 2015, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>.

powerful principle protects individuals against potential excesses of government, while guaranteeing economic and social rights.

The general freedoms, rights, and obligations of persons and citizens are expressed in Chapter II, which is the longest part of the Constitution, and consists of 56 articles. In Article 30, there is a clear declaration that "the natural and inalienable dignity of the human being constitutes the source of the freedoms and rights of man and citizen. It is inviolable and its respect and protection is the obligation of public authorities."¹¹ According to Anna Michalska and Jan Sandorski, "a source of human rights conceived in such a way puts them above the state power, which should only recognize and protect, but has no creative competencies in the field."¹²

The right to life is proclaimed in Article 38, which states that Poland "shall ensure the legal protection of the life of every human being [and] guarantees to everyone the legal protection of life."¹³ This deliberately vague wording was a compromise allowing the Sejm to pass abortion laws in either restrictive or liberal directions. However, the law on abortion from 1993 pre-dated constitutional changes and due to political tensions¹⁴ remained unchanged for more than two decades. Generally, it prohibits "abortion on demand" or abortion "for important social reasons," allowing abortion only for limited medical reasons. According to Human Rights Watch, Poland's law regulating abortion is one of the most restrictive in Europe and even the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women recommended "the establishment of less restrictive conditions and clear standards for legal abortion and effective remedies to contest refusals of abortion."¹⁵

One of the general principles of the Polish Constitution is that equality is understood as entailing equal treatment of persons by public authorities. Clearly, there is no constitutional protection of the private

11 Ibid., art.30.

12 Anna Michalska and Jan Sandorski, "Remarks on the Place of International Human Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland," *Polish Yearbook of International Law* 19 (1991–1992), 118.

13 "The Constitution of the Republic of Poland," art. 38.

14 This is in spite of some attempts to change the legislation by both the left in 1996 (attempting to legalize abortion in difficult personal and financial circumstances) and the right in 2007 (protecting human life from the moment of conception).

15 *World Report 2015*, Human Rights Watch, USA 2015, 245.

sphere, as this sphere is regulated by other legal acts. Essentially, in the private sphere everyone enjoys the freedom to do as they wish, unless there is a positive law to the contrary. Moreover, prohibited areas and grounds of discrimination are not specified, and Article 33 (1) indicates only that men and women have equal rights.

Other general principles include the right to information, religious freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of association, and economic, social, and cultural rights. In the case of civil and political rights and freedoms, most of them are to be found in two international treaties ratified by Poland, namely the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights¹⁶ and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

In addition, the Constitution safeguards an increasingly-important “third-generation” right to a clean and healthy environment. Due to the vague conceptualization of the state’s responsibilities in this area, there remains the possibility of a watered-down interpretation of this right, with priority given to economic concerns over the environment.

Undoubtedly, the Polish constitution was designed in a spirit of universal and European values, but under the strong influence of national specificities. One can find fault with the lack of precise wording in some places, but on the other hand, it is important to acknowledge the durability of the constitutional order in Poland. The constitution was amended only twice—extraordinary for a young democracy—and these amendments occurred only in minor areas (for example, the European Arrest Warrant).

Citizenship, the Protection of Minorities, and the Status of Aliens

The Polish constitution provides clear rules on the acquisition and loss of citizenship. Article 34 says that the *jus sanguinis* principle is applied in Poland, meaning that citizenship is acquired by birth to parents who are Polish citizens—with the provision that other methods are specified by law. The Polish state has an obligation to protect Polish citizens abroad, and loss of citizenship can take place only in the event of renunciation. It is note-

16 Poland fully acceded on 7 November 1991.

worthy that representatives of the German minority in Poland objected to the preamble phrase “We, the Polish Nation—all citizens of the Republic.”

In the case of Polish citizens belonging to national or ethnic minorities (as specified in the Polish legal order), the state is obliged to ensure “the freedom to maintain and develop their own language, to maintain their customs and traditions and to develop their own culture.”¹⁷ Minorities can also establish educational and cultural institutions and institutions designed to protect their religious identity, as well as to participate in solving issues related to their cultural identity.¹⁸ However, there is “no explicit constitutional entitlement to state assistance for minority activities.”¹⁹ Aliens within Poland’s jurisdiction can enjoy the same rights and freedoms as Polish citizens unless otherwise specified by law. This means that they can enjoy most civil and political rights, aside from access to public services, the right to vote, and the right to obtain information on the activities of public authorities. Economic and social rights—health, housing, education, social security, and so forth—are fully applied only to Polish citizens; according to Ryszard Cholewiński, this is at odds with the universal values of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which guarantees these rights to everyone.²⁰

The Act on Ethnic and National Minorities and Regional Languages

Aside from the Constitution of 1997, which established the basic framework for the rights of minorities,²¹ the Act on Ethnic and National Minorities and Regional Languages of January 6, 2005 is a basic document dealing with the issue.²² This document defines the official understanding

17 “The Constitution of the Republic of Poland,” art. 35(1).

18 Ibid., art. 35 (2).

19 Ryszard Cholewiński, “The Protection of Human Rights in the New Polish Constitution,” *Fordham International Law Journal* 22, no. 2 (1998): 256.

20 Ibid.

21 More information on minority-related legislation in Marta Moskal, “Language minorities in Poland at the moment of accession to the EU,” *Noves SL: Revista de Sociolinguística*, (Spring/Summer 2004), accessed February 24, 2015, <http://www.gencat.cat/llengua/noves>.

22 Full text of the Act in Polish: “Ustawa z dnia 6 stycznia 2005 r. o mniejszościach narodowych i etnicznych oraz o języku regionalnym,” Internetowy System Aktów

of the term “minority,” making a clear division between ethnic and national minorities. Furthermore, it contains a list of minorities, indicating to which of those two categories they belong. There are six characteristics of both ethnic and national minorities, five of which are identical. In order to be officially recognized as a minority, a group must: be numerically smaller than the ethnic Polish population; differ substantially from other citizens by language, culture, or tradition; strive to preserve its language, culture, or tradition; be aware of its own historical and national bonds and aim to express and preserve them; and its ancestors must have inhabited the territory of today’s Poland for at least the past one hundred years. The sixth characteristic that distinguishes the ethnic and national minority is whether it identifies itself with a nation organized in its own state (a national minority) or not (an ethnic minority). However, where rights and freedoms are concerned, the Act treats both types of minorities equally.

The Act confirms the constitutional prohibition of any forms of ethnic discrimination or assimilation against the will of the members of the group. It also forbids the implementation of any means that may be aimed at altering the national or ethnic proportions within the areas inhabited by minorities. It goes even further to oblige the authorities to support the preservation and development of the minority cultures, including financial support where appropriate. It also grants minorities a set of linguistic rights. The members of all recognized minorities have the right to write their names and surnames in accordance with the rules of their respective minority languages. The only exception is made for those languages using alphabets other than Latin; names and surnames in those languages should be transliterated to Latin characters. Minorities have the right to teach and learn their respective native languages in public minority schools, and each group may use its native language as the language of instruction. A school with a small number of students can be closed due to financial reasons, but this is decided by the local authorities.

In communities where the proportion of a certain minority exceeds 20% of the local population, the minority language may be recognized as an auxiliary language in the local administration. In some cases, the Act allows two alternative versions of city and street names. This may be approved by the Local Council in two cases: either when the local minority

constitutes more than 20% of the total population of this community, or through a local consultation when such a motion has been agreed on by more than 50% of the participants of the consultations. The latter solution may be used for cities or other administrative entities smaller than the community. As a result of the Act, a Common Commission of Government and Ethnic and National Minorities has been created, with the representatives of various governmental bodies on one side, and the representatives of all the minorities and groups using regional languages on the other. It is designed to serve as a dialogue platform and as a body to initiate counter-measures against any signs of discrimination. In reality, the importance of this commission is limited, but this is because of the low numerical force of the minorities, who together constitute less than 4% of the total population of Poland.

Opinion polls show that the Polish people generally agree with the specifications in the Act.²³ The only point that caused some doubts is related to the use of minority languages. The majority of the respondents agree that there should be classes in minority languages in schools (81%) and that members of minorities should be able to learn in their respective minority languages (61%). But the opinion changes when it comes to the use of minority languages in official situations. The use of alternative names for cities and streets is a clear example, as 63% of respondents opposed the idea in a poll conducted in 2005.²⁴

Political Participation of National Minorities in Poland

According to the Act of January 6, 2005 on National and Ethnic Minorities and on Regional Languages, nine minority groups in Poland are officially recognized as national minorities. These are Belarusians, Czechs, Lithuanians, Germans, Armenians, Russians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, and Jews (see Table 4.2). The Act further lists four ethnic minorities: Karaim (or Karaites), Lemkos, Tatars, and Roma. Each of these groups meets all of the

23 "Tożsamość narodowa Polaków oraz postrzeganie mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce," Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, BS/84/2005 (Warsaw: May 2005), accessed February 24, 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_084_05.PDF.

24 Ibid.

requirements enumerated in the Act on Ethnic and National Minorities and Regional Languages. Although the number of national minority groups seems to be relatively high, today's Poland is considered a very homogeneous country where issues of national or ethnic background are not widely discussed topics.

Table 4.2
Ethnic and national minorities in Poland (2011)

Ethnic and national minorities	Population	Urban area (%)	Rural area (%)
Belarusians	43,878	54.29	45.71
Czechs	2,831	79.53	20.47
Karaim	314	90.67	9.33
Lithuanians	7,376	41.37	58.63
Lemkos	9,640	43.84	56.16
Germans	144,236	40.57	59.43
Armenians	1,683	84.71	15.29
Roma	16,723	91.72	8.28
Russians	8,796	81.64	18.36
Slovaks	2,739	42.36	57.64
Tatars	1,828	87.66	12.34
Ukrainians	38,795	58.80	41.20
Jews	7,353	88.34	11.66
Kashubians	108,140	17.40	82.60

Source: Ministry of Administration and Digitization, <https://mac.gov.pl/>

Poland is among a majority of postcommunist counties where voting rights for national minority groups are guaranteed. The German minority is the largest national minority group in Poland. According to the 2011 Polish Census of Population and Housing, 144,238 Polish citizens declared

German nationality.²⁵ It is also the most politically active and, at the central level, the most effective national group. Making use of special legislation, the German minority committee does not have to exceed the threshold of 5% to gain seats in the Polish Parliament. The minority has its own parliamentary representation; in the early 1990s it had one senator and seven Members of Parliament, but currently the group has only one Member of Parliament. Its representatives have played and still play an important role in local government at various levels in Opole Province. Following the local elections of May 1990, the German minority in the Opole region gained 26.4% of the votes and 388 seats at different levels of local government. In the local elections in November 2010 local Germans garnered 17.8%. The regional council has introduced six provincial representatives, among others, while having a substantial representation of mayors and other local leaders.²⁶

There is a visible difference between political activities of German minority and other national minorities living in Poland. The German minority candidates taking part in the elections start with their own groups, not in cooperation with other major political parties. Candidates from other minority groups do not form their own election committees; instead, they mostly derive from the coalition lists created with the major Polish political parties. The elections of 1991 constituted the exception to this rule, as the Ukrainian minority, in cooperation with Lithuanian, Slovak, and Czech minorities, formed a political bloc. However, their candidates failed to enter the Parliament, not least because candidates from the German and Belarusian minorities refused to join the bloc. In these elections, the German minority candidates gained seven places in the Polish Parliament and one seat in the Senate. The Belarusian minority supported candidates created by the Belarusian Election Committee but failed to win a seat in the Parliament. It is noteworthy that, in 1991, the national minority groups established the Council of National Minorities. Its main goal was cooperation between the organizations of Belarusians, Lithuanians, Germans, and Ukrainians and the acceleration of work on regulations relating to the status of national minorities in Poland, pro-

25 In 2002, German nationality was declared by 147,094 people.

26 Andrzej Sakson, "Problematyka mniejszości narodowych w kontekście realizacji polsko-niemieckiego traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy z 1991 r.," *Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego* 6 (2011).

protecting their rights at the constitutional level. This organization was not registered and ultimately ceased to exist.²⁷ The Belarusian Democratic Union was the only minority party, formally institutionalized at the beginning of the 1990s.²⁸

Wider political activity on the part of ethnic and national minorities in Poland can be observed only at the level of local government. Firstly, it is seen in the presence of many minority leaders in elections to municipal councils, districts, and provincial regional councils. Electoral committees of national minorities take on the character of political parties. In the local elections in 1990, approximately 550 representatives were selected from these communities throughout Poland.²⁹ In the years 1990, 1994, and 1998—according to the report prepared for the European Union—separate lists of election committees were reported only by the German, the Belarusian, and the Ukrainian minorities.³⁰ In the case of these minorities, their political activity was particularly noticeable in the areas they inhabited. In local elections held in November 2014, candidates of the German minority were important participants; they took part in the elections in 28 cities and municipalities, including Opole, the first city where a German minority candidate participated in local presidential elections since 1945. Moreover, candidates from the German minority were elected to the provincial governments at various levels in Silesia and Opole. In the same elections, the Belarusian minority candidates did not have any of their own electoral committees, but took part in the elections in cooperation with Polish political parties. Representatives of the Belarusian minority took office in many municipal councils. In

27 Sławomi Łodziński, "Aktywność społeczno-polityczna mniejszości narodowych," Kancelaria Sejmu, Biuro Studiów i Analiz, Report 29 (Warsaw, 1992), accessed February 24, 2015, http://biurosejmu.sejm.gov.pl/teksty_pdf_92/r-29.pdf.

28 The party began its activities in 1990. The leaders were members of the Belarusian Club, whose political engagement was visible since 1989. Later, the Belarusian Electoral Committee was established and participated in the elections to the Polish Parliament. The election result did not give Belarusians any seats in Parliament, but their independent participation was seen as a great success. Unfortunately, the programme of the party was not recognized by the Belarusian community in Poland. The party was included into the structure of Democratic Left Alliance, and their political role was mostly marginalized.

29 Ewa Ganowicz, "Niepartyjne formy ekspresji politycznej mniejszości narodowych," *Annales Universitatis Pedagogice Cracoviensis: Studia Politologica* (2013): 26–27.

30 Sakson, "Problematyka mniejszości narodowych."

the case of the Ukrainians, the third largest national minority group in Poland, political participation seems to be quite low. Hence, despite the relatively high numbers of Ukrainians inhabiting Podkarpackie and Małopolskie Voivodeship, Ukrainian candidates did not appoint their own election committee to stand for local and parliamentary elections held in 2007, 2010, 2011, or 2014. The largest population of Lithuanians is concentrated in Sejny region in Podlasie. In Puńsk city more than 75% of the population belongs to the Lithuanian minority. Like the Ukrainian minority, candidates representing the Lithuanian minority in local government did not have any electoral committees, but their electoral campaign was nevertheless a broad success. It is worth adding that the four ethnic minority groups—Karaim, Lemkos, Tatars, and Roma—are not active on the political stage.³¹

Generally speaking, the political activity of national minorities in Poland manifests through non-partisan forms of political expression at the central level, either through their own electoral committees (as in the case of the German minority), or starting from electoral lists of other political parties (the Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities). At the local level, national minorities mostly create their own civil election committees. In both situations, these forms of expression cannot be defined as political parties, although in the case of the German minority some characteristics of a party can be identified. Firstly, the Social and Cultural Society of Germans has its own structures, formulates election programs, and its candidates stand for local and parliamentary elections. However, the organization cannot be classified as a party, not least because its electoral programs do not have a distinct ideological base.

Educational, Linguistic, and Cultural Activity of Ethnic and National Minorities

Cultural heritage is a basic instrument designating people's identity. In particular it is something recognized as a significant element of each culture, confirming its ethnicity and nationality. Freedom of expression entails a group being able to preserve its own language, culture and tradi-

31 *Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011, Raport z wyników.*

tions; this is essential for all minority groups and is assured by the Polish state. Although the number of citizens without a native command of Polish is low, Poland is still considered to be one of a number of multilingual countries in East Central Europe. It must be underlined that national minority groups, such as Ukrainians and Belarusians, have a very strong language identity, in comparison with ethnic minority groups such as the Silesians, which demonstrate a weaker attitude towards language.

In Poland, 15 individual minority languages can be distinguished: Belarusian, German, Kashubian, Lithuanian, Romany, Slovak, Czech, Ukrainian, Lemkish, Russian, Yiddish, Karaim, Grabar (the language of Armenians), Tatar, and Silesian. In Poland, there are three categories to classify the languages of ethnic and national minorities and regional communities. Regional languages belong to the first category. These languages are spoken by particular indigenous ethnic groups, and are often closely culturally associated with the language of the majority. The Kashubian, Lemkish, and Silesian languages can be included in this category. Minority languages are included in the second category. Belarusian, Czech, Lithuanian, German, Slovak, Russian, and Ukrainian are examples of the languages from this group; all the languages in this category are officially spoken on the territories of other states. The third category groups diasporic languages: Yiddish, Romany, Karaim, and Grabar. Diasporic languages are spoken by representatives of ethnic and national minority groups without their own state territories.³²

The level of development differentiating regional, ethnic and minority languages in Poland is strongly determined by linguistic and extra-linguistic factors. It is also connected with each minority group's level of organization. The Yiddish and Czech languages, for example, have largely disappeared in Poland. Conversely, Germans, Lithuanians, Slovaks, and Ukrainians are examples of minority groups that are substantially supported by their respective mother-states, with the minority languages maintained and developed in each case. The situation of the Belarusian minority seems to be quite different, as the Belarusian nation-state is thought to be disinterested in continuing Belarusian language development. Another important factor determining minority language develop-

32 Further reading: *European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages*, Council of Europe, ETS no. 148, Strasbourg, September 5, 1992.

ment is the support of Churches which have promoted language cultivation.³³

Education and cultural institutions are classified as a key area of activity for ethnic and national minorities. Schoolchildren belonging to language minority groups can obtain education in public minority schools, bilingual schools, and schools with supplementary native language education which are financed by the state. Taking into consideration the number of students from linguistic minorities, supplementary education schools are the most popular option for ethnic and national minority students. In recent years, the German language was taught in 589 schools to 38,783 students belonging to the German minority.³⁴ Bilingual teaching gives wider opportunities to cultivate national identity. Three additional hours of German-language instruction, according to German minority representatives, enable students to better propagate the tradition and culture of Germany. The further development of German-language teaching in schools and kindergartens is seen as a continuation of the bilingualism already present in the private sphere, and the next step to multilingualism. The German minority is an active participant in minority associations and unions.³⁵ The Belarusian, Kashubian, Lithuanian, Lemko, German, Slovak and Ukrainian languages are taught at state schools as extracurricular subjects.

National minority education encounters a number of problems, most notably funding shortages, an insufficient number of curricula, and low availability of school textbooks and teaching staff. Additionally, demographic trends have had a strong influence on education. Minority organizations are still active in lobbying to improve educational conditions. Hence, the Act of 2005 grants the Kashubian language the rank of regional language, the only minority language with this status. Among other benefits, it allows young Kashubians the opportunity to pass their matriculation exam in their native language.

33 Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Lemkish/Ruthenian languages were strongly supported by the Church.

34 Ministry of Administration and Digitization, accessed January 29, 2015, <http://mniejszosci.narodowe.mac.gov.pl/>.

35 Henryk Chałupczak and Tomasz Browarek, *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce 1918–1995*, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Cuire-Skłodowskiej, 1998), 128–147.

The Roma minority is recognized as the other special case among minorities in Poland. The level of education among the Roma people is below the national average—which results in fewer professional opportunities for Roma and higher criminality. Poor interethnic relations, a low level of education, and a relatively high number of Roma people in Poland lead to a situation where Roma people are the only ethnic minority which can benefit from special governmental programs aimed at their inclusion, through measures such as university scholarships.³⁶

Ethnic and national minority groups living in Poland are active participants in cultural events, often having organizations which support their traditions and customs. These organizations regularly promote events such as music festivals, cultural venues such as theaters, alongside publishing minority magazines and newspapers. Some ethnic and national minorities prefer to cultivate their own culture, promoting it among other cultural groups. Germans, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians can be included in this group, in contrast with Tatars, who prefer to cultivate their traditions among themselves rather than display them publicly.

Immigrants—A New Political Challenge

Despite satisfactory solutions regarding the status of historic ethnic and national minorities in Poland, a totally new discussion has been opened in recent years, centering on the influx of refugees and migrants from further afield. The Law and Justice government, with its prime minister, Beata Szydło, is opposed to allowing refugees and other migrants from Islamic countries in the Middle East and Africa to settle in Poland. She, and other members of her government, play on popular fears by claiming that some of the refugees could be criminals, terrorists, or even homosexuals. Szydło and her cabinet ministers are avowedly against any number of immigrants arriving in Poland, framing them as a security risk. To take any further steps, an adequate verification system would have to be introduced that would be a starting point for a wider discussion regarding the relocation of people among the European Union states. The previous Polish government declared its participation in actions taken by Brussels and promised

36 *Education of the national and ethnic minorities in Poland*, Analytical Report PHARE RAXEN CC Minority Education, Vienna, 2004.

to accept several thousand people arriving in Poland on a voluntary basis, but Beata Szydło claims that putting an end to terrorism in Europe is more important than discussion about immigrants, who she believes should not be welcomed to Poland. The refugee and immigration problems, she suggests, need to be solved outside the European Union, with Turkey given adequate money to build camps where immigrants can reside before returning to their home countries.

The attitude towards Muslims in Poland is an important factor influencing immigration issues. Public opinion polls show that the attitude of Poles to Muslims is definitely negative, with approximately 44% of Poles reporting negative feelings about them, and only 23% expressing positivity.³⁷ While some of this negativity is caused by cultural and religious differences, it mostly arises from the perceived conflict between West and East. Such cold feelings toward Muslims directly influence attitudes toward refugees and immigrants, mostly Muslims coming from Syria, Iraq, and North Africa. There has recently been a significant change in the attitude of Poles towards immigrants; specifically, in May 2015 more than 70% of citizens declared that they accepted immigrants and understood their situation, while in February 2016 less than 40% still believed that Poland should help immigrants, and 57% claim that immigrants should not be given permission to settle in Poland.³⁸ The escalating migration crisis is testing the European Union, and the present Polish government appears entirely uninterested in taking any further actions to deal with this crisis.

Conclusion

Summing up, it is worth acknowledging that the status of national and ethnic minorities in Poland has evolved dramatically during the past hundred years. The interwar period was marked by a relatively visible minority presence, as their number rose to one third of the general population. The young democracy ostensibly respected the rights of non-Poles, but also could not resist acts of xenophobia mainly targeting the Jewish

37 *Postawy wobec islamu i muzułmanów*, Komunikat z badań CBOS, no. 37, Warsaw March 2015.

38 *Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców*, Komunikat z badań CBOS, no. 26, Warsaw February 2016.

and Ukrainian minorities. World War II resulted in a dramatic change in the ethnic and national structure of Poland. Due to border changes, resettlements, and migrations, Poland became one of the most homogeneous societies in Europe. The scarce number of representatives of national minorities decreased even further due to politically motivated anti-Semitism, forcing many Jews to leave Poland.

The year 1989 marked the beginning of an axiological change in relation to ethnic and national minorities in the direction of tolerance, equality, and often special rights. The main driving force behind these processes was the prospect of Polish integration with Western democratic institutions, most notably the European Union. Poland adopted a new constitution in 1997 and subsequently also the Act on Ethnic and National Minorities and Regional Languages in 2005. Both of these documents are in accordance with European and international standards.

Currently, both national and ethnic minorities in Poland are integrated within Polish society, although their integration should not be mistaken for assimilation or full, unconditional acceptance. Cultural and social issues are considered to be an indissoluble part of minority life. Minority languages and separate cultural identities have constructed united and cohesive communities recognized as autonomous groups in society, as there are no state-led actions that might lead to forced assimilation. Indeed, this notion of forced assimilation not only is contrary to Polish legislation, but also finds only minor popular support within Polish society. Minorities tend to preserve their own language, culture, historical memory, and traditions. One of the most visible examples of this is education in minority languages, which continues to be provided within the public educational system.

The minorities generally share the same axiological platform as the majority of the Polish population, which is proven by the fact that in most cases minority groups in Poland are not active players on the political stage. Only members of the German minority have any representatives in the Polish Parliament. Other minorities present in politics are members of major national political parties; this is especially noticeable at the local government level. In addition, none of the minorities aim towards separatism or partake in any anti-state actions, which, among other things, reflects their small number.

In general, basic interactions between Poles and representatives of the historic minorities are peaceful, but cannot be called smooth. Ethnic or

national issues rarely reach high levels of public interest, besides historical events which still need more research and interpretation. Major political parties in Poland typically refrained from using strong nationalistic arguments, but after the 2015 elections the shift towards a national and conservative identity is visible. Nevertheless, ultra-right conservatives with openly xenophobic and homophobic programs are not currently able to attain the 5% threshold for seats in the parliamentary elections.

The strong legal protection of ethnic and national minorities does not mean that there are no signs of intolerance from Poles towards outgroups. For example, the Roma constitute the most negatively perceived group by the general public, due to their family-clan identity and unwillingness to participate in public life. A second problem is connected with persistent anti-Semitism. In a way, this is a paradox in a country with almost no representatives of this minority, and proof that historical resentments and aversions play a larger part in Polish nationalism than present realities. Finally, a litmus test for Polish tolerance will be the general attitude toward immigrants entering Europe. As opinion polls show, Polish society does not support the settlement of immigrants in Poland. Like other people in Europe, Poles feel threatened by newcomers representing different civilizational circles and this fear can be instrumentalized by political forces in this almost homogeneous society.

PART TWO

VALUES IN POLAND

CHAPTER 5

Polish Civic Values in European Context

KRISTEN RINGDAL

This chapter examines Polish civic values after the fall of communism based on longitudinal data from the European Values Study (EVS).¹ Polish values will be compared in two ways; firstly, they will be compared with other European countries, and secondly, civic values just after the fall of communism will be contrasted with the results from the latest available value survey.

First on the list of civic values are the basic values inherent in the concept of democracy. Møller and Skaaning distinguish three basic attributes of liberal democracy, namely electoral rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law.² The first attribute implies regular, free and fair general elections. Political liberties include freedom of speech, opinion, association, demonstration, and petition. The rule of law implies civil rights, encompassing equal access to, and treatment under, the law. Democratization may be seen as a sequence of steps through gradations from liberal democracy to minimalist democracy. Poland was classified as an electoral democracy with inclusive elections, but lacking in terms of civil liberties

1 *European Values Study*, accessed February 26, 2015, <http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/about-evs/>.

2 Jørgen Møller and Svend Erik Skaaning, "Beyond the radical delusion: conceptualizing and measuring democracy," *International Political Science Review* 31, no. 3 (June 2010): 261–83.

as well as the rule of law. Unfortunately, the EVS does not ask questions relating to these basic attributes of democracy.

A more comprehensive approach may be based on the concept of civic culture. In their landmark study, Almond and Verba saw civic culture as the link between the micro and macro levels of the political system.³ Civic (political) culture is a mixture of modern participatory, as well as traditional and parochial values that ensures stability. It is based on values and attitudes that work to sustain participatory democratic institutions. These values and attitudes relate to political interest, feelings of political efficacy, and active participation in civil society and politics. Other relevant factors are trust in other people, and confidence in the political institutions of society. The civic culture also includes tolerance. Some of these aspects of political culture, especially trust in people and participation in civil society, have also been considered indicators of social capital, which is important for the development and sustainability of democratic political systems.

Ronald Inglehart and his colleagues have made important contributions to the understanding of changes in basic values linked to the transition from industrial to postindustrial society, as well as value differences between countries, based on data from the World Values Survey.⁴ In an article on the relationship between political culture and economic development, Inglehart argues that civic culture is a crucial link between economic development and a stable democratic society.⁵ His concept of civic culture consists of three elements: interpersonal or social trust; life satisfaction; and attitudes to societal change. Inglehart and Baker link modernization and democracy in a more comprehensive way.⁶ They see modernization as driven primarily by economic growth, while simultaneously leading societies away from absolute standards of moral values and

3 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

4 Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); also, Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

5 Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 4 (December 1988): 1203–30.

6 Ronald Inglehart and Wayne Baker, "Modernization and Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65, no. 1 (February 2000): 19–51.

towards values that are increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory. This indicates that the move from traditional to modern, secular and rational values are seen as important in the development of a democratic society. This line of reasoning is further developed in a book by Inglehart and Welzel.⁷ Some of their contributions contrast with Almond and Verba's view of civic culture, since traditional values such as religion are part of a societal structure that fosters stability. The civic culture approach is increasingly valuable when dealing with indicators such as social and political trust, life satisfaction, political and cultural tolerance, as well as indicators of modern versus traditional values.

In the empirical part of the chapter, I will start with attitudes toward democracy and continue with social trust and participation in civil organizations, both central indicators of social capital.⁸ Next, attitudes toward gender roles will be examined. Modern gender roles, with equal participation in society by both men and women, are important for a functioning democracy. Thirdly, as tolerance remains one of the core values of democracies, this chapter will look at both ethnic and political tolerance. Another key component of a viable democracy is citizens participating actively in the political system, whether through conventional and unconventional political activities. The former includes voting in elections, working in political parties or organizations, and engaging in activities designed to influence politicians. Unconventional political activities, or political activism, include political action outside of electoral channels.⁹ A recent book edited by Dalton and Welzel¹⁰ indicates that people in general have become more distrustful of electoral politics, institutions, and representatives, and are now more ready to confront elites with demands from below through political activism. Dalton and Welzel also contend that societies furthest advanced in the transition from an allegiant to an assertive model of citizenship are better-performing democracies, both in terms of

7 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*.

8 Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); also, Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (January 1995): 64–78.

9 Pippa Norris, "Political activism: new challenges, new opportunities," in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 629–49.

10 Russell J. Dalton and Christian Welzel, eds., *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

accountable and effective governance. I have chosen to base this part of the analysis on a set of indicators highlighting political activism or political action, again found in the EVS.

In a democratic political system, citizens' evaluation of the outside of politics is important for how democracy is evaluated, for confidence in political institutions, and for general satisfaction with life. For this purpose, we will examine trust in political organizations as well as the level of happiness as expressed in the EVS.

Firstly, let us look at general expectations regarding Polish civic values on Inglehart and Welzel's cultural map of the world.¹¹ The cultural map has two dimensions, namely traditional versus secular-rational values and survival values versus self-expression values. In addition, cultural/religious zones are drawn on the world map, according to which Poland is classified as belonging both to Catholic Europe and to the postcommunist part of Europe. The first dimension represents the contrast between societies where religion is very important and societies that may be characterized as secular. The second dimension is linked to the transformation from industrial to postindustrial society. Changes in the direction of self-expression values typically produce a culture of trust and tolerance, as well as activist political orientations, attributes that are clearly part of the civic culture sustaining democracies. Poland scores just below the midpoint of zero on both dimensions, which is to say, midway between the endpoints of the dimensions. Compared to most postcommunist countries, Polish society appears more traditional, but scores higher on self-expression values.

Next, let us look at expectations for the themes covered in this chapter: democratic attitudes, social capital, attitudes toward gender roles, tolerance, political participation, trust in political institutions, and happiness. First, we may expect democratic political institutions to show an initial high popularity in Poland after the fall of communism in 1989, followed by disillusionment due to the economic hardship of the 1990s. The experience of communism may represent a hurdle for postcommunist societies to develop a pluralist civil society, since the establishment of organizations and movements outside the control of the state was clearly discouraged during the communist era. However, in Poland, the Catholic Church has long enjoyed considerable freedom of organization, even

11 See *World Values Survey*, accessed February 26, 2015, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.

during the communist period. Moreover, Poland is well known for political activism, especially the role of Solidarity in its struggle for democracy. In 1983, Lech Wałęsa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to ensure workers' rights to establish their own independent organizations.

The experience of communism may have inhibited civil and political participation in Poland, as in other countries in East Central Europe, although this may be expected to change in the period studied. In general, we would expect both political and social tolerance to be rather low in East Central Europe, including Poland, compared to countries in the West. Again, with increasing levels of education, modernization, and experience of democracy, one would expect social tolerance to have improved between 1990 and 2008.

The Data Sources

The description of Polish civic values is based on data from the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values initiated by the European Value Systems Study Group in the late 1970s. The analysis will be based on data from the 1981–2008 longitudinal data file.¹² The second wave was fielded mainly in 1990, covering 26 European countries. This is a good starting point, since the data collection took place just after the fall of communism in Poland. The fifth wave, fielded mainly in 2008 and expanded to cover 47 countries, has a broad coverage, but a time-point closer to the present would be preferable. The surveys cover a range of topics including life satisfaction, attitudes, and values relating to family, work, religion, politics, and society.

Evaluations of Democracy: 2008

There were no suitable questions on attitudes or on evaluation of democracy in the 1990 survey in Poland. Therefore, this section builds entirely on data from 2008. The first question is on satisfaction with democracy: "On

12 EVS (2011): European Values Study 1981–2008, Longitudinal Data File. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, ZA4804 Data File Version 2.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11005.

the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?" The response categories range from 4 (very satisfied) to 1 (not at all satisfied).


The second measurement of attitudes to democracy is based on a set of questions on system critique. The set was introduced in this way: "I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each of them?" I have chosen three out of four questions that were posed both in 1990 and 2008:

- In democracy, the economic system runs badly
- Democracies are indecisive and have too much squabbling
- Democracies aren't good at maintaining order

The response categories were again scored from 1 to 4, so that high numbers indicate disagreement with the critique of democracy. A summary scale was constructed as the mean score for each respondent.

In Figure 5.1, the mean score for each country on the two measurements of evaluations of democracy are displayed. For both dimensions in the figure, the scores may range from 1 to 4, with high scores indicating favorable evaluations of democracy. The pattern indicates a medium to strong correlation ($r=0.66$) at the country level, indicating that evaluations on the two dimensions tend to concur.

The general impression is that the established democracies of Western Europe show more favorable evaluations of democracy than the former communist regimes in East Central Europe. In the upper right corner, we find Denmark with the highest scores on both dimensions; we can conclude that the Danes are satisfied with the way democracy is developing and disagree strongly with the critiques of democracy offered to them during the survey. Next to Denmark, we find Malta and Sweden. In the lower left corner, Bulgaria is least satisfied with the way democracy is developing, but is in line with Romania, France, and Latvia regarding the critiques of democracy. Poland is close to Slovenia and scores low on disagreement with the critiques of democracy, but nevertheless, Poles appear rather satisfied with the way democracy is developing. On this dimension, the score for Poland is at the same level as Austria and Finland.

Figure 5.1*Evaluation of democracy. Source: EVS 2008*


Social Capital: 1990–2008

The first indicator of social capital is a single question on social trust: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" The response categories were: "most people can be trusted" and one "can't be too careful."

The percentages that chose the trusting alternative in 1990 and 2008 are displayed in Figure 5.2. On average, there are very minor changes in social trust in Europe. The number stating that most people can be trusted has increased from 35.5% to 37%, and the country-level correlation between the percentages for the two years is 0.94. There appears to be a pattern with four clusters. In the upper right corner with the highest level of social trust in both years are Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands, where 60–80% of the populations endorse the trusting alternative. Next follows a small cluster with Iceland, Ireland and the UK, where

40–50% answer that most people can be trusted. Towards the lower left corner, we find two clusters; the first one with trust scores between 30–40%, and the last one with scores below 30%. In the latter cluster, we find a mix of South and East Central European countries including Poland. The level of social trust in Poland remains unchanged, just below 30% for both 1990 and 2008. In the former cluster, countries from across Europe can be found, including Lithuania, Estonia, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Germany and Austria.

Figure 5.2
Social trust. Source: EVS 1990, 2008



The second indicator of social capital is participation in organizations. This is an indicator of the extensiveness of civil society. This is important for democracy in two ways: firstly, organizations represent a training ground for political activities; and secondly, organizations may give voice to policy relevant views and claims. In both 1990 and 2008, the EVS included a question on belonging to, and doing voluntary unpaid work for organizations. The question is identical in both years: "Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say ... a) which,


if any, do you belong to? b) which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?" The list of organizations includes fourteen types, in addition to "other groups." These types are:

- Welfare organizations
- Religious organizations
- Cultural activities
- Trade unions
- Political parties/groups
- Local community action
- Third world-development/
human rights
- Environment, ecology, animal
rights
- Professional associations
- Youth work
- Sports/recreation
- Women's groups
- Peace movement
- Voluntary health organizations
- Other groups

The number of organizations mentioned by respondents is our measurement of engagement in voluntary work. The distribution was skewed, as expected. Therefore, we distinguish only between those who reported to be doing voluntary, unpaid organizational work in one or more organizations, and those who did not report such activity.

The results for the two years are displayed in Figure 5.3. On average, the percentage doing voluntary work has diminished slightly from 27.7% to 24% from 1990 to 2008. The correlation between the scores for the two years is moderately high ($r=0.67$). The dispersion in the figure indicates some changes over the twenty-year period. In 1990 Finland had the largest percentage of the adult population doing unpaid work for one or more organizations. However, the percentage engaged in voluntary work in Finland declined from 1990 to 2008, as the Finns were surpassed by the Netherlands, where the number had grown from 35 to 47%. The number for Denmark shows a similar pattern with an increase from 25 to 37%. Norway is close to the top in both years with close to 40% engaged in voluntary work.

In the lower left corner, we find a group of countries from Central Eastern and Southern Europe with the lowest level of unpaid work for organizations. The group includes Spain, Hungary, Bulgaria, Portugal, Malta, Slovakia, and Poland. In these countries, the percentage doing voluntary work in organizations ranged from 30 to 10% in 1990 and from 15 to 10% in 2008. This means that this type of organizational activity declined over the period studied.

Figure 5.3***Voluntary (unpaid) work in organizations. Source: EVS 1990, 2008***

Generally speaking, in small, rich West European countries, the level of unpaid work in organizations has been relatively high for the whole period. This group includes the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Belgium, Denmark, and the Czech Republic. Most formerly communist countries, along with postdictatorship Spain and Portugal, show low and declining engagement in voluntary work. Poland is an example of this pattern, showing an especially strong decline from 27% in 1990 to only 9% in 2008. A remarkable exception to this pattern is Slovenia, where the percentage engaged in organizational work increased from 15% in 1990 to 32% in 2008.

Gender Roles: 1990–2008

The EVS 2008 included a set of eight questions on gender roles. In an analysis of the 2008 data, I found that two related scales may be formed from these eight questions.¹³ The first one was labelled “modern gender roles,” and was based upon questions about women’s roles. The second scale was based on questions about gender equality. Since the analyses in this chapter are based on a longitudinal perspective, the measurement of gender roles have to be based on identically phrased questions present in both the 1990 and the 2008 rounds of the EVS. The two rounds have only three questions in common, one from each scale and another that was not used in my former analysis. The statements offered to respondents were:

- A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.
- Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
- Both husband and wife should contribute to household income.

The four response categories range from agree strongly (1) to disagree strongly (4). A factor analysis shows that the three questions form a satisfactory scale to measure gender roles. Note that the second question is loaded in the opposite direction of the two others, where disagreement is indicative of modern gender roles. In constructing the scale, the scores for the first and the third questions were reversed. The scale is the mean score for the three questions, with high scores indicating modern gender roles.


The average change for all countries is from a mean score of 2.36 to 2.65 on a scale ranging from 1 to 4. This shows that the overall change is in the direction of more modern gender roles. The country-level correlation between percentages at the two years is about 0.5. This medium level correlation indicates quite a few differences in the ranking of countries according to modern gender roles. The most traditional gender roles at both time points are found in the cluster at the bottom left of Figure 5.4. Malta and Lithuania are apart from the others in the cluster with the most

13 Kristen Ringdal, “Gender Roles in Southeastern Europe,” in *Gender (In)equality and Gender Politics in Southeastern Europe: a Question of Justice*, ed. Christine M. Hassensstab and Sabrina P. Ramet (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2015).

traditional gender roles, followed by the Netherlands, Poland and Ireland. Poland has slowly changed in the direction of more modern gender roles, but by only half of the average increase of about 0.3.

The countries with the most modern gender roles in 1990 were Portugal, Romania, and Finland. By 2008, they have fallen behind due to a decrease on the scale by about 0.2 in Portugal and around 0.1 in Romania and Finland. The change in the ranking of the countries is brought about by strong increases in the scale scores for some countries, notably Bulgaria which shows an increase of 0.6 and Norway with more than 0.4. Thus, in 2008, the most modern gender roles were found in Norway, Bulgaria, Sweden, and France which has increased its score on the scale by almost 0.3.

Figure 5.4
Modern gender roles. Source: EVS 1990, 2008



Social Tolerance: 1990–2008


Tolerance of other people, including those with extreme political views, is seen as essential in maintaining a pluralist democracy. However, there are no direct indicators of tolerance in the EVS. Instead, the measurements of ethnic and political tolerance must be based on a question about the acceptance of a list of groups as potential neighbors. This identical question was used in both the 1990 and the 2008 surveys: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" The list in 1990 included 14 groups, while in 2008 it included 15 groups. The lists are almost identical, but one group present in 1990 was not repeated in 2008, and two groups in the 2008 list are new. From the common groups in the lists for 1990 and 2008, I chose six involving either an ethnic or a political group. A factor analysis confirmed that two scales could be formed from these indicators:

- People of a different race
- Muslims
- Immigrants/foreign workers
- Jews
- Left-wing extremists
- Right-wing extremists

Those who picked one or more of the ethnic groups were classified as ethnically intolerant, while the remaining respondents were classified as ethnically tolerant. The same procedure was used for political tolerance. In Figures 5.5 and 5.6, the proportion classified as tolerant in each country are displayed.

The country-level correlation between ethnic tolerance in 1990 and 2008 is a moderate 0.52, which indicates quite a few changes in the placement of some countries. The overall change is from 67.7% to 70.3%, a mere 2.6 percentage points. Since the scale is identical for both years, a position above the main diagonal indicates a decline in ethnic tolerance, while countries below the diagonal show increasing ethnic tolerance. The countries close to the diagonal show stability in levels of ethnic tolerance over the period studied.

Above the diagonal we find a cluster of countries with declining levels of ethnic tolerance: Malta, Lithuania, Estonia, the Czech Republic, and Austria. In Malta, the percentage classified as tolerant decreased from nearly 80% to below 50% from 1990 to 2008. The group of stable

Figure 5.5*Tolerance of ethnic groups as neighbors. EVS 1990, 2008*


tolerant countries include Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Portugal, and Germany. Poland also belongs to this group, with a slight decline in ethnic tolerance of 6 percentage points. Two groups of countries seem to have become markedly more ethnically tolerant over the period studied. The first group includes countries with high levels of tolerance: Iceland, France, Norway, Belgium, and Hungary. The second group scored relatively low in ethnic tolerance in 1990, but considerably higher in 2008. This includes Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. The greatest improvement in ethnic tolerance is found for Bulgaria, where the figure of tolerant respondents increased from 38% to around 66%.

Political tolerance is measured by not excluding left and right extremists as neighbors. As an indicator, this is of course far from ideal, but acceptance of extreme political groups is clearly part of political tolerance. The overall change is an increase of about 5% in the direction of increased political tolerance. The pattern in Figure 5.6 indicates three clusters of

countries. Those making the greatest improvement in political tolerance from 1990 to 2008 include Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. Poland, where the number of politically tolerant respondents increased from 79% to 85%, is in a cluster of stable tolerant countries, together with Hungary and a mix of West, South, and East European countries. The lower left cluster, including Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, show stable but low levels of political tolerance.

Figure 5.6

Tolerance of left-wing and right-wing extremists as neighbors



Source: EVS 1990, 2008

Political Participation: 1990–2008

As mentioned earlier, we should distinguish between conventional and unconventional political participation. The first dimension is linked to electoral channels, and may include voting and active membership in

political parties. Because of the lack of adequate indicators, this dimension is dropped from the analysis. Instead we have to concentrate our attention on unconventional political participation, also known as political activism and political action. Here, political action is defined as any action that puts pressure on political or governmental agencies and/or individuals, in order to persuade them to adopt certain policies or change their behavior. This focus could also be a good choice because political activism has increased, whereas traditional political participation has largely decreased.¹⁴

The EVS includes an identical battery of questions on political action introduced in this way: "Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it."


This was followed by five forms of political action:

- Signing a petition
- Joining in boycotts
- Attending lawful demonstrations
- Joining unofficial strikes
- Occupying buildings or factories

The response categories were: "have done," "might do" and "would never do." Since the distribution is skewed, here I only distinguish between respondents who answered that they had done one or more of the five activities and those who had not participated in any political action. Figure 5.7 is based on the percentage in each country who reported engaging in one or more political action.

Overall, the level of political activism has declined by a couple of percentage points. The country-level correlation between the percentages is 0.63, medium to strong correlation. This means that the placement of most countries largely remains the same across the years. Looking at the figure, we see three interesting clusters of countries. The cluster in the upper right corner includes countries with a high level of political

14 Norris, "Political Activism," *passim*.

Figure 5.7**Political activism. Source: EVS 1990, 2008**

Note: The questions were not asked in Romania in 1990. The missing number was replaced by the percentage from EVS round 3 in 1999.

activism for the period studied, most notably Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the UK, Germany, Iceland, Italy, and Belgium, all with percentages above 60. In the opposite corner, we find Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and Portugal, all with a stable, but relatively low level of political activism. Between those clusters, below the diagonal, we find Slovenia and Spain, where the level of political activism has increased. Lithuania and Latvia are located in the upper left corner with high levels of political activism in 1990 (between 60% and 70%), but with very low levels in 2008. In Lithuania, the percentage who reported engaging in one or more political action dropped from 75% to 26% from 1990 to 2008.

The Output Side of Politics: 1990–2008

The policies produced by the political system have consequences for economic growth, as well as the level and quality of public institutions and services. How people perceive and evaluate the output from politics will most likely influence their level of political trust. The EVS had a battery on confidence in various institutions, both in 1990 and 2008. In 2008, the list included 18 institutions, of which six satisfied the dual criteria of being posted in both years, and constituting reasonable indicators of political trust. The battery was introduced by this question: "Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all?" The following institutions were picked from the larger lists:


- The police
- Parliament
- Civil service
- The justice system
- Political parties
- Government

A factor analysis confirmed that all questions belong to the same dimension. The scale of political trust was constructed as the mean score of confidence in the six institutions. The scale has a range from one to four and is scored so that high values indicate high levels of political trust.

The results are presented in Figure 5.8. On average, political trust is rather stable, with a slight decline over the period studied. Most countries are scattered around the main diagonal, some above with a decline in political trust, some below with increasing trust. In the upper right corner, we find the Nordic countries, plus Ireland and the Netherlands, with relatively high political trust at both time points. Most East Central European countries are characterized by low levels of political trust. Decline in political trust is observed for several countries including Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary. In Bulgaria, the scale score declined from just below the mean at 2.4 in 1990 to 1.8 in 2008. In Poland, average political trust declined from an average level of 2.5 in 1990 to a clearly below average 2.1 in 2008.

Figure 5.8

Trust in political institutions. Source: 1990, 2008




Note: Data on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is missing for 1990 and was replaced with data from 1998.

Political output in terms of services and standard of living may also influence the happiness of the people. In both 1990 and 2008, the EVS included a question on happiness: "Taking all things together, would you say you are: very happy (4), quite happy (3), not very happy (2), not at all happy (1)." The mean score for each country may range from one to four, with high scores indicating happiness. The overall average is around 3.0 for both time points, which corresponds to the response category "quite happy." In the upper right corner, we find a cluster of small, rich countries, including Iceland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, and Norway, plus the UK with consistently high levels of happiness. These countries are followed by Sweden, Malta, Austria, France, and Spain. In the opposite corner, we find the countries with consistently low levels of happiness. The lowest level is found in Bulgaria, but Lithuania, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, and Slovakia also show low levels of happi-

ness. Poland, along with Slovenia, is among the countries with the largest increase in happiness. For Poland, the mean scale score increased from a clearly below average 2.6 in 1990 to the average level, just above 3.0, in 2008.

Figure 5.9
Happiness. Source: EVS 1990, 2008



Conclusion

In this final section, the findings for Poland will be summarized and discussed in relation to the expectations presented in the introduction, and in relation to results from other studies. The empirical part of the chapter started with attitudes to democracy. People in Poland seemed to be relatively satisfied with the way democracy was developing in 2008, but they are among the most inclined to agree with critiques of democracy focusing on the economic system, indecisiveness, and on maintaining order.

On social trust, Poland is in the low end of the distribution among European countries, although the Poles do better than most countries in Eastern and Southern Europe. The percentage responding that most people can be trusted remains just below 30 for both 1990 and 2008. Results based on the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2002, however, give an even bleaker picture of social trust in Poland.¹⁵ While the respondents in the EVS were restricted to answer whether most people could be trusted or not, the respondents in the ESS were presented with a response-scale ranging from 0 ("You can't be too careful") to 10 ("Most people can be trusted"). The mean score in Poland of about 3.8 is the second lowest among the countries in this round of the ESS.

On doing voluntary, unpaid work in organizations, Poland was in the middle of the distribution in 1990 with a participation of 27%. However, in 2008 this had dropped to 9%, clearly the lowest percentage in Europe in 2008. This is in agreement with results from the ESS. Fridberg and Kangas found that Poland scored lowest in Europe in 2002 on both membership and voluntary work in organizations.¹⁶

In Poland, gender roles were among the most traditional in Europe for the period studied. The change towards modern gender roles was also weaker in Poland than the average change for Europe.

Ethnic tolerance was measured by a question on accepting people from named ethnic groups as neighbors. In this sense, social tolerance in Poland in 1990 was higher than in other postcommunist countries, and close to the European average. By 2008, several other postcommunist countries had caught up with Poland, where social tolerance had weakened. Political tolerance was measured in the acceptance of left-wing and right-wing extremists as neighbors. In this respect, Poland was the most tolerant country in 2008 and also among the best in 1990.

Poland was expected to score high on political activism, based on its relatively free and active Church, as well as the role of the trade unions in the struggle for freedom and democracy towards the end of the 1980s. However, the results indicate that respondents who had participated in one or more of five political actions, dropped from an already

15 Torben Fridberg and Olli Kangas, "Social capital," in *Nordic Social Attitudes in a European Perspective*, ed. Heikki Ervasti, Torben Fridberg, Mikael Hjerm, and Kristen Ringdal (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008), 65–85.

16 Fridberg and Kangas, "Social Capital," passim.

low 42% in 1990 to only 23% in 2008. This latter figure makes the Poles among the least engaged in political activism in Europe. The ESS has questions on both conventional and unconventional political activities and may be used to supplement the findings in this chapter. Berglund, Kleven, and Ringdal presented results from both dimensions of political activity, based on the combined data from the 2002 and 2004 rounds of the ESS.¹⁷ Their results indicate that Poland is in the group of countries with the lowest levels of both conventional and unconventional political activity in Europe. The scores for Poland on both dimensions are similar to those of Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Portugal, and Greece. The number of Poles engaged in political action in 2002/04 is only around 15%. This is lower than the results for 2008 (23%) and was a weak indication of a turn towards a higher level of political activism in Poland.

The empirical analysis ended with two indicators that might reflect an evaluation of political output. The first one was political trust, measured by the average confidence in six political institutions on a scale from one to four. Poland scored 2.5 in 1990, just above the European average and alongside the level of Germany and France. However, by 2008 confidence in the institutions had fallen to 2.1, one of the lowest figures observed and clearly below the level of political trust in the West European countries. Listhaug and Ringdal analyzed political trust in Europe based on the ESS 2004.¹⁸ The question was worded slightly differently from that of the EVS, but five of the six indicators were similar to those used in this chapter. The results show that political trust in Poland is the lowest in Europe for the five indicators that the ESS has in common with the EVS. As such, it is quite reasonable to conclude that the political trust manifested in the early days of democracy in Poland has eroded.

Finally, the analysis included data from a question on happiness. Poland was in the lower end of the distribution in 1990 with a score of 2.6, which is between "not very happy" and "quite happy." By 2008 the country's position had changed significantly, moving up to a score of 3.1, just above "quite happy." Poland now is close to the European average in happiness, at the level of Finland and Italy, but still far behind the top scoring

17 Frode Berglund, Øyvind Kleven, and Kristen Ringdal, "Political activism," in *Nordic Social Attitudes in a European Perspective*, ed. Ervasti et al., 110–30.

18 Ola Listhaug and Kristen Ringdal, "Trust in political institutions," in *Nordic Social Attitudes in a European Perspective*, ed. Ervasti et al., 131–51.

countries. An analysis of unhappiness based on the 2002 and 2004 rounds of the ESS, however, gives a different view on happiness in Poland.¹⁹ The question posed in the ESS is quite similar to that in the EVS, but the respondents were asked to respond on a scale ranging from 0 (extremely unhappy) to 10 (extremely happy). Those who reported a score in the range 0–5 were classified as unhappy. In terms of unhappiness Poland scored lower than the impression from our analysis; indeed, ESS data shows Poland among the countries with the highest score of unhappiness, far above the European average.

19 Terje Andreas Eikemo, Arne Mastekaasa, and Kristen Ringdal, "Health and happiness," in *Nordic Social Attitudes in a European Perspective*, ed. Ervasti et al., 48–64.

CHAPTER 6

Religion in Public Life

MACIEJ POTZ

Among the most far-reaching consequences of the fall of communism in Poland has been the dissolution of the clearly defined ideological divide between “us,” the nation or, later, the civil society epitomized by the “Solidarity” movement, and “them,” the authoritarian regime. The Catholic Church, reliably supporting civil society against the regime, suddenly found itself in a reality of social and political pluralism, where it had to redefine its attitude towards the democratic state, decide upon the level and form of its political engagement, and find ways to retain its authority among a now ideologically diverse public. The state, with the involvement of the Church, had to work out a formula for Church–state relations and the presence of religion in the public sphere.

The chapter begins with a review of historical factors that help account for the Poles’ persistent and homogeneously Catholic religiosity, their attitudes towards the presence of religion in the public sphere, and the Church’s dilemmas in defining its place in Poland’s postcommunist social and public life. It then presents a legal-institutional framework for the functioning of religious groups in Poland, with the sources of Polish confessional law, the main spheres of shared competence—and thus possible inflection points—of religious and public authorities, and, finally, the overall model of Church-state relations emerging from these regulations.

In the next section, I move beyond this static picture and adopt a political science approach to analyse the activity of the Catholic Church as a political actor. Using examples of its political involvement, I demon-

strate strategies utilized by the Church in its capacity as a political actor, aimed at influencing power relations within the polity. Finally, a broader issue, namely the legitimacy of bringing religious perspectives to bear on public debates, is addressed. The Church's assertion of its right to speak out on moral issues—without, however, direct involvement in party politics—turns out to be widely accepted in Polish society, even if the majority of Poles do not agree with some of the episcopate's particular stances.

Getting There: A Historical Perspective

Early modern Poland emerged, especially following its union with Lithuania, as a multinational, multicultural state, widely recognized for its policy of religious toleration. Amid religious wars and the persecutions of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, Poland became a safe haven for Jews expelled from Western countries, as well as anti-trinitarians and all sorts of Protestant dissenters. This was facilitated by the fact that Poland was never a centralized, absolutist monarchy in the mold of seventeenth-century France, Spain, or Austria, and even though both the kings and the majority of the population were Catholic, the influence of the Roman Catholic Church was relatively weak. The actual ruling stratum of the society, the noblemen—which was mostly Catholic, but open to Orthodox, Protestant, and anti-Trinitarian confessions—were jealously guarding their privileges and liberties against the encroachments of the monarchy, and because of this class interest, they would also protect religious dissenters within their ranks.¹ This sentiment was expressed forcefully in a declaration of religious freedom known as the Warsaw Confederation, adopted by the Sejm in 1573: “we who differ with regard to religion will keep the peace with one another, and will not for a different faith or a change of churches shed blood nor punish one another by confiscation of property, infamy, imprisonment or banishment, and will not in any way assist any magistrate or officer in such an act.”²

1 Janusz Tazbir, *A State Without Stakes: Polish Religious Toleration in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (New York: Kosciuszko Foundation, 1973).

2 Quoted in Diarmuid MacCulloch, *Reformation. Europe's House Divided, 1490–1700* (London: Allen Lane, 2003), 343.

Of these two important traits of the Polish early modern political culture—namely, its antiabsolutism, institutionalized in the form of a unique system of noblemen's democracy, and religious toleration—only the former has left a durable imprint on Polish mentality. The latter has been supplanted, due to historical developments, by a growing identification of the nation with the Roman Catholic Church. Throughout the nineteenth century, a time of lost sovereignty and partition of Polish territory among its neighbours, the Church was a mainstay of national culture, and perhaps the only independent institution that could support the nation's struggle to preserve its Polish identity. Furthermore, the Church, unlike in many other Catholic countries, did not identify itself with a particular part of a society—a ruling elite—and was thus able to avoid antagonizing workers, intellectuals, or any other social group.³

The resulting "Pole-Catholic" formula—the prevailing definition of the Poles' national identity—remained largely intact through the spell of independence between the wars, and was further augmented by the Church's role during and after World War II. Having secured its own institutional survival in the face of Stalinist-era persecution which, in the case of the Soviet Union itself and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc, had often led to the almost complete marginalization of religion, the Church in Poland proceeded to compete successfully with the communist regime for the loyalty of Polish society. As the only independent institution, at least before the emergence of organized political opposition in the late 1970s, the Church provided a much-needed sphere of liberty, with its own organizations (such as Clubs of Catholic Intelligentsia), meeting facilities, publications, and holidays, alternatives to the state holidays which were unpopular and lacked legitimacy. The Church was also highly supportive of the anticommunist opposition, which culminated in the "Solidarity" movement, even if its role in the 1980s, after the proclamation of martial law in December 1981, was more of a mediator or third force between the regime and the opposition than an uncompromising supporter of the latter.⁴ Nevertheless, not only did the Church win the battle for control of the religious sphere, it was

3 Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 93–94.

4 Sabrina P. Ramet, "Thy Will Be Done: The Catholic Church and Politics in Poland since 1989," in *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, ed. Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 121.

also instrumental in preserving a traditional national identity based on religion and nineteenth-century romantic idealism, and even embraced some of the civil and social rights program of the “Solidarity” movement.⁵ As a result, the Church emerged from the communist era as a strong, respected, and popular institution.

These historical factors also help explain a steadily high level of religiosity, hovering around 90% throughout the second half of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century⁶—one of the highest in Europe. The non-existence of clear secularization trends can also be attributed, according to the traditional theory of secularization, to the lack of rapid economic development, social security, welfare, and similar factors during the communist era—all factors which contributed to a decrease in religious belief and practice in many Western countries. In fact, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart claim the same factors (such as age) correlate with religiosity in both Western and East Central Europe.⁷ On the other hand, cultural and historical variables are necessary to explain the vast difference between largely secularized postcommunist societies, such as the Czech Republic or Estonia, and the very religious societies of Poland and Romania.

5 Casanova, *Public Religions*, 102–109.

6 Precise figures are difficult to establish, because the Polish Constitution forbids public organs to compel citizens to disclose their religious beliefs or affiliation (art. 53, par. 7). As a result, the data is obtained either from representative samples (which tend to overlook religious minorities) or from non-mandatory questions in the national census. The figure of roughly 90% comes from declaration of membership gathered from the religious groups. See: *Wyznania religijne: Stowarzyszenia narodowościowe i etniczne w Polsce 2009–2011* (Warsaw: GUS, 2013), accessed on March 21, 2017, http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/oz_wyznania_reliligijne_stow_nar_i_etn_w_pol_2009-2011.pdf. Furthermore, the term “religiosity” is in itself ambiguous and will have different levels depending on whether one takes it to mean religious beliefs, religious practice, or formal membership in a religious group. For instance, the close to 90% membership in the Catholic Church refers to all who were baptized into the Church, while the actual level of regular religious practice in Poland, as measured by the participation in Sunday mass (*dominicanes*) has decreased from almost 60% in 1982 to around 40% of the formal church members (excluding children) in 2011. See *Kościół katolicki w Polsce 1991–2011* (Warsaw: ISKK and GUS, 2014), 185–86, last modified April 16, 2014, <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/kosciol-katolicki-w-polsce-1991-2011,12,1.html>.

7 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 123–28. Poland does not, however, confirm the authors’ claim—directed against the “religious markets” theory of secularization—that high levels of religious liberty correlate positively with a low level of religiosity.

The Polish Model of Church–State Relations

Basic regulations of the relations between religious groups and the state, as well as issues of religious liberty, are contained in a number of legal acts, including the Constitution of 1997 and the *Act on the Guarantees of Conscience and Religion* of 1989.⁸ Article 25 of the Constitution stipulates the equality of all religious denominations (par. 1), impartial treatment of all religious and non-religious convictions (par. 2), and mutual independence of all churches and the state, as well as autonomy of the former, within their respective spheres (par. 3). Extensive guarantees of religious freedom as a fundamental human right are provided both in the aforementioned act and Article 53 of the Constitution, which ensures the freedom to publicly express one's religious convictions, participate in religious worship, proselytize, provide religious education for one's children, and so forth (par. 2), with the usual limitations dictated by important public interests, such as public safety, order, and the rights of others (par. 5).

The legal status of religious groups in Poland is not uniform. Most of them, numbering 161 as of January 2015,⁹ are recognized on the basis of general regulations: they are registered by the government upon fulfilling certain formal requirements. Fifteen other groups, including the Roman Catholic, Old Catholic, Orthodox, and major Protestant Churches, as well as Jewish and Muslim organizations, are recognized by specific acts of parliament regulating the state's relations with them. Additionally, the Roman Catholic Church enjoys a unique regulation in the form of a concordat—an international agreement between Poland and the Vatican.

The model of Church–state relations in Poland emerging from these and other regulations is characterized by the lack of an official (state) religion, a high standard of religious liberty enshrined in the Constitution as a fundamental human right, the institutional separation of Church and state, and formal legal equality of all religious groups. However, there does exist some preferential treatment of religion over non-religion in general,

8 *Ustawa o gwarancjach wolności sumienia i wyznania*, Dz.U. 1989 Nr 25 poz. 155, accessed March 24, 2017, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19890290155>.

9 *Kościół i związki wyznaniowe wpisane do rejestru kościołów i innych związków wyznaniowych* [Register of legally recognized religious groups in Poland], accessed March 12, 2015, https://mac.gov.pl/files/ost._e-rejestr_hw_22.01._2015.pdf.

which is particularly enjoyed by some denominations (in this case, the Catholic Church). It is variously referred to as friendly or "benevolent" separation¹⁰ or the "endorsed Church model."¹¹ The first of these descriptions focuses more on the fundamentally secular character of the state with some recognition of the role of religion, while the latter points to the special position that the Catholic Church enjoys in Poland.

Some critics are, in fact, much more explicit in stating that the separation of Church and state, whether in strict or benevolent form, is formal at best; they contend that in practice, Poland has become, in the words of legal scholar Ryszard Małajny, a "quasi-confessional state."¹² Similarly, legal professor Paweł Borecki talks about a "confessionalization of the state," invoking certain areas where the state has allegedly crossed the wall of separation by, among other things: financing religious organizations from the public budget; violating the institutional (organizational) division between itself and the churches; and ignoring the principle of axiological neutrality, favouring Christianity against atheism and Catholicism against other denominations.¹³ Regarding the first point, legally recognized religious groups in Poland enjoy a number of tax privileges, such as the exemption from property taxes and Corporate Income Tax (CIT) if the proceedings from their economic activity are used for ritual or charitable purposes. Moreover, the state directly funds religious universities, both state-owned (for instance, Cardinal Wyszyński University, the Academy of Christian Theology, theology faculties at some public universities) and Church-owned (the Catholic University of Lublin and John Paul II Papal University in Kraków). Moreover, a state-financed Church Fund donates

10 Małgorzata Winiarczyk-Kossakowska, *Państwowe prawo wyznaniowe w praktyce administracyjnej* (Warsaw: Scholar, 1999), 26.

11 Benjamin Neuberger, "Religion and State in Europe and Israel," *Israel Affairs* 6, no. 2 (1999): 67–82.

12 Ryszard M. Małajny, "III Rzeczpospolita państwem quasi-wyznaniowym (10 lat obowiązywania konfesyjnych postanowień Konstytucji z 1997 r.)," in *Dziesięć lat Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, ed. Ewa Gdulewicz and Halina Zięba-Załucka (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2007), 199: "The constitution introduces neither the separation of Church and state model, nor the confessional state model, but, instead supports an in-between system. The constitutional practice, however, clearly approaches the confessional model. Therefore, I conclude that the III Polish Republic is a *quasi*-confessional state."

13 Paweł Borecki, "Elementy konfesjonalizacji państwa we współczesnej Polsce," in *Państwo wyznaniowe. Doktryna, prawo i praktyka*, ed. Jarosław Szymanek (Warsaw: Elipsa, 2011), 148–49.

around 90 million złotych annually to religious organizations—with the Catholic Church receiving the vast majority—in the form of pension contributions, land, renovation of church buildings, and so forth.

As far as the second charge is concerned, there indeed exist spheres of mixed competence, where religious functionaries are, or effectively act in the capacity of, state employees. Ever since (non-obligatory) religion lessons were introduced to public schools in 1990, the teachers of religion, roughly half of them priests or nuns, have received state salaries. Religion is taught in public facilities as a regular part of the curriculum, even though the content of the course is entirely determined by the respective Churches. Another such sphere is marriage law: the state recognizes the civil validity of marriages performed by eleven denominations, with priests acting, in effect, as civil registry officers. Finally, the state employs chaplains in the army, police and border guard agency, with priests of a few major denominations serving as regular, high ranking officers in these formations. Hospitals, prisons, and similar institutions are also obliged to secure the services of chaplains.

Thirdly, the axiological predilection for Christianity can be inferred from legislation as well as from the actions of public officials. The *Act on the System of Education* of 1991 and the *Act on Radio and Television* of 1992 state that both public school education and radio and television programs (especially those of public channels) should respect the Christian value system. The parliament has, on numerous occasions, commemorated religious holidays, Catholic saints, or dates related to Pope John Paul II.¹⁴ State ceremonies are often accompanied by religious rituals (masses, blessing of new buildings) with the participation of public officials. Crosses adorn the walls of many public buildings, ranging from classrooms to the main hall of the Parliament. The preferential treatment of the Roman Catholic Church over other religious organizations means, among other things, a difference in the regulation of its status vis-à-vis the state, as noted above (a concordat, as opposed to acts of parliament or mere registration), with more money going to the dominant Church and easier access to religious education in schools for Catholic children.

While these facts are beyond dispute, their interpretation as indicators of the confessional character of the state is debatable. For instance,

14 Ibid., 155–56.

the money donated from state coffers to the Catholic Church through the Church Fund is a recompense for property nationalized after World War II; as such, it essentially constitutes a form of reprivatization, rather than state funding of religion. Employing chaplains in the army, hospitals, or prisons is justified by the need to secure access to religious services for the soldiers, patients, or inmates in these closed institutions. The situation represents a classic, if somewhat paradoxical, instance of a clash between the principles of separation of Church and state and freedom of religion: to guarantee the latter, the state has to relent in the strict application of the former.¹⁵ As for religious education in schools and religious marriage ceremonies, while churches obviously benefit from these arrangements, so too do citizens. Having just one wedding ceremony (although it is, of course, still possible to have only civil marriage, or to perform both ceremonies separately) saves the couple some effort, while the civil consequences of marriage are entirely separate from religious ones (that is, one can divorce and remarry according to civil law, regardless of whether this is authorized by the Church). The preferential treatment of the Catholic Church needs to be put in numerical perspective: if the state chooses to subsidise religion at all, it is only natural that the organization serving the vast majority of religious believers should proportionally benefit from such an arrangement.

The Catholic Church as a Political Actor

I will now switch to a political science mode of analysis, where religious organizations (in this case, primarily the Catholic Church, henceforward the Church) are treated as subjects acting within a political system. The latter term refers to a system of social subjects with institutions, norms, rules, and procedures regulating their mutual relations, in which power relations are shaped. In other words, a political system is a sphere where social subjects, in their capacity as political actors, strive to improve their position in power relations by either gaining or retaining power, freeing themselves from the power of others, or influencing decision-making

15 See Maciej Potz, *Granice wolności religijnej. Kwestie wolności sumienia i wyznania oraz stosunku państwa do religii w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki* (Wrocław: FNP, 2008), 146–49.

processes in order to further their interests. This approach, in relation to religious organizations, has many advantages. Firstly, it allows one to move beyond the static picture of the legal status of Churches and the institutional model of Church–state relations to show the dynamics of these organizations’ political involvement. Secondly, it stipulates treating churches as any other political actors (parties, interest groups, non-governmental organizations, and so on)—even though they certainly differ in many respects—and using the same tools to analyse their political behavior. Thirdly, it takes away a lot of the “normative overload” of the Church–state paradigm, because we are not so much occupied with how a particular model of Church–state relations conforms to some set of philosophical principles (for instance, axiological neutrality of the state, equal treatment of all religions, civil rights, and so forth), but, instead, we are interested in the goals that the Churches set themselves in the public sphere and the political strategies they use to achieve them.

To treat a Church as a political actor is not to imply that political activity constitutes its *raison d’être*. On the contrary, from the believers’ perspective, a Church is primarily a religious organization, whose activity is grounded in and mandated by the supernatural. Insofar as it engages in power relations, however, we are justified in viewing it as a political subject. Nor is it necessary to treat it, due to its peculiarity, as influencing the political system from the outside.¹⁶ In the functional approach adopted here, the political system is composed of actors for whom political activity may be fundamental (for instance, those in state institutions or political parties) or merely an auxiliary aspect of their existence. They are within the political system to the extent that they engage in power brokering.

Among the political objectives the Church set itself when entering the postcommunist period were: a) institutionalizing its position within a non-separationist model of Church–state relations; b) securing the material basis of its existence; c) retaining influence on decision-makers in the new pluralistic political environment; and d) retaining its societal authority to speak out on public issues. To realize these goals, the Church in Poland has utilized a variety of strategies, resembling a non-governmental organi-

16 See Krzysztof Kowalczyk, “Kościół katolicki jako podmiot oddziałujący na system polityczny,” *Wrocławskie Studia Polilogiczne* 17 (2014): 126–41, for whom the Church is situated in the internal environment of the political system; see in particular, 131.

zation (publicly expressing opinions on issues within its sphere of interest), an economic interest group (lobbying with government officials) or even a social movement (mass mobilization). Krzysztof Kowalczyk has conceptualized the Church's political influence by identifying its subjects (government institutions, political parties, interest groups, mass media, society at large), the main issues (current politics, the model of Church–state relations, socio-economic issues, financing of the Church, and the axiological aspects of the EU's functioning), methods (direct and indirect lobbying, both with government officials and through grass-roots mobilization; moral sanctions, including publicly praising and rebuking politicians, up to the threat of excommunication), and goals (expanding or merely retaining the status quo).¹⁷

According to Krzysztof Zuba, the Church in Poland has used three distinct political strategies. In the initial postcommunist period of 1990–1997, it acted in a nakedly political fashion, trying to exert direct influence by supporting the establishment and functioning of explicitly Catholic political parties (a “political principal” strategy). Having experienced the ineffectiveness of this strategy due to the failure of such parties and the associated loss of public credibility, the Church eschewed direct political involvement and, between 1997 and 2004, assumed the role of a creator of political values. In this period, the Church influenced the political system in more subtle ways, stating its opinion on public issues and acting through its political allies on the right, though these political parties were not directly associated with it. Finally, throughout the entirety of the post-communist era, the Church behaved as an effective interest group, successfully securing its own institutional interests and, specifically, the material basis of its existence.¹⁸

The above typology, though certainly useful, tends to overemphasise the periodization of the Church's political involvement. While its role as a direct player in party politics can indeed be quite precisely dated to the early nineties, and one may note that it was subsequently abandoned,¹⁹ its second strategy—the creation of values—is an all-important, perma-

17 Ibid., 133–39.

18 Krzysztof Zuba, “The Political Strategies of the Catholic Church in Poland,” *Religion, State & Society* 38, no. 2 (June 2010): 119–27.

19 Marek Delong, “Episkopat polski a wybory parlamentarne i prezydenckie w latach 1991–1995,” *Przegląd Religioznawczy* 1/235 (2010): 59–70.

nent feature of the Church's public profile that has pervaded its activity throughout the whole postcommunist period. As is well-recognized by the Church hierarchy, remaining an authority on as many public issues of moral significance as possible is an important precondition for being an effective interest group. In most cases, the decision-makers bend to the Church's pressure not because of their personal religious convictions, but because of the hold the Church has on the opinions and consciences of the public. Suffice it to say that as many as 77% of adult Poles regard religion as important, more than half considering it to be "very important" in their lives.²⁰ In a 2013 poll, 90% stated they regard "the majority of Catholic moral principles valid," although half of them indicated these principles are not sufficient and need supplementing.²¹ This certainly does not entail the acceptance of each and every stance of the Church, especially on overtly political issues, but it definitely demonstrates the political potential of the Church. In the remainder of this chapter, I will focus on this role of the Polish Catholic Church as a value-based political actor.

The Church's Value-Based Politics

As public opinion surveys clearly indicate, the majority of Poles approve of the Church's presence in the public sphere. More than 80% of respondents in a survey conducted in 2013 accept religion lessons in public schools and religious symbols in public buildings, while around 75% are not offended by seeing priests during public ceremonies or on TV. Importantly, while more than 60% accept the Church taking positions on moral issues, significantly less—only 40%—approve of it taking a stand on laws passed by the parliament, and a mere 15% find it acceptable for priests to tell people for whom to vote.²² It has been, thus, of paramount importance for the Church as a political actor to be able to present all issues with which it is concerned in the public sphere as moral issues. Accordingly, the Church has unequivocally asserted its position as a moral authority, insisting against the reduc-

20 *Znaczenie religii w życiu Polaków* (Warsaw: CBOS, May 2006), accessed April 8, 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2006/K_081_06.PDF, 4.

21 *Religijność a zasady moralne* (Warsaw: CBOS, February 2014), accessed May 4, 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2014/K_015_14.PDF, 9.

22 *Religia i kościół w przestrzeni publicznej* (Warsaw: CBOS, December 2013), accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_170_13.PDF, 2.

tion of religion to the ritual sphere and its consequent privatization. It draws a sharp distinction between the absolute character of moral claims and the vicissitudes of politics: "While there can be no compromise on moral issues, in politics compromise is the essence of law-making in a democratic state." The Church does not engage directly in politics, it claims, but it is authorized to set "boundaries for the involvement in adopting an immoral law"²³ for the Catholic law-makers.

The questions over which the Catholic Church in Poland has exerted its political influence since 1989 fall within two broad categories. First, there are those which have a bearing on the institutional position of the Church in society, such as the religious clauses of the constitution, the concordat, the teaching of religion in public schools and the financing of the Church. Second, there are purely ethical questions, such as abortion, contraception, homosexual rights, in vitro fertilization, and so forth. From the first category, the last point has had a relatively low profile, since it is obviously hardest to represent as a moral issue how much the Church should receive from government coffers.²⁴

On other fronts, battles were waged and, to a large extent, won by the Church. Religious instruction, introduced into public schools in the early 1990s, has remained there ever since, despite recurring protests by some left-wing and anticlerical circles. The constitution, while neither singling out Roman Catholicism for special treatment, nor providing for the separation of Church and state, talks instead in Article 25 about "autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own sphere." Significantly, it also contains, in the preamble, the following clause: "We, the Polish Nation—all citizens of the Republic, both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, as well as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from other sources..."²⁵ This certainly is not a classic *invocatio Dei* and it is technically neutral, as

23 *Apel Prezydium Konferencji Episkopatu Polski w związku z rozpoczęciem prac nad projektem ustawy o medycznym wspomaganiu prokreacji (in vitro)*, March 31, 2015, accessed April 9, 2015, http://episkopat.pl/dokumenty/6549.1,Apel_Prezydium_Konferencji_Episkopatu_Polski_w_zwiazku_z_rozpoczeciem_prac_nad_projektem_ustawy_o_medycznym_wspomaganiu_prokreacji_in_vitro.html.

24 The public visibility of this issue has been due to the left-wing and anticlerical media (such as the weeklies *Nie!* [No!] and *Fakty i mity* [Facts and myths]) documenting some abuses in this regard.

25 *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997*, accessed April 10, 2015, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm>.

it includes all citizens. Nevertheless, the clause raises the question of why faith in God was selected as the most important social distinction (rather than, say, gender, age, or class). According to one interpretation, the clause, far from favouring a specific religion, is instead a sort of anti-absolutist provision, a recognition of natural law and "a ban on state totalitarianism . . . or precaution against any uncontrolled and unlimited state power."²⁶ Still, especially coupled with the further pronouncement that the constitution is established "recognizing our responsibility before God or our own consciences," it undoubtedly gives religious values in the public sphere a certain legitimacy, on which the Church's aspiration to remain the conscience of the nation in the new democratic polity can be built.

The strategy used by the Church in this phase of its political activity was mainly direct lobbying of decision-makers, in this case principally the members of the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly. Even before the legislative process leading to the adoption of the constitution began in the Parliament elected in 1993, the Plenary Commission of the Polish Episcopate, at the invitation of the Senate Constitutional Commission, published its *Position on the Axiological Principles of the New Constitution*.²⁷ During the decisive stage of the procedure, the bishops criticized several drafts of the constitution, making sure that any mention of the "secular" or "neutral" character of the state or its "separation" from the Church would be deleted.²⁸ They argued that "separation" reminded people of the hostile treatment of religion by the communist regime. The Church escalated its pressure until it was able to obtain the "autonomy and mutual independence" formula adapted from the Second Vatican Council teachings.²⁹ The reason the legislators in the Constitutional Commission were so submissive to the hierarchy's lobbying was that they realized the Church's support (or at least neutrality) for the final version of the constitution may prove crucial to its passage in the subsequent referendum.

The second category, the ethical questions, primarily includes issues connected with family and sex. Indeed, there seems to be a certain preoc-

26 Krystian Complak, "Will Poland be the Most Confessional State of the European Union?" *Jurisprudence* 119 (2010): 87.

27 Sławomir Sowiński, "Polityka i religia w Polsce po roku 1989," in *Religia i polityka: Zarys problematyki*, ed. Piotr Burgoński and Michał Gierycz (Warsaw: Elipsa, 2014), 666.

28 *Ibid.*, 667.

29 Michał Pietrzak, *Prawo wyznaniowe* (Warsaw: PWN, 1999), 253.

cupation, bordering on obsession, on the part of the Polish Church with sexual ethics (reflecting a similar attitude on the part of Pope John Paul II), to the relative exclusion of social problems such as poverty, working conditions, and social marginalization.³⁰ Certainly the latter are less susceptible to moral judgements derived from the teaching of the Church, and any open support for the underprivileged smacks too much of liberation theology, so detested by the Polish Pope.

The standard concern of the Church in Poland has been the admissibility of abortion. Entirely legal in the communist era, it was outlawed under pressure from the bishops in 1993, with the exception of cases when pregnancy endangers the life or health of the mother, is the result of rape or incest, or when the fetus is seriously damaged. Although this was a compromise considering the Church's initial demand for a full ban, the hierarchy considered it worth maintaining and attacked any attempts at liberalization of the law, without pressing for its toughening, either. The situation changed significantly after the 2015 general election. With the new conservative Law and Justice (PiS) government more sympathetic to the Church's claims, the bishops have adopted a more radical stance, demanding, in a March 2016 statement, a full ban on abortion.³¹ This puts the government in a difficult position. In the previous term, while still in opposition, PiS supported a popular legislative initiative to toughen the abortion law, just as it initially did with a similar initiative submitted to the Sejm in March 2016. However, after a wave of mass pro-choice demonstrations in April, party leader Jarosław Kaczyński and prime minister Beata Szydło have become more equivocal in their attitude: the last thing they need is another battle, while the conflict over the Constitutional Tribunal, with its internal and international repercussions, remains unresolved.³²

30 Konrad Sawicki, "Episkopat na jedno kolano," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, April 8, 2015, 13.

31 *Komunikat Prezydium KEP w sprawie pełnej ochrony życia człowieka*, last modified March 30, 2016, accessed June 27, 2016, <http://www.episkopat.pl/komunikat-prezydium-kep-w-sprawie-pelnej-ochrony-zycia-czlowieka>. The bishops, referring to the existing 1993 act on abortion, "are asking all the people of good will, believers and non-believers alike, to take action for the full legal protection of the life of the unborn."

32 Malwina Dziedzic, "Komu ciąży aborcja," *Polityka* 14, 30 March–5 April 2016. For this reason, Law and Justice is allegedly putting pressure on the Church hierarchy to loosen their support for the radical pro-lifers, in exchange for concessions on other issues, notably the in vitro legislation.

On the issue of homosexuality, the Church, while regarding homosexual relations sinful, treats gays and lesbians as suffering people who can be helped to overcome their affliction. At the same time, the bishops have spoken out against same-sex marriage or any other form of legal recognition of same-sex unions and have regarded LGBT activism, or even public media tolerance campaigns, as an aggressive promotion of homosexuality.³³ Other well-publicized and influential positions of the Church were directed against contraception, sex education in schools, and euthanasia.

The two most recent axiological battles were waged over the issues of artificial insemination and "gender." In the first case, the Church position against the *in vitro* procedure, which involves the destruction of some of the embryos created in the process, is a natural extension of its anti-abortion stance based on the principle of the protection of life from the moment of conception. This position was repeatedly pronounced in 2014 and early 2015, in the course of the preparation of a parliamentary act regulating IVF. In the second case, the word "gender" serves as a malevolent epitome of all the evils that feminism and related (post)modern ideologies present for the traditional model of the family. As Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek commented after the Sejm approved the European convention against domestic violence, "I survived Nazism, I survived communism, I will survive genderism, too."³⁴ More than just an expression of stoic resignation, this statement reflects the conviction of a large portion of the episcopate that "genderism" is a new aggressive ideology, comparable to Nazism or communism not (yet?) in its disastrous effects, but in its total character and revolutionary implications.

33 See, for instance, a letter from the bishop Wacław Depo, the chair of the Polish Bishops' Conference's Commission for Mass Media, to Jan Dworak, the President of the National Council of Radio and TV, protesting against a "Najbliżsi obcy" [The closest strangers] TV spot, promoting tolerance for homosexuals, as being in contravention of Article 18 of the Constitution (defining marriage as a union between a male and a female) and Radio and TV act (stipulating respect for Christian values). Accessed April 23, 2015, http://episkopat.pl/dokumenty/6265.1,List_Przewodniczacego_Rady_KEP_ds_Srodkow_Spolecznego_Przekazu_ws_emisji_spotu_quot_Najblizsi_obcy_quot.html.

34 "Biskupi krytykują konwencję. 'Ogranicza suwerenne kompetencje Polski w sprawach etyki i ochrony rodziny'," *TVN24*, last modified February 6, 2015, <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/konwencja-antyprzemocowa-przyjeta-przez-sejm,512805.html>.

The whole array of methods, enumerated above by Kowalczyk, were used in an attempt to bring the Church's moral principles to bear on the relevant legislation: grassroots lobbying (for instance, an anti-abortion rally of some 50,000 people, in order to put pressure on the Senate considering a change of the abortion law in 1996),³⁵ direct lobbying of government officials by personal communication, announcements, declarations and similar (for instance, letters sent by the Polish Bishops' Conference claiming "promotion" of homosexuality to be at odds with the constitution), and moral appeals to decision-makers. A telling recent example of the latter is the *Appeal of the Presidency of the Polish Bishops' Conference regarding the Introduction of the Bill on Medical Support of Procreation (in vitro)* of March 31, 2015, in which the bishops adduce arguments against the procedure. Having observed that there are members of Parliament who are open and active Catholics, the bishops feel concerned that they could "remain in full bond with the community of the Catholic Church and in the disposition to receive Holy Communion." They thus offer guidelines for how these MPs should proceed with the bill, since the support for an "immoral law" may "amount to excluding oneself from the community of the Church."³⁶ Such a dictum—an extremely thinly veiled threat of excommunication—may prove an effective instrument of pressure, especially on at least a few dozen members of the Sejm and the Senate who declare themselves devout Catholics (mainly from PiS, but also from other significant parties, such as Civic Platform and the Polish Peasant Party). This type of pressure may see these MPs occasionally vote against their parties' positions on explicitly moral issues.

The measure of success of the Church's value-based politics is both the passage or failure of relevant legislation and the public acceptance of its moral principles. On both counts, the results have been mixed. While the Church has been able to maintain the abortion compromise and halt any progress towards same-sex unions, it could not block the antiviolence

35 Ramet, "Thy Will Be Done," 135–36.

36 "Apel Prezydium Konferencji Episkopatu Polski w związku z rozpoczęciem prac nad projektem ustawy o medycznym wspomaganiu prokreacji (in vitro)," accessed January 24, 2015, http://episkopat.pl/dokumenty/6549.1,Apel_Prezydium_Konferencji_Episkopatu_Polski_w_zwiazku_z_rozpoczeciem_prac_nad_projektem_ustawy_o_medycznym_wspomaganiu_prokreacji_in_vitro.html.

convention allegedly undermining the traditional model of family, nor could it prevent the adoption of IVF legislation by the Civic Platform government, although the new PiS cabinet has already stripped IVF programs of state funding.³⁷ On the second count—all-important, since public support is the greatest asset the Church can offer in bargaining with political parties—the majority of Poles support the existing law on abortion, coming increasingly closer to the position of the bishops. Between 1997 and 2006, the public acceptance of abortion “on demand” (without specifying the reason) within the first weeks of pregnancy fell from 65% to 44%.³⁸ On the other hand, as much as three-fourths of the respondents approve of sex before marriage (74%) and contraception (77%), while 62% accept divorce.³⁹ Many Polish Catholics, especially from the younger generations, are thus happy to “pick and choose” as far as the moral message of the Church is concerned.

Radio Maryja

Among the instruments with which the Church influences both other political actors and the society at large, one deserves special mention. Radio Maryja (“Radio Virgin Mary”), a local radio station established in 1991 in Toruń, has today developed into a nationwide concern consisting of a TV station (TV Trwam), a daily newspaper (*Nasz Dziennik*), a college, a charitable foundation, a number of businesses, including a cell phone network, and a company exploring geothermal energy, in addition to its radio station. Even more importantly, Radio Maryja has evolved into a social movement (often referred to as Radio Maryja Family) of considerable potential for political mobilization. Assuming that only half of the regular listeners of Radio Maryja (between 3.0% and 3.4% of the population in the

37 “Poland to end state funding for IVF treatment,” *The Guardian*, last modified December 2, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/poland-end-state-funding-ivf-treatment>.

38 Stanisław Burdziej, “Voice of the Disinherited? Religious Media After the 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Poland,” *East European Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (June 2008): 215–16.

39 “Kościołowi w polityce mówimy ‘nie’” (interview with Mirosława Grabowska), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, April 8, 2015, 11.

years 2012–2014)⁴⁰ are susceptible to political mobilization—a rather conservative estimate—this would still comprise nearly 700,000 people ready to respond to radio director Father Tadeusz Rydzyk's call to action.⁴¹

This potential was used in many of the openly political activities led by the radio station. It supported a number of right-wing parties and politicians, such as the Christian National Union, Jan Olszewski's Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and Marian Krzaklewski's Solidarity Electoral Action in the 1990s, Roman Giertych's League of Polish Families in the early 2000s and, most recently, the Kaczyński brothers' Law and Justice Party (although not without reservations). Backing the Church's conservative moral principles, Radio Maryja was instrumental in organizing the October 1996 antiabortion protests, with Fr. Rydzyk calling members of parliament supporting liberalization of the abortion law "criminals" and "traitors" who "should be shaved like prostitutes who sinned with Germans [during World War II]."⁴² Other significant political actions of the radio station include a drive to nullify the 1995 presidential elections, won by postcommunist candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski, with mass protests, a letter-writing campaign and other similar actions;⁴³ opposing the 1997 Constitution as not explicit enough in invoking God; opposing Poland's accession to the EU;⁴⁴ collecting money to save the bankrupt Gdańsk shipyard, the symbolic birthplace of Solidarity (with the funds allegedly later appropriated by the radio station);⁴⁵ and accusing former Solidarity leader and Polish president Lech Wałęsa of being a communist secret police informer. The station's fol-

40 Monika Trochimczuk, *Wskaźniki słuchalności i audytorium programów radiowych w 2012 r.* (Warsaw: KRRiT, 2013), accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/kontrola/program/radio/kwartalne/rynek_radio-wy2012.pdf; idem, *Udział w rynku i wielkość audytorium programów radiowych w II kwartale 2014 r.* (Warsaw: KRRiT 2014), accessed April 25, 2015, http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/regulacje-prawne/polska/kontrola-nadawcow/rynek_2_kwartal2014.pdf.

41 The annual Radio Mary Family pilgrimages to the Jasna Góra sanctuary gather between 200,000 and 500,000 of the station's followers. See "Jasna Góra: dziś rozpoczyna się Pielgrzymka Rodziny Radia Maryja," eKai, July 10, 2010, accessed April 28, 2015, <http://ekai.pl/diecezje/x30983/jasna-gora-dzis-rozpoczyna-sie-pielgrzymka-rodziny-radia-maryja/>.

42 Piotr Gołuchowski and Jacek Hołub, *Imperator: Ojciec Tadeusz Rydzyk* (Warsaw: Agora, 2013), 259.

43 Ibid., 110.

44 Burdziej, "Voice of the Disinherited?" 208.

45 Gołuchowski and Hołub, *Imperator*, 127–30.

lowers were also ready and disciplined whenever Radio Maryja's own interests were at stake; they joined to defend Fr. Rydzyk from prosecution connected with his slanderous labelling of liberal MPs, and demonstrated for a place for TV Trwam on a nationwide free broadcasting platform.

It is somewhat misleading to call Radio Maryja an instrument of the Church, since it certainly does not represent the views of the whole Catholic community in Poland, either within the hierarchy or among the rank and file. Although the division between the liberal ("Łagiewniki church") and the conservative ("Toruń church") wings of the Polish Church is often grossly exaggerated in the mainstream media,⁴⁶ Fr. Rydzyk's media concern is largely independent,⁴⁷ and many of its activities and positions are repugnant to some of the bishops. These include strong anti-Semitic and xenophobic sentiments alongside overt political engagement. On the other hand, there is no denying within the Church the orthodoxy, piety, and evangelization efforts of the Radio: in line with the Church as a whole, Radio Maryja is primarily a religious, not a political, entity.⁴⁸ This may explain why the hierarchy has always been hesitant to take any decisive action against the quasi-independence of the radio station. In fact, according to one interpretation, the bishops treat Radio Maryja in an instrumental way: they benefit from its success, but can always distance themselves from Fr. Rydzyk whenever he faces heavy criticism for his political excesses.⁴⁹

Conclusion

The new Third Republic of Poland, emerging from the shadow of communism, constituted itself as a democratic, secular state ensuring religious liberty for all. In this new pluralistic environment, emerging from the dissolution of an artificial ideological unity of the nation against the authori-

46 Karol Osłowski, "Radio Maryja w 'Gazecie Wyborczej' w latach 1998–2004" in *Czego nas uczy Radio Maryja*, ed. Ireneusz Krzemiński (Warsaw: WAIp, 2009), 156–70.

47 Radio Maryja is owned by the Redemptorist Order (to which Fr. Rydzyk belongs), thus not directly answerable to diocesan bishops.

48 On a given, average day, purely religious programs constitute over 40% of the broadcasting time, while news and programs with potentially (although not exclusively) socio-political content constitute less than 30% (the rest is filled with music, culture, local concerns, etc.) See radio program for April 25, 2015, <http://www.radiomaryja.pl/antena/program/dzisiaj/> (accessed April 25, 2015).

49 Zuba, "The Political Strategies", 121.

tarian regime, the Catholic Church found itself as only one among many voices in the public forum. It quickly assumed its role as a political actor within the democratic political system. Unlike other actors, its ultimate goals and motivations are otherworldly and its arguments normative and universal, rather than pragmatic and particular. But in other respects it does not differ so much from other political subjects.

We have seen the Church acting as a social movement (such as with Radio Maryja and its grassroots mobilization potential) and an interest group, using a variety of strategies, ranging from direct, oral, and written lobbying of decision-makers, to moral pressure often exerted by religious means (such as the threat of excommunication). At the same time, the Church retained its position as moral arbiter for a significant proportion of Poles, even though its moral principles met with a varying degree of acceptance. In doing this, it avoided the danger of privatization of religion, to use Casanova's terminology, and remained well-entrenched in the public sphere. The Church managed to secure its institutional-legal and financial position within a non-confessional, non-separatist model of Church-state relations and to realize some of its value-based goals (for instance, the ban on abortion for social-material reasons). To some extent, the Church's political fortunes have been dependent on the configuration of the political scene: for example, the Social Democrats had refused to ratify the concordat between 1993 and 1997, while the Civic Platform cabinet proved moderately resistant to the Church's stance on some moral issues. The current Law and Justice government has certainly proven more responsive to the bishops' demands (and those of Radio Maryja, which supported the PiS during the electoral campaign), but Poland remains a long way from a full alliance of Church and state.

The high visibility of religion in the public sphere and the participation of the Church in public discourse are, in general, socially accepted features of Polish political culture. As we have seen, the majority of Poles have no issue with religion in schools, religious symbols in public places, priests at state ceremonies or on TV, and being informed by the Church hierarchy on moral issues. The most deplorable, in the eyes of the public, form of Church politics—openly backing particular politicians and especially election candidates—has long been abandoned as the general policy of the Church, individual exceptions notwithstanding. The only activity in which the episcopate is heavily engaged, which is not accepted by the majority of the society, is taking a stand on particular legislation.

This attitude is one strong argument in favor of the continuous presence of religion in general, and the Catholic Church in particular, in the public forum. Another is a liberal-democratic one: there is no reason why the biggest non-governmental organization in the country, representing a significant proportion of society, should be denied a voice in shaping the country's politics. From this perspective, even the political activity of Radio Maryja can be valued as mobilizing hitherto inactive, mostly elderly people, to political participation (in the form of voting, demonstrating, letter-writing and so on), thus contributing to the growth of civil society—no matter what values or opinions this political participation is grounded in. Whether such activity is within the scope of the Church's mission is to be determined by its own community, not imposed from outside.

CHAPTER 7

Religiosity, Tolerance of Homosexuality, and Support for Gay and Lesbian Rights in Poland: The Present and the Likely Future(s)

EWA A. GOLEBIOWSKA

In a much-publicized election, Robert Biedroń became Poland's first openly gay mayor in December 2014.¹ Biedroń's success in the second round of a mayoral election in Slupsk, a small city in northern Poland, followed on the heels of his 2011 election as the first openly gay man to serve in the Polish Parliament. His accomplishments in Polish politics are especially impressive because they fly in the face of the internationally-known image of Poland as a hotbed of homophobia.

While Biedroń's electoral successes are important indicators of progress in the status of Poland's gay and lesbian community,² it would be premature to argue on their basis that homophobia is no longer a social, economic, and political problem in Poland—where I use the term homophobia loosely to refer to readiness to discriminate against individuals or groups on the basis of their sexual minority status.

More systematic evidence on the legal, social, economic, and political climate in which Polish gays and lesbians live points to a more complicated state of affairs. On the positive side, several changes have been made to the Polish gay and lesbian population's legal status since they

1 Not counting Marcin Nikrant, the first openly gay village administrator, or *sołtys*, elected in 2011.

2 I use the term gay(s) and lesbian(s) throughout, rather than more inclusive LGBT terminology, because the survey questions I use in my analyses refer to gays and lesbians.

began agitating for equality around the turn of the twenty-first century. On the longer, negative side of the ledger, few explicit instruments that protect sexual minorities can be found in Polish law, and recent legislation actually sanctions discrimination against them.³ Non-governmental organization (NGO) reports document numerous instances of psychological and sometimes physical violence that gays and lesbians face in Poland, alongside common experiences of discrimination with which they have to contend in housing, employment, health care, media portrayals, Church, and family life.⁴ Public opinion surveys also demonstrate that support for gay and lesbian rights in Poland is limited and has been evolving glacially—and not always in the direction of greater support for equality—since the first surveys on the subject have been conducted.⁵ Based on the totality of this evidence, it is no exaggeration to conclude that gays and lesbians constitute one of the most discriminated against minorities in present day Poland.

Because the present situation for Polish gays and lesbians appears decidedly bleak, it is important to consider what their future might look like. This question can be approached from more than one angle. For one, further changes in the legal landscape of protections based on sexual orientation can be anticipated (such as the passage of domestic partnership legislation, which has been introduced in the Polish parliament on several occasions). For another, informed predictions about positive developments in public opinion regarding gay and lesbian rights can be attempted. Investigating public opinion is important because future institutional changes in gays' and lesbians' status—as well as the overall well-being of this marginalized and stigmatized minority—hinge at least partially on positive developments in Polish attitudes.

In this chapter, I start with a brief description of the current institutional landscape of gay and lesbian rights in Poland, and review existing scholarship on the nature and sources of Polish public opinion regarding gay and lesbian rights. Subsequently, utilizing data from a nationally rep-

3 Ewa A. Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance: Attitudes towards Diversity in Poland* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 143–44.

4 Mirosława Makuchowska and Michał Pawłęga, *Situation of LGBT Persons in Poland: 2010 and 2011 Report* (Warsaw: Campaign Against Homophobia, 2012): 12–16; Krzysztof Śmiszek, *Dyskryminacja ze Względów na Orientację Seksualną i Tożsamość Płciową w Zatrudnieniu* (Warsaw: Kampania Przeciw Homofobii, 2012), 90–105.

5 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 145.

representative survey conducted by one of Poland's premier survey research organizations, I explore the nature and underpinnings of Polish views on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights. Building on previous research on attitudes toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights, I seek to identify in part the routes through which tolerance of gay and lesbian rights might grow over time. To that end, I contemplate whether the relatively strong link between religiosity and Polish views on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights might weaken as a result of growing levels of education and generational replacement.

The Institutional Landscape of Gay and Lesbian Rights in Poland

Homosexuality was not criminalized in communist Poland, but neither were the rights of sexual minorities protected under the law. In addition, the stigma attached to homosexuality in Polish society was so severe that few gays and lesbians dared to be open about their sexual orientation.⁶ Both the country's legal landscape and its sexual minority members' willingness to come out of the closet started undergoing significant changes in the period leading up to Poland's accession to the European Union (EU). In large part thanks to EU pressure, efforts to institutionalize equal treatment of Poland's sexual minorities' rights became part of the public agenda.⁷

In the decade since the country joined the European Union, several important changes have taken place in Poland's sexual minorities' legal status.⁸ Most significantly, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment has been explicitly prohibited in the country's Labor Code.⁹

6 Ibid., 143.

7 Robert Biedroń, "How Has Discrimination against Gays and Lesbians Become a Political Issue?" In *Situation of Bisexual and Homosexual Persons in Poland: 2005 and 2006 Report*, ed. Marta Abramowicz (Warsaw: Kampania Przeciw Homofobii, 2007), 37–44.

8 Krzysztof Śmiszek, "Changes in the Legal Situation of Homosexual Persons in Poland," In Marta Abramowicz (ed.), *Situation of Bisexual and Homosexual Persons in Poland: 2005–2006 Report* (Campaign against Homophobia: Warsaw, Poland, 2007), 45–50.

9 Krzysztof Śmiszek and Przemysław Szczepłocki, "Still Insufficient Legal Protection," in *Situation of LGBT Persons in Poland: 2010 and 2011 report*, ed. Mirosława Makuchowska and Michał Pawłęga (Warsaw: Lambda and Campaign Against Homophobia, 2012), 166–84.

In another significant legislative development, a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute that includes sexual orientation was enacted in 2010. With the passage of this statute, "Poland has prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in health care, employment, and education as well as in access to social and public services."¹⁰ However, this statute simultaneously permits broad discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as long as "it is necessary . . . in the name of public safety and order, protection of health and rights and freedoms of other people, or in order to avert otherwise illegal activities."¹¹

Aside from these two major exceptions, few legal instruments are in place which specifically pertain to equality on the basis of sexual orientation. Most importantly, same-sex marriages, gay and lesbian domestic partnerships, and gay and lesbian adoption rights are not legally recognized and are highly contentious matters in public debate.

Previous Research on Polish Public Opinion on Gay and Lesbian Rights

Generally speaking, systematic research on public opinion on gay and lesbian rights is extensive, although most of this research has focused on the West.¹² In one exception to this generalization, a spate of recent cross-national studies have examined attitudes toward homosexuality in Eastern Europe though, out of necessity, they have not given a lot of attention to the nuances of public opinion in any one country.¹³ Just as importantly,

10 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 143.

11 Ibid, 167.

12 For instance, Gregory M. Herek, "The Psychology of Sexual Prejudice," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 9, no. 1 (2000): 19–22; Gregory M. Herek, "Gender Gaps in Public Opinion about Lesbians and Gay Men," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 66, no. 1 (2002): 40–66; Gregory M. Herek, "Beyond Homophobia: Thinking about Sexual Stigma and Prejudice in the Twenty-First Century," *Sexuality Research and Social Policy* 1, no. 2 (2004): 6–24; Gregory M. Herek and John P. Capitanio, "'Some of My Best Friends': Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals' Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 22, no. 4 (1996): 412–24; Gregory M. Herek and Kevin A. McLemore, "Sexual Prejudice," *Annual Review of Psychology* 64 (2013): 309–33.

13 For instance, Hanneke van den Akker, Rozemarijn van der Ploeg, and Peer Sheepers, "Disapproval of Homosexuality: Comparative Research on Individual and National Determinants of Disapproval of Homosexuality in 20 European Countries,"

these studies have focused on cross-national variation in attitudes toward homosexuality, but have not explored public opinion on gay and lesbian civil rights and liberties. While it might seem that opinions about homosexuality are indistinguishable from attitudes toward gay and lesbian rights, they remain distinct conceptually because they should be driven by (at least partially) different predictors. For example, attitudes toward homosexuality should be more deeply tied to a person's religious values, and should therefore be shaped to a greater extent by religiosity than attitudes toward gay and lesbian rights. In contrast, views on gay and lesbian equality might be shaped more powerfully by an individual's commitment to equality as an overriding value. In short, the etiology of attitudes toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights should be examined separately.

The beginnings of research specifically examining Polish views on sexual minorities' rights and their sources roughly coincides with the politicization of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights around the time of Poland's 2004 accession to the European Union. Much of this writing on Polish attitudes toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights to date merely describes them. For example, survey reports discuss the levels of Polish acceptance of homosexuality and support for allowing gays and lesbians to show their sexual orientation in public, have sex, marry, enter into domestic partnerships, and adopt children, and for allowing gay and lesbian organizations to hold public rallies.¹⁴ Existing attempts to isolate the sources of Polish attitudes concerning sexual minorities are largely limited to bivariate or, at most, trivariate analyses and mostly consider the

International Journal of Public Opinion Research 25, no. 1 (2013): 64–86; Jürgen Gerhards, "Non-Discrimination towards Homosexuality: The European Union's Policy and Citizens' Attitudes towards Homosexuality in 27 European Countries," *International Sociology* 25, no. 1 (2010): 5–28; Anabel Kuntz, Eldad Davidov, Shalom H. Schwartz, and Peter Schmidt, "Human Values, Legal Regulation, and Approval of Homosexuality in Europe: a Cross-Country Comparison," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 45 (2015): 120–34; Susanne Slenders, Inge Sieben, and Ellen Verbakel, "Tolerance towards Homosexuality in Europe: Population Composition, Economic Affluence, Religiosity, Same-Sex Union Legislation, and HIV Rates as Explanations for Country Differences," *International Sociology* 29, no. 4 (2014): 348–67.

- 14 For instance, Michał Wenzel, "Akceptacja Praw dla Gejów i Lesbijek i Społeczny Dystans Wobec Nich," accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2005/K_127_05.PDF; Michał Wenzel, "Prawo do Publicznych Demonstracji Gejów i Lesbijek," accessed February 3, 2015, http://www.bezuprzedzen.org/doc/prawo_do_publicznych_demonstracji_gejow_i_lesbijek_2005_CBOS.pdf.

links between socio-demographic attributes and Polish views on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights.¹⁵ Put differently, researchers have examined correlations between Polish support for gay and lesbian rights and either one or two predictors at a time.¹⁶

While bivariate analyses effectively identify the population subgroups where greater or lower tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights resides, they cannot effectively determine which predictors are more important and which predictors are less important or unimportant, because some of the predictors may themselves be intercorrelated. For example, bivariate analyses purporting to show that interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians is strongly linked with a pro-equality attitude most likely overestimate the independent effect of contact, because its influence could be partially confounded with heterosexuals' other attributes that also shape their views on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights—be it their age, urban versus rural residence, or religiosity.

In an exception to these generalizations, I have previously used multivariate analysis to examine the etiology of Polish tolerance of gay and lesbian rights.¹⁷ Multivariate analysis makes it possible to isolate the significant influences on an outcome variable—such as tolerance—and to rank-order those significant influences in terms of their predictive might. Because the analytic techniques I have used have been more appropriate for isolating the influence of individual predictors, my findings to date are more conclusive with regard to the hierarchy of influences on Polish thinking about gay and lesbian rights. Thus, I have found that general tolerance of gay and lesbian rights, measured with questions about willingness to allow gays and lesbians to show their sexual orientation in public, have sex, marry, enter into civil unions, rally, and adopt children, is affected most strongly by the respondents' conceptions of family, opinions about

15 For instance, Michał Feliksiak, 2013, "Stosunek Polaków do Praw Gejów i Lesbijek oraz Związków Partnerskich," accessed April 10, 2015, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_024_13.PDF.

16 For instance, Ireneusz Krzemiński, "Tolerancja, Stosunek do Innych Narodowości oraz do Mniejszości," In *Demokracja w Polsce 2005–2007*, ed. Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Jacek Kucharczyk, and Jarosław Zbieranek (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2007), 336; Michał Feliksiak, "Stosunek Polaków do Praw Gejów i Lesbijek."

17 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 143; Ewa A. Golebiowska, "Tolerance of Polish Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace," in *Sexual Orientation and Transgender Issues in Organizations: Global Perspectives on LGBT Workforce Diversity*, ed. Thomas Köllen (New York: Springer, 2016), 451–66.

Poland's membership in the European Union, age, religiosity, and ideological self-identification.¹⁸ Tolerance of gays and lesbians in employment moves most predictably with respondents' interest in politics, opinions on Poland's membership in the European Union, age, and ideological self-identification.¹⁹

Some of the predictors touted by previous researchers for their empirical prowess in predicting opinions about gay and lesbian rights have failed to deliver a "big punch" in the multivariate analyses I have previously reported.²⁰ Most dramatically, even though it tended to be linked significantly with tolerance of gay and lesbian rights, interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians has had a rather anemic impact once the influence of other predictors has been isolated. Similarly, education, often considered a major antidote to prejudice and intolerance, was correlated with Polish tolerance of gay and lesbian rights only weakly at best.²¹

In this chapter, I build on existing research to address several new questions about Polish attitudes toward sexual minorities. First, I compare and contrast the sources of Polish sentiments toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights. Second, given the importance of religiosity as a predictor in previous analyses of tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights,²² I examine its role in Polish tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights more carefully. Within this analysis, I compare and contrast the impact that two different dimensions of religiosity—frequency of religious attendance and frequency of listening to Catholic news on the radio—have on approval of homosexuality and attitudes toward gay and lesbian rights. Furthermore, I seek to determine whether and how the impact of religiosity depends on respondents' education and

18 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 155–59; Ewa A. Golebiowska, "The Links Between Gender Role Beliefs, Conceptions of the Family, Attitudes toward Poland's Membership in the European Union, Religiosity, and Polish Support for Gay and Lesbian Rights," *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, March 14, 1–19 (2016).

19 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 155–59.

20 Ibid., also Ewa A. Golebiowska, "Tolerance of Polish Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace," 13.

21 Ibid.

22 For instance, N. Susan Gaines and James C. Garand, "Morality, Equality, or Locality: Analyzing the Determinants of Support for Same-Sex Marriage," *Political Research Quarterly* 63, no. 3 (2010): 553–67; Gregory M. Herek and Kevin A. McLemore, "Sexual Prejudice," 309–333; Darren E. Sherkat, Melissa Powell-Williams, Gregory Maddox, and Kylan M. de Vries, "Religion, Politics, and Support for Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, 1988–2008," *Social Science Research* 40 (2011): 167–80.

age. Finally, the findings I report here partially replicate my previous examinations because they are based on a different data set.

Hypotheses

The models of tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights that I estimate include socio-demographic and political variables, socio-economic perceptions, and interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians. The socio-demographic variables that might influence attitudes toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights include education, age, religiosity, sex, and area of residence. I expect individuals who are well-educated,²³ younger,²⁴ less religious,²⁵ female,²⁶ and residing in bigger towns or cities²⁷ to embrace more favorable views toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights than their counterparts who are poorly educated, older, more religious, male, and living in smaller towns or villages.

In an effort to provide a richer portrait of the links between religiosity and Polish views on gay and lesbian rights, I include two measures of religiosity—only weakly correlated with each other ($r = .17$, $p < .01$)—in the model. Both measures capture differences in religious practice, rather than religious affiliation, because an overwhelming majority of Poles identify as Catholic. Therefore, it is not practical to examine religion-related differences in Poles' views based on the nationally representative data I employ. The first measure is a commonly used indicator, namely frequency of church attendance. In light of the Catholic Church's doctrinal condemnation of homosexuality, more frequent churchgoers should be less tolerant

23 Marta Selinger, "Intolerance toward Gays and Lesbians in Poland," *Human Rights Review* 9 (2008): 15–27.

24 Ewa A. Golebiowska, "Gay and Lesbian Rights," in *Public Opinion and Polling Around the World: a Historical Encyclopedia*, Vol. 1, ed. John Geer (Santa Barbara, CA: ABL-CLIO, 2004), 244–50.

25 For instance, Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 156–57; Bernard E. Whitley, "Religiosity and Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men: a Meta-Analysis," *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 19 (2009): 21–38.

26 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 156–157; Gregory M. Herek, "Heterosexuals' Attitudes toward Lesbians and Gay Men: Correlates and Gender Differences," *The Journal of Sex Research* 25, no. 4 (1988): 451–77.

27 Krzysztof Zabłocki, "Surviving Under Pressure: Working for 'Days of Tolerance' in Poland," in *Challenging Homophobia: Teaching about Sexual Diversity*, ed. Lutz van Dijk and Barry van Driel (Stoke-on-Trent, UK: Trentham Books, 2007).

of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights because they are more likely to be exposed to their Church's negative messages about homosexuality.²⁸ The second measure of religiosity attempts to capture an independent effect of exposure to more extreme religious rhetoric on Radio Maryja, a Catholic media outlet that broadcasts across Poland, alongside any local Catholic stations to which respondents might be listening. I expect that the negative messages about homosexuality and gays and lesbians are likely to be amplified in those media and, as a result, listening to Radio Maryja and/or a local Catholic outlet should have a stronger influence on tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights than frequency of religious attendance. Thus, individuals who listen to these radio stations less frequently should be more tolerant than those who listen to them more frequently.²⁹

In the absence of a direct measure of respondents' sexual orientation which I could control, I include a measure of respondents' domestic partnership status as a proxy for their sexual orientation. Certainly, this is only a crude proxy because cohabitation in present day Poland is not limited to members of sexual minorities. Regardless, those who live with domestic partners may be expected to embrace less traditional family ideologies and should, for that reason, be more eager to support gay and lesbian rights than those who do not have a domestic partner.

Respondents' political attributes may also influence their views on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights. In my previous research, I have shown that support for gay and lesbian rights is associated with greater political interest, self-placement on the left of the ideological self-identification scale, and contentment with Poland's membership in the European Union.³⁰ In this chapter, I re-examine the predictive power of ideological self-identification and interest in politics, expecting more favorable views towards homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights among those on the ideological left and those with a greater interest in politics.

There is also reason to anticipate that respondents' personal experiences with the economy and their perceptions of Poland's economic well-

28 Jürgen Gerhards, "Non-Discrimination towards Homosexuality," 5–28.

29 "Rydzik: Geje Gorski jak Komunizm," Fakt24.pl, accessed April 20, 2015, <http://www.fakt.pl/ojciec-dyrektor-tadeusz-rydzik-o-homoseksualizmie-szef-radia-maryja-o-gejach-artykuly,203232,1.html>.

30 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 156–57.

being might affect their views on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights.³¹ This expectation derives from the scapegoating theory which suggests that members of the majority tend to be more charitable toward minority group members during economically propitious times and less charitable in times of economic stress.³² In the analyses I report in this chapter, I examine the links between subjective individual financial well-being and perceptions of the state of Polish economy on the one hand, and approval of homosexuality and support for gay and lesbian rights on the other. I expect more favorable attitudes among those who are more satisfied with their finances and view Poland as economically successful.

Intergroup contact is another theoretically important variable worthy of inclusion in any analysis of tolerance. Extensive research on the so-called contact hypothesis demonstrates that contact with members of one's outgroup can lead to a reduction of prejudice towards it.³³ In line with that body of research, previous scholarship on Polish public opinion suggests that interpersonal contact with gays or lesbians has a sizable influence on attitudes towards them—though as I have noted above, this research does not control for other factors which might be at least partially responsible for the apparent magnitude of contact's effect.³⁴ In contrast, in my previous multivariate analyses of Polish tolerance of different gay and lesbian rights, I have found the influence of contact to range from modest to non-significant.³⁵ Nevertheless, I once again examine the link between interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians and Polish opinions on homosexuality and gay and lesbian equality, expecting more positive attitudes among respondents who know someone who is gay or lesbian than among those who have not had any interpersonal contact with gays or lesbians.

31 Ibid.

32 Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1954), 325–34; Michał Bilewicz and Ireneusz Krzemiński, "Anti-Semitism in Poland and Ukraine: The Belief in Jewish Control as a Mechanism of Scapegoating," *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 4, no. 2 (2010): 234–43.

33 Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*, 453–55; Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda Tropp, "How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-analytic Tests of Three Indicators," *Journal of European Social Psychology* 38, no. 6 (2008): 922–34.

34 For instance, Ireneusz Krzemiński, "Tolerancja, Stosunek do Innych Narodowości," 336.

35 Golebiowska, *The Many Faces of Tolerance*, 157; Ewa A. Golebiowska, "Tolerance of Polish Gays and Lesbians in the Workplace."

Finally, in an effort to illuminate the paths through which the expected impact of religiosity on Polish views on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights might diminish over time, I examine four interactions that involve religiosity. Initially, I consider a possibility that the impact of religiosity on Polish public opinion of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights, whether measured with a question about religious attendance or frequency of listening to Catholic radio, is dependent on the respondents' age. Further, I examine the possibility that the link between religiosity, whether based on religious attendance or tuning in to Catholic news, and public opinion on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights depends on respondents' level of education. I put forward a non-directional prediction regarding the direction of the four interactions. On the one hand, it could be expected that religiosity would have less influence among younger and more educated Poles, as the levels of religiosity have been declining in those two demographic subgroups.³⁶ On the other hand, religiosity might have more influence among younger and more educated Poles, and less influence on the judgments of older and less-educated respondents. Older and less-educated respondents may have many other reasons to oppose homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights—whether because they unquestioningly accept their religion's teachings on homosexuality or because they subscribe to negative stereotypes of gays and lesbians, for example—leaving little room for additional messages condemning homosexuality, whether through higher Church attendance or through Catholic media outlets, to influence their opposition. Conversely, younger and more educated respondents should exhibit a stronger commitment to equal treatment of all people and reject negative stereotypes of any group, leading them to be more accepting of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights in general. At the same time, they may also be more open to countervailing messages on these issues when they attend their place of worship more frequently or listen to Catholic media outlets more often.

36 Rafał Boguszewski, *Religijność i Moralność w Społeczeństwie Polskim: Zależność czy Autonomia* (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2012); Mirosława Marody and Sławomir Mandes, "Przemiany Polskiej Religijności," in *Wartości i Zmiany: Przemiany Postaw Polaków w Jednoczącej się Europie*, ed. Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar), 191–206.

Data

I rely on nationally representative survey data collected by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion (CBOS) in order to explore the underpinnings of Polish attitudes toward homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights. Face-to-face interviews were conducted between May 9 and 12, 2008 with a random sample of 1,116 adult Poles. More information about CBOS' polling methodology is available on its web site (<http://www.cbos.pl>). The wording of all questions I use in my analysis is available in the Appendix.

Polish Public Opinion on Gay and Lesbian Rights and its Sources


To start my exploration, I report differences in Polish approval of homosexuality and willingness to allow gays and lesbians to show their homosexuality in public, have sex, marry, form civil unions, and adopt children, as well as to allow gay and lesbian organizations to stage public demonstrations. The relevant data are summarized in Figure 1. For the sake of simplification, I report percentages of tolerant and intolerant responses only but have left out the middle category in each case.

Figure 1 demonstrates that a great majority of Poles consider homosexuality not to be normal, though a majority nonetheless say that it should be tolerated. More specifically, about a third of respondents express a most critical view of homosexuality, claiming that it is not normal and should not be tolerated; a majority consider it not to be normal, but are willing to tolerate it; and only fewer than one in ten think of homosexuality as normal.

Most respondents are also generally unwilling to extend various civil rights and liberties to sexual minorities. Solid majorities oppose same-sex marriage and adoption, allowing gays and lesbians to show their sexual orientation in public, and allowing gay and lesbian organizations to stage public demonstrations. Opposition to same-sex marriage and adoption is especially vehement. Majorities are not only opposed but express strong antagonism by indicating that they would "definitely not allow" same-sex marriages (53%) and, to an even greater extent, adoption (75%). Views are more closely divided on the question of whether gays and lesbians should be allowed to have sex or whether domestic partnerships for gays and lesbians should be legalized. Nevertheless, negative responses to the latter two questions are also common.

Figure 7.1

Polish tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights
(Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 2008)



"Tolerant" in the case of homosexuality refers to a % of Rs who say that homosexuality is normal,

"intolerant" refers to a % of Rs who say is not normal and should not be tolerated.

"Tolerant" in all other cases refers to %s of Rs who say that a particular activity should be allowed or definitely allowed,

"intolerant" refers to %s of Rs who say that a particular activity should not be allowed or definitely not allowed.

Since the data on which I am relying were collected a few years ago, one might ask what changes, if any, have taken place in Polish approval of homosexuality and support for gay and lesbian rights since. The short answer is few, if any.³⁷ Survey reports that are based on more recent data allude to a tiny increase in the number of Poles who say that homosexuality is normal and who support equal treatment for Poland's sexual minorities—though such an increase is not evident at all in support for gays' and lesbians' right to adopt children. Given the small magnitude of observed changes, one cannot tell for sure whether tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights has grown over time, or whether the changes that are registered in more recent surveys simply reflect sampling error.³⁸ In short, while the data I use may not perfectly capture the most current levels of opposition to gay and lesbian rights, there is good reason to believe that the numbers I report here have largely remained steady.

37 Michał Feliksiak, "Stosunek Polaków do Praw Gejów i Lesbijek," 4–5.

38 Or, indeed, the fact that all available data are based on samples of the Polish public, and thus generalizations on their basis are only accurate within a certain margin of error or sampling error.

While overwhelmingly negative perceptions of homosexuality and widespread opposition to gay and lesbian equality prevail, the data also show that Poles differ among themselves, whether in the direction of their views or at least in their intensity. Therefore, at the next stage of analysis, I seek to identify the sources of Polish support for gay and lesbian equality by testing the hypotheses I described above. OLS (ordinary least squares) regression is the analytic technique I use to identify the sources of attitudes toward homosexuality and support for gay and lesbian rights.³⁹ There are two dependent variables in this analysis: firstly, a question about whether homosexuality is normal and should be tolerated; and secondly, an additive scale capturing Poles' views on gay and lesbian rights, composed of the six questions I described above. Both dependent variables are coded such that a lower score corresponds to a more negative view of homosexuality and lower support for gay and lesbian rights. All predictors are coded with an expectation of a positive correlation with the dependent variables. All variables have also been rescaled to a 0–1 scale, making it possible to compare and contrast the effects of independent variables using unstandardized regression coefficients.

I first regress the two dependent variables on all the predictors in the model (main effects models). Subsequently, I re-estimate these two models with the interaction terms between both measures of religiosity on the one hand, and respondents' education and age on the other, in order to determine whether the effects of religiosity on tolerance are contingent on respondents' education and age (interaction models). The results from the main effects models are available in Table 7.1. I discuss the relevant results from the interaction models in the text that follows.

The results in Table 7.1 demonstrate that respondents' education, age, sex, ideological self-identification, and both measures of religiosity—church attendance and listening to Catholic news on the radio—are significantly correlated with Polish opinions about homosexuality. The direction of all significant influences is in line with expectations—respondents who are more educated, younger, female, identify with the ideological left, and are less religious on both measures of religiosity express more charitable

39 Technically, ordinal regression would be a more appropriate tool for analyzing differences in attitudes towards homosexuality. Because the results based on OLS regression are largely equivalent—and it is a more commonly used and better understood technique—I report OLS results instead.

Table 7.1

*Sources of Polish tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights
(Based on the data from the Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 2008)*

Predictor	Tolerance of homosexuality	Tolerance of gay and lesbian rights
Education	.21 ***	.09 ***
Age	.18 ***	.21 ***
Sex	.07 ***	.07 ***
Area of residence	.03	.05 **
Frequency of church attendance	.09 **	.16 ***
Frequency of listening to Catholic news	.20 ***	.09 **
Domestic partnership status	.04	.02
Political interest	.07 *	.12 ***
Ideological self-identification	.12 **	.11 ***
Personal experiences with the economy	.02	-.01
Perceptions of Poland's economic well-being	.08 *	.11 ***
Interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians	.05 *	.06 **
R-squared	.25	.19
F/sig F	27.61 ***	17.6 ***

*Numbers in the table are unstandardized regression coefficients; they are directly comparable within and across models because all variables have been re-scaled to 0–1 prior to all analyses; *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$*

views towards homosexuality. Variation in opinions about homosexuality is also predicted marginally by respondents' satisfaction with the state of the Polish economy. As expected, respondents who are more satisfied

with the state of the Polish economy are more tolerant of homosexuality. Examination of the magnitude of unstandardized regression coefficients associated with each significant effect shows that education, listening to Catholic news on the radio, and age are the three most important influences on Polish attitudes towards homosexuality; these three factors are largely comparable in their influence. Ideological self-identification, satisfaction with the state of the Polish economy, and church attendance are relatively less influential.

The results of the multiple regression model predicting Polish opinions on gay and lesbian rights demonstrate that all predictors, save for respondents' satisfaction with their own finances, are significantly correlated with tolerance of gay and lesbian rights. As expected, greater support for gay and lesbian rights can be found among respondents who are younger, more educated, less religious on both measures of religiosity, female, more politically interested, more satisfied with Poland's economy, located on the ideological left, who know a gay or lesbian person, and who live in a larger urban area. Judging from the size of unstandardized regression coefficients associated with each significant effect, age and religiosity—measured as church attendance—are most strongly linked with opinions on gay and lesbian equality. Political interest, ideological self-identification, and satisfaction with the state of the Polish economy are also relatively important influences on tolerance of gay and lesbian rights.

Of most interest in the results from the interaction models is the impact of the four interactions designed to capture the expected conditional effects of church attendance and listening to Catholic news. Of the four interactions that involve the two measures of religiosity, education, and age, only an interaction between respondents' education and frequency of church attendance achieves an acceptable level of statistical significance in both models ($b = .24$, $p < .04$ in the model of tolerance of homosexuality and $b = .36$, $p < .001$ in the model of tolerance of gay and lesbian rights). To interpret each interaction, I have re-estimated the model for three subgroups of respondents—those in the bottom third on the education measure (or least educated), those in the middle third, and those in the top third (or most educated). This analysis shows that religious attendance significantly influences tolerance of homosexuality among the most educated respondents ($b = .17$, $p < .01$) but has no significant influence on the views of the least educated respondents and those in the middle third on the education measure. Religious attendance has no sig-

nificant influence on tolerance of gay and lesbian rights among the least educated respondents and significantly affects the views of the middle third and most-educated respondents ($b = .15, p < .01$ and $b = .27, p < .27$, respectively). In short, the impact of greater church attendance on tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights increases with respondents' education.

Conclusions

I have set out in this chapter to describe the institutional environment of gay and lesbian rights in present-day Poland, and to illuminate the nature and etiology of Polish attitudes towards homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights with an eye towards making informed speculations about their future evolution. My brief overview of the institutional environment in which Polish gays and lesbians live demonstrates that sexual minority status now receives some protection under the law. However, equal treatment is not guaranteed in all domains of public and private life and, in some cases, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is permitted under the law.

In keeping with previous research reports on Polish public opinion on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights,⁴⁰ I have demonstrated that Poles as a group remain negatively disposed towards homosexuality and extending full equality to sexual minorities. At the same time, there is some variation in contemporary public opinion on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights in Poland, whether in the direction or intensity of views. As such, I sought to identify the underpinnings of these differences in order to predict how these attitudes might evolve in the future. To that end, I estimated multiple regression models of attitudes towards homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights and examined how the influence of religiosity on tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights depends on respondents' education and age.

As expected, my analysis demonstrated that the most important influences on tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights over-

40 For instance, Michał Wenzel, "Akceptacja Praw dla Gejów i Lesbijek;" Michał Wenzel, "Osobista Znajomość i Akceptacja Praw Gejów;" Michał Wenzel, "Prawo do Publicznych Demonstracji;" Michał Feliksiak, "Stosunek Polaków do Praw Gejów i Lesbijek."

lapped only partially. Specifically, differences in Polish attitudes toward homosexuality were predicted most effectively by respondents' educational level, the frequency of listening to Radio Maryja or a local Catholic station, and age. To a lesser extent, tolerance of homosexuality also varied with ideological self-identification, satisfaction with the state of the Polish economy, and frequency of church attendance. Differences in Polish tolerance of gay and lesbian rights were predicted most effectively with information about respondents' age and frequency of their church attendance. To a lesser extent, tolerance of gay and lesbian rights also varied with political interest, ideological self-identification, satisfaction with the state of the Polish economy, differences in the frequency of listening to Catholic radio outlets, and educational level. Interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians, respondents' sex, and size of the town or city in which they live were also significantly but very weakly linked with tolerance of gay and lesbian rights. Finally, the influence of church attendance on both tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights was also conditioned by education, such that its impact increased with respondents' educational level.

Collectively, these results are a good platform from which to attempt forecasts about the future of Polish public opinion on homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights. Given the links between education, religiosity, and age on the one hand, and opinions about homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights on the other, acceptance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights should grow as a result of educational increases, greater secularization, and generational replacement. Recent trends in educational attainment and, to a lesser extent, religiosity would seem to bode well in this regard, as the number of Poles pursuing higher education has been on a steep increase since the country's transition to democratic governance commenced. Moreover, some signs of secularization have been surfacing, especially among well-educated and younger individuals.⁴¹ On the other hand, the nexus between satisfaction with the economy and tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights has less straight-

41 "Wyniki Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego Ludności i Mieszkań 2011," Główny Urząd Statystyczny, accessed April 30, 2015, http://stat.gov.pl/cps/rde/xbcr/gus/lu_nps2011_wyniki_nsp2011_22032012.pdf; Rafał Boguszewski, *Religijność i Moralność w Społeczeństwie Polskim*; Mirosława Marody and Sławomir Mandes, "Przemiany Polskiej Religijności," 191–206.

forward implications for the future of public opinion in this area. In line with predictions of the scapegoating theory, it suggests that tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights might increase in economically auspicious times, but wane in bleaker economic circumstances.

The dependence of the impact of church attendance on education further suggests that educational increases should soften the hostility that homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights currently evoke in Poland. Churchgoers are more intolerant than non-churchgoers in general but this is especially true among well-educated Poles. In other words, the more frequent churchgoers differ from their less frequent counterparts to a lesser extent, if at all, among less-educated Poles; by contrast, they are substantially more intolerant than less frequent churchgoers among the well-educated. This suggests that, with further educational increases in Poland, likely coinciding with further declines in church attendance among well-educated Poles,⁴² tolerance of homosexuality and gay and lesbian rights might grow overall as a result of increases in the number of well-educated Poles who are also less likely to attend church.

Finally, somewhat dishearteningly from the perspective of identifying sources of increasing support for gay and lesbian rights in the future, interpersonal contact with gays or lesbians is linked with tolerance of gay and lesbian rights only weakly once the influence of other factors has been controlled, and is only marginally associated with Poles' opinions about homosexuality. These findings fly in the face of others' arguments about the importance of interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians. They also suggest that, in spite of recent increases in the number of heterosexual Poles who know someone belonging to a sexual minority, we cannot currently expect tolerance to grow very much as a consequence of this contact.⁴³

42 Rafal Boguszewski, *Religijność i Moralność w Społeczeństwie Polskim*, 145.

43 Michał Feliksiak, "Stosunek Polaków do Praw Gejów i Lesbijek," no page.

Appendix

Wording of all survey questions used in the analyses reported in the chapter (items that have been reverse-coded are marked with *)

Tolerance of homosexuality: Do you think that “homosexuality is not normal and should not be tolerated” (1), “homosexuality is not normal but should be tolerated” (2), and “homosexuality is normal” (3)

Tolerance of gay and lesbian rights: Should gay or lesbian couples, or two people of the same sex who are in an intimate relationship, have a right to:

- a. Show their lifestyle in public
- b. Marry
- c. Have a domestic partnership that is not a marriage in which partners have the same property rights like married people, e.g., right to joint taxation, inheritance
- d. Adopt children
- e. Have sex

Education: What is your education? Coded from “less than grade school” (1) to “MA or higher” (11)

Age: In what year were you born?

Religiosity:

Frequency of religious attendance—Do you participate in religious practices such as masses or religious meetings? Coded from “yes, typically several times a week” (1) to “never” (5)

Frequency of following religious news—How often do you listen to Radio Maryja? and How often do you listen to your local Catholic station? Coded from “daily or almost daily” (1) to “never” (5)

Gender: Coded by the interviewer as “male” (1) or “female” (2)

Size of town or city: In what type of area do you live? Coded from "village" (1) to "city of 500,000 or more" (6).

* *Domestic partnership status:* Regardless of your marital status, do you live in an informal domestic partnership? Coded "yes" (1) or "no" (2)

Personal experiences with the economy: How would you rate your household's material situation? Coded from "bad" (1) to "good" (5)

* *Perceptions of Poland's economic well-being:* How would you rate Poland's economic situation? Coded from "very good" (1) to "very bad" (5)

* *Ideological self-identification:* Different political views are marked on the following line from "left-wing" (1) to "right-wing" (7). Which of these points corresponds best to your views?

* *Interest in politics:* How would you describe your interest in politics? Coded from "very high—I carefully follow almost everything that happens in politics" (1) to "none—I am not at all interested in it" (5)

* *Interpersonal contact with gays and lesbians:* Do you personally know any gays or lesbians? Coded "yes" (1) or "no" (2)

CHAPTER 8

The National–Catholic Impact on Anti-Semitism in Poland: Report of the Significant Results of Empirical Research

IRENEUSZ KRZEMIŃSKI

Basic Information about the Study

The following chapter, which presents the main results of the study carried out in 2012 (National Science Centre grant, Project No. 2011/01/B/HS6/01957: “Anti-Semitism, xenophobia and national stereotypes for the third time”), focuses on the correlations between anti-Semitic attitudes and religiosity. The study, which is the basis for the analyses to follow, was the third in a series of similar studies, the first of which was carried out in 1992, at the beginning of the democratic transformation occurring in Polish society. The second iteration of the study was carried out in 2002. Unfortunately, our studies were not panel studies, so for each study a representative sample of the adult population (those aged eighteen and over) in Poland was drawn by the Laboratory of Social Research in Sopot. We strived to ensure that the samples were chosen in a similar manner. In any case, the last sample was chosen analogously to the one in 2002. This was supposed to increase the comparability of results obtained in subsequent polls.

The sample size has also changed in the last survey. While in 1992 and 2002, the sample was slightly over 1,000 people, in the study of 2012 the sample size was higher and we expected a selection of 1,200 people for the survey.

The survey was carried out by researchers who used laptops to record the respondents’ answers. The survey was quite long and difficult for the

respondents. At the end, we asked what the respondents and researchers thought of the survey, and we can say that the respondents and interviewers generally evaluated it positively. They typically affirmed that despite the difficult questions put forth in the survey, it was very interesting and—withstanding some of the researcher-consultants' concerns—respondents gladly answered all of the questions.

Despite changing some of the questions and adding others, the main set of questions concerning the measurement of anti-Semitic attitudes, as well as questions regarding national-ethnic minorities and national stereotypes, could not be altered. In the latest study, we restored some of the questions from the 1992 survey, which were eliminated from the one in 2002 due to the rate of changes in mentality and changes in social relations. This includes a specific transformation of Polish religiosity in some parts of Polish society.

Basic Questions, Assumptions, and Hypotheses of the Study

The primary objective of the study was to determine the prevalence of anti-Semitic attitudes among Poles. From the beginning, however, we tried to analyze anti-Semitic attitudes in the wider context of attitudes towards other nationalities and ethnic groups: in other words, xenophobia. We also analyzed the anti-Semitic and xenophobic attitudes in the broader context of the stereotypes of nations, important for Poles, particularly stereotypes of the most important, neighboring nations, as well important as the Jews. The content of national stereotypes could determine the xenophobic and anti-Jewish opinions. It was equally important to examine the autostereotype, or the self-image of one's own national group. Beliefs, which are the expression of the content of the national identity, were connected with the hypotheses of the study and proved to be an important factor in explaining attitudes.

Above all, however, the basic premise of the study and its hypothesis was the presence of two types of anti-Semitic attitudes in peoples' minds. In the first studies, we identified, along with Helena Datner, two types of anti-Semitic attitudes, namely traditional and modern anti-Semitism. The theoretical idea was to explain the differentiation of anti-Semitic attitudes by the kind of justifications of the antipathy and hostility toward Jews. People generally do not tolerate negative attitudes well—their persis-

tence in the consciousness of individuals requires substantial justification. Typological differentiation of anti-Semitic attitudes was therefore based on various justifications of resentful and hostile attitudes towards Jews.

The first type of attitudes are those in which the dislike of Jews was justified by traditional religious stereotypes, the main accusation being that the Jews are responsible for the death of Jesus Christ. We called this type of attitudes traditional anti-Semitism, while the second type we called modern anti-Semitism—the justification for the hatred of Jews in this case was based on the content of anti-Semitic ideology. We assume here, following the thought of Hannah Arendt,¹ that anti-Semitic ideology emerged in Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world along with modernity, namely after the French Revolution. It attributed to Jews negative traits and great influence, primarily a supposed control of world finance, the pursuit of power in every situation in a surreptitious manner, and a special solidarity—“Jews stick together”—which threatened, of course, the interests of the dominant nation. Often this was accompanied by another set of beliefs: blaming Jews for communism and supporting the revolution, which, by extension, destroyed the established order of civilization rooted in Christianity. The views which were commonly referred to as “Judeo-communism” were especially important in East Central Europe.² Assigning blame to Jews for communism somehow was not in conflict with—as I previously mentioned—anti-Semitic accusations blaming Jews for their control of world capital.³

These basic tenets of anti-Semitic ideology were similar across all of Europe, although they were generally prompted by and strongly linked to national, indeed nationalistic, ideologies. Therefore, anti-Semitism would take on the specific shade of a particular national ideology. Modern anti-Semitism in Poland was integrally linked with the national democratic ideology and thought of Roman Dmowski (1864–1939).⁴ I will interpret

1 Hannah Arendt, *The origins of totalitarianism*, rev. ed. (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).

2 See, for instance, Paweł Śpiewak, *Żydokomuna: interpretacje historyczne [Judeo-communism: historical interpretations]* (Warsaw: Wyd. Czerwone i Czarne, 2012).

3 Currently there are concepts binding ideological anti-Semitism with “modernity,” which assign particular importance for the formation of the modern ideology of anti-Semitism with Germany and Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, see: Steven Beller, *Antisemitism: a Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

4 Roman Dmowski, *Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka* (Lwów: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze; H. Altenberg, 1907).

the most important ideas of Dmowski expressed in his work, *Thoughts of a Modern Pole*. In this work, Dmowski contrasts "modern patriotism" with Romantic patriotism, of which he is essentially critical; he also accuses the nobility and aristocracy of promoting Jews, and thereby making it impossible for the indigenous Polish bourgeoisie (the middle class, which is the source of modernity) to flourish and develop. Therefore, it is essential to eliminate Jews from Polish life so that a Polish native middle class can appear, which could then lead the modernization of the country and the nation. In this way Dmowski laid the foundations for a modern political ideology, creating a model of patriotism for a Catholic Pole, anti-Jewish in his assumptions from the very beginning. He would also be hostile to the "individualist" idea of liberal democracy. As such, the idea of "national" democracy emerged as the "proper" system for the reborn Polish state, which did not exist at the time, the territory of Poland having been divided between three invaders.⁵ I note this at the outset because it is important for the interpretation of our results.

Another important hypothesis of our study was the assumption of a competition between Poles and Jews for moral and cultural superiority of one nation over the other. I assumed that the foundations of Polish national consciousness are built on opposition toward, Jews (but also toward Germans). In saying this, I am referring to the view which attributes a "moral superiority" to Poles, since they were guided throughout history by noble motives and kept their promises even at the expense of their own interests, while never simply making calculations of their national gains, something which supposedly characterized the Jews (and, indeed, the Germans). From this view also derives an apologia for Polish suffering as the logical price for choosing nobility over calculation, which led to many failures and, as a result, national suffering. Competition for noble behavior throughout history is thus an expression of deeper ideas of national identity.⁶

5 Broad introductions to this period for the English-speaking reader include Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe: a Short History of Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); also Norman Davies, *God's Playground: a History of Poland*, vol. 2, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

6 See, for instance, Ireneusz Krzemiński, "Anti-Semitism in Today's Poland: Research Hypotheses," *Patterns of Prejudice* 27, no. 1 (1993): 127–35; also Ireneusz Krzemiński, "The Polish–Jewish Rivalry: Complex Background to the Dialogue", in *Jews and Christians in Dialogue II: Identity-Tolerance-Understanding*, ed. Michał Bron Jr (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 2001), 141–51.

Finally, a few comments regarding our methodology: how did we investigate anti-Semitic attitudes? Well, we assumed, according to the principles mentioned earlier, that stereotypical and critical statements about Jews will not always be indicative of significantly hostile or antagonistic attitudes about them. Various Polish researchers pointed this out, for instance Alina Cała in her study of peasant opinions about Jews: not all comments which assigned stereotypically negative traits to Jews were signs of anti-Semitic attitudes.⁷ Indeed, this was the case in our first study: the national stereotype of Jews included both positive and negative traits. Meanwhile, anti-Semitic stereotyping precludes any positive traits whatsoever; even those features that are positively viewed in other national stereotypes, in this case take on a negative meaning (for example, the previously mentioned national ties). Therefore, our indicators of anti-Semitic attitudes were not questions based on the content of national stereotypes. Instead, indicators of traditional anti-Semitic attitudes were answers to the question of whether Jews are guilty of the murder of Jesus Christ, as well as the question of whether Jews themselves are to blame for what happened to them throughout history.

The indicators of modern anti-Semitic attitudes were answers to questions about undue influence or power of Jews in the spheres of the economy, politics, and the media (specifically, the press, radio, and television) in Poland, as well as the question of the influence of Jews in the world. In fact, there were more questions that we selected as possible indicators of anti-Semitic attitudes (for instance, whether a Jew brought up in the Polish tradition is a Pole, or remains a Jew), but analysis of statistical dependencies eliminated all questions other than those indicated.

We considered a proper indicator of anti-Semitic attitudes a situation in which the respondent gave negative and unflattering responses to all the questions put forth about Jews. On the other hand, by assuming that the refusal to accept anti-Semitic responses can be considered an attitude opposed to anti-Semitism, we were able to distinguish “anti-anti-Semitic” indicators, both traditional and modern. This proved to be a very good idea for data analysis.

7 See Alina Cała, *Image of the Jew in Polish Folk Culture* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1995).

Key findings in 2012, in partial comparison to previous years

Antoni Sulek published research results and an analysis of the methods for studying anti-Semitism. He referred to studies carried out by the research agency TNS OBOP, which indicated a significant decrease in anti-Semitic attitudes in Polish society.⁸ Sulek argued that in general, attitudes about Jews occupy a marginal place in the popular consciousness. The article, published in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, one of the most important Polish newspapers, aroused a lively response and a sense of satisfaction, even in the Jewish community in Poland.

In general, our results support Sulek's conclusion. Indeed, our findings show a decline in the percentage of both types of declared anti-Semitic attitudes. Below are the results of three studies:

Table 8.1

*Amount of anti-Semites and anti-anti-Semites in the period 1992–2012 in %
(percentages counted from the sum of all respondents,
rounded to the nearest whole number)*

Type of anti-Semitism	1992	2002	2012
Modern anti-Semitism	17	27	20
Traditional anti-Semitism	11.5	11.6	8
Modern anti-anti-Semitism	8	16	21
Traditional anti-anti-Semitism	29	35	45

If we compare the most important indicator of attitudes, namely modern anti-Semitism, which increased significantly in 2002, we can clearly see its decline. One fifth of respondents expressed modern anti-Semitic attitudes, while in 2002, nearly a third of respondents expressed such views. The percentage of traditional, religious anti-Semitic attitudes also decreased. The

8 Antoni Sulek, "Dużo antysemitów, ale znowu mniej" *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Warsaw), May 25, 2012. See also Antoni Sulek, "Method and Meaning in Surveys on Attitudes to Jews in Poland," *Polish Sociological Review* 4, no. 184 (2013): 431–50; also Antoni Sulek, "How Ordinary Poles See the Jews: Review and Interpretation of 1967 to 2008 Survey Results," in *Jewish Presence in Absence: Aftermath of the Holocaust in Poland, 1945–2010*, ed. Feliks Tych and Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2013), 995–1036.

most interesting fact, however, is the one which also corresponds with the findings of Antoni Sulek: a significant increase in attitudes which we call “anti-anti-Semitic.” These are, specifically, statements which rejected all accusations against Jews which were included in our questions. Reluctance to accept accusatory stereotypes clearly grew over the years and is currently equal to the percentage of those holding anti-Semitic views.

The most important data are those on the conditioning of attitudes. From the beginning, there was a significant relationship between attitudes of hostility toward Jews and level of education. In all cases, the level of education had the biggest impact on traditional anti-Semitism: the higher the level of education, the rarer this type of anti-Semitism. Education eliminated religious aversion to Jews, a situation which remains today.

Table 8.2
Education level and anti-Semitic attitudes
(average for the different educational categories)

Education level 2012	Traditional anti-Semitism	Modern anti-Semitism
Primary	0.7073	1.5935
Vocational	0.4565	1.4895
Secondary	0.3968	1.4372
Higher	0.2590	0.9960
Average of sample	0.4163	1.3755

Education has also influenced modern anti-Semitism, but in a more complex way. Although anti-Semitism has been most prevalent among the less educated, it has not been uncommon among people with higher education. A study from 2002 found that the least anti-Semitic people were those with post-secondary education and incomplete higher education.⁹ Currently, the relationship has become clearer: people with higher education show significantly fewer signs of anti-Semitism than those with

⁹ The survey results of 2002 are most fully described in my book: Ireneusz Krzemiński, ed., *Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie: Raport z badań* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004). A full description of the results of the study in 1992 and 2002 may be found in Ireneusz Krzemiński, “Does ‘Polish antisemitism’ exist: Research in Poland and Ukraine,” *POLIN* 29 (2015).

Table 8.3***Educational level and traditional anti-Semitism, 2012***

Education		Traditional anti-Semitism			Sum
		Lack of anti-Semitism	Median	Anti-Semitism	
Primary	N	59	41	23	123
	%	48.0%	33.3%	18.7%	100.0%
Vocational	N	212	90	31	333
	%	63.7%	27.0%	9.3%	100.0%
Secondary	N	335	122	37	494
	%	67.8%	24.7%	7.5%	100.0%
Higher	N	196	45	10	251
	%	78.1%	17.9%	4.0%	100.0%
Sum	N	802	298	101	1201
	%	66.8%	24.8%	8.4%	100.0%

P=,000

Table 8.4***Educational level and modern anti-Semitism, 2012***

Education		Modern anti-Semitism					Sum
		Lack of anti-Semitism	Median 1	Median 2	Median 3	Anti-Semitism	
Primary	N	53	21	6	9	34	123
	%	43.1%	17.1%	4.9%	7.3%	27.6%	100.0%
Vocational	N	146	57	27	27	76	333
	%	43.8%	17.1%	8.1%	8.2%	22.8%	100.0%
Secondary	N	233	68	37	56	100	494
	%	47.2%	13.8%	7.5%	11.3%	20.2%	100.0%
Higher	N	147	44	9	16	35	251
	%	58.6%	17.5%	3.6%	6.4%	13.9%	100.0%
Sum	N	579	190	79	108	245	1201
	%	48.2%	15.8%	6.6%	9.0%	20.4%	100.0%

P=,002

a lower education (including secondary). This is evidenced by the averages on our anti-Semitism scale for each educational category.

The above tables, which accurately show the relation between the variable of education and the level of anti-Semitism confirm the findings, based on calculations of average values on the scale of anti-Semitism for different age categories.

Religiosity and anti-Semitism

However, above all there persists a very strong correlation between declared religiosity and religious practices on the one hand, and anti-Semitism on the other. The explicitness of this correlation surprised me in 2002, when I initially wrote about it.¹⁰ In the 1992 data, there was no simple correlation between religiosity and anti-Semitism; instead, it only appeared when education was included. That is to say, believers with a low level of education had more anti-Semitic attitudes, but more highly educated believers showed far fewer signs of anti-Semitism. In 2002, the impact of religion and religious practices on attitudes toward Jews was clear.¹¹ Currently, this correlation is still maintained, although those declaring deep faith exhibit fewer signs of modern anti-Semitism than the general religious population when the percentages are compared.¹² Regarding the index of traditional anti-Semitism, a deep faith results in the most common anti-Semitism (which is consistent with the logic of this indicator).

10 It is worth recalling that the results of previous research are contained in two books: Ireneusz Krzemiński, ed., *Czy Polacy są antysemitami?* (Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa, 1996); and Ireneusz Krzemiński, ed., *Antysemityzm w Polsce i na Ukrainie: Raport z badań* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004). See also Ireneusz Krzemiński, "Nationale Opferkonkurrenz und Beharrlichkeit der Tradition: Antisemitismus In Polen und der Ukraine," in *Feindbild Judentum: Antisemitismus in Europa*, ed. L. Rensmann and J. H. Schoeps (Berlin: vbb, 2008): 347–76.

11 The measure of one's religiosity were the respondents' declarations of faith, whether they were deeply religious, just religious, undecided, or irreligious. There was also the category "strongly irreligious." By allowing this category, the study's author, Professor Stefan Nowak, wanted to distinguish the true ideological atheists who are opposed to religion.

12 It turns out that the data in table 12 are not statistically significant, $p=.355$.

Table 8.5*Declarations of religiosity and declarations of traditional anti-Semitism, 2012, in %.*

Religiosity	Traditional anti-Semitism			Sum
	Lack of anti-Semitism	Median	Antisemitism	
Deeply religious	53.0%	26.5%	20.5%	100.00
Religious	62.5%	29.3%	8.2%	100.00
Undecided	60.3%	30.2%	9.5%	100.00
Irreligious	76.5%	23.5%	0%	100.00
Strongly irreligious	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%	100.00
Sum	61.1%	29.0%	9.9%	100.00

Table 8.6*Declarations of religiosity and declarations of modern anti-Semitism, 2012, in %*

Religiosity	Modern anti-Semitism					Sum
	Lack of anti-Semitism	Median 1	Median 2	Median 3	Strong anti-Semitism	
Deeply religious	40.2%	21.2%	9.8%	15.9%	12.9%	100.00
Religious	37.4%	24.7%	8.0%	13.1%	16.8%	100.00
Undecided	33.3%	25.4%	11.1%	12.7%	17.5%	100.00
Irreligious	29.4%	11.8%	5.9%	35.3%	17.6%	100.00
Strongly irreligious	16.7%	16.7%	16.6%	0%	50.0%	100.00
Sum	37.3%	24.0%	8.5%	13.7%	16.5%	100.00

However, the situation looks different when you calculate the averages on the scales of anti-Semitism:

Table 8.7***Declarations of faith and the averages of anti-Semitism, 2012***

Declaration of faith 2012	Traditional anti-Semitism	Modern anti-Semitism
Deeply religious	0.5812	1.8462
Religious	0.4471	1.4446
Undecided	0.3094	1.0935
Irreligious	0.2419	0.8065
Strongly irreligious	0.3200	0.7200
Refusal to answer	0.1719	1.0781
Average of sample	0.4163	1.3755

Those who declared themselves to be deeply religious, as is clear from the preceding tables, placed higher on the scale of anti-Semitism than nonbelievers; this was the case with both types of anti-Semitism. While in 2002 the percentage of anti-Semites among the strongly irreligious also grew (compared to the undecided and irreligious), by 2012 this effect had disappeared. I interpreted this as the effect of the tradition of atheistic, nationalistic anti-Semitism, which was prevalent in the formerly ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR); for instance, in Gierek's Poland during the 1970s, this view was represented by the Grunwald Association. Similarly, this is also the case with practices:

Table 8.8***Religious practices and the averages of anti-Semitism, 2012***

Religious practices 2012	Traditional anti-Semitism	Modern anti-Semitism
Regularly (at least once a week)	0.5967	1.7735
Not regularly	0.3674	1.2965
Only most important practices (baptism, wedding, etc.)	0.3652	1.1629
Does not practice at all	0.2500	0.8966
Refusal to answer	0.2121	1.1818
Average of sample	0.4163	1.3755

The conclusion from this is obvious, especially when comparing these data with the results from the first study. There was no direct correlation then between faith and practice, and anti-Semitic attitudes. Something had to change in the Church itself for it to become a factor contributing to the persistence of anti-Semitic attitudes.

National beliefs, religiosity, and anti-Semitism

The impact of religion and the Church on attitudes toward Jews is not one-sided. Knowledge about Jews, whether good or bad, does not come from the religion lessons in the schools or openly from the sermons.. The impact of religion comes from the ties with the nationalistic ideology and national-Catholic ideas that become more important for a person with age. This increasing importance is largely because individuals, as they become adult citizens, become more interested in socio-political life; a person's worldview, such as the Catholic-nationalistic worldview, is also shaped and defined with age.

A significant finding is that those who thought the Catholic Church should have a strong impact on the law in Poland were more than twice as likely to be anti-Semites as those who thought the Catholic Church should have no greater influence than any other Churches, organizations, or citizens. Among those who thought the Church should have a privileged position, 36% were modern anti-Semites, while the number of anti-Semites fell to 17% among those not in favor of privileging the Church. It is interesting that anti-Semitism was also connected with the belief that "Poland should be primarily Poland, neither like the West nor like the East." 75% of "our" modern anti-Semites chose such a reply.

I also calculated the dependencies that exist between answers to measurable questions and the intensity of apologetic national opinions. Firstly, there was the question of whether the Poles acted more nobly throughout history, and secondly, whether Poles suffered more than other nations historically. Religious faith, especially declarations of deep faith and declarations of frequent, regular observance of religious practices strongly correlated with views expressing a positive attitude about the nation. The less common the observance of religious practices and the weaker the intensity of national feeling, the more frequent the choice of answer that Poles were neither distinguished by their nobility, nor suffered more than other

nations. It turned out that these correlations are also associated with anti-Semitism: both religiosity, which has already been discussed, and feelings of national pride and praising one's own nation. This tri-variable dependency suggests the interrelatedness of these elements: national pride, religious faith, and anti-Semitism form an amalgamation of ideological attitudes.

At the beginning, I referred to a time-honored national-Catholic ideology, whose traditions arose from the pre-independence Polish National Democratic Party, also one of the most important ones before the Second World War. In Poland, especially since the mid-1990s, this tradition has been promoted by Radio Maryja, a Catholic radio station founded by priests of the Redemptorist Order. The station operated locally since 1991, but became more prominent after receiving nationwide broadcast coverage in 1994. This station was the most important factor in restoring the tradition of Polish nationalism and the ideas of Roman Dmowski to the Polish mentality. The head of the radio station, Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk, supported political actors who directly referred to the pre-World War II ideology of National Democracy, such as the League of Polish Families (LPR). Currently, the station's support is given to the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS), although the national ideology promoted by the radio broadcast, alongside other media connected with Fr. Rydzyk's media concern, has changed in several important ways. Ideas of Romanticism and the motif of Polish suffering, which were quite alien to Dmowski, were included in its scope. The fundamental ideological-political conflict between the National Democracy camp and the supporters of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in Poland before 1939 has also been mitigated, in an attempt to make Piłsudski a part of the common national heritage.¹³

In our studies, we identified a very clear correlation between listening to Radio Maryja and both types of anti-Semitism, as well as between anti-Semitism and voting for the PiS in the parliamentary elections of 2011. Among those who listen regularly to Radio Maryja, or only to some programs occasionally, the percentage of anti-Semites reaches 37–38.5%, while among PiS voters, 41% of respondents showed anti-Semitic atti-

13 Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), Marshal of Poland, who was instrumental in helping to gain independence for Poland, was the most ardent enemy of Roman Dmowski and was at least partially sympathetic to socialist ideas. Dmowski also has achievements in diplomacy, helping to restore the Polish nation after 1918. Radio Maryja creates a myth about the similarity between these two heroes despite their political and ideological differences.

tudes. By comparison, among voters of the Civic Platform party (PO), a mere 13% exhibited these attitudes. While it is true that there were many anti-Semites among the voters of other Polish parties (for instance, 32% of Polish Peasants' Party, or PSL, voters and—importantly—22% of the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance voters), PiS certainly attracts more of them than any other party. Among the listeners of Radio Maryja, one finds the greatest number of people who are convinced of the noble actions of Poles throughout history—and of their allegedly unique suffering. Proponents of the idea that Poles behaved more nobly than other nations throughout history were most often PiS voters. The same was true with the assessment of Polish suffering: 80% of PiS voters claimed that Poles suffered more than other nations, while 60% of the Civic Alliance (PO) party voters and 73% of the Peasant Party (PSL) voters held this idea.

Taking this into account, I think the thesis that anti-Semitic attitudes, especially attitudes of modern anti-Semitism, are a strong component of the national-Catholic worldview is pretty well documented in modern day Poland. In a sense, the expression or manifestation of anti-Semitic attitudes can be seen as an expression of a broader ideological orientation tied to a clear political representation.

Regardless of this, however, years of democratic practice have resulted in a growing aversion to anti-Semitic prejudices—just as toward all xenophobic beliefs—on a societal scale. Not only has the percentage of those holding prejudiced beliefs fallen, but clearly there are a growing number of those who actively say “no” to the superstitions of the past. The paradox lies in the fact that, thanks to democracy, it was possible to form ideology, which had based on the old tradition of the national-catholic ideas, generally antidemocratic in our present understanding. This ideology included the vision of the world, which preserves, maintains, and includes an attitude of animosity toward Jews and other nationalities, as well as toward minority groups or “others”. Proponents of this philosophy are clearly a minority, but they are a very significant minority, which has decreased—although not significantly—since the previous survey in 2002. At the same time, it has achieved a much stronger and clearer mode of expression in the form of the political movement PiS, alongside the support of parts of the Church and many priests and bishops for this political formation. It must be noted that the leaders of PiS certainly are not anti-Semites, but they clearly benefit from the support of those for whom national feelings and antipathy towards Jews are synonymous.

*Anti-Semitism and other conditions***Table 8.9***Financial conditions and anti-Semitism, 2012*

Financial conditions	Traditional anti-Semitism		Modern anti-Semitism	
	Lack of anti-Semitism	Anti-Semitism	Lack of anti-Semitism	Anti-Semitism
Poor	63.7%	6.6%	33.0%	30.8%
Rather poor	61.3%	10.6%	43.7%	27.5%
Medium, Average	64.8%	9.3%	47.9%	20.1%
Rather good	71.6%	7.6%	54.0%	16.1%
Good and very good	80.0%	3.0%	58.0%	12.0%
Average N	802	101	579	245
%	66.8%	8.4%	48.2%	20.4%

In the table above one can see the correlation between anti-Semitism and the variable which resulted from respondents' assessment of their own financial situation. In fact, the correlation with income should be investigated further, but in recent studies half of the respondents choose not to disclose their income. Regardless, it seemed interesting to investigate the relationship between the respondents' assessment of their own financial situation and their attitudes towards Jews. It is a sociological stereotype to expect that lower income and a worse financial situation will most likely correlate with negative attitudes toward others, including anti-Semitism. And indeed, it can be seen in Table 8.9, albeit with some irregularities, that a better assessment of one's financial situation correlated with a lower percentage of anti-Semitic statements.

Table 8.10 shows the calculated correlation of coefficients between our variables. I correlated the indicators of traditional and modern anti-Semitism with answers to questions about the assessment of respondents' financial situation and "national" questions, about the pride of Poles in their nation's actions throughout history, as well as the conviction that Poles have more valuable features than other nations. The size of the coef-

Table 8.10***Correlation coefficients between variables.***

Pearson's correlation table between indicators of anti-Semitism and the variables: declared financial conditions, pride in the noble conduct of Poles throughout history, and the belief that Poles have more valuable traits than other nations.

Indicators of over .100 are highlighted.

	Traditional anti-Semites N		Modern anti-Semites N		Financial conditions N		Poles' pride in their history N		Valuable traits of Poles N	
Traditional anti-Semites	1098	1	1098	.330**	1083	-.128**	1040	.150**	1024	.217**
Modern anti-Semites	1098	.330**	1098	1	1083	-.095**	1040	.161**	1024	.129**
Financial conditions	1083	-.128**	1083	-.095**	1		1039	-.079*	1023	-.065*
Poles' pride in their history	1040	.150**	1040	.161**	1039	-.079*	1		990	.302**
Valuable traits of Poles	1024	.217**	1024	.129**	1023	-.065*	990	.302**	1	

* Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (two-sided)

** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (two-sided)

ficients is not too high, but it achieves quite a distinct size for the quality of the variables. If we exclude ratios lower than 0.100, then it becomes clear that both types of anti-Semitism are most strongly positively associated with each other, which should not be surprising. However, the relationship between anti-Semitism and answers to “national” questions is much stronger than the relationship with the “financial conditions” variable. Firstly, it is noted that traditional anti-Semitism correlates with financial conditions at a level = -0.128; with Poles’ pride in their history = 0.150, and with valuable traits of Poles = 0.217. The negative value of the correlation with financial conditions means that the better respondents’ financial conditions, the lower their anti-Semitism, and vice versa. In the remaining “national” variables, the more positive the assessment of Poles, the higher the anti-Semitism. Secondly, modern anti-Semitism correlates with financial conditions at the level = -0.095—below the predetermined value of the significant, with Poles’ pride in their history = 0.161, and with valuable traits of Poles = 0.129.

It follows from this that the “national” variables are much more strongly correlated with anti-Semitic attitudes than our variable which measured declarations about financial conditions. It seems that this can be regarded as yet more proof of the significance of ideological beliefs as a strong correlate of anti-Semitic attitudes.

Table 8.11

Place of residence and anti-Semitic statements. 2012.

Size of city	Traditional anti-Semitism	Modern anti-Semitism
city of over 200,000	8.6%	19.6%
city of 50,000–200,000	7.2%	20.4%
city of under 50,000	7.9%	21.6%
Village	9.2%	20.1%

A further correlation also belongs to the sociological stereotypes: the dependence of anti-Semitism on place of residence. In general, it is assumed that, relatively independent of educational level, the inhabitants of large cities manifest anti-Semitic attitudes to a lesser degree than resi-

dents of small towns and villages (just like all other attitudes about those who are perceived as different, foreign, and outsiders). In Table 8.11, in fact, it can be observed that traditional anti-Semitism is highest among villagers, although the size of this percentage is surprisingly close to the percentage of residents of major cities. In the case of modern anti-Semitism, the lowest percentage of anti-Semites is among residents of major cities, but the differences in percentages are so small that in practice, the place of residence does not significantly impact on modern anti-Semitic statements.

However, the situation has changed in the past two decades:

Table 8.12

Place of residence and anti-Semitic statements, 1992, in %.

Size of city	Traditional anti-Semitism	Modern anti-Semitism
City of over 500,000	1.3%	21.3%
City of 101,000–500,000	5.2%	18.5%
City of 51,000–100,000	6.5%	7.8%
City of 21,000–50,000	5.2%	13.4%
City of up to 20,000	10.1%	14.6%

As we can see, the analogous dependency in the first study from 1992 looked quite different: traditional anti-Semitism in the countryside was strikingly higher than anti-Semitism of this type in the largest cities. While the cities were grouped a little differently due to their size, the data still withstands effective comparison. Only in the smallest cities was the amount of declared traditional anti-Semitism comparable to that in the villages; yet the figure here, even at less than 6% of them, is still a significant number.

On the other hand, the dependency in the case of declarations of modern anti-Semitism was surprisingly irregular and contradicted the sociologists' stereotypes. Strangely, the highest proportion of modern anti-Semites was found among the residents of the largest cities. The percentage of modern anti-Semites in large and major cities exceeded the percentage of anti-Semites in small towns.

Currently, the proportion of traditional anti-Semites in general is much lower, especially in the country: 9% compared to 16% twenty years

ago. However, the proportion of modern anti-Semites balanced out, oscillating at approximately 20% of the population of cities of various sizes. Indeed, we can say that the variable of residence does not play a distinguishing role in determining the proportion of anti-Semites. As such, if we were to refer to the previous concept that currently anti-Semitic attitudes are determined by national-Catholic identification—and this works rather consistently throughout the entire country—then the result can be seen as a confirmation of the hypothesis. Regardless of old traditions, ideological influence has a clear impact on the emergence of anti-Semites.

A Short Summary

If our hypothesis about the emergence of a coherent national-ideological orientation, supported by the religious beliefs and activities of the Catholic Church, is indeed true, it means that Polish religiosity supports anti-Semitic and xenophobic attitudes. They are associated with a certain ideological image of Polishness and the Pole, in which Jews are a negative point of reference; moreover, as a result of Dmowski's national ideology, Jews are blamed for having a negative influence on Poles throughout history. At the same time, according to this worldview, Polish identity is based on the Catholic religion. Of course, the reasoning outlined here, and supported by empirical data, describes an incomplete picture of Polish religiosity, and to an even greater extent, the Polish Church. Indeed, the Polish Church and Polish Catholicism are certainly diverse, and one can even speak of sharp discrepancies, albeit weakly expressed. However, in these studies, repeated three times over twenty years during the growth of democratic Poland, the role of the Church and religion as a factor in preserving anti-Semitic attitudes (and likely xenophobic ones as well) seems obvious. This does not mean that the national-Catholic minority of Poles manifests, on a daily basis, particularly aggressive views about Jews. However, an anti-Semitic attitude appears constantly when talking about Poland's past, the painful experience of the war and the postwar period, as well as when the topic of Polish national identity is raised. Elements of the ideology of Roman Dmowski, who was mentioned previously several times here, have seeped deeply into the general national consciousness, often without any awareness of their origins.

PART THREE

VEHICLES OF SOCIALIZATION

CHAPTER 9

Civic Education: Controversies Surrounding Socialization Factors and Mechanisms

RENATA SIEMIEŃSKA

The overthrow of the communist system in the states of East Central Europe 25 years ago raised many questions regarding whether these countries would be able to follow the path of Western democracies, and if so, how much time the democratization process would take. It was often suggested that perhaps these countries should find a path of their own, taking into account the specificities of their experience of almost fifty years of socialism.¹

The existence of a civic society plays a key role in shaping the democratic system (as expressed by Putnam,² Walzer,³ Gutmann,⁴ Jennings and Niemi,⁵ Ichilov,⁶ and others). The activity of citizens is perceived as a sig-

1 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 15–141.

2 Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 83–186.

3 Michael Walzer, "The idea of civil society," in *Toward a Global Civil Society*, ed. Michael Walzer (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1995), 7–27.

4 Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 19–27.

5 M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 3–181.

6 Orit Ichilov, "Edukacja i obywatelstwo demokratyczne w zmieniającym się świecie," in *Psychologia polityczna* (orig. Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology), ed. David O. Sears, Leoni Huddy, and Robert Jervis, trans. Robert Andruszko (Kraków: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2008), 585–614.

nificant component in the identification of problems on the local and national scale, legitimizing the implementation of decisions by elected and executive bodies. For a long time, it was thought that the development of democracy would be correlated with the increased participation of citizens in conventional forms of activity,⁷ and that their interest in politics, as well as competences, would develop in tandem. At the same time, many researchers shared the firm belief that state institutions would be trusted by citizens, who would also trust in the ability of decision-makers to identify the problems of various social groups, to choose appropriate, acceptable problem-solving methods, and to implement them successfully.

Research undertaken in recent decades has shown that the models of democracy implemented in stable democratic systems also change (as noted, for instance, by Russell J. Dalton,⁸ Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel)⁹, although their key traits are preserved. In this chapter, I will focus on three key questions: which factors influence the civic education of the young generation? To what extent does the young generation, born after the political transformation in Poland, differ from older generations with regard to their systems of values and behaviors? Finally, to what extent are they consistent with the model of members of a democratic society?

Civic education is part of political socialization, which also includes information, persuasion, and political socialization structures such as the family, school, mass media, peer groups, social networks, and political agents. In this chapter, I will discuss the role of macrostructural living conditions and selected agents of socialization (the parents, school, peers, and the media), as well as the Catholic Church, due to its special role in Polish history and the values the Church has propagated.

7 Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kasse, *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979), 13–56.

8 Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2002).

9 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, 327.

Controversies Associated with the Factors and Mechanisms of Socialization

There are a number of theories explaining the mechanism of intergenerational changes and differences, incorporating a combination of factors that characterize the period of development of an individual or a generation and intergenerational influences. For instance, in his theory of generational changes, Mannheim¹⁰ states that the faster social change occurs, the greater the probability that groups of young people will emerge sharing the same culture and patterns of interaction, which differ visibly from those cultivated by the older generation.¹¹ Fast-changing situations force younger generations to search for their own answers to newly-emerging problems, making it impossible to follow the patterns of older generations. According to Inglehart's "socialization hypothesis," the period of early youth, up to around fifteen years of age, is of key significance.¹² In Inglehart's opinion—along with other scholars, such as M. Kent Jennings—few changes to value systems take place in later years. According to another of Inglehart's ideas—his "scarcity hypothesis"—the conditions in which a given generation grows up have a significant impact on the shaping of that generation's value system.¹³ Under conditions of scarcity, people give top priority to materialistic goals, whereas under conditions of prosperity, they become more likely to emphasize postmaterialistic goals.¹⁴ When they start adult life, they introduce their value system, which eventually becomes dominant in the adult population as the older generations die out. In this way, a slow, systematic generational change

10 Karl Mannheim, in *From Karl Mannheim*, ed. Kurt H. Wolff (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 368–69.

11 Peter Ester, Loek Halman, and Ruud de Moor, *The Individualizing Society: Value Change in Europe and North America* (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, 1993).

12 Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 33–36.

13 M. Kent Jennings, "The Crystallization of Orientations," in *Continuities in Political Action: a Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies*, ed. M. K. Jennings, Jan W. van Deth et al. (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 313–48.

14 Inglehart and Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy*, 98.

takes place, with some changes being period effects.¹⁵ In their study of ten Western European countries, Ester, Halman, and de Moor show that the more a given society modernizes with regard to the economic and social sphere, the greater are the differences between the value systems of individual generations.¹⁶

Many researchers have underlined that a significant role in the socialization process is played by the family, as the environment in which the individual grows, as well as the broader social environment, in which it is rooted.¹⁷ Some authors suggest that the vertical and horizontal mobility of individuals and differences in terms of social status, becoming sources of tension in individuals, result in extremely conservative or radically egalitarian views. Others suggest that attitudes and values in such cases rather tend to be placed "somewhere in the middle" between those acquired in the early socialization period and those more typical for their environment. Some researchers indicate that the role of parents in the socialization process is less significant than generally thought.¹⁸ As has been proven, however, such a conclusion is legitimate only if we define socialization as the reproduction of the knowledge and attitudes of the parents. It is necessary to take into account situations in which—even if we assume that the parents have fully and successfully controlled the process of socialization of their children—they may prefer not to impose their own value system upon them. In such cases, the socialization process will result in differences between the values of the parents and the children.¹⁹ Moreover, as Kagan has indicated, the retention of certain traits from childhood may appear in various forms, while the same behaviors in different periods of life may have different meanings.²⁰

It is generally agreed that a significant role in the socialization process should be played by schools. However, many studies indicate that

15 Ibid., 102–107.

16 Ester, Halman, and de Moor, *The Individualizing Society*.

17 Ichilov, "Edukacja i obywatelstwo demokratyczne w zmieniającym się świecie," 601.

18 Jennings, "Crystallization of Orientations," 313–48.

19 Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Response to Pressure from Peers vs. Adult among Soviet and American School Children," *International Journal of Psychology* 2, no. 3 (October 1967): 199–207.

20 Jerome Kagan Jr., "Three Faces of Continuity in Human Development," in *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, ed. D. A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), 15–39.

in reality, schools' roles are much less significant than originally thought in terms of transferring of attitudes, as well as knowledge and skills.²¹ In general, school prepares the young generation to live in a way which is consistent with the expectations—in principle—of the elite of a given society. In stabilized, democratic societies, where changes take place relatively slowly, its expectations are usually consistent with those of the majority of society. In a period of rapid change, however, the results can be very different, which—as we will prove below—is happening in Poland.

Another significant role in the socialization process is played by the peer environment, which is integrated according to the similarity of problems and concerns encountered by a given generation. However, the direction of the impact of peer groups differs depending on the country—sometimes, they strengthen the orientations and attitudes promoted by the school, while in other cases, they offer completely different patterns clearly inconsistent with those taught at school.²² Different social groups, institutions, and politicians may also assign an excessively important or insufficient role to particular agents (such as family or youth organizations).

The Differentiation of Polish Society

As a result of the economic changes of the last twenty-five years, Poland has become a more economically differentiated country than before. Structural unemployment, associated with the economic crisis in certain regions, results in a deepening of differences between regions and in the levels of affluence of the inhabitants. Adaptation abilities are greater in better educated social groups (as shown, for instance, by Bourdieu).²³ In Poland, the number of higher education graduates increased from 11.1%

21 Paul Allen Beck, "The Role of Agents in Political Socialization," in *Handbook of Political Socialization*, ed. Stanley Allen Renshon (New York: The Free Press, 1977), 115–41.

22 James A. Nathan and Richard C. Remy, "Comparative Political Socialization: a Theoretical Perspective," in *Handbook of Political Socialization*, ed. Renshon, 85–111.

23 Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

of the overall population in 2002 to 24.3% in 2011.²⁴ This was possible thanks to the development of mass education at university level, through the establishment of numerous private universities, and increasing admission levels at state universities. Nevertheless, poverty and lack of education in some groups is a significant barrier, which can hardly be overcome by any potential attempts to break the “vicious circle.” The mass emigration of young people from Poland, particularly after the country’s accession to the European Union in 2004, has created new points of reference for Polish citizens. In their life aspirations, they now take into account the standard of living in the well-developed countries of Western Europe. As a result, despite the fact that differences between these countries and Poland are becoming less and less significant, they currently feel that Poland has failed to decisively catch up with these countries, and that its attempts to do so are progressing too slowly.²⁵

Macrostructural Conditions as a Factor that Shapes Generations

Historic events leave an important mark on a generation’s values and attitudes, and define the possibilities to meet their aspirations. In Poland after the Second World War, the following generations have been identified: the so-called “generation of Columbuses,” the generation of March 1968, and the generation of Solidarity, martial law, and Pope John Paul II. The “generation of Columbuses” refers to writers and poets born in the 1920s, who came of age during the war and who, as adults, had to navigate through the new communist system, which denied values and objectives taught to them earlier. The generation of March 1968 were young people born after the war, mainly students, who protested against the growing wave of antisemitism on the part of the authorities and the limitations placed on freedom of speech. The generation of Solidarity, on the other hand, were young people, who wanted a systemic change and participating,

24 Rocznic Demograficzny 2016. Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2016. (Warsaw: Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 2016), 164. Available at https://stat.gov.pl/files/gfx/portalinformacyjny/pl/defaultaktualnosci/5515/3/10/1/rocznik_demograficzny_2016.pdf

25 Janusz Czapieński and Tomasz Panek, *Diagnoza Społeczna 2013* (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, 2014), 360.

on a mass scale, in political opposition, giving rise to the Solidarity movement in 1980. Ten years later, its elite formed the core of the newly established authorities, charged with implementing the basic economic and political transformation of the country. The experience of martial law in the 1980s was a traumatic period for Polish society, associated with the destruction of Solidarity and, with it, any hope for change. The period of systemic transformation after 1989, including the creation of the foundations of a democratic state and a free market economy. It was a source of new hopes, but also new disappointments, both for individuals and some social groups. The young generation, comprising those currently 20 to 35 years of age, is growing up under different circumstances. They are not burdened directly by the communist past, and have high expectations for society, particularly with regard to the standard of living. However, the generation remains visibly divided into those who have better chances to achieve their aspirations, and those who live with a sense of impossibility.

The Role of Family in the Socialization Process

Families play a very important role in socialization, passing knowledge, attitudes, and values to younger generations, along with behaviors and lifestyles,²⁶ providing access to specific social networks. Research conducted in the 1990s has shown that young people most often trust and seek advice from their mothers and friends. The role of the father is much less important, except for situations concerning politics; however, this topic is discussed relatively rarely at home.²⁷

Frequent conversations with their parents, peers and teachers about politics, education, and work, as well as personal affairs, may indicate close links with the social environment in which the young generation lives. However, they are more a component of different lifestyles, cultivated by different social groups, and not necessarily a symptom of lack of trust towards potential interlocutors. The higher education of the children, as well as the parents, the more frequently they tend to discuss these

26 Bourdieu, *Distinction*, 487–571.

27 Renata Siemieńska, "The Role of Family and School in Socialization in a Changing Polish Society," in *Sozialwissenschaftliche und bildungstheoretische Reflexionen*, ed. Birgit Wellie and Klaus-Peter Hufer (Berlin: Galda+Wilch Verlag, 1998), 283–300.

issues, and the more often the youth come to hold the same views as their parents. The correlation is stronger in the case of mothers than fathers. Young people more often seek the advice of their parents and agree with them, if the careers of the parents have brought them material success (a correlation which is more visible in terms of contacts with the father).²⁸

The popular hypothesis, stating that traditionally-oriented young people tend to talk to and agree with their parents more often, was not confirmed. These young people are less authoritarian, more interested in politics, and show a higher level of acceptance for the non-traditional role of women.²⁹ In other words parents, particularly those with higher education levels, play a significant role as promoters of change. In comparison with previous years, by 2013, more students were brought up by only one of the parents (usually the mother).³⁰ In the twelve-month period preceding the survey, 17% of respondents reported personal experience of economic migration of at least one of their parents, more often fathers than mothers. In a small number of cases, both parents worked abroad (2%). The study of students in the last grade of high school shows that the role of the family in the lives of young people has not changed significantly in the last twenty years. In 2013, 81% of young people aged 18–24 and 36% aged 25–29 lived with their parents.³¹ Young people tend to attend schools near their parents' residence, both to reduce costs and to maintain a close relationship with the family, which is consistent with existing cultural patterns. As in the 1990s, the mother has remained the most important person in the family for young people. They declare that they can count on her support when facing difficult times (60%), and she is also an authority, about whom they care the most (47%). Only 28% of students declared that their father was among those people on whose support they could count. Girls, notably more often than boys, mention their mother as a person they like to spend time with and talk to. Contact with fathers is more important for the boys, but seems to be less intense than the mother-daughter relationship.³²

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Beata Roguska, "Dom rodzinny, rodzice, rówieśnicy w opiniach młodego pokolenia Polaków," in *Raport o młodzieży* (Warsaw: CBOS, 2013), 100.

31 Barbara Fałęcka, "Family and economic situation of young Poles and their consumer attitudes," in *Raport o młodzieży*.

32 Roguska, "Dom rodzinny, rodzice, rówieśnicy w opiniach młodego pokolenia Polaków".

Peers are a further source of support for 36% of young people. In 2013, 29% of respondents mentioned their boyfriends or girlfriends as sources of support.³³ The unemployment level was found to have a negative impact on young people's relationships with their immediate family regardless of the place of residence, but this negative impact did not extend to peer relationships.

The Role of Schools and Teachers in the Socialization Process

Teachers' assessments

According to research conducted in 1994 and 1998, teachers were assessed negatively by young people in terms of their mutual relations, with a mere 11% of young people assessing them as very good. The percentage of those viewing these relations as bad was higher in regions with high unemployment. In 2013, about 80% of students believed that teachers possessed substantial knowledge. However, more than 10% of respondents pointed to pathological behaviors by teachers, such as the humiliation or harassment of unliked students.³⁴ As in the 1990s, teachers played a less significant role as advisors to young people, in such issues as politics and life choices, than family and peer groups. In the opinion of young people, the views of teachers tend to differ both from their own and those of their parents. The frequency of discussions with teachers did not differ depending on the gender of the respondents, their educational level, or their financial situation.

The evaluation of the impact of schools is complicated, due to the fact that schools differ in terms of their status (public or non-public), location (urban or rural), the composition of their student body, what type of schools they are (general education schools, vocational and technical schools, and so forth), and numerous other factors. Schools are playing to some extent an "allocating role."³⁵ They largely reflect the traits of particular social groups in terms of life experiences and opportunities; these differences apply also to teachers. In non-public schools, attended by

³³ Ibid., 103.

³⁴ Jolanta Kalka and Michał Feliksiak, "Młodzież a szkoła," in *Raport o młodzieży*, 30.

³⁵ Gutmann, *Democratic Education*.

young people from more affluent and better-educated backgrounds, the teachers often come from upbringings similar to those of their students. As a result, they inevitably transfer the value systems and political attitudes typical for their social milieu, which has been shown by research conducted in the mid-1990s on students, parents and teachers in both public and non-public schools. Teachers do not play the role of a compensating factor in the case of youth from poorly educated and less affluent groups, who could benefit significantly from their assistance.³⁶

Textbooks

High expectations used to be associated with the role of textbooks in the process of children's socialization. After 1989 the scope of state control over textbooks decreased dramatically, though ethnic, religious, feminist, and other groups have attempted to control their content since then. Moreover textbooks, just like other media, are subject to market principles. Editors do their best to market textbooks that will not be controversial, not least in order to ensure larger sales figures.³⁷ In a later part of the chapter, I will discuss the results of analyses of history, civic education, and family life textbooks and the controversies concerning their content.

History textbooks

In the last fifty years, Polish history textbooks underwent significant changes, initially being treated as an instrument of indoctrination by those who held power. In the communist period (1944–1989) certain changes in textbook content took place; however, this chapter will assess only those occurring after the systemic transformation of 1989, when the version of history taught to young people was considered one of the priorities in civic education, constituting a key part of the development of a demo-

36 Renata Siemieńska, "Szkoła państwowa i niepaństwowa a wartości demokratyczne," *Kwartalnik Pedagogiczny* 1–2, nos. 151–52 (1994): 55–78.

37 Renata Siemieńska, "Środki masowego przekazu jako twórcy obrazu świata", in *Portrety kobiet i mężczyzn w środkach masowego przekazu i podręcznikach szkolnych*, ed. Renata Siemieńska (Warsaw: Scholar, 1997).

cratic system. Anna Glimos-Nadgórska, a historian of education systems, wrote about the changes in Polish education, concluding that “the newly written history textbooks in Poland—despite their weaknesses and flaws, eliminated in the subsequent editions—remain a study of history consistent with the current state of research and fundamental assumptions of history teaching. They gradually introduce the new narrative philosophy of history, including, in particular, the pluralism of truths. They also serve as a basis for students to acquire and consolidate their knowledge and skills, coming from various sources.”³⁸ Her conclusions are congruent with the opinion of the Commission for Assessment of School Textbooks of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (Polska Akademia Umiejętności).

Nevertheless, some authors point out a number of weaknesses. For example, “none of the textbooks mentions the issue of immigration in Poland and in the world,” and none discuss it in the context of human rights.³⁹ In his analysis of Polish history, civic education, and family life textbooks, which were used at junior high schools in the early 2000s, political scientist and sociologist Tomasz Żukowski writes:

It is also of significance that religious authority is gaining the status of a general authority.... The right of all religious groups to issue their own textbooks does not change this situation for two reasons. First of all, every textbook presents a particular point of view; secondly, the diversity of textbooks, written from the perspective of a single point of view, in practice may only strengthen the hegemony of religion, which has the most believers, leading to a split between followers of different religions... The future citizen graduates from school will believe that a particular point of view is a general, unchallengeable truth... This determines their perception of such problems as equal rights for sexual minorities, the right to sexual education, the right to abortion, etc.⁴⁰

38 Anna Glimos-Nadgórska, “Podręczniki do historii—50 lat zmian,” *KLIO: Czasopismo poświęcone dziejom Polski i powszechnym* 21, no. 2 (2012): 3–30.

39 Tomasz Żukowski, “Życzliwość czy prawa? Tolerancja w szkole republikańskiej,” in *Program „Szkoła Otwartości”: Wyniki monitoringu podręczników gimnazjalnych do języka polskiego, historii, i wiedzy o społeczeństwie (wychowanie obywatelskie i wychowanie do życia w rodzinie) z perspektywy zawartego w nich obrazu mniejszości etnicznych, religijnych i innych*, ed. Tomasz Żukowski (Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie „Otwarta Rzeczpospolita”, 2004), 83–90.

40 Ibid., 92.

Many researchers have also pointed out that assessments of history by members of Polish society change over time. For instance, the head of the research agency TNS Polska, Piotr Kwiatkowski, found that:

in 2015, 21% of Poles answered that "Poland was victorious in the Second World War," 35% that it was a partial victory, while 27% considered that Poland could hardly be listed among the victors of the Second World War. The rest of the respondents declared they had no opinion on the matter. The current political situation influences changes in perceptions of the past. One year earlier, more Poles tended to perceive Poland as being victorious. Memory of the Second World War is perceived as being of key significance for understanding the events and political situation in Poland during the next five decades.⁴¹

Images of Women and Men in Textbooks

The insufficient increase of women's role in public life is now believed to be one of the most urgent problems of modern democracy. Summarizing the analysis of fifteen textbooks for early education (grades 1–3 of primary school) used in 1995, academic Elżbieta Kalinowska wrote: "The images of women and men, girls and boys, shaped by textbooks, are not based on observation of modern reality, but on the socially functioning stereotypes of men and women... In textbooks, gender stereotypes tend to be much sharper than in reality; as a result, the world presented in the textbook shows more gender discrimination than the real world."⁴² At the same time, sociologist Ewa Nasalska compared selected history textbooks, used in Poland and Germany, from the perspective of roles played by women and men in post-World-War-II history. Her analysis showed that women rarely appeared in texts or photographs, although they were depicted slightly more frequently in the German textbooks. In Poland, most text-

41 "Dyrektor TNS Polska: Pamięć Polaków o II wojnie światowej nadal podzielona," *Dzieje.pl*, accessed November 4, 2015, <http://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/dyrektor-tns-polska-pamiec-polakow-o-ii-wojnie-swiatowej-nadal-podzielona>.

42 Elżbieta Kalinowska, "Wizerunki dziewczynek i chłopców, kobiet i mężczyzn, w podręcznikach szkolnych dziewczynki i chłopcy. Podział wedle płci w prezentowanym dzieciom obrazie świata," in *Portrety*, ed. Siemieńska, 151.

books referred to the roles women played in culture and science, and later, in politics and economy. The German textbooks referred mainly to roles played in everyday life, or contained fragments dedicated to the issue of gender equality.⁴³ In 2005, the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment of Women and Men ordered the examination of 18 history curricula at the primary school level, 27 junior high school curricula, and 17 general high school, professional high school, and vocational school curricula (from a total of 62 curricula and more than a hundred textbooks). The results of the analysis conducted by Anna Wołosik have been summarized as follows in the UNDP Gender equality report (2007), prepared by the Polish team of experts:⁴⁴

...it can be stated that, apart from a few exceptions, the authors of these curricula fail to comply with the rules of gender mainstreaming. Most—or, in fact, all of the textbooks in Poland—reproduce the stereotypes on gender roles.... This is applicable to all stages of education.... we are dealing with clearly defined places for both genders in the family and in the society. The grey-haired grandmas sit in their rocking chairs, and they are usually depicted as persons interested only in knitting or cooking. The grandpas more often deal with activities “outside the house”.... Thus, we can observe a multi-level discrimination of the elderly—due to gender and due to age... There is a “hidden curriculum,” which contains an implicitly negative assessment of the role of women or depreciation of their achievements.... All instructions are addressed in the masculine, as it is assumed that “the (male) student” is not a masculine, but a universal form. An exception here is presented by religion textbooks; in these, both forms are used, however, not to promote equality, but to underline the difference between the sexes... If a text contains a dialogue between children and parents, most often, it is a conversation of a father and a son—the son asks ques-

43 Ewa Nasalska, “Role kobiet w historii powojennej w podręcznikach polskich i niemieckich w latach dziewięćdziesiątych,” in *Portrety*, ed. Siemieńska, 153–64.

44 Anna Wołosik, *Edukacja do równości czy trening uległości? Czy polskie podręczniki respektują zasadę równości płci?* (Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie „W Stronę Dziewcząt”, 2009), 7.

tions (for instance, how electric current works), and the father provides the explanation.⁴⁵

The authors of the report stress that the textbooks and curricula present a stereotypical model of the family as incorporating a mother, a father, and two children, although this image is far from reality in many cases (for various reasons, there are many single-parent families in Poland). In the textbooks, there are no "others." So, "there are no disabled people, no people of different ethnic origin, living in Poland (such as Romani people, Vietnamese, or Chechen refugees), representatives of religions other than Catholicism, as well as persons of sexual orientation other than heterosexual. The textbooks fail to discuss topics associated with social, sexual, and gender exclusion, racism or anti-Semitism."⁴⁶ Only a few high school curricula mention such issues as sexual pressure, or the harm associated with the treatment of people as sexual objects. In many cases, the authors of textbooks associate women's aspirations for emancipation with negative social phenomena, such as decadence, family breakdown and the loosening of social ties. An example here may be the following opinion, highlighted in the report: "An extension of social ferment of the 1970s was the development of the American feminist movements, which righteously fought against discrimination against women at work, often promoting rather shocking slogans (for instance, the thesis of the social and not biological origin of sex/gender—'nobody is born a woman')."⁴⁷

In the history textbooks for junior high schools, covering a period of five thousand years, women emerge very rarely. There is a textbook on the modern history of Poland, starting from the year 1945, which neither mentions any women, nor depicts any in photos. Authors of another textbook developed a list of 167 characters in history, including only five women, namely: Sappho, Cleopatra, Queen Jadwiga of Poland, Catherine the Great of Russia, and Wisława Szymborska (the Nobel Prize-winning Polish poet). The history of women as a group, who were discriminated against, enslaved, tortured, burned at the stake, and killed, is not covered in the textbooks.

45 UNDP, *Gender Equality Report 2007* (Warsaw: UNDP, 2007).

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 51.

The history and civic education curriculum for primary schools for the year 2008, encompassing the period from ancient times until the establishment of the Third Polish Republic in 1989, refers to only four women, alongside 32 men. These women are the Greek goddess Athena, the Queen of Poland, Jadwiga, the Nobel Prize laureate Maria Skłodowska-Curie, and the actress, Helena Modrzejewska. The men mentioned are politicians, leaders, artists, scientists, and so forth. The history curriculum for junior high school (grades 7–9) contains the names of 25 men and no women at all.⁴⁸

An analysis of Polish and French textbooks for the last grade of junior high school, conducted in 2012, brought results similar to those described earlier in the chapter. Women were shown to be depicted less frequently in Poland, although the French textbooks are not much better in this regard, despite the generally greater awareness of French society with regard to gender equality and the presence of this issue in public discourse, the longer tradition of female organizations and so forth.⁴⁹ The author analyzed three Polish books for civic education, three Polish history books, three French civic education textbooks and two French history and geography textbooks (referring only to the chapters on history) published between 2004 and 2011. Their selection was based on their popularity. The average percentage of female characters in the Polish history textbooks is 12.6%, while in the French textbooks, the figure was 15.6%. In the civic education textbooks analyzed, the percentage of women reaches 29.1% in the Polish publications and 32.6% in the French ones.

Sociologist Zuzanna Cichowska found that:

In the Polish civic education textbooks, most women are depicted in chapters dedicated to the economy (in most cases, these are anonymous women in photographs), while in the French textbooks, chapters devoted to discussions of what it means to be a citizen of France, the signs of citizenship etc., are illustrated mainly by the image of Marianne—the symbol of France, as well as anonymous

48 Iwona Chmura-Rutkowska, Edyta Głowacka-Sobiech, and Izabela Skórzyńska, "Nie-godne historii. O nieobecności kobiet w dziejach w kontekście analiz wybranych podręczników do nauki historii w Polsce Sensus," *Historiae* 12 (2013/4): 47–70.

49 Zuzanna Cichowska, *Wizerunki kobiet i mężczyzn w polskich i francuskich podręcznikach szkolnych* (Warsaw: Praca magisterska wykonana w Instytucie Socjologii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012).

female citizens of France. In the French textbooks, the lowest percentage of women are in the chapters on central and local government, and in the Polish ones, in the chapters on international relations and economy.... In the French textbooks, most illustrations present equal relations between women and men; in the Polish textbooks, men are usually dominant (either in numbers or through their posture or positioning of figures in the photograph).⁵⁰

Many historic characters appear in relation to males—as mothers, wives, sister, and daughters of kings and so forth: “in the French history textbooks, the proportion of women in illustrations (18%) is higher than in the Polish ones (7.7%). In the French textbooks, women are almost exclusively blue-collar workers, while in the Polish ones, they are depicted in a family context. In the Polish and French textbooks, men mainly play roles in public life and as professionals.”⁵¹

The Church

The conservative nature of the Polish Church is reflected in the content of curricula disseminated to school students during religion classes. The role of the Church goes far beyond the school grounds; it maintains a visible presence in both the media and politics. Its influence on people's value systems is more visible in the case of the poorly educated older generation, living in villages and small towns. Religious practices have become less frequent especially among young people, much as in other European countries.⁵² In recent years, about half of all Poles aged 18–24 claim to participate in religious practices once a week or more frequently; in the early 1990s, this figure was more than two thirds (in 1992, 72%). The number of young people attending Sunday Mass has also decreased, from 63% to 45%.⁵³ Young people also attach far less importance to religiosity as a value which should be taught to children; in 2012, 30% of people aged

⁵⁰ Ibid., 53.

⁵¹ Ibid., 59–64.

⁵² Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

⁵³ CBOS, *Wierzący, ale coraz rzadziej praktykujący: Przemiany religijności młodych Polaków* (Warsaw: CBOS, 2009).

18–24 felt religiosity was important, as opposed to 56% of those aged 65 and over.⁵⁴

The media

When discussing the impact of various factors on socialization processes, it is impossible to disregard the impact of messages communicated by radio, television and the internet. Almost all young people (97%) have internet access at home. According to data from 2013, students spend an average of three hours a day online. More than 20% of them spend four to five hours, or even more, using the internet, while on average male respondents spent twenty minutes longer online than females. Boguszewski et al. note that those who spent more time online went on to achieve poorer grades in their studies.⁵⁵ Interestingly, in spite of this heavy internet use among young people, only 15% of Poles spend more time on the internet than watching TV in Poland.⁵⁶

Contacts of Citizens with Institutions

Civic education is not limited to what young people learn at home, in school, or through contact with the Church and the media. Civic education takes place through individuals' contact and interaction with various institutions, at various stages of their lives. Therefore, the need to encourage citizens, and to make it possible for them to articulate their individual and group needs, has been underlined by both researchers and politicians. Participatory budgeting, participation in various nongovernmental organizations, as well as elections, are some ways of involving citizens in building a democratic society. However, many studies show that such activities do not occur frequently. In 1997, 14% of Poles declared their

54 World Values Survey 2012, unpublished paper.

55 Rafał Boguszewski, Michał Feliksiak, Magdalena Gwiazda, and Jolanta Kalka, "Młodzież o sobie: wartości, obyczajowość, grupy odniesienia," in *Opinie i Diagnozy 28 Młodzież 2013*, ed. Mirosława Grabowska and Jolanta Kalka (Warsaw: CBOS, Krajowe Biuro ds. Przeciwdziałania Narkomanii, 2013), 149–60.

56 Janusz Czapieński and Tomasz Panek, *Social Diagnosis 2013* (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej, 2014), 360.

activity in NGOs, political parties, and similar organizations; this figure was less than in other countries in Europe, both East and West. Two decades later, in 2013, the number of Poles belonging to NGOs or other associations almost doubled (rising to 25%), though the European average was still higher, at 43%. In other postcommunist countries, the numbers are similar to, or lower than, corresponding figures in Poland.⁵⁷ Poles are active mainly in organizations focused on education, charitable support for children, religious and Church-affiliated groups, civic groups and organizations helping the sick, the elderly, and the homeless.⁵⁸ These low organizational activities in Poland correspond with a recently growing belief among inhabitants of the European Union that European citizens do not need such organizations, and that they have other means of influencing political decision-making.⁵⁹ The number of people espousing this belief runs between 23% and 55% depending on country; in Poland, the figure is 43%. A significant role is played by activities undertaken by individuals and groups on their own.⁶⁰ Sometimes the joint actions start as initiatives of individuals or groups, which later transform into CSOs for various reasons, for instance to gain entitlement to financial support from authorities, and to have formal status to cooperate with public agencies. In Poland organizations with grassroots origins are more trusted by potential participants, as they are initiated by individuals known in their social network. This is largely due to citizens' low level of trust in all kinds of public institutions and authorities,⁶¹ which are suspected of looking after their own interests, and not those of the citizens as they imagine they should be. Protest has remained one of the most significant means of exerting impact up to now. Recently, the percentage of persons involved

57 Flash Eurobarometer 273, *Europeans' Engagement in Participatory Democracy* 2013, (2013).

58 CBOS, "Social activities in civic social organizations" (Warsaw: CBOS, 2011).

59 Flash Eurobarometer 273 (2013): 7.

60 CBOS, *Potential of activism and Poles' engagement in voluntary activities* (Warsaw: CBOS, 2011).

61 Alejandro Moreno, Renata Siemieńska, and Miguel Basanez, "Międzypokoleniowe różnice w orientacji na wartości i stosunku do demokracji i co z tego wynika (rezultaty Światowych Badań nad Wartościami)" [Intergenerational differences in value orientation and attitudes toward democracy and its consequences], in *Krótkie wykłady z socjologii, Vol. II*, ed. Anna Firkowska-Mankiewicz, Tatiana Kanasz, and Elżbieta Tarkowska (Warsaw: Wyd. Akademii Pedagogiki Specjalnej, 2013), 271–86.

in various forms of protest, or other ways of expressing their opinions in Poland, did not differ from the European average; indeed, in 2013 the figure was slightly lower than the European average.⁶²

Civic Education Versus Real Attitudes, Values, and Behaviors of the Young Generation

Lack of interest in politics

According to research conducted in 2010, only 14% of nineteen-year-olds declared any interest in politics. A great majority of young people claimed that joining a political party was out of the question; only 12% of young people do not exclude this possibility. One fifth of young Polish students did not see anything wrong with non-democratic political systems.⁶³ In 2012, only 18% of respondents aged 18–24 considered military governments “very bad,” while among older age cohorts the figure was about 30% or more.⁶⁴ Young people are focused on their own aims and life aspirations, and appear more devoted to their professional careers and leisure activities than on efforts to influence the shape of social and political life. Young people’s low levels of interest and involvement in politics can also be explained to some degree by their critical attitudes toward politics and, therefore, an unwillingness to express their views in a conventional way (voting, participation in NGO activities, and so forth); this is especially characteristic of less educated youth. The World Values Survey, conducted in Poland and in other countries of East Central Europe in 2008 and 2012, showed that young people aged 18 to 24 were more materialistically oriented, and less supportive for the democratic system in comparison with the slightly older age cohorts.

62 Flash Eurobarometer 273 (2013).

63 Krystyna Szafraniec, *Youth 2011 Poland* (Warsaw: Kancelaria Rady Ministrów, 2011), 91–135.

64 Moreno, Siemieńska, and Basanez, “Międzypokoleniowe różnice w orientacji na wartości,” 271–86.

Political behavior

In Poland, the number of people voting in elections for the parliament remains rather low. In elections to the Sejm (the lower house of parliament), the number of voters in eight consecutive elections between 1991 and 2015 ranged between 43.2% and 53.9%; in the most recent elections in 2015, the figure was 50.92%. According to the State Election Commission, older and better educated citizens are more eager to vote. The lack of a well-established political stage and party system, evolution of party agendas, lack of clearly developed political preferences, and the economic polarization of society result in a transfer of votes to those politicians who offer easy, poorly thought-out solutions. In the case of those who do not vote, a question arises as to whether the only reason is a lack of interest in politics, a lack of belief in elections as an effective mechanism of exerting impact on politics, or a negative attitude towards the choices offered.

In the last parliamentary election of October 2015, the belief that the young generation, brought up after the transformation of 1989, would be oriented towards values typical of democratic societies—that is, would be more liberal, tending to value freedom highly, more tolerant of those who think differently, who differ in terms of their race or religion—appeared to be proved wrong. Different attitudes, largely associated with the inability to satisfy rapidly rising consumption needs, have brought completely different political choices. More than 26% of voters aged 18 to 29 supported the populist right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) which won the October 2015 election. Another 20% voted for the electoral committee of the rock musician Paweł Kukiz, and a further 16% voted for the KORWiN party, according to the State Electoral Commission. The programs of the two latter parties were based mainly on rejecting what has been built in the political sphere since the transition to democracy. The liberal, pro-EU Civic Platform—the party which had ruled in Poland for the previous eight years—lost over 15% of its vote in the elections. The leftist coalition Allied Left (incorporating the Democratic Left Alliance, Your Movement, and smaller organizations), and the newly established radical leftist Together party, failed even to reach the required threshold for seats in the elections (8% for a coalition, 5% for a single party).

The electoral behavior of young people shows a growing polarization of attitudes among the young. The neutral center is diminishing, while the

group of determined liberals and conservatives is growing. Currently, the latter is growing much faster. The attitudes of young people have shifted strongly to the right, becoming far closer to older generations in their attitudes. Young people accumulating dissatisfaction and disappointment with limited opportunities to meet their consumptive aspirations tended to vote not for specific programs, but simply against those who hold power. In conclusion, political behavior is determined by several factors. Civic education offered within the school system is only one of many and not necessary particularly significant in comparison with others.

CHAPTER 10

History Textbooks in Poland since 1989: A Dialogue between the Past and the Present

SYLWIA BOBRYK and THOMAS STROBEL

History education in Poland reflects the troubled history of the nation. Initially, it was organized by the countries which partitioned Poland in the eighteenth century.¹ Later, during the interwar period, Poland was able to exercise sovereignty over its own history education. During the World War II, teaching continued illegally. Then, during the Stalinist era it was strongly influenced by the Soviet Union. After 1956, the communist authorities enjoyed relative freedom to develop their own history education, in contrast to many other socialist countries.²

1989 marked the point when Polish history education and history textbooks were freed from the official control of the communist state. It was also a time when diverse and often conflicting values, memories, and narratives of the past were promoted by domestic, transnational, and international actors. This chapter attempts to shed some light on textbook development in Poland after the collapse of communism. How have the communist-era textbooks and the post-1989 textbooks differed

1 The partitions of Poland (more accurately, of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) were conducted by the Kingdom of Prussia, the Russian Empire, and Habsburg Austria, which divided up the Commonwealth lands among themselves. The first partition was decided in 1772, the second in 1793 (without the participation of Austria). The third partition of Poland took place in 1795. With this partition, Poland ceased to exist as an independent state until 1918.

2 Jerzy Maternicki, *Pogranicza historii: Studia i szkice* (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego), 119–20.

in their treatment of twentieth-century history? In particular, have values enshrined in textbook narratives changed, and if so, how? What has this meant for the aims of history education?

In order to answer these questions, we will first discuss how existing academic literature portrays the link between societies and history textbooks. We will then provide an insight into history textbooks in Poland. Whilst the years 1989 and 1990 were the “zero hour” for the development of textbook narratives in the German Democratic Republic, in Poland there is evidence of continuity between the old and new system. For this reason, we will pay particular attention to the processes that took place in the 1980s, such as the negotiations regarding history education between the communists and the Solidarity opposition movement.

The Function and Relevance of Textbooks

Studying the past can never be objective. Our contemporary experiences and our understanding of the past are mutually constitutive. The same applies to narratives in history textbooks. They are embedded in the political, institutional, and cultural settings in which they are constructed and used, and connected to the values of those who create or try to influence them.

The state generally appears to have the greatest influence over textbooks. State institutions have traditionally perceived textbooks to be a powerful tool in the construction of nations. The literature on nationalism emphasizes that states in Europe used education and textbooks to create and legitimize national narratives, as a means of fostering national unity during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Benedict Anderson, for example, stresses the role of education in establishing a standard vernacular as a crucial foundation of modern nation states, claiming that “the official or culture-language of rulers and elites usually came to be the official language of modern states via public education and other administrative mechanisms.”³ Likewise, Eric Hobsbawm highlights that “states . . . used increasingly powerful machinery for communicating with their inhabitants, above all in the primary schools, to spread the image and heritage of the

3 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 78.

'nation' and to include attachment to it."⁴ In this context, history textbooks fulfilled the purpose of contributing to nation-building processes. They told stories about national myths and national heroes which would play a significant role in the evolution and confirmation of collective memories.⁵

In the twentieth century, in politically contested spaces where state institutions sought to exercise tight control over history education, history textbooks continued to play an important role in the state's project of nation-building. This was no doubt the case with communist Poland and the German Democratic Republic, where textbooks served communist parties and were the means to pass on "correct" interpretations and values. This is still the case even today in authoritarian regimes such as China, where state institutions certainly exercise direct control over curricula and textbook content.⁶

Nevertheless, the assumption that in the twenty-first century a democratic state is capable of employing textbooks as master-narratives for its nation-building project is too simplistic. Recent research shows that history textbooks are just as likely to represent diverse memories, values, and alternative or even opposing narratives of societal groups. For instance, Luke Terra's analysis shows that history textbooks in Northern Ireland published since 1991 "reflect diverse perspectives on controversial events."⁷ Bert Vanhulle, in his study of narrative build-up in Belgian textbooks, reveals that in the period between 1945 and 2004 they evolved from "a relatively one-dimensional and ideologically based narrative to a more complex one" and moved away "from an archetype, proclaiming the realization of the end in history, towards more complex types of narration that struggle with the relationships between past, present and future."⁸ This suggests that various, sometimes conflicting memories and values, which erode national master-

4 Eric John Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 91.

5 Elie Podeh, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Israeli History Textbooks, 1948–2000* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 3.

6 Zheng Wang, "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China," *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (December 2008): 803.

7 Luke Terra, "New Histories for a New State: a Study of History Textbook Content in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 46, no. 2 (March 2014): 225.

8 Bert Vanhulle, "The Path of History: Narrative Analysis of History Textbooks—A Case Study of Belgian History Textbooks (1945–2004)," *History of Education* 38, no. 2 (March 2009): 281.

narratives, can be institutionalized in textbooks. It also shows that textbook narratives depend on the institutional, political and cultural settings in which they are developed and used.

History Textbooks in Poland until 1980

The communist state used history textbooks as a means of ideological control. It permitted only one, Marxist-Leninist, interpretation of history in school textbooks. This interpretation was developed and guarded by the centralized education system, which was headed by the Ministry of Education and controlled directly by the Polish Communist Party (officially known after December 1948 as the Polish United Workers' Party, PUWP). Textbooks painted a black and white picture of the world and Polish history, and exploited anti-German and anti-Semitic sentiment. They were used to legitimize the rule of the party and the so-called friendship with the Soviet Union.⁹

As a result of this manipulation by the party, textbooks were full of fabrications and alterations of historical events. The opposition criticized them for having "white spots," that is, not including historical events that were incompatible with the official version of history. They saw them mostly in Polish-Soviet history, for example the Polish-Russian War of 1920 and the Katyn Massacre.¹⁰ In contemporary history, strikes and demonstrations against the communists were not presented in the way that the opposition remembered them.¹¹

Thus, the Polish opposition movement, Solidarity, demanded "truth" in history teaching. It perceived the removal of state control over education as crucial to Polish society becoming "the master of its own culture

9 Zbigniew Osiński, "Osiąganie celów ideologicznych i politycznych za pomocą treści podręczników historii dla szkoły podstawowej w latach 1944–1989," in *Polska—Europa—Świat w szkolnych podręcznikach historii*, ed. Stanisław Roszak, Małgorzata Strzelecka, and Agnieszka Wieczorek (Toruń: Stowarzyszenie Oświatowców Polskich, 2008), 199.

10 Christine S. Parker, *History Education Reform in Postcommunist Poland 1989–1999: Historical and Contemporary Effects on Educational Transition*, Ph.D. thesis (Ohio: Ohio State University, 2003), 154.

11 Aleksander Achmatowicz, *Jak doszło do zmiany w programie nauczania historii w szkole* (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych w Warszawie, 1981), 9.

and education.”¹² As a result of the strikes in 1980, negotiations between the communist government and the opposition took place in 1981. The negotiations included talks between the Ministry of Education and the opposition, who demanded changes in history teaching.

In order to prepare for negotiations, Anna Radziwiłł, future Vice-Minister of Education (1989–1990), representing Solidarity, prepared a document entitled “The Proposals for Immediate Changes in History Instruction in Primary and Secondary Schools.”¹³ One of the main postulates was to “verify and supplement the history textbooks and reading lists, especially for teaching contemporary history, so that students can learn comprehensively about the history and culture of their country.”¹⁴ Solidarity demanded the de-politicization and de-ideologization of school history, so that more than one interpretation of history would be allowed.

The document shows that most changes were planned for teaching twentieth-century history. With regard to World War II, the authors demanded a reinterpretation of Polish-Soviet history. They wanted pupils to learn about the Polish underground and “the role of the Home Army in organising the resistance movement in the country,” the Warsaw Uprising and “controversies over [its] assessment.” Finally, they wanted to inform children about taboo subjects in Polish-German and Polish-Jewish history: “the resolutions of the conferences in Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam” regarding not only the Polish-German but also Polish-Soviet border, and “the information about the resettlement of Germans from Polish territories as well as “the Shoah of Polish Jews and undertaken by them attempts of resistance.”¹⁵

The Ministry of Education introduced the initial changes that had been demanded by the opposition to history teaching programs in the

12 “Solidarity’s Programme Adopted by the First National Congress,” in *Poland 1981: Towards Social Renewal*, ed. Peter Raina (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 354.

13 Maria Irena Matejuk and Urszula Płatek, “Zmiany w programach historii szkół podstawowych i średnich,” *Wiadomości Historyczne* 24, no. 5 (July–August 1981): 319.

14 Krajowa Komisja Koordynacyjna Oświaty i Wychowania NSZZ “Solidarność,” “Propozycje doraźnych zmian w materiale nauczania historii w szkolnictwie podstawowym i ponadpodstawowym. Ostateczna redakcja przedstawionego tekstu uwzględnia zmiany wprowadzone podczas negocjacji z Resortem Oświaty i Wychowania 13, 21.III.1981 r. oraz 15.IV. 1981r.” (Warsaw: Krajowa Rada Sekcji Oświaty i Wychowania, 4 February 1981), 1.

15 Ibid., 14–15.

school year 1981–1982.¹⁶ Introducing new textbooks, however, was more difficult. In October 1981, representatives of the Ministry and the School and Pedagogical Publishers (*Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne*, WSiP) met with opposition representatives.¹⁷ Together they proposed to launch a competition for textbook authors.¹⁸ Ultimately, the proposal was never implemented, as martial law was imposed in December 1981.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the Ministry had to publish a new textbook to match the newly revised teaching programs. Thus, Andrzej Leszek Szczesiak, already an author of history textbooks, prepared a new history textbook which was published in 1984.²⁰ During this time at least two competing histories existed: the official account supported by the communist government, and the opposition's evolving search for their own vision of history.²¹ After the imposition of martial law, the activities of independent trade unions and social protests against the party were made illegal, and activists, including Solidarity's co-founder Lech Wałęsa, were detained.²² Solidarity historians were pushed underground to continue research on "white spots." Nevertheless, at the same time, the party understood how important the "memory battle" was for their society. They "abandoned the tactic of silence about uncomfortable historical issues"²³ and instead

16 Teresa Bochwic, *Narodziny i Działalność Solidarności i Wychowania 1980–1989 (W świetle dokumentów NSZZ "Solidarność" i relacji jej działaczy)*, Ph.D. thesis (Warsaw: Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej im. Marii Grzegorzewskiej, 2006), 109; also Parker, *History Education Reform*, 159; also Jerzy Centkowski, "Zmodernizowane programy nauczania historii a warsztat pracy nauczyciela," in *Warsztat pracy nauczyciela historii*, ed. Alojzy Zielecki (Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Rzeszowie, 1988), 106.

17 Among them were Anna Radziwiłł, Anna Sucheni-Grabowska, and Zofia T. Kozłowska.

18 "Warunki konkursu na podręczniki historii," in *IPS*, I/28, 1625. (Warsaw: Archiwum Akt Nowych, n.d.), 1–2.

19 Bochwic, *Narodziny*, 109.

20 Andrzej Leszek Szczesiak, *Polska i świat naszego wieku: Książka pomocnicza dla klasy ósmej szkoły podstawowej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1984).

21 Jerzy Maternicki, "Nauczanie historii najnowszej. Część II," *Wiadomości Historyczne* 30, no. 1 (December 1987), 3–19.

22 Kazimierz Kłoc, "Poland's Political System—Change and Future Scenarios," in *Poland into the 1990s: Economy and Society in Transition*, ed. George Blazysca and Ryszard Rapacki (London: Printer Publishers, 1991), 15.

23 Antoni Dudek, "Historia i polityka w Polsce po 1989 roku," in *Historycy i politycy: Polityka pamięci w III RP*, ed. Paweł Skibiński, Tomasz Wiścicki, and Michał Wysocki (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo DiD, 2011), 34.

tasked their trusted historians with carrying out research to give contemporary history "correct" interpretations.

How did Szczesniak's textbook respond to the divide between the official and oppositional history? The author himself explained later that the textbook was not purely a communist vision of the past. Nonetheless, the official version of history was not removed, as the book had to be accepted for publication by the office of censorship. When evaluating controversial historical events such as the Warsaw Uprising, Szczesniak aimed to present the arguments of both the communists and the opposition.²⁴ This is not to say that Szczesniak was a *tabula rasa*. In fact, he was a long-term employee of the Ministry of Education, who had represented the Ministry both in the Polish-West German and the Polish-Soviet Textbook Commissions.²⁵

The author had to somehow manoeuvre not only between the expectations of the party and society, but most importantly between the Soviet Union and the PUWP. In the textbook he did something that had not been done before: he referred to the Katyń massacre, and without mentioning who committed the crime, he explained that it had caused a break in Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. Szczesniak's textbook, therefore, was in reality a hybrid and a reconstruction that was dialogic with contemporaneous political and societal currents. It was published at a time when the official communist interpretation of twentieth-century history was being challenged by the opposition.

The 1980s were, therefore, a crucial period for the transformation of Polish history textbooks and for preparing the ground for what was still to come: further search for the "truth" about the nation's history, alongside a growing appetite for pluralism and freedom of expression. Although there was yet no fundamental change in textbook development, textbooks had to respond to the opposition demands for "truth." The opposition not only demanded that the party introduce changes in history teaching, but also themselves created new narratives to fill in the "white spots," often employing a "nostalgic construction of the past,"²⁶ a romantic

24 Julia Tazbirowa, Stefan Meller, Andrzej Paczkowski, Wojciech Roszkowski and Andrzej Szczesniak, "Samotność historyka," *Mówią Wieki: Magazyn Historyczny* 36, no. 2 (September 1992): 9.

25 Andrzej L. Szczesniak, "Polsko-radziecka współpraca nad doskonaleniem podręczników historii," *Wiadomości Historyczne* 26, no. 3 (December 1983): 241–46.

26 Kazimierz Przyszczypkowski, "Społeczny ruch odnowy edukacji w Polsce w latach 80-tych," *Ruch Pedagogiczny* XXXV, no. 5–6 (September–December, 1993): 90.

ethnic vision of the national past portraying Poland as a victim. Members of the opposition who participated in history teaching negotiations were soon to take over key positions in the Solidarity government. With regards to textbook content, in spite of the fact that new interpretations of history remained hidden between the lines, this was a radical change from the system that had been tightly controlled by the communists earlier.

The Year 1989 in Education and History Teaching

The Round Table negotiations of 1989 and the elections that followed consolidated the power of Solidarity over history teaching, as Solidarity became the leading political force in Poland.²⁷ Henryk Samsonowicz was appointed Minister of Education, while Anna Radziwiłł, Andrzej Janowski, and Mirosław Sawicki became his vice-ministers. In the early 1990s, they introduced the principles of decentralization, democratization, and plurality into textbook narrative development. Their intention was to free history education from the domination of the state.²⁸

First of all, in 1990 they dissolved the Institute of School Curricula, as the institution responsible for the development of teaching programs under the communist system. In its place the Ministry recruited “new” experts—those who had not previously held the monopoly—and tasked them with adapting the content of the old curricula so that it could be used in the new political setting.²⁹ They removed details about the history of the proletarian movement from the teaching programs of primary schools and added information regarding “white spots”, such as the Katyń massacre.³⁰

In order to allow greater pluralization, and because creating new teaching programs was highly complex, in 1992 the Ministry of Education developed and adopted a minimalist curriculum which prescribed, in very general and vague terms, what was to be taught in the classroom

27 Kloc, “Poland’s Political System,” 16.

28 Bochwic, *Narodziny*, 249.

29 Stanisław Sławiński, *Reforma szkolna w III Rzeczypospolitej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1996), 57.

30 Parker, *History Education Reform*, 154.

and what information textbooks should contain.³¹ In the same year, the Ministry of Education introduced the principle of plurality and decentralization into textbook production.³² This meant that more than one history textbook was allowed for each school year group and, in turn, triggered competition between existing and newly created publishing houses.³³

Moreover, the monopoly previously held by the Ministry of Education regarding the content, author and style of textbooks was broken. The Ministry was only to evaluate and authorize textbooks based on expert reviews obtained by the publishing houses themselves.³⁴ This started a new era of textbook development where textbooks could not be taken simply as a reflection of the objectives of a purposeful "state" as a unitary actor.³⁵

The first "postcommunist" history textbooks

Faced with the impossibility of developing "new" history textbooks for the school year 1989–1990, due to the necessary lead time for developing them, the huge financial costs involved and most of all the uncertain geopolitical situation, the new Solidarity government instructed teachers to continue using "old" history textbooks.³⁶

In the school year 1989–1990, primary schools teaching twentieth-century history used a new edition of a textbook written by Szcześniak in 1984. The secondary schools had no textbooks for post-1945 history at all.³⁷ Hence, teachers were mobilized to change the manner in which they taught history. For example, the history teaching program for higher

31 Minister Edukacji Narodowej, *Minimum programowe przedmiotów ogólnokształcących w szkołach podstawowych i średnich obowiązujące od 1 września 1992* (Warsaw: FREN, 1992).

32 Stanisław Sławiński, *Raport o reformie szkolnej 1991–1993* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1994), 27.

33 Ibid.

34 The list of experts was prepared by the Ministry for Education. Publishers each selected four reviewers from the list. Nevertheless, the list of reviewers was not ready at the time. See Sławiński, *Raport*, 27.

35 Anna Radziwiłł, "Tezy o oświacie 1989–1994," *Spółeczeństwo Otwarte* 94, no. 12 (December 1994): 37.

36 *Program nauczania historii w szkole podstawowej* (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Edukacji, 1990).

37 Małgorzata Walczak, "Kilka uwag nauczyciela historii po pierwszym roku pracy," *Wiadomości Historyczne* 33, no. 4 (1990): 212.

secondary schools stated that: "It is the duty of the teacher to execute the program and not simply teach textbook contents, which expand considerably and often stray from the intentions of the program."³⁸ Nevertheless, the majority of history teachers were not capable of executing the new program without textbooks, nor of distinguishing which "old" textbook content remained relevant.³⁹ As such, teachers and students "waited for a new history textbook that would no longer provoke resistance and which could be used without fear of making mistakes."⁴⁰

However, history teachers and their pupils were not the only sections of society that wished for new textbooks. Societal groups, educators, and politicians perceived them as tools for creating a new postcommunist reality. Stanisław Kawula, a professor of pedagogy, wrote in 1991: "Our whole society and the nation . . . [are] looking for positive ways out of the socio-economic and educational crisis. The question is with what past, present and future a young man should identify."⁴¹

New textbooks for teaching twentieth-century history were gradually published. However, not all of them featured new narratives. The majority of textbooks for secondary schools had been prepared in the 1980s, when the communist system and its office of censorship were still functioning.⁴² Among those prepared after the collapse of communism were textbooks by Roman Tusiewicz⁴³ and Anna Radziwiłł and Wojciech Roszkowski.⁴⁴ All of the authors were members of Solidarity and, therefore, their textbooks can be seen as attempts by Solidarity to present their

38 Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej, *Program Nauczania: Historia dla szkoły średniej* (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Edukacji Narodowej, 1990).

39 Jacek Bukowski, "Nowy program," *Spółeczeństwo Otwarte* 90, no. 7 (1990): 50–51.

Julian Radziejewicz, "Jak się bronić przed wolnością," *Spółeczeństwo Otwarte* 90, no. 2 (1990): 40–41.

40 Jerzy Eisler, "Dobry szkolny podręcznik," *Wiadomości Historyczne* 37, no. 1 (1994): 59.

41 Stanisław Kawula, "Wstęp," in *Świadomość i edukacja historyczna*, ed. Stanisław Kawula and Mirosław Świątecki (Olsztyn: Wydawnictwa Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1991), 8.

42 Eisler, "Dobry szkolny podręcznik," 59.

43 Roman Tusiewicz, *Polska Współczesna 1944–1989. Podręcznik dla szkół średnich klasy IV liceum ogólnokształcącego oraz klasy III technikum i liceum zawodowego* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1993).

44 Anna Radziwiłł and Wojciech Roszkowski, *Historia 1945–1990. Podręcznik dla szkół średnich* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1994).

own values and visions of the past. Such visions were clearly intended to contrast with the former official history, and with the textbooks that had embraced it.

This also shows that “old” and “new” narratives did coexist, especially in the early years of democracy when plurality was encouraged. Radziwiłł & Roszkowski’s textbooks were reprinted and used in classrooms until 1999, when they were withdrawn due to structural changes in the education system. The textbooks by Tusiewicz and by Szcześniak remained in use even longer: their new editions were certified by the Ministry of Education in 2001 and were republished until 2004.

Textbooks and history education reformed

In 1999, new history textbooks were introduced to Polish schools, as a result of the structural reform of education implemented by the Solidarity Electoral Action government. Until 1999, both primary schools and secondary schools had taught history in a chronological manner. The education reform added a new tier: the lower-secondary, or middle school, called *gimnazjum*. Since then, chronological history was taught twice: first in the *gimnazjum*, and then in the higher secondary schools. As a result of these changes, new curricula and new history textbooks had to be prepared.

The curricular work was, however, not a straightforward process. It had begun in 1992, during the era of the Solidarity government, but the group of experts, headed by the academic historian Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, was interrupted by each successive parliamentary election. The final version of the curriculum, signed in 1999, was re-written by undisclosed persons appointed by the Ministry of Education, and Mędrzecki accused them of “fixing a ‘Polonocentric’ conception of history”⁴⁵ in the curricula.

The key characteristic of history teaching after the structural reform was the high number of textbooks. The Ministry of Education certified twelve textbooks for teaching contemporary history at *gimnazjum* level. This increase was accompanied by a growing number of publishing houses.

45 Włodzimierz Mędrzecki, “Jak pisałem podstawę programową historii,” *Wiadomości Historyczne* 42, no. 3 (1999): 154.

The Polish textbook market until 1989 was characterized by its centralization, censorship, and scarcity.⁴⁶ The publisher WSiP had a monopoly in schoolbook publishing. When communism collapsed, the number of publishers grew rapidly: in the first three years of the transformation, one hundred and seventy-eight new publishers appeared.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, WSiP managed to remain the largest educational publisher in those first years. Between 1990 and 1994, it published 1,010 new textbooks and revised 351 others.⁴⁸ This was due to several advantages that WSiP had over its competitors, most notably access to distribution networks, expertise and the capacity for large scale publishing.⁴⁹

WSiP was not the only publisher that decided to publish history textbooks after 1999; Znak and Polwen were also major players in this period. During the communist years, Znak had been associated with the opposition and the Catholic Church. Polwen had been associated with the Catholic University of Lublin; it decided to re-publish Szcześniak's textbook, even though some reviewers had criticized it for anti-Semitism.⁵⁰ There were also publishing houses owned by those whose first experience of book publishing was with WSiP. But it was not uncommon for textbook publishers to be clearly profit-oriented, with their roots in other forms of book publishing; for example, Marek Rożak began by publishing self-help books for car repair.

As the curriculum was ready only in February 1999, and textbooks had to be ready for September, publishers had begun work on textbooks ahead of time. The prevalent mindset of the time was that it was "not important who was better, what was important was who was first."⁵¹ For this reason, many of the new publishers decided to reprint the old textbooks, while others developed textbooks of low standards which contained factual and grammatical mistakes, or were not even compatible with the curricula. In this hectic period, "a blind eye was liberally turned

46 Ewa Jabłońska-Stefanowicz, "Polish Textbook Market (1970–2012): Changes and Tendencies," *Knygotyra* 63 (2014): 67.

47 *Ibid.*, 68.

48 Łukasz Gibała, "Na początku był Falski," *Rzeczpospolita*, April 5, 1995, accessed July 17, 2015, <http://archiwum.rp.pl/artukul/49564-Na-poczatku-byl-Falski.html>.

49 Parker, *History Education Reform*, 162.

50 Jerzy Tomaszewski, "Podręcznik, który źle uczy," *Wiadomości Historyczne* 38, no. 4 (1995): 223–29.

51 Tadeusz Mosiek, *Podręczniki 2000/2001—Raport* (Warsaw: Biblioteka Analiz, 2000), 10.

and [even] not fully finished textbooks were accepted"⁵² and authorized by the Ministry.

Textbooks and reforms since 2009

In 2009, history teaching was reformed again, this time under Civic Platform rule. The Minister of Education, Katarzyna Hall (2007–2011), introduced a new curriculum into Polish schools. Following these reforms, pupils were taught history chronologically, starting from lower secondary school through to the first year of higher secondary school. Twentieth-century history was taught to the majority of pupils only once—in the first year of higher secondary schools.⁵³ The old textbooks were discarded and eight new textbooks were certified for the teaching of twentieth-century history. The number of textbooks decreased significantly in comparison to the previous reform and only six publishers remained in the history textbook market.

The 2009 reform of history teaching was highly controversial. This can be illustrated by debates in the conservative newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*. Among the opponents of the reforms, historian Andrzej Nowak laconically argued that the reform was "the end of history."⁵⁴ On the other hand, Jolanta Choińska-Mika and Anna Radziwiłł, the authors of the curricula, underlined that the reform "is not the end of history" and that pupils' knowledge of twentieth-century history would improve as a result of the reform.⁵⁵ It seems that both sides agreed on one element: acquisition and understanding of twentieth-century history is crucial for contemporary Polish society.

52 "Kogo rozpieszczą WSiP? Rozmowa z Janem Rurańskim," *Głos Nauczycielski*, April 27, 2005, 5.

53 Katarzyna Hall, "MEN i IPN razem dla historii," *Rzeczpospolita*, January 24, 2011, accessed July 17, 2015, <http://archiwum.rp.pl/artykul/1016160-MEN-i-IPN--razem--dla-historii.html>.

54 Andrzej Nowak, "Prawdziwy koniec historii," *Rzeczpospolita*, December 18, 2008, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/235811.html>.

55 Jolanta Choińska-Mika and Anna Radziwiłł, "Końca historii nie będzie," *Rzeczpospolita*, December 30, 2008, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/241223.html?print=tak&p=0>.

This debate was a part of a larger political, academic, and societal dispute about the state and its policy toward history. The dispute goes back to 2001 when Jan Tomasz Gross published a book in English entitled *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*, in which he described how Poles killed 1,600 Jews in Jedwabne.⁵⁶ The book triggered the most important Polish public debate about World War II since 1945, during the course of which two rival perspectives on remembering the massacre have been presented. On the one hand, there are those who evaluate the national past critically and want to confront the “dark” events. On the other side are those who perceive the book as anti-Polish propaganda and wish to protect the nation.⁵⁷

Partially in response to the debate, Polish conservative historians such as Andrzej Nowak, Tomasz Merta, and Marek A. Cichocki, introduced the term *polityka historyczna*. Literally translated, this means the *politics* of history, but in the Polish context it refers to the *policy* of history, which is to say, a program.⁵⁸ They have argued that, after the collapse of communism, politicians treated the past as “dangerous ballast”⁵⁹ and critiqued them, as well as revisionist historians, for their inability to create a new coherent master-narrative. They have proposed to develop a Polish policy of history not only at home, but also abroad, in order to incorporate Polish victimhood during the Second World War into a European foundational myth.⁶⁰

The suggestions of conservative historians were put into action by politicians from the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Due to the efforts of former Mayor of Warsaw Lech Kaczyński, a Warsaw Rising Museum was built. In its campaign leading up to the parliamentary elections in 2005, PiS proclaimed the establishment of the Fourth Republic, to replace the

56 Jan Tomasz Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

57 Antony Polonsky and Joanna Michlic, eds., *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003).

58 Rafał Stobiecki, “Historians facing politics of history: The case of Poland,” in *Past in the Making: Historical Revisionism in Central Europe after 1989*, ed. Michał Kopecek (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2013), 179–92.

59 Tomasz Merta, “Pamięć i nadzieja,” in *Pamięć i odpowiedzialność*, ed. Robert Kostron and Tomasz Merta (Kraków–Wrocław: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej/Centrum Konserwatywne), 77.

60 *Ibid.*, 71–86.

name of the republic that had existed since 1989.⁶¹ After their short, coalitional rule with other right-wing parties, PiS lost the 2007 elections to the Civic Platform (PO).

The Civic Platform government, although it never proclaimed an official history policy, also took an active role in the politics of history. In 2009, the government announced that the year 2009–2010 would be the Year of Contemporary History and prepared, in coalition with several institutions, educational activities to assist the teaching of contemporary history.⁶² The PO-led government also undertook various initiatives of reconciliation and dialogue with other countries. In 2008, it supported the German-Polish initiative of a common history textbook.⁶³ It also restarted the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters.

Textbooks: Narratives and Values

The early postcommunist textbooks enshrined values and narratives advocated by Solidarity. This was possible in the changing political environment which saw Solidarity become the main political power. Poles witnessed the reinterpretation of three historical periods, earlier heavily manipulated by the communists: the Second Republic, spanning the years between 1918 and 1939, World War II, and the post-1945 period.

With respect to the Second Republic, the example of the representation of Józef Piłsudski shows how substantial the reinterpretation was. Up until the mid-1960s, Polish textbooks had classified Piłsudski's regime as fascist. In the 1970s and 1980s, the image was still very negative, but the vocabulary changed and now the textbooks instead discussed "Piłsudski's authoritarian rule."⁶⁴ Textbooks published since 1989 have offered yet

61 Jacek Kochanowicz, "Right turn: Polish politics at the beginning of twenty-first century," *Eurozine*, September 14, 2007, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-14-kochanowicz-en.html>.

62 Barbara Fedyszak-Radziejowska, "Jak uczyć o historii," *Rzeczpospolita*, January 31, 2011.

63 Simone Lässig and Thomas Strobel, "Towards a Joint German-Polish History Textbook: Historical Roots, Structures and Challenges," in *History Education and Post-Conflict Reconciliation: Reconsidering Joint Textbook Projects*, ed. Karina V. Korostelina and Simone Lässig (London: Routledge, 2013), 90–119.

64 Adam Suchoński and Marek Białokur, "Przewrót majowy Józefa Piłsudskiego w podręcznikach szkolnych," *Wiadomości Historyczne* 50, no. 3 (2007): 18–21.

more perspectives on the coup of May 1926, when Piłsudski used the military to seize power, and they judge neither the actions nor the figure of Piłsudski categorically. What is more, most of them contain underlying positive assumptions about his rule.

As for the Second World War, while communist textbooks relied on martyrological visions of the Polish nation and Polish victimhood under Nazi occupation, Solidarity textbooks have begun to focus on Soviet crimes against Poles.⁶⁵ Textbook authors attempted to fill in the “white spots” in the history of Polish–Soviet relations. The massacre of Polish officers by the Soviet NKVD in Katyn forest in 1940 became the new symbol of Polish suffering at the hands of the Soviets.⁶⁶ Moreover, textbooks called the situation in the Polish eastern territories an “occupation” and assigned it a status comparable to Nazi occupation.⁶⁷ The Warsaw Uprising was no longer portrayed as an act perpetrated by fascists and the exile government in London against “democratic” forces in the country, but as a symbol of the fight for independence against both Nazi and Soviet occupation forces, of unique character in the whole of Europe.⁶⁸

One of the most visible changes in the interpretation of the war was the representation of the Holocaust. Communist textbooks had focused on the Polish ethnic nation and, in order to convince readers that its victimhood during the war was unique, the fate of other nations and especially the murder of European Jews were marginalized. Since the reform of 1999, the term “Holocaust” has been present in all textbooks for teaching

65 Hanna Węgrzynek, “Tematyka Zagłady w podręcznikach szkolnych (1945–2009),” in *Następstwa Zagłady Żydów: Polska 1944–2010*, ed. Feliks Tych and Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2012), 611.

66 Rafał Roguski, “Zbrodnia katyńska i zbrodnie stalinowskie z lat 1939–1941 w polskich podręcznikach historii,” *Historia i Świat* 2 (2013): 233–46; also Anna Glimos-Nadgórska, “Problematyka Katynia na kartach podręczników szkolnych do historii obowiązujących w latach 1981–1999,” in *Niewygodne dla władzy. Ograniczanie wolności słowa na ziemiach polskich w XIX i XX wieku*, ed. Dorota Degen and Jacek Gzella (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2010), 521–38.

67 Teresa Maresz, “Zmiana obrazu Rosji i Rosjan w podręcznikach do historii dla szkół licealnych,” in *Tradycja i mity w edukacji historycznej w dobie reform*, ed. Stanisław Roszak, Małgorzata Strzelecka and Mariusz Ziółkowski (Toruń: Stowarzyszenie Oświatowców Polskich, 2004), 191.

68 Marian M. Drozdowski, “Powstanie Warszawskie 1944 roku w wybranych syntezach historycznych i podręcznikach polskich,” in *Edukacja historyczna a współczesność*, ed. Barbara Kubis (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2002), 465–74.

twentieth-century history and it became an integral part of textbook structure with separate chapters dedicated to the phenomenon. Nevertheless, teaching about the Holocaust remained nationally framed. Although a few textbooks explained the murder of European Jews, and shed light on the complex Polish–Jewish relations during the war, the majority of textbook narratives emphasized Polish ethnic martyrology and treated the Holocaust in a fragmentary and factual manner. They did not explain the difference between the fate of Poles in concentration camps and that of the Jews in death camps. Some still held on to communist narratives and instrumentalized the Holocaust to show Polish heroism in saving Jews.⁶⁹

Today's textbooks represent the Holocaust "in line with the current state of academic knowledge."⁷⁰ Following the public debate about the Jedwabne massacre and Polish participation in the Holocaust, the majority of them hint at Polish participation in the murder of Jews and mention the Jedwabne massacre. Nevertheless, they continue to distance themselves from this still controversial and shameful topic. The master-narrative about Polish martyrology and Polish heroism dominates.⁷¹

As for the presentation of the history of Polish–German relations, the socialist-era textbooks appear convinced of a long-lasting conflict between Germany and Poland. They promote the myth that the establishment of the new postwar border on the Oder–Neisse line was a return to the old Polish homeland, the Piasts' lands. They also argue that the post-1945 expulsions of Germans from Polish territory brought historical justice to Poles who had suffered under the German occupation.⁷² After 1989, the presentation of this conflict diminished. Textbooks began to show empathy for the severe circumstances of Germans expelled from Poland. They also contextualized the German displacements by looking at other migration movements after the war. Today, textbooks no longer use moral

69 Hanna Węgrzynek, "Prezentacja Holokaustu i dziejów Żydów w aktualnych podręcznikach historii," in *Nauczanie o Holokauście*, ed. Andrzej Żbikowski (Póltusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna im. Aleksandra Gieysztor, 2006), 13–74.

70 Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs and Robert Szuchta, "The intricacies of education about the Holocaust in Poland: Ten years of the Jedwabne debate, what can Polish school students learn about the Holocaust in history classes?" *Intercultural Education* 25, no. 4 (2014): 289.

71 *Ibid.*, 290–91.

72 Ewa Nasalska, "Wysiedlenie Niemców jako element szkolnej edukacji historycznej w latach 1956–2006," *Rocznik polsko-niemiecki* 15 (2007): 83–88.

or historical arguments to persuade readers that the territorial changes after 1945 were justified.⁷³

Early postcommunist textbooks also contained new narratives about the post-1945 period. As they were published during the transformation, their authors attempted to analyze the immediately preceding communist era. This rapid evaluation produced mixed results; some authors evidently idealized the socialist experience, while others condemned it. Most of them made clear that the coalition of Solidarity and the Catholic Church had been responsible for the fall of the socialist system. They emphasized the uniqueness of the Polish revolution, as the Polish Round Table negotiations took place while the Berlin Wall was still standing.⁷⁴

Probably the most controversial topic in textbook memory of the socialist era is the imposition of martial law in Poland, announced on December 13, 1981 by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, then-First Secretary of the PZPR. The 1990s textbooks disagreed among themselves about the reasons and aims of martial law. They portrayed it either as an attempt on Jaruzelski's part to rescue Poland from a possible Soviet intervention, or alternatively, as a brutal defense of the socialist system against the wishes of the society. Today's textbooks broadly disapprove of the introduction of martial law in 1981. Although from a didactic point of view the event could be used to show multiple perspectives in history, most of the textbooks fail to use it in that way.⁷⁵

In general, a set narrative describing the post-1945 period has yet to emerge. It appears that textbook authors still engage in disputes about who is the "hero" and who is the "villain" of the communist era.⁷⁶ Generally speaking, they show the socialist period as a "perpetual confrontation between the alien and imposed power [the Soviet Union] and the opposing society."⁷⁷ By doing so, they marginalize the partly existing

73 Ibid., 88–99.

74 Bartłomiej Krupa, "Obrazy PRL-u w licealnych podręcznikach historii (1989–2004)," *Polonistyka* 5 (May 2006): 45.

75 Joanna Wojdon, "History textbooks facing controversial issues—case study of the Martial Law in Poland," *Yesterday and Today* 12 (December 2014): 75–89.

76 Józef Brynkus, "Stan wojenny w polskiej współczesnej edukacji historycznej," in *Stan Wojenny. Fakty, Hipotezy, Interpretacje. Zbiór Studiów*, ed. Arkadiusz Czwołka and Wojciech Polak (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 2008), 441–50.

77 Maciej Górny, "Sprawozdanie z badania gimnazjalnych podręczników do historii," in

societal support for communist rule, and those Poles who participated in maintaining a socialist government.

Polish history education since 1989 has been committed to the teaching of civic values. This is most clearly visible in the curriculum, which requires that textbooks present democratic traditions in national history (from the Republic of Nobles up to the Polish Third Republic). Indeed, today's Polish textbooks are far from being xenophobic. They are modern, highly knowledge-based, but also skill- and value-oriented, and meet European standards. Polish history is presented as strongly related to the history of the country's neighbors, and Polish belonging to the European community since the Middle Ages is emphasized.

Nevertheless, one can observe also some critical phenomena. In quantitative terms, national history still plays a more dominant role than the history of Europe or the world. At the core of textbook narratives are wars, uprisings, and battles—the struggles of the nation for its independence and existence. The national history is presented as the history of the majority ethnic group. Minorities (Jews, Germans, Armenians, Ukrainians, and so forth) and certain regions with a diverse history (for instance, Silesia) do not constitute an integral part of the nation's master narrative. When reviewing textbooks, one could gain the impression that Poland was always a mono-ethnic nation. In reality, however, this has been the case only since 1945.⁷⁸

Moreover, what also matters is not just what is in the textbooks, but what is not. It appears that political history is predominant, but at the expense of social, cultural and everyday history. One such absence is the portrayal of female historical figures. Curricula, as well as history textbooks, predominantly analyze the roles of men, with as little as 5% of historical figures mentioned in curricula in 2008 being female. For example, in the Middle Ages the curriculum mentions thirteen male figures, such as Piast the Wheelwright and Nicolaus Copernicus, but only one woman: Queen Jadwiga of Poland (1373/74–1399; reigned 1384–1399). Women are not only underrepresented, but also seem to have little or no historical influence.⁷⁹ There is little information about their legal and social

Wyniki monitoringu podręczników gimnazjalnych do języka polskiego, historii i wiedzy o społeczeństwie, ed. Tomasz Żukowski (Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Otwarta Rzeczpospolita, 2004), 29.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 27.

⁷⁹ Iwona Chmura-Rutkowska, Edyta Głowacka-Sobiech and Izabela Skórzyńska, "Nie-godne historii". O nieobecności kobiet w dziejach w kontekście analiz wybranych

situation or even about their fight for voting rights in the nineteenth century.⁸⁰

Finally, textbook narratives clearly show that the value of freedom is paramount. While discussing the time of partitions in the eighteenth century and up to the World War I, textbooks consider freedom of the nation and sovereignty of the state to be of key significance. Then, during the time of the First and the Second World Wars they attach value to freedom from war and occupation. Finally, in the post-1945 period they underline the value of individual freedom, and the wish for the inviolable sovereignty of the state, free from foreign influences.⁸¹

Current Developments

In recent years there have been numerous changes which have significant implications for the development of textbooks and the functioning of the textbook market. In 2012, the Ministry of Education launched a program called "Cyfrowa Szkoła" ("Digital School"). The program produced e-books for fourteen different subjects, including history textbooks for all the levels, available since autumn 2015. Both schools and pupils can use such e-books free of charge.⁸²

The Civic Platform government had also started introducing various state-funded printed textbooks and educational materials.⁸³ This was a reaction to long-standing criticism claiming that parents had been excessively burdened by the cost of buying new textbooks for their children.⁸⁴ Hence, starting from the school year 2014–2015, free textbooks have been progressively introduced to primary schools, developed by

podręczników do nauki historii w Polsce," *Sensus Historiae* 12, no. 4 (2013): 60, 65.

80 Górny, "Sprawozdanie," 29.

81 I am grateful to Hanna Grzempa from the Georg Eckert Institute for this comment.

82 Textbooks are available on the website: <https://www.epodreczniki.pl>.

83 "Ustawa z dnia 21 lutego 2014 r. o zmianie ustawy o systemie oświaty," *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw: March 7, 2015, Poz. 290); also "Ustawa z dnia 30 maja 2014 r. o zmianie ustawy o systemie oświaty oraz niektórych innych ustaw," *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw: June 23, 2015, Poz. 811).

84 Polska Agencja Prasowa, "Raport: Darmowe podręczniki dużą pomocą dla rodzinnych budżetów," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, February 5, 2015, accessed January 10, 2016, http://wyborcza.pl/1,91446,17363686,Raport__darmowe_podreczniki_duza_pomoca_dla_rodzinnych.html.

teams of authors employed by the Ministry of Education. For the higher grades since the year 2015–2016,⁸⁵ every school receives state funding⁸⁶ in order to purchase sets of textbooks for all school subjects, and for every pupil. These are prepared by private publishing houses and schools are able to select which textbooks they wish to use.

Changes led by the Civic Platform government to textbook policy are being modified by the new Law and Justice government, which has been in power since October 2015. The new Minister of Education, Anna Zalewska, announced firstly that the Ministry would no longer develop new textbooks itself and, secondly, that the Ministry would instead select three textbooks for each grade and subject from those prepared by existing publishers. If the school chooses one of them, then the Ministry would refund the cost of the textbook chosen.⁸⁷ At the time of writing, it is not fully clear how the system would function.

For the publishers, such changes are having serious economic implications. One of the leaders in the textbook publishing market, WSiP, had already suffered enormous losses in trading by 2014.⁸⁸ This previous communist monopoly and state-owned publisher was privatized in 2005 and has been owned by the investment fund Advent International since 2010.⁸⁹ In 2013, the company lost its leading position in the textbook market to Nowa Era, a publishing house established at the beginning of the 1990s.⁹⁰ Other prominent history textbook publishers include Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Oświatowe from Gdańsk, founded in 1991, and Operon from Gdynia, established in 1993. The government's policy of pro-

85 "Rozporządzenie Ministra Edukacji Narodowej z dnia 7 lipca 2014 r. w sprawie udzielania dotacji celowej na wyposażenie szkół w podręczniki, materiały edukacyjne i materiały ćwiczeniowe," *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw: July 8, 2015, Poz. 902).

86 The state funding is equivalent to 250 złotych (around 64 dollars) per school child per school year.

87 "Zalewska: W klasach I–III podręczniki będą darmowe i do wyboru," *Newsweek Polska*, May 23, 2016, accessed July 14, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.pl/polska/darmowe-podreczniki-klasy-i-iii-anna-zalewska-men-podreczniki-do-wyboru,artykuly,386164,1.html>.

88 "Efekt 'rządowego podręcznika.' WSiP planuje zwolnienia grupowe," *Dziennik Gaze-ta Prawna*, May 19, 2014, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/artykuly/459387,efekt-rzadowego-podrecznika-wsip-planuje-zwolnienia-grupowe.html>.

89 "Historia," WSiP, accessed January 10, 2016, <http://www.wsip.pl/o-firmie/historia/>.

90 Jabłońska-Stefanowicz, "Polish Textbook Market," 70–71.

viding free textbooks has already influenced the way in which the textbook market operates. The state policy of subsidising sets of textbooks favors the larger publishers, as they are able to offer textbook packages for all subjects at the low price fixed by the state.

Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated that changes to the political system involved the transformation of textbook development. The power of the Ministry of Education diminished in favor of a variety of actors: publishers, textbook authors, historians, educators, and societal groups who called for their history to be represented in textbooks. The influence of the publishing houses over textbook narratives has significantly increased.

What has become apparent is both the continuity and fluidity between the communist and democratic systems. Old textbook narratives were reused and reprinted continuously, as shown by the example of Szcześniak's textbook. With regard to actors, the oppositional networks that developed in the 1980s played an important role in the development of textbooks in the 1990s and beyond. It appears that the former opposition members asserted themselves after 1989 and used textbooks to popularize their narratives of the past. Substantial revision of textbook contents has therefore taken place in the postcommunist era.

Although the textbook plurality of the post-1989 period makes it very difficult to make sweeping statements about all textbooks, one can still see some general tendencies. History education and textbooks have so far not been used by the government as a direct means to promote a specific vision of the past; it has rather been the point of view of the authors and editors, or the societal and political movements which they represent. Often, they have expressed contested opinions more openly than in other countries, such as Germany. New history curricula and textbooks often triggered "history wars"; yet the principle of the plurality of views has been respected.

All in all, Polish textbooks have manifested balanced views of a "liberal ethnocentrism"—something between fostering national pride and promoting the principles of democracy.⁹¹ Further efforts in teaching multiper-

91 Wolfgang Höpken, "Between Civic Identity and Nationalism. History Textbooks in East-Central and Southeastern Europe", in *Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value*

spectivity, explaining how political elites can misuse history, and teaching about the culture of memory should be undertaken to develop an even more critical attitude towards the past. Specifically for history education, it would be helpful to draw more comparisons between historical periods, such as the Second Republic or the socialist era, and Polish democracy today.⁹²

Finally, printed textbooks remain the leading media used in schools, but digital textbooks are already appearing on the horizon. The consequences of the new state policy of “free textbooks” are not yet precisely known, and it is unclear whether the policy will lead to a reduction in textbook quality. There will, without doubt, be consequences for the textbook publishing market.

As already noted, the parliamentary elections of 2015 resulted in a change of government. The Minister of Education, Anna Zalewska, announced in June 2016, after several months of public consultations, that the school system would be reformed. The first eight grades of school will be merged into a single school, the so-called general school, which pupils will attend in their first eight years of education.⁹³ The decision to restructure the education system has various implications. Most of all, it requires yet another change of curricula and textbooks. Previous reforms of the education system were used by governments to introduce their conceptions of historical education. One might, therefore, predict that another change in textbook values is on its way. Whether the Law and Justice government is going to follow this path, using textbooks to promote its version of patriotism and national values, including in history education, will be clear in the near future. At the time of writing, their policy acknowledged the importance of bilateral history education dialogue, and in June 2016 the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski met with his German counterpart, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, to promote the first volume of the Polish-German history textbook.⁹⁴

Transformation, Education & Media, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 174–75.

92 Górny, “Sprawozdanie,” 25.

93 Justyna Suchecka, “Koniec gimnazjów ogłoszony,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 28, 2016.

94 The textbook was published in German and Polish: *Europa. Unsere Geschichte. Band 1* (Wiesbaden: Eduversum, 2016); *Europa. Nasza historia. Tom I* (Warsaw: WSiP, 2016).

CHAPTER 11

Rock Music and Politics in Poland: Lyrics of Protest and Resistance

SABRINA P. RAMET

The rock scene is not usually thought of as a battleground where the struggle over values is fought. But there have always been various concerns about the implicit values in rock performances; one need merely recall the consternation which the early Elvis Presley's gyrations excited in socially conservative circles to see the point. The lyrics of early folk-rock artists such as Bob Dylan and Joan Baez make the same point quite clearly. Bringing the story to the communist-era East European context, various rock bands faced a simple binary choice. On the one hand, they could sing panegyric rock songs, as the official bands Veselye Rebyata (Happy Guys) and Samotsvety (Semiprecious Stones) did in the Soviet Union.¹ Alternatively, bands could use the rock medium to provoke

This chapter is based on interviews carried out in Kraków and Łódź in October 2013, and in Warsaw and Gdańsk in October 2015. I am grateful to Irena Borowik for arranging for my interviews in Kraków, to Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak for arranging my interviews in Łódź, and to Ewa Beldowska and Paweł Piotrowski for arranging my interviews in Warsaw and Gdańsk. I am also grateful to Wiesław Weiss, Michał Kirmuć, Grzegorz Brzozowicz, Christine M. Hassenstab, and Małgorzata Żurada for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. The visit to Poland in 2013 was arranged within the framework of an Erasmus exchange with the University of Łódź. I am grateful to Marit Reitan, dean of the Faculty at the Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU) for providing funding for the 2015 research trip.

- ¹ See Sabrina Petra Ramet, Sergei Zamascikov, and Robert Bird, "The Soviet Rock Scene," in *Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia*, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 183, also 192–93.

people, as Laibach did in Slovenia,² or satirize the communists, as the Bosnian group Zabranjeno Pušenje (Smoking Forbidden) did with its song “Haile Selassie”³—a song directed not at Selassie, in fact, but at Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito. Rock bands, especially since the collapse of communism, seek as ever to entertain their audiences (or, possibly, to put them into a state of altered consciousness); moreover, one may assume that they certainly strive to be financially successful. But along the way, they also give voice to values—whether uncivic (as in the case of the Croatian performer Marko Perković, known as “Thompson” after the Thompson submachine gun⁴), civic (as I believe may be said of the Polish punk band Dezerter) or alternative values. And, of course, there are bands which, on the surface, might appear to be expostulating certain values but which, on closer inspection, are probably best viewed as giving their audiences a heightened libidinal experience; here I am thinking of the death metal scene in general.

Can rock performers change people’s values or behaviors? Politicians have repeatedly thought so. For example, in September 1985—at the instigation of Tipper Gore and three other women, who had formed a lobby group called the Parents’ Music Resource Center (PMRC)—Dee Snider, leader of the metal band Twisted Sister, and Frank Zappa, lead singer with the Mothers of Invention, among others, were called to appear before the Senate. At that hearing, Snider was compelled, *inter alia*, to explain the meaning of the lyrics to his songs “Under the Blade” and “We’re Not Gonna Take It,” which he claimed had been completely misunderstood and misrepresented by the PMRC.⁵ But there could have been no mistake about the meaning of the lyrics sung by the Hungarian Coitus Punk Group in March 1983, “Rotten stinking communist gang—why has

2 Sabrina Petra Ramet, “Shake, Rattle, and Self-Management: Making the Scene in Yugoslavia,” in Ramet, *Rocking the State*, 117–21.

3 A reissue of the song is included on the recording Zabranjeno pušenje, *Zabranjeno pušenje*, Dallas CD 139, 1997, compact disc.

4 Thompson, *E, moj narode*, HNZS Croatia Records 5475040, 2002, compact disc.

5 Some recordings from the Senate hearings are available online. For Dee Snider, see “Dee Snider’s PMRC Senate Hearing Speech (Full),” YouTube video, 30:28, posted by “Douglas Stewart,” May 4, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50Vyr1TyITE>. For Zappa’s testimony, see “Frank Zappa at PMRC Senate Hearing on Rock Lyrics,” YouTube video, 33:34, posted by “Bartek Kaszuba,” May 16, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hgAF8Vu8G0w>.

nobody hanged them yet?"⁶ The members of that band were taken into custody and, after a six-month trial, given sentences ranging from eighteen months to two years. Many more examples exist. But the point is already clear enough: some rock and punk groups sing lyrics with provocative content, sometimes intentionally, sometimes not. And some of these groups have gotten into trouble with the authorities (the Czechoslovak group Plastic People of the Universe being yet another example of a band put on trial).⁷

The Polish rock and punk scene has served for decades as a medium for the expression of anti-establishment values. In the 1980s, during the dark days of martial law, groups such as Maanam, Perfect, TSA, and Brygada Kryzys variously mocked and satirized communist authorities. Indeed, Brygada Kryzys stopped playing in 1982 rather than work under the conditions of martial law, but was resurrected in 1991, only to disband for the second time in 1994 and reconstitute once again in 2003. Since the "big bang" of 1989, both the players dominating the establishment, and the nature of rock opposition, have changed. Instead of communism, it is capitalism which is now seen by some rock bands, and especially by punk bands, as "the enemy." Among those groups, the punk group Dezerter (a Warsaw band, formed in 1981), which had earlier been vocal in its anti-communism, has been especially prominent. There have also been other bands protesting against capitalism and the proliferation of meaningless chatter in postcommunist Poland, including Cool Kids of Death, from Łódź, and Włochaty (Shaggy), an anarchist punk band from Szczecin. The thrash metal band Acid Drinkers (formed in 1986 in Poznań) and the alternative metal band Sweet Noise (formed in 1990 in Swarzędz) have performed songs protesting against a lack of freedom, mob mentality, and some features of postcommunist society which they consider absurd. And while the Catholic Church had figured in the 1980s as a rallying point for anticommunist sentiments, after 1989 it was able to influence the reconfiguration of the legislative system affecting religious instruction in state schools, abortion, radio and television broadcasting, and other spheres.

6 As quoted in Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation*, 2nd ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), 259.

7 Details in Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Rock Music in Czechoslovakia," in Ramet, *Rocking the State*, 61–64.

Perhaps predictably, an anticlerical reaction set in, with blackened death metal band Behemoth and death metal band Vader taking up anti-Christian themes; indeed, Behemoth's Adam Darski, known as Nergal, gained notoriety in 2007 for tearing up a Bible on stage.⁸ There has also been a counterreaction, epitomized by the Christian gothic metal band Undish which was formed in 1991, and the Christian rock band 2Tm2,3, the name of which refers to St. Paul's second epistle to Timothy, chapter 2, verse 3 ("Thou therefore endure hardness as a good soldier of Jesus Christ.")⁹

There have also been some right-wing currents in the metal scene, such as the pagan metal band Graveland, which has constructed a village and has strived to revive traditional religious beliefs.¹⁰ Graveland was launched in 1992 by Rob Darken, originally as a black metal band; it later adopted a pagan/Viking profile and style, drawn upon Celtic and Slavic mythology, and also Norse mythology. This chapter will also take note of the legendary Czesław Niemen (1939–2004) as well as of Maanam, and—in the context of a brief retrospective—of the Gdańsk band Czerwono-Czarni, which was active from 1960 to 1976 and was the first Polish rock band to cut a record, as well as Republika, a Toruń-based band which was active from 1978 to 1986, resurfacing in the 1990s. Where the death metal scene is concerned, Decapitated, formed in 1996, was one of the most important heavy metal bands in the late 1990s. As these preliminary comments make clear, rock music serves, whether intentionally or unconsciously, as a medium for the transmission of values, whether merely promoting materialism and hedonism, or implying/conjuring/advocating/suggesting/conveying certain social and political attitudes. But to understand "where" Polish rock is today, it is necessary to tell the story from the beginning, tracing its development from its innocent beginnings to its first confrontation with the communist regime and its increasing political engagement since 1981, which has continued apace since 1989.

8 Piotr Praschil, record producer, in interview with the author, café near Music Corner, Kraków, October 18, 2013, Marcin Zwierdzyński, interpreter; also Jarek Szubrycht, journalist, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 9, 2015, in consultation with Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

9 King James Version.

10 Jarek Szubrycht, journalist, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 9, 2015, in consultation with Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

Early Years

Rock 'n' roll, as it was originally called, reached Poland as early as 1956, predominantly thanks to Radio Luxemburg and Voice of America. Polish youngsters were enchanted by Elvis Presley, Tommy Steele, Bill Haley, and other performers of that time, and some of them were keen to replicate what they had heard. Members of the early bands listened to Radio Luxemburg, mastered the music, and transcribed the texts phonetically, as they heard them—which is to say, sometimes erroneously.¹¹ But, from the beginning, Polish rockers also sang songs in Polish, with some of them singing a mixture of English and Polish. Poles' first exposure to live performances of hits by Elvis Presley and Bill Haley came in 1957, when Drazek and His Five, a mostly Dixieland band from Kraków, included some of Presley's and Haley's songs in their concerts.

The first Polish rock 'n' roll band of any consequence was led by Bogusław Wyrobek and performed under the name Rhythm and Blues, even though the music played by Wyrobek's band had more in common with that of Elvis Presley than with R&B.¹² Rhythm and Blues played its first show in the Red Cat Club in Gdańsk on 24 March 1959.¹³ Two months later, the band won the National Amateur Competition of Jazz and Rock Ensembles in Warsaw. Although the group had been playing mainly covers of American and British hits, it also performed its own song, "Big Boogie Woogie," written by Leszek Bogdanowicz, the band's guitarist. The group's concerts provoked such intense and noisy excitement that the band used its posters to urge its fans to behave in a more restrained manner—to no avail. Eventually, the culturally conservative communists of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), including its First Secretary, Władysław Gomułka, had enough, and in autumn 1959 the group was banned.¹⁴ Nonetheless, its members regrouped to form a new band, Czerwono-Czarni (Red and Black), which went on to become one of Poland's most

11 Marek Michalak, jazz musician and composer, in interview with the author, Hard Rock Cafe, Kraków, October 17, 2013.

12 Sławek Macias, Radio Łódź journalist and musician, in interview with the author, Novotel, Łódź, October 21, 2013.

13 Alex Kan and Nick Hayes, "Big Beat in Poland," in Ramet, *Rocking the State*, 42.

14 *Ibid.*, 43; confirmed with additional detail in interview with Sławek Macias.

popular rock bands, performing for sixteen years. The band reached the peak of its popularity in the mid-1960s, winning an award in 1964 for its song, "Don't worry about me." But after Ryszard Poznakowski left the band in summer 1967, the band endured a slow decline in popularity. In 1971, the group suspended work, only to resume performing the following year. Finally, in 1976, Czerwono-Czarni disbanded.

Gomułka might have been able to suppress the Rhythm and Blues band (or, rather, to force its members to reconstitute under a new name), but he could not hope to halt the spread of rock 'n' roll which, by 1960, had established a presence in Warsaw, Gdańsk, and Łódź, and would soon spread to other cities and towns. In the early 1960s, the Twist was very popular among young people across Poland. The lyrics, however, were initially very innocent. The first performer to use a song to offer a commentary was the legendary Czesław Niemen, with his song "Strange is this world," which he performed at the Opole Festival in 1967.¹⁵ Niemen's song was understood as a signal that people could sing songs with meaningful lyrics. "Underground" bands took up this challenge in gigs in student clubs in the second half of the 1960s, and the authorities responded by occasionally shutting down offending clubs.¹⁶

The four dominant rock bands of the 1960s were: Polanie (the Poles, formed in 1965), which played blues rock; Czerwone Gitary (Red Guitars, formed in 1965 in Gdańsk), which reflected the influence of the Beatles and became, by the end of that decade, the most popular rock ensemble in Poland; Skaldowie (the Skalds, launched in Kraków in 1965), two of whose members were conservatory-trained instrumentalists/singers, who brought baroque and classical romantic ideas into their compositions for the band, and were influenced also by Polish folk music from the Tatra Mountains;¹⁷ and Blackout (formed in 1965 in Rzeszów), which may be presumed to have pleased the regime with its 1968 song against the US war in Vietnam, "Te bomby lecą na nasz dom" ("These bombs fly on our

15 Leszek Gnoiński and Jan Skaradziński, *Encyklopedia Polskiego Rocka* (Konin: Wydawnictwo IN ROCK, 1996), 303; also interview with Sławek Macias.

16 Gnoiński and Skaradziński, *Encyklopedia Polskiego Rocka*, 303.

17 Wiesław Weiss, editor of *Teraz Rock*, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 6, 2015. See also Radosław Rabański, *Krakowska scena muzyczna. Encyklopedia* (Cracow: Muzyka Jagellonica, 2006), 160–62.

house").¹⁸ That same year, Blackout changed its name to Breakout and, by 1970, the band was coming under fire in the mass media because of the band members' long hair and Western lifestyle.

The 1970s and 1980s

Czesław Niemen, now playing with a new rock ensemble, Niemen Enigmatic, and Skaldowie continued to dominate the Polish rock scene in the 1970s, alongside Budka Suflera, SBB (a highly improvisational group), and Breakout, which evolved from psychedelic rock to blues rock. Budka Suflera was launched in Lublin in 1969 and, in its early years, made a name playing covers of songs by John Mayall, Jimi Hendrix, and Led Zeppelin, before moving on to performing original material. SBB, initially known as the Silesian Blues Band, was formed in 1971 and built a reputation that extended beyond the borders of Poland, touring Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, East and West Germany, Hungary, The Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

As the regime accepted that rock was here to stay, it became directly involved in trying to manage it, issuing licenses to some bands, but not to others, and financing student clubs (which served as musical venues). In order to enjoy the privileges associated with official status, including higher fees for concerts, a band had to obtain a license to perform, and, in the 1980s, they typically earned 400 złotych per performance, although some "official" bands were paid 700 or as much as 1,200 złotych per performance. "Unofficial" bands were generally paid 150 złotych for a performance.¹⁹ This system ended even before 1989, however.

18 Kan and Hayes, "Big Beat in Poland," 45; also Rüdiger Ritter, "'1968' —The Emergence of a Protest Culture in the Popular Music of the Eastern Bloc?," in *Music and Protest in 1968*, ed. Beate Kutschke and Barley Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 217.

19 Marek Michalak, jazz musician and composer, in interview with the author, Camelot Café, Kraków, 19 October 2013.

Punk Music

The first punk band was started by Walek Dzedzej in 1976.²⁰ Dzedzej had started as a street musician, playing an acoustic guitar and singing Polish translations of Bob Dylan songs. In 1976, he wrote nihilistic lyrics in his song "I am nobody":

*I am nobody
I am not a communist
I am not a Catholic
I am not an anticommunist
I am fucking nobody*²¹

Such lyrics were not to the authorities' liking and, after only three concerts, the police suppressed the band. Dzedzej would ultimately leave the country, moving to Sweden.

Two years later, seventeen-year-old Robert Brylewski put together Poland's second punk band, The Boors—a word play on the American rock group, The Doors. The Boors wrote songs with anti-system lyrics and slowly grew in popularity. In May 1979, the band members renamed that group Kryzys;²² about that time, the band's political engagement became noticeable. Kryzys and Deadlock were the first punk bands in Poland but could not get on the radio; their only concerts were in private homes or in small clubs around Warsaw.²³ Recordings by British punk bands Sex Pistols and the Raincoats made an enormous impression on Polish youth and kick-started the Polish punk scene with various bands such as Alians (sic), WC, Apatia (a vegetarian band), and later Armia (a band which sang lyrics inspired by Dante's *Divine Comedy*, the Bible, J. R. Tolkien, and other

20 Regarding the early years of punk in Poland, see Marta Marciniak, *Transnational Punk Communities in Poland: From Nihilism to Nothing outside Punk* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2015), chapter one ("The most sensible way to be? The first two decades of punk in Poland.")

21 Text translated for me by Sławek Macias.

22 Paweł "Kelner" Rozwadowski, erstwhile member of Deuter and Izrael, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 7, 2015, in consultation with Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

23 Wiesław Weiss, editor of *Teraz Rock*, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 6, 2015.

sources)—most of these being formed in the decade which followed the proclamation of martial law on December 13, 1981.²⁴ Abaddon, a band established in Bydgoszcz in 1982, recorded the first punk LP in the history of Polish popular music.²⁵

Two of the most legendary punk bands were, however, both founded in the course of 1981, during the brief period of pluralization which preceded the declaration of martial law. Created by guitarists Robert Brylewski (formerly a member of Kryzys) and Tomasz Lipiński (formerly a member of the punk band Tilt), Brygada Kryzys established a reputation for what one might call “trouble-making,” with the issue in 1982 of its “black album,” which was recorded without authorization and was understood as an insult to the authorities.²⁶ Inevitably, the group got into trouble with the authorities and some of its concerts were canceled.²⁷ Among the songs on the album are “Fallen, fallen is Babylon,” “We have nothing to lose,” and “Stop deceiving yourself.”²⁸ Perhaps the most provocative of the songs on this album was “Nie ma nic” (“We have nothing to lose”):

*If there is something new,
if there is a new world,
the one that we are waiting for
and that we are dreaming of—
for some, not this one,
for some not—
here, nothing is left... to lose.
If there is something that has some meaning,
something that everybody knows
and everybody wants,
wants to see now, wants to see here,*

24 Ewa Langer, member of the band PRL (1992–97), in interview with the author, Ibis Hotel, Kraków, October 19, 2013; also interview with Sławek Macias.

25 Sławek Macias, Radio Łódź journalist and musician, in interview with the author, Novotel, Łódź, October 21, 2013.

26 Wiesław Weiss, editor of *Teraz Rock*, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 6, 2015.

27 Gosia Fruzińska, manager and singer at the Rock Pub, and Ziemek Kosmowski of Rendez-Vous, in interview with the author, Novotel, Łódź, October 21, 2013; and Tomek Lipiński, founder of Tilt and cofounder of Brygada Kryzys, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 5, 2015.

28 Brygada Kryzys, *Brygada Kryzys*, Tonpress SX-T 16 (1982), vinyl.

*here there is nothing,
 here there is nothing,
 here there is nothing,
 here there is nothing to lose...*²⁹

Dezerter, founded in May 1981 under the name SS-20, debuted in November of that year. The authorities disapproved of the band's name, however, since "SS-20" referred to a Soviet ballistic missile, and the authorities—no doubt rightly—understood this as a provocation. In September 1982, in response to regime pressure, the band changed its name to Dezerter (sometimes called De-zerter by journalists)—which only made the provocation even more explicit. The regime kept a close eye on this group and passed judgment on which of Dezerter's songs could be recorded, and which not. Dezerter combined satire, sarcasm, and expressions of despair to produce lyrics aimed, like darts, at the communist regime. In 1983, Dezerter brought out a 45-rpm disc with four songs, distributing 50,000 copies to be sold in music shops around Poland.³⁰ After the first pressing sold out, a second pressing was produced but, at this point, the censors decided that allowing the release had been a mistake. At that point, authorities confiscated the second pressing.³¹

Punk became enormously popular among Polish youth in the 1980s, not least because of the lyrics which punk bands sang. The town of Jarocin became the site of annual punk festivals. The first Jarocin festival in 1980 drew a modest crowd of 600 fans of punk; but by 1984, the crowd which came to this small Baltic town was estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000.³² Perfect, a rock group formed by Zbigniew Hołdys together with Wojciech Morawski and Zdzisław Zawadzki in 1977, also won a huge following.

29 Translated for me by Aleksander Zdravkovski. The song is posted on YouTube: "Brygada Kryzys—Nie ma nic," YouTube video, 4:45, posted by "Ser269," January 3, 2010, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S0Vyr1TylTE>.

30 Robert Madera, composer, guitarist, and vocalist for Dezerter, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 8, 2015, in consultation with Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter;

31 Gnoiński and Skaradziński, *Encyklopedia*, 126; also interviews with Madera and Macias.

32 Kan and Hayes, "Big Beat in Poland," 49.

The Rock Scene in the 1980s

The imposition of martial law in December 1981 sent shock waves throughout Polish society. The independent trade union Solidarity was suppressed, as was its agricultural counterpart, Rural Solidarity. Various Solidarity activists were rounded up and incarcerated, while Lech Wałęsa, the leader of Solidarity, was placed under house arrest. The independent student union was shut down, along with various other independent initiatives, and the relative freedom of the press which had come about in the wake of the August 1980 shipyard strikes, now ended. The temporarily wayward Democratic Party and United Peasant Party were also brought back into line.³³ Even rock groups were gagged, as most new wave bands now found themselves unable to obtain permission to cut records; in response, bands made private tapes of garage performances and circulated them among friends.

Then, in 1980, the band Maanam, which had been put together four years earlier by Marek Jackowski and Kora Jackowska, brought out a hit song, "Hamlet,"³⁴ followed by another hit, "Buenos Aires."³⁵ Then, in 1984, the band issued its fourth album bearing the title *Night Patrol*.³⁶ The album took its title from a song sung in English:

*Shadows in the dark city
linger through the night.
Danger lurks by your doorway,
don't turn out the light...
don't go out alone
evil is prowling...
Night patrol's alert*

33 For details concerning all of these developments, see Ramet, *Social Currents in Eastern Europe*, specifically chapter 4 ("Underground Solidarity and Parallel Society in Poland.")

34 A live recording of this song from a 1997 concert performance is posted at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qfeWAsZbSb0> [accessed on April 16, 2017].

35 A live performance of this song is posted on YouTube. "Maanam—Boskie Buenos (Buenos Aires)," YouTube video, 3:24, posted by "Dzień dobry! Dobry wieczór!," July 3, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVaNvnPd-Dg>.

36 Gnoiński and Skaradzinski, *Encyklopedia*, 277.

*making sure that you're OK
that you don't get hurt,
anxious to protect you.
Everything's all right.
Shadows in the sad city
bleed through the night.*³⁷

Maanam was not alone in confronting the communist regime. On the contrary, among those rock and punk groups which sang political lyrics in the 1980s—in addition to the aforementioned punk groups—were Kult, T. Love, Deuter, and Republika (see Box 11.1).³⁸

Box 11.1 *New rock, punk, and heavy metal groups established in the years 1977–88*

The years 1977–88 saw the emergence of a number of influential rock, punk, and heavy metal groups, beginning with the establishment of the punk group KSU in 1977 and Kryzys in 1978. These two bands launched the first wave of punk in Poland, which continued with the formation of Deadlock (1979), Deuter (1980), Dezerter, and TZN Xenna (1981). A second wave of punk followed in the years 1982–86, with the launch of T.Love, Aya RL, Farben Lehre, Acid Drinkers, and Post Regiment, among others. In the meantime, Kat, a thrash metal band, and the short-lived rock band Klaus Mitffoch in Wrocław, were both set up in 1979. Also noteworthy from this decade are the gothic band Closterkeller, the rock/punk band Golden Life, and the satirical cabaret-rock band Big Cyc in Łódź—all formed in 1988.

Given the courage it took to venture into politics at a time when the regime was still trying to promote “harmless” lyrics for rockers, and the

37 Maanam, *Night Patrol*, no. 6.25728-BL, Artic (1983), vinyl. The song is posted on YouTube: “Maanam—Nocny Patrol,” YouTube video, 4:50, posted by “Kamil Fiałek,” September 28, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=seNQ9gK2JBs>.

38 Leszek Gnoiński, director and script writer of the film “Beats of Freedom” and journalist, in interview with the author, Ibis Hotel, Kraków, October 18, 2013, Marcin Zwierzdzyński, interpreter.

sheer incisiveness of many of the lyrics, I was not surprised to find, during my visit to Poland in October 2013, that several of my conversation partners wanted to emphasize that the 1980s were a golden age for Polish rock. This has been confirmed by Raymond Patton, who writes that "some [Poles], particularly those who were teenagers and young adults in the 1980s, remember those years . . . as the peak of Polish rock music. Indeed, the martial law era was a high point not just for rock, but also [for] heavy metal, reggae and punk."³⁹ But there is a puzzle here. The puzzle is this: how was it that the rockers and punks were able to sing and listen to such critical songs during martial law, at a time when Solidarity activists and others were being locked up and when heavy censorship was reimposed on book publishing and the media? The solution to this puzzle, as Jolanta Pekacz has explained, is to understand that, for the communist authorities, rock music seemed like a relatively harmless way for young people to let off steam, and they specifically decided to allow the rockers a degree of freedom of expression not permitted in other sectors of society.⁴⁰ Jerzy Urban, Polish government spokesman in the 1980s and now editor of the weekly magazine *Nie*, was later asked about why the rock bands were allowed so much leeway in the 1980s: he replied that the authorities were in agreement that rock and punk did not matter. The authorities had bigger problems on the agenda.⁴¹ In any event, the authorities did not allow just anything to be performed; the rock groups still had to submit their lyrics in advance before singing them. But the controls were relaxed.

In terms of record sales and concert attendance, the dominant bands in the 1980s were Maanam, Perfect, Republika, and Lady Pank, a band launched in Warsaw in 1981 by Jan Borysewicz and Andrzej Mogielnicki. Republika was based in Toruń and had been formed in 1978. Grzegorz Ciechowski became the leader of the band in 1979 (dying in 2001). Republika was at least as much concerned with the conformity and monotony imposed by modern, corporate life, as with communist rule. This is reflected in the song "Kombinat", released as a 45-rpm single in 1983:

39 Raymond Patton, "The Communist Culture Industry: The Music Business in 1980s Poland," *Journal of Contemporary History* 47, no. 2 (2012), 428.

40 Jolanta Pekacz, "On Some Dilemmas of Polish Postcommunist Rock Culture," *Popular Music* 11, no. 2 (May 1992), 206.

41 Lipiński interview (see note 27).

*factory is working, breathing, building,
 factory is tissue, I am a cell
 I will never get out
 that's all I know, know, know, know
 that's all I know
 factory pulsates—no one knows I live
 I know nothing about myself
 my pulse is regular
 I will never get out, I will never get out
 that's all I know, know, know, know
 that's all I know
 these desks stretch far to the horizon
 I go to sleep in [the] drawer designated
 I will never get out
 now I know, know, know
 now I know...⁴²*

But there was also a significant underground rock scene, with such bands as Kult, Klaus Mitffoch, Dżem, Turbo, Kat, the aforementioned Dezerter, and others.

As the decade came to a close, the pop group De Mono looked back on the struggles by underground Solidarity and other anticommunist activists in this 1990 song:

*You no longer remember streets in flames:
 neither conversations until the dawn
 nor stones thrown blindly.
 You no longer remember what's fear and pain.*

42 The English text is provided in the subtitles to the video of this song: see "Republika – Kombinat (English subtitles)," YouTube video, 3:23, posted by "zadrzewiacz," February 27, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=li08yjCFmHA>. Visually far more interesting, however, is the performance version, which drives home the message of the lyrics in a manner nothing short of brilliant. It is also available on YouTube: "Republika—Kombinat," YouTube playlist, 14 videos, posted by "Obywatel Republikanin," December 27, 2006, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9kK6YyG-QIQc&list=PL8E0AD83E3948A0E6&index=1>.

*When you marched with others on the streets
to fight for your rights,
tired you'd come home late,
you were fighting until the dawn.
You no longer remember what's fear and pain....*

*It's not the same life—
it's not what it used to be.
You have new ideals,
for you, the revolution is over.⁴³*

About the same time, the rapcore band Kazik Staszewski, looked to the postcommunist future with dread at the prospect of growing consumerism and materialism.

*They want you to be a consumer,
not to think,
to function as an instrument,
because the consumer says
that he is eating in order to eat.
So think about it:
do you eat in order to eat?
And everyone is bombarded with rubbish,
smothered in information.⁴⁴*

In 1986, several Warsaw musicians assembled the hardcore punk band Post Regiment. The following year Dominika "Nika" Domczyk took over as lead vocalist. Among the band's early songs was "Madman," in which the group warned, "Actually, everyone is crazy."⁴⁵ In the meantime, Kult

43 As quoted in Kan and Hayes, "Big Beat in Poland," 52–53. I have altered the capitalization scheme and punctuation slightly.

44 "Konsument," on the album *Kazik na Żywo*, translated for me by Aleksander Zdravkovski. A live performance of this song is posted on YouTube: "Kazik Na Żywo - Konsument (live)," YouTube video, 2:51, posted by "zbigniew joka," December 14, 2007, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnNH3P809k0>.

45 Gnoiński and Skaradziński, *Encyklopedia*, 340–341; also "Post Regiment," Last.fm, accessed October 21, 2015, <http://www.last.fm/music/Post+Regiment>.

(formed in 1982) brought out the aforementioned its song "Konsument" (Consumer) in 1986,⁴⁶ signaling the beginning of a shift in the political engagement of rock musicians.

Rock Lyrics Since the Collapse of Communism

By 1988, the communist regime's power had significantly waned, and strikes in spring and late summer induced the authorities to think about compromise. Round Table talks with Solidarity and other opposition groups followed from February to April of 1989, and semi-free elections took place in May. In this new context, communism was no longer a factor, but now Poles encountered greed, aspirations of the Catholic Church to moral hegemony (alongside revelations of priestly pedophilia), and commercially driven pressures to conform. Sweet Noise, an alternative metal band which was formed in 1990, brooded over some of this in the song "Black Leather Boots," sung in English and included in the group's 2007 album, *Triptic*:

*Am I losing you or just losing myself?
Out in the dark, the site of my fate
Falling walls, smashed up bones
Brother kills brother, and the gold is gold
Betrayed you, like they betrayed me
They fucked my love and tried to fuck me
Pearls sink in greed and lust
Flowers die fast and I see my people wasted
People tired of being tested
People die somewhere molested
Used to feed the rich and nasty*

*Black leather boots
kicking peace right in the teeth
(They're killing my baby)...*

46 Gnoiński and Skaradziński, *Encyklopedia*, 257–258.

*Here's the priest, sucking a boy
 Starting up war, blessing the bombs
 on top of the world
 Somebody's waiting for you
 He's breathing war, smoking up war
 like fucking a whore, just playing a role
 He's stealing your child, raping your mind
 He's blowing your life to pieces....*

*I need your hands in this one
 I need your hands this time
 against corruption and lies
 mass destruction and mental slavery
 I need your hands against discriminating nations
 discriminating people
 discriminating our right to live in love and peace.⁴⁷*

The most highly regarded rock bands of the 1990s were Proletaryat (formed in 1987), Wilki, Myslovitz, Acid Drinkers, Homo Twist, Vader, Voo Voo, Armia, Kult, T. Love, and Budka Suflera. Other popular groups in the 1990s included the aforementioned Republika, as well as Püdelisi, Dżem, and Ira, a pop-rock band from Radom, alongside female vocalist Edyta Bartosiewicz, while Maanam, Perfect, and Lady Pank regrouped and gained new followings.⁴⁸ Most of these bands have remained prominent in the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century; to this roster, one can now add Hey, Cool Kids of Death, Coma, Lao Che, Nosowska, Pogodno, Ścianka, Strachy na Lachy, Vader, Behemoth, and Closterkeller (a Gothic rock band).⁴⁹ Warsaw remains the most important center for rock music in Poland. But one can find popular rock groups across Poland,

47 Sweet Noise, "Black Leather Boots," from the album, *Triptic* (2007). Lyrics at "Black Leather Boots' Lyrics," LetsSingIt.com, accessed January 4, 2015, <https://www.letsingit.com/sweet-noise-lyrics-black-leather-boots-1tmqswc#axzz3NrRK2E7z>. The song is posted on YouTube: "Sweet Noise—Black Leather Boots," YouTube video, 5:17, posted by "Wretched Ragnar," April 26, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-XOLkZLhAs>.

48 "Polish rock and pop music," Slavorum, accessed January 4, 2015, <http://www.slavorum.org/forum/discussion/6083/polish-rock-and-pop-music>; also interview with Leszek Gnoiński.

49 Same sources as listed in the previous note.

including in Łódź, Radom, Wrocław, Gdańsk, Poznań, Bydgoszcz, and elsewhere. In the 1990s, there was a huge alternative scene in the Tri-City area (Gdańsk, Sopot, Gdynia); this included Apteka, a band known for promoting drug use.

Dezerter

Assembled by Robert Matera (guitar), Krzysztof Grabowski (drums), and Dariusz Stepnowski (bass)—students at a secondary technical school in Warsaw—Dezerter remains one of the most popular punk bands in Poland. There have been some changes in the band's lineup over the years, but Matera and Grabowski are still members of the band, together with Jacek Chrzanowski, who joined the ensemble in 2000. Other members of the band have included: Dariusz "Skandal" Hajn, 1981–86; Paweł Piotrowski, 1985–93; and Tomasz "Tony von Kinsky" Lewandowski, 1994–99.⁵⁰ The band has performed in several European countries besides Poland, as well as in the United States and Japan. Among the group's albums are *Dezerter* (1987, later reissued under the title, *Kolaboracja*), *Kolaboracja II* (1989), *Blasfemia* (1992), *Nielegalny zabójca czasu* (Illegal killer of time, 2004), and *Prawo do bycia idiotą* (The right to be an idiot, 2010). Dezerter's songs have also been included in three Polish films—among them *Beats of Freedom* released in 2010.⁵¹

Until 1989, as already noted, Dezerter directed its barbs at the communist regime, although there were also songs about feelings and about life in general. But after 1989, the group abandoned its now largely irrelevant anticommunism and took on capitalism, consumerism, and the Catholic Church. Some material was completely new, but in some cases the band was content to make a few changes in old lyrics in order to give a song a new meaning.⁵² Emblematic of Dezerter's new orientation is the

50 See Gnoiński and Skaradziński, *Encyklopedia*, 126–128.

51 The entire film was posted on YouTube with English subtitles, accessed January 8, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JAfJZxi0hio>. It is no longer available. For a brief comment on the film, see "Beats of Freedom Premieres in Poland," *Krakow Post*, last modified March 12, 2010, <http://www.krakowpost.com/article/1944/>.

52 Sławek Macias, Radio Łódź journalist and musician, in interview with the author, Novotel, Łódź, October 21, 2013.

song "Blasphemy," included on the album, *The Right to be an Idiot*, in which the band mocks the Lord's prayer:

*Give us our daily bread
since we will get it ourselves
Forgive us our trespasses,
since we forgive them too
Lead us not into temptation
since temptations thrive
But deliver us from evil
since you don't do that enough...*

*Hollowed (sic) be thy name
it doesn't bother us
It is better to have saints
than fools around the altar
Thy kingdom's coming
Thy will being done
particularly on earth
[which] might get out of control.⁵³*

The only rather pallid consolation for the Catholic Church here was that the group called the song *Blasphemy*, since that is how the Church would understand the text.

In the title song from this album, Dezerter combined anticlericalism, anticonsumerism, anticapitalism, and hostility to the reduction of individuals to cogs in the machine and digits in the tax office:

*No more complaints
that everything sucks
the mindless consumption
the shopping that never ends
that the national Catholics
see a conspiracy all around
while praying for a calamity*

⁵³ Text in English in the booklet included with the album: Dezerter, *Prawo do bycia idiotą*, Mystic Production MYSTCD 141 (2010), compact disc.

*so that their agenda stays on top
No more complaints
that the globalization and corporations
kill individualism
that the authorities are always in the right
that each step is watched
Numbers for the ID, tax, and PIN
secret service police
anonymous informers...*

*That may all be rubbish
and life is not like that
Perhaps governments are honest
no secret meaning to be found
Whatever they want to sell you
perhaps you ought to buy
without posing tough questions
Just try to like them now*

Refrain:
*We have a freedom of speech
the freedom to be ourselves
We have a right of choice
the right to be an idiot.⁵⁴*

With this, Dezerter has registered its claim to be seen as the conscience of the nation.

But how do the members of the band see themselves? In their song, "We are a sect," included on the same album, Dezerter's musicians offered a tongue-in-cheek answer:

*We're a sect of normal people
our existence is unofficial
we don't trust their promises
that they want to improve our bad lives*

54 Ibid.

*We're an army that does not fight,
a group of freaks that does not complain,
in a world of madness and phony incentives
a mental flaw, a sect of refugees...*

Refrain:

*In a country where abnormality is the norm
where hypocrisy means morality
where (the) voice of reason is drowned out
we're a sect of normal people⁵⁵*

Death Metal and Metaphorical Satanism

In turning to the macabre and morbid videos and apparently nihilistic lyrics of the death metal scene, it is important to keep in mind that, whatever the members of these bands may say in public, it is extremely unlikely that they take their own lyrics literally; indeed, the whole point of Behemoth's lyrics and performance is to urge people to think for themselves.

There are a number of death metal bands in Poland, including Lost Soul (formed in Wrocław in 1990), Hate (Warsaw, 1990), Decapitated (Krosno, 1996), and Emperor (formed in Łódź in 1984 and active until 2000), alongside Frontside, a deathcore band from Sosnowiec (but recently playing mainstream heavy metal). But by far the best known black metal/death metal rock bands in Poland today are Vader, launched in Olsztyn in 1983, and Behemoth, formed in Gdańsk in 1991.

Vader was formed by Piotr Wiwczarek and Zbigniew "Vika" Wróblewski. In the more than thirty years the band has been performing, there have been multiple changes in its lineup; but since 2011, the band consists of Wiwczarek on guitar and vocals, Mark "Spider" Pająk on guitar, Tomasz "Hal" Halicki on bass, and a Briton, James Stewart, on drums. Vader started out as a heavy metal group but quickly moved on to thrash metal, speed metal, and, by the end of the 1980s, death metal. The band's third demo,

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Morbid Reich (1990)⁵⁶ won it international recognition and opened the way for tours abroad. The title of the band's 2002 album—*Revelations*—made clear Vader's desire to be viewed either as a band addressing the most serious themes or as a pop-satanic group playing around with religious and satanic themes. Some of the titles of Vader's songs may come across as self-important or pretentious, such as "Halleluyah!!! (God is Dead)," "Come and see my sacrifice," and "Silent Empire," not to mention the band's second album, *De Profundis* (1995). This culminated in the band's "World Destruction Tour" in 2007.

But Vader has clearly established itself as a major presence on the Polish death metal scene, and its lyrics have excited attention in some circles. The general thrust of many of Vader's songs is that humanity is doomed and that there is no hope—except perhaps an empty hope for the excessively naïve. Take, for example, the band's track "Abandon all hope," included in the band's tenth studio album *Tibi et igni*, released in May 2014:

"Omnes relinquitte spes, o vos intrantes"
Your empty, unavailing life
is coming to an end now—
all shaking and frightened,
calculating the last minutes of your time:
Come to me!!! ... Welcome to Hell!!!!
Are you losing your mind
or trying to retrieve the name of your God?
No angels or demons exist in my house,
Now you're eternally mine—
*Abandon all hope...*⁵⁷

The same album includes also the song "Where angels weep," which is even more explicit about the group's presumed foreboding of the coming Kingdom of the Prince of Darkness:

56 The demo was posted online, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K7InCQMtwHk> [last accessed on April 16, 2017].

57 "Vader – Abandon All Hope Lyrics," Songlyrics.com, accessed January 7, 2015, <http://www.songlyrics.com/vader/abandon-all-hope-lyrics/>. I have edited the text modestly for correct English usage and modified the punctuation, although the exclamation marks are as given at the website.

*...The heaven's fallen
 all soaked in holy blood,
 forsaken, debased:
 victorious demons flying high
 to welcome the lord who rises up from the
 pits of tar...*

*No prayers will help
 No god to avenge
 Darkness is rising
 life has come to an end...
 How did it come to this?
 How could the heavens fall?⁵⁸*

But is this "lord who rises up from the pits of tar" the Biblical Satan, or should we take this more figuratively—to refer perhaps to a more earthly, human satan? Another of Vader's songs—"Epitaph (for Humanity)," included on the album *Revelations*—opens up the possibility of that latter interpretation:

*Blindness and fanaticism are those types of aberration
 which are always slowing down the development
 of humankind.*

*And nothing has changed on that score up to today...
 Watching the flow of people—
 how do you define a mob?
 Miserable life of ants,
 claiming to be the friends of God:
 Their absence of intelligence
 means stupidity and blindness...
 It doesn't matter how hard you're trying,
 this world is lost..⁵⁹*

58 "Vader – Where Angels Weep Lyrics," Songlyrics.com, accessed January 7, 2015, <http://www.songlyrics.com/vader/where-angels-weep-lyrics/>. I have edited the text modestly for correct English usage and modified the punctuation.

59 "Vader – Epitaph (For Humanity)," YouTube video, 3:44, posted by "GrotesqueEpitaph," September 16, 2014, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDxNBWahqp0>.

In this song, it is not a supernatural Satan who is bringing humankind down, but rather people's "blindness and fanaticism." People—"ants"—who claim to be "the friends of God" act out their "stupidity and blindness" and, in the context of this song, this is why "this world is lost." For Vader, then, there is no "right to be an idiot," for it is the idiots who are taking the world in the wrong direction. The key question, of course, is how do audiences understand these lyrics? Or, to put it differently, what proportion of Vader's audiences pays attention to the lyrics and perhaps even takes them to heart?

About the time that Vader attracted international attention, a second death metal band, Behemoth, was launched, albeit initially playing traditional black metal music. Behemoth is the creation of vocalist/guitarist Adam "Nergal" Darski (just fourteen years old at the time the band was founded), alongside two other collaborators who are no longer part of the band. Today, in addition to Nergal, the band includes Zbigniew "Inferno" Promiński on drums, Tomasz "Orion" Wróblewski on bass and vocals, and Patryk "Seth" Sztyber on guitar and vocals.

Behemoth is nothing if not controversial, above all because of lead vocalist Nergal, who offended Catholic sensibilities by tearing up a Bible on stage during a concert in Gdynia in 2007, was not rehired to serve on the jury of a talent show after reports in the press which connected him with Satanism,⁶⁰ and was deported from Russia in May 2014 after spending a night in jail.⁶¹ After the Bible-tearing episode, the singer was put on trial for insulting religion, only to be cleared by the district court in Gdynia.⁶² But in January 2013, a court in Gdańsk overturned that verdict

60 Jarek Szubrycht, journalist, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 9, 2015, in consultation with Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

61 Sophia Deboick, "A Sunday satanist or the voice of new Poland?," *The Guardian*, September 24, 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/sep/24/sunday-satanist-voice-new-poland/>; "'Satanic' rocker 'heals' wheelchair-bound guitarists," *Polskie Radio*, October 7, 2011, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/56420,Satanic-rocker-heals-wheelchairbound-guitarists>; "Public TV sacks 'Satanic' rocker from talent show," *Polskie Radio*, October 14, 2011, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/56807,Public-TV-sacks-Satanic-rocker-from-talent-show>; and "Prison time for Polish bands," *New Poland Express*, May 24, 2014, http://www.newpolandexpress.pl/polish_news_story-6557-prison_time_for_polish_bands_php.

62 "Bible-ripping rock star cleared in court," *Polskie Radio*, last modified August 19, 2011, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/53634,Bibleripping-rock-star-cleared-in-court>.

and called for a fresh trial of the sacrilegious performer.⁶³ Nergal was subsequently cleared for a second time. But the Church was not unanimous in its condemnation of Nergal, as Father Adam Boniecki, editor-in-chief of the liberal Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* publicly defended Nergal's right to express himself, only to be reprimanded by the bishop of Włocławek for "spreading confusion among the faithful."⁶⁴

If anything, Behemoth's lyrics have offended the Church more than any sung by Vader. In Poland, as elsewhere in the world, Catholics hold Jesus's mother—often called the Blessed Virgin Mary—in high regard. It is obvious, then, how Catholics would regard the following song by Behemoth, included on the band's 2014 album, *The Satanist*:

*I saw the virgin's cunt spawning forth a snake
I witnessed tribes of Judah reduced to ruin
I watched disciples twelve dissolved by flame
Looked on the son of god snuffed in vain*

*Blow your trumpets Gabriell!...
Hosanna (Hosanna)
Let the wine of Sodom fill our mouths
Hosanna (Hosanna)
May the sin of Gomorrah grace our hearts*⁶⁵

For both Vader and Behemoth, thus, death metal (blackened death metal in the case of Behemoth) and metaphorical Satanism go hand in hand, and the Catholic Church, whether directly or indirectly, figures as the main target.

Satan is not treated literally, however, but figures rather as a symbol or even metaphor for self-assertion and realization of the three I's—identity,

63 "Death metal star to be re-tried for insulting religion," *Polskie Radio*, last modified January 8, 2013, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/123543,Death-metal-star-to-be-retried-for-insulting-religion>.

64 "Church at loggerheads over 'Satanic' rock star," *Polskie Radio*, last modified September 28, 2011, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/55938,Church-at-loggerheads-over-satanic-rock-star>.

65 "Behemoth—Blow Your Trumpets Gabriel Lyrics," *Lyricsfreak.com*, accessed January 7, 2015, http://www.lyricsfreak.com/b/behemoth/blow+your+trumpets+gabriel_21077142.html. I added "the" in three places in the text.

individuality, and independence.⁶⁶ To assert one's independence of propaganda, of the media, of the Church, etc., is an act of defiance, much like Lucifer's rebellion against God as described in Christian annals. Thus, the verse sung by Behemoth—"I believe in Satan"—is not to be taken literally, but as an assertion of the spirit of rebellion and the three I's. In conversation with me in October 2015, Behemoth's lyricist Krzysztof Azarewicz emphasized the metaphorical character of this verse and stressed that he and the members of Behemoth do *not* believe in Satan.⁶⁷

The Skinhead Scene

There were roughly 2,000 hardcore racist skinheads in Poland as of 2012,⁶⁸ with perhaps an additional 4,000 or so persons associated with the scene. Although Warsaw and Kraków are, as with rock music, centers of skinhead activity, skins have made their presence felt in at least ten other Polish cities, though they should be considered of relatively minor importance. Skinhead presence in Poland can be dated to the mid-1980s, with skinheads beginning to display far-right orientations by the beginning of the 1990s. As in other countries, skinheads in Poland are xenophobic and anti-Semitic; in the Polish context, they are also antipunk, most of them figuring as "former punk rock fans who felt punk had become 'too safe'."⁶⁹ Skinheads are specifically *countercultural*, meaning that they challenge or even repudiate some of society's basic values and fantasize about reorganizing society, even if their ideas are "formulated in rather indistinct and muddy categories."⁷⁰ Violence against immigrants serves both to affirm symbolically the skinheads' preference for social and racial homogeneity, and to build and sustain group solidarity. As Alexei Lastovsky has noted, concerts by skinhead bands are typically preceded by brief introductions with racist ideo-

66 Krzysztof Azarewicz, poet and lyricist for Behemoth, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Sopot, October 12, 2015.

67 Ibid.

68 "The Skinhead International: Poland," *The Nizkor Project*, accessed January 4, 2015, <http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/orgs/american/adl/skinhead-international/skins-poland.html>, p. 1 of 4.

69 Rafal Pankowski, *The Populist Radical Right in Poland* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2010), 98. See also "The Skinhead International," 2 of 4.

70 Alexei Lastovsky, "Ideas and practices of the skinhead youth counterculture in Belarus," *Political Sphere* 11 (2008): 102.

logical content, which are greeted with Nazi stiff-armed salutes.⁷¹ Skinhead bands in Poland, some of which may no longer be active, have included BTH, Grunwald, Ramses and the Hooligans, Szczербec (Sword), White Power, Slav Power, Zyklon B, Fatherland, Poland, Sex Bomba, Zadruga, Honor, Sztorm 68, and Legion. The bands Konkwista 88 and Falanga 88, both from Wrocław, describe themselves as National Socialist ("88" is neo-Nazi code for "Heil Hitler", H being the eighth letter of the alphabet).⁷²

Christian, Anticlerical, and Antisystem Bands

I have already alluded to the existence of both Christian and anti-clerical bands in Poland, which reflect the polarization of religious and moral values in society. For Christian bands, in order to be moral one must be Christian; for anticlerical bands, the link between morality and Christianity is denied and other values are given emphasis. Of course, not all rockers fall into one of these camps. For example, Tomasz Lipiński, founder and long-time leader of Tilt and cofounder of Brygada Kryzys, is a Buddhist. By his own account, Dzogchen, a path within Tibetan Buddhism, in which he is involved, has had an "indirect impact" on his rock music.⁷³ But Lipiński is an exception. For most rockers, when they think about religion, they think, in the first place, about Christianity—and in Poland that usually means Catholicism.

Christian Bands

Dariusz "Maleo" Malejonek, one of Poland's top rock performers and a veteran of a number of rock groups, including Armia, Izrael, and Houk, as well as founder and leader of Maleo Reggae Rockers, was the leading force in the creation of the aforementioned 2Tm2,3—also known as Timothy—a band which, according to Malejonek, is committed to spreading the Christian Gospel.⁷⁴ The band was formed in 1996 as a collaborative effort

71 Ibid., 112.

72 "The Skinhead International", 3 of 4.

73 Lipiński interview (see note 27).

74 Dariusz "Maleo" Malejonek, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 10, 2015, in consultation with Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

on the part of Malejonek, Tomasz Budzyński, and other members of Acid Drinkers, Flapjack, Armia, and Houk. As Malejonek explains, he considered himself an anarchist in his younger days, but felt lost. Finding Christianity gave him hope since, as he puts it, "God loves me even though I am a sinner."⁷⁵ The band 2Tm2,3 performs some of its songs in Aramaic and Hebrew and employed a Jewish friend to help the members of the group with the pronunciation of the texts. The band plays in churches but also at festivals and in local concerts. The band, according to Malejonek, is committed to spreading love.

Malejonek was also pivotal in the creation of Noah's Ark, a Christian band oriented to children. The members of this band perform together with their children and the children of their friends. Although Rev. Andrzej Draguła, writing in the pages of *Tygodnik Powszechny*, accused this second band of trivializing the Gospel, Pope John Paul II was impressed by the concept of the band and invited Noah's Ark to play for him in a private concert—which the band did in January 2001.⁷⁶

Anti-clerical Tendencies in the Rock Scene

Quite apart from what Behemoth and Vader have been doing, there are also anti-clerical tendencies with some other bands and rock artists. Piersi (The Breasts), a band in which Paweł Kukiz, who stood for the presidency of the republic in 2015, was a member, brought out an explicitly anti-clerical song, "The ZChN is coming," in 1992. The All-Polish Committee for Defense against Sects, headed by Ryszard Nowak, has evaluated hundreds of bands, producing a list of anti-clerical artists and bands which includes Kora Jackowska, Behemoth, and Kat, among others.

But Big Cyc (Big Tit) deserves a special mention here. Led by Krzysztof Skiba, a professional provocateur, the band was originally assembled in order to hoodwink the media. Advertising that they would stage a Big Tit competition, Skiba and his associates contacted scores of news media and were elated when a large number of them turned out for the event. In fact, Skiba had no intention of having any breasts on display and most of those

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

coming to the event were aware that what was planned was a concert, pure and simple. Skiba was apparently delighted when 85 news journalists walked out, upon learning that there would be no "tits" on display, although three remained. Be that as it may, the hoax propelled this newly minted group into the limelight and the group's members decided to take the name of this event as the name of their band.⁷⁷ A series of equally provocative albums then followed, with the first featuring the image of Lenin with a Mohawk haircut, the second, entitled "Don't Believe the Electricians," using a large photo of Wałęsa on the cover, and the third featuring a cover showing a nun hanging condoms on a clothesline. This third album was condemned by the National Christian Union. Big Cyc later performed a song "Mohair Berets," mocking the followers of the xenophobic and homophobic radio priest, Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk. "There are lots of anti-clerical songs in our albums," Skiba told me when I met him in Sopot. "We don't like the Church, but we mock everyone."⁷⁸ In addition to the Church and its followers, Wałęsa, and communists, Big Cyc has also mocked capitalism, Solidarity, and Russian president Vladimir Putin, and has performed an antiracist song, "Makumba," which was listed for a while as the #1 song by 250 radio stations across Poland.⁷⁹

After the October 2015 elections brought the right-wing Law and Justice party (PiS) into power, the daring Krzysztof Skiba was ready to register his opposition. Thus, when Polish opposition groups organized a huge anti-PiS, pro-EU rally on May 7, 2016, bringing an estimated 240,000 people onto the streets of Warsaw,⁸⁰ Skiba's Big Cyc was on hand, performing in support of the antiregime protest.⁸¹ A week later, Skiba's band brought out a new album, *Black Sun Nation*, with ten very political

77 Krzysztof Skiba, leader of Big Cyc, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Sopot, October 14, 2015, Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid. The song is posted online: "BIG CYC—Makumba," YouTube video, 3:24, posted by "szampon12," June 20, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4z3qo8VNfg>.

80 "Wir bleiben in Europa," *Wiener Zeitung*, last modified May 7, 2016, http://www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/europa/europastaaten/817334_Wir-bleiben-in-Europa.html; also Wiktor Szary and Jakub Iglewski, "Huge anti-government protest fills Warsaw's ceremonial boulevard," *Reuters*, last modified May 7, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-protest-idUSKCN0XY0EY>.

81 Wojciech Staszewski, "Cycki do przodu," *Newsweek Polska*, no. 21/2016, accessed May 21, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.pl/plus/spoleczenstwo/big-cyc-i-krzysztof-skiba-wsparli-kod-dlaczego-,artykuly,385600,1,z.html>.

songs.⁸² One of the songs, posted online,⁸³ mocks Antoni Macierewicz, who has served as deputy leader of PiS since November 2013 and as Minister of Defense since 2015. The text includes the following lines:

*Who keeps in his fridge a brand new atomic bomb?...
Who has the eyes of a Taliban?
Who calls to Martians for help?
Who breaks into NATO's offices?
To whom does everything smell like treason?...*

REFRAIN (x 2)

*Antoni issues a call to arms,
Antoni will defend his fatherland.*

*Antek [diminutive for Antoni] fights the whole world,
Russia is not quite enough.
He'll attack Sweden today...
overthrow the government in America,
start a hell of purges in Costa Rica,
until the Lord God in heaven tells him,
"Attack yourself!"*

REFRAIN (x 8)

*Antoni issues a call to arms
Antoni will defend the fatherland.*⁸⁴

Not surprisingly, the government took note of Big Cyc, attempting to dismiss it as "not serious" and as a band consisting of "vulgar comedians."⁸⁵

82 Krzysztof Skiba, telephone interview with SPR, May 17, 2016.

83 "Big Cyc—Antoni Wzywa Do Broni (Lyric Video)," YouTube video, 3:05, posted by "Big Cyc," April 30, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V3YxFizj6pk>. The album title in Polish is *Czarne Słońce Narodu*; the song title is "Antoni wzywa do broni"—"Antoni issues a call to arms".

84 Translated for me by Małgorzata Żurada.

85 Telephone interview with Skiba.

Antisystem Tendencies in the Rock Scene

A number of rock, punk, and heavy metal bands have displayed what may be broadly called “anti-system tendencies,” by which I mean tendencies to subject the political system, the Church, Polish thinking and ways of life, and even Poles’ orientation to the past, to severe criticism, parody, or mockery. Some of these, such as The Boors and Dezerter, have been mentioned above. Kazik Staszewski, who performs under his given name—Kazik—told me that he considers his band Kult to be an “anti-system band.”⁸⁶ Moreover, even as the communist regime was in decline and Solidarity was asserting itself, he and other punks opposed both the communists and Solidarity, both the outgoing regime and the new faces seeking to establish a new system. Indeed, TZN Xenna’s Krzysztof “Zygzak” Chojnacki recalls seeing people on buses in 1980–81, sporting Solidarity badges on their lapels and glaring at him and other punks with hatred in their eyes; Solidarity was a movement for freedom but not, apparently, for everyone.⁸⁷ Kult’s music has reflected the influence of various bands, including the British bands Spear of Destiny and Test Department, and the Slovenian avant-garde industrial group Laibach. For Kazik, music is a vocation and, although he does not expect that the ideas expressed in his lyrics will influence more than a handful of people, he nonetheless expresses some clear anti-systemic ideas. For example, he states that “we [Poles] have lots of victories but also lots of complexes; we are a nation with so many complexes.” In fact, he brought this idea into one of his songs, in which he condemns “stupid national pride and complexes [continuing] for centuries.”⁸⁸ Kult’s anthem—if one may call it that—is a song entitled “Polska” (Poland), written in 1986. “Polska” is about Poland as a “nasty place” and, from Kazik’s perspective, nothing significant changed during the entire lifespan of communism.⁸⁹

86 Kazik Staszewski, founder and leader of Kult, in interview with the author in his home, Warsaw, October 5, 2015.

87 Krzysztof “Zygzak” Chojnacki, leader of TZN Xenna, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 6, 2015, Krzysztof “Panek” Pankiewicz, interpreter. On this point, see also Marciniak, *Transnational Punk Communities in Poland*, 87–89.

88 Staszewski, “Cycki do przodu.”

89 Ibid.

Paweł "Kelner" Rozwadowski, a published poet who founded the group Fornit (meaning Furniture Polish) in 1979 and played with the legendary groups Deuter (which mixed punk, funk, and reggae) and Izrael (which has mixed reggae and rock), took a decidedly antisystem stance in the communist era, as in his song "Fallen is Babylon." Although others have interpreted this song differently, for Kelner, "Babylon" was code for communist General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who served as prime minister of Poland from 1981 to 1985 and as chairman of the Council of State from 1985 to 1989.⁹⁰ He tends to be skeptical about the uses of sarcasm and criticism of the system, and denies that rock bands can actually lead a war against the system. At the same time, he describes Polish politics as "a circus of impossibility" in which "even simple things are hard to do." Indeed, politicians are, for Kelner, best viewed as incompetent frauds: "Our politicians don't know what they are talking about... Poland is like a huge psychiatric clinic."⁹¹

Ever Political, but not Always

A frequently mentioned politically-themed song is "Czerwone tango" (Red Tango), a song recorded by the group Püdelśi, led by Andrzej "Pudel" Bieniasz, in 1995. The song brooded about the postcommunist SLD's victories in the 1994 parliamentary elections.⁹² For Püdelśi, the SLD was an "old whore," as the group made clear in these words:

*You came back, you old whore,
you weren't around for so many years,
already once you took everything from me,
and again you are standing in my doorway.
You have put new makeup on your face,*

90 Paweł "Kelner" Rozwadowski, erstwhile member of Deuter and Izrael, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 7, 2015, in consultation with Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

91 Ibid.

92 Piotr Praschil, record producer, in interview with the author, café near Music Corner, Kraków, October 18, 2013, Marcin Zwierżdżyński, interpreter; also Andrzej "Pudel" Bieniasz, in interview with the author, by telephone from the Ibis Hotel, Kraków, October 16, 2013.

*your lips are red,
again you want to be my woman,
although you are fifty-something years old.
Red tango, we can't live without you...
Red tango, the enchantment of the hairstyle of your cabaret,
Red tango, give me your lips,
so that the pain and sorrow will disappear.*⁹³

Set to a very danceable tango rhythm, the song invited Poles to question just how much the now ex-communists had really changed.

The aforementioned Paweł Kukiz, a charismatic right-wing rock star and social activist, made a name for himself in the 1980s and 1990s as the vocalist for the rock band Piersi,⁹⁴ but has recently become known for his anti-refugee and anti-immigrant views. The political party he assembled in 2015—Kukiz '15—secured 42 seats in the 460-seat Sejm in October of that year, while Kukiz himself placed third in the presidential election held in May 2015. That third-place finish notwithstanding, an opinion poll conducted in early 2016 found that, among 20 Polish political figures, Kukiz ranked as the person with whom Poles would most like to share a beer—ahead of second-place Andrzej Duda (elected president in May 2015) and third-place Aleksander Kwaśniewski (who served as president in the years 1995–2005).⁹⁵ As for his political party, at least on the subject of refugees, Kukiz '15 is considered by some to be even more intolerant than the ruling PiS.⁹⁶

But not everything is about politics or religion. Among other things, there is a small neo-medieval folk-rock scene, in which Slavland (established in 2001) and Percival (established in 2005) figure prominently. These groups are quite serious about reenacting, as they put it, the spirit

93 "Pudelsi - Czerwone Tango," YouTube video, 4:00, posted by "sekrecja," June 26, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b-28ZkV6aAo>; translated for me by Aleksander Zdravkovski.

94 "The Cult of Kukiz," *Krakow Post*, last modified September 7, 2015 <http://www.krakowpost.com/9918/2015/09/the-cult-of-kukiz>.

95 "Politician poll: Kukiz ranked as Poles' preferred drinking partner," *Polskie Radio*, last modified February 2, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/239013,Politician-poll-Kukiz-ranked-as-Poles-preferred-drinking-partner>.

96 Luis Ramirez, "Poland's Clash of Cultures Escalates," *Voice of America*, last modified July 12, 2016 <http://www.voanews.com/content/poland-clash-of-cultures-escalates/3415435.html>, 1.

of medieval times. Thus, for example, members of Percival undertook several research trips with musicologists to small villages in Poland and Belarus, where they found recordings made in the 1960s of local people still singing pre-Christian songs which had not been written down. The group also studied the archives, consulted with specialists and, where they could find only lyrics, composed their own music in the old style of medieval times. Eventually, in addition to performing their neo-medieval folk-rock, the musicians associated with this group also blended medieval musical ideas with heavy metal, performing then under the name Percival Schuttenbach.⁹⁷

Equally non-political but in a different way is the group Myslovitz, which is widely loved for its lyrics; while poignant, these lyrics typically involve musings about life in general. Here is an extract from the text of Myslovitz's song "Wonderful Life" (which the group sings in English):

*...No need to laugh and cry
It's a wonderful, wonderful life
No need to run and hide
It's a wonderful, wonderful life*

*Gulls in the sky and in my blue eyes
You know it feels unfair
There's magic everywhere
And I need a friend, Oh I need a friend
to make me happy
to not stand here on my own*

*Look at me standing
here on my own again,
up straight in the sunshine...*⁹⁸

97 Mikołaj Rybacki and other members of Percival, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 9, 2015, Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

98 "'Wonderful Life' Lyrics," LetsSingIt.com, accessed January 8, 2015, <http://artists.letssingit.com/myslovitz-lyrics-wonderful-life-qtxsgt2>. A live performance of the song is posted on YouTube: "Myslovitz - Wonderful Life (live)," YouTube video, 6:30, posted by "oszooszo," February 8, 2008, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-2bE-a9Q86Q>.

Myslovitz (which owes something stylistically to Britpop) was launched in 1992 in the town of Mysłowice, a town with a population of roughly 75,000 inhabitants. At first, the group performed under the name "The Freshmen" but, in 1994, the musicians adopted the name Myslovitz, a variation of the German form (Myslowitz) of the name of their hometown. The group originally included Artur Rojek (guitar and lead vocals), Marcin Porczek (bass guitar), and Rafał Cieślik (drums), and sings in both Polish and English.⁹⁹ Rojek left the band in 2012 to launch a successful solo career, and Michał Kowalonek came in as lead vocalist. Myslovitz has attained some international recognition, being declared Best Polish Act at the MTV Europe Music Awards in 2002 and 2003; in 2005, the band received the European Breakthrough award, for having brought out the best-selling album (*Korova Milky Bar*) among the 10 new EU member states. As for the political situation in Poland today, Myslovitz echoes Kelner, saying that "This country's like a psychedelic trip."¹⁰⁰

Cool Kids of Death, an alternative rock band formed in Łódź in 2001, have also considered what it means to live in postcommunist Poland, and have offered a preliminary answer with their song "Generation Nothing" (*Generacja Nic*).¹⁰¹ The Cool Kids—comprising Krzysztof Ostrowski (lead vocals), Kuba Wandachowicz (bass guitar), Marcin Kowalski (guitar), Kamil Łazikowski (keyboards), and Wojciech Michalec (guitar, effects, backing vocals)—are accomplished musicians, as highly regarded for their instrumentation as for their lyrics. As an example, one may listen to Cool Kids' instrumental number, "Saint Etienne (Underworld mix)," which is eerily reminiscent of the music for the closing credits to the 1982 film, *Blade Runner*.¹⁰²

There may be some controversies concerning which of Poland's rock/punk/metal bands can qualify as "super-groups", but, among those bands active in the latter half of 2015, the following would probably appear on anyone's list (in alphabetical order): Armia, Behemoth, Brygada Kryzys,

99 "myslovitz," at <http://www.myslovitz.pl/en/historia/> [accessed on 16 April 2017].

100 Myslovitz, "Acidland," lyrics posted online: "Acidland," LyricsTranslate.com, accessed March 19, 2017, <http://lyricstranslate.com/en/acidland-acidland.html>.

101 Studio recording available online: "Cool kids of death - Generacja nic," YouTube video, 2:48, posted by "polskifansportu," April 10, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=95zuqxSf9gg>.

102 Studio recording available online: "Saint Etienne—Cool Kids Of Death (Underworld Mix)," YouTube video, 14:29, posted by "TheMilan1973," January 9, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OPwGIprMYM>.

Dezerter, Kult, Perfect, Riverside, Vader, and Wilki. (See Box 11.2 for lists of the most highly regarded rock/punk bands, the most highly regarded metal bands, and the most highly regarded soloists active today.)

**Box 11.2. *The most highly regarded rock artists
in Poland as of October 2015***

Most highly regarded rock/punk bands: Kult, Dezerter, Brygada Kryzys, T.Love, Armia, Homo Twist, Lady Pank, Perfect, Wilki, Voo Voo, Hey, Coma, Riverside, Post Regiment, Luxtorpeda, and Myslovitz.

Most highly regarded metal bands: Behemoth, Vader, Acid Drinkers, Decapitated, Frontside, TSA, Kat with Roman Kostrzewski, Furia, and Mgła (though the last two are not as popular as the other groups on this list).

Most highly regarded soloists active today: Kora Jackowska, Tomasz Lipiński, Kazik Staszewski, Katarzyna Nosowska, Artur Rojek, Edyta Bartosiewicz, and Lech Janerka.

Conclusion

Rock, punk, and metal musicians in Poland share some things in common with their counterparts elsewhere in the world and some things in common with their counterparts in other postcommunist countries. But in some ways, the rock scene (under which I now include punk and metal) in Poland is distinct. Like rock musicians throughout Europe, North America, and to an extent elsewhere in the world, Polish rock musicians have been influenced by the Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Led Zeppelin, Deep Purple, and Laibach. Certain groups were influenced also by Jethro Tull (in the cases of Riverside, Collage, and Yes), by the Clash and Exploited (punk bands), by Nirvana (Hey and Coma), by Oasis (Myslovitz), by Iron Maiden, Black Sabbath, and Metallica (bands in the metal scene), by Bob Marley and reggae (Kazik and Malejonek, among others), and also various groups by the Police and Sex Pistols. Most of the trends in the rock/punk/metal scenes were established earlier in the USA, Britain, and elsewhere. Even neomedieval folk-rock, exemplified by the masterly bands Percival and

Slavland, has its counterparts in Germany (for example, Corvus Corax), Sweden (for instance, Hedningarna), Denmark (Sorten Muld), and Norway (for instance, Lumsøk).

At the same time, rock bands throughout communist Eastern Europe shared a common experience and often felt the need to address the problems associated with one-party dictatorship. In the 1980s, one could find rockers satirizing or outright criticizing their respective communist authorities in the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, just as one could also in Poland. And the disposition to take on the authorities, whether political authorities or ecclesiastical, continues not only in Poland but also in the post-Yugoslav region and up to a point in Russia (as the case of Pussy Riot reminds us).

But there are also some distinctive trends in the Polish rock scene. To begin with, given the relatively greater freedom enjoyed by Polish rockers than their counterparts in most other communist countries (and in certain countries in the region also today), an anti-systemic lyrical tendency is probably more pronounced in Poland than elsewhere in the region. Second, it was easier in communist times to invite artists from non-communist countries to perform in Poland than it was to invite them to perform elsewhere in the communist world.¹⁰³ Third, in the 1990s, Poland was possibly the third most important center for reggae, after Jamaica and the USA,¹⁰⁴ not least due to the anti-punk reggae “revolution” which started in the Tri-City area.¹⁰⁵ And fourth, anticlericalism is more pronounced among Polish bands than among bands in other countries, perhaps anywhere in the world.

103 Grzegorz Brzozowicz, journalist, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Warsaw, October 7, 2015.

104 Ibid.

105 Jacek “Bodek” Bogdziewicz and Jarosław “Pastyl” Turbiarz, members of the band Golden Life, in interview with the author, Sheraton Hotel, Sopot, October 13, 2015, Małgorzata Żurada, interpreter.

CHAPTER 12

Film and Values: Polish Cinema of National Remembrance

ELŻBIETA DURYS

Poland is a past-oriented country. The prevalence of arguments referring to the past in discussions of contemporary political and social issues is a clear indication of this. In the process of nation-building, however, of greater importance is the way this shapes the identity of Poles, both as a group and as individuals. Here, the romantic era has been (and still is) most significant for Polish identity, reflecting the ideals of independence, solitary action, and self-sacrifice at the altar of the nation's freedom. Neither the collapse of communism (1989), nor entering NATO (1999) and the EU (2004), nor globalization managed to effectively challenge this romantic paradigm. Fierce discussions concerning the nation's past have led to a more or less comprehensive debunking of historical events. However, these discussions did not undermine the persistent way of thinking. This practice became explicit when the "new cinematography act" was passed in 2005. Although the minister of culture became responsible for "creating conditions for the development of all kinds and types of filmmaking," it was historical films that most attracted the attention of the Polish Film Institute (the state organization established to implement the guidelines of the act). Of special interest were those historical movies that were of great "importance to national culture and the strengthening of Polish tradition and language."

Filmmakers seized upon these suggestions immediately, making movies that dealt with the problems of twentieth-century Polish history. Historical movies made since 2007 form one of the most (or even the

only) noticeable and critically discussed trend in recent Polish cinema. In this group one can find: *Katyń* (2007, directed by Andrzej Wajda); *Generał Nil* (2009, directed by Ryszard Bugajski); *Generał—zamach na Gibraltarze* (*The General: The Gibraltar Assassination*, 2009, directed by Anna Jadowska and Lidka Kazen); *Popiełuszko. Wolność jest w nas* (*Popiełuszko: Freedom Is Within Us*, 2009, directed by Rafał Wierzyński); *Róża* (*Rose*, 2011, directed by Wojciech Smarzowski); *80 milionów* (*80 Million*, 2011, directed by Waldemar Krzystek); *W ciemności* (*In Darkness*, 2011, directed by Agnieszka Holland); *Czarny Czwartek. Janek Wiśniewski padł* (*Black Thursday*, 2011, directed by Antoni Krauze); *1920 Bitwa Warszawska* (*Warsaw Battle 1920*, 2011, directed by Jerzy Hoffman); *Ida* (2013, directed by Paweł Pawlikowski); *Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei* (*Wałęsa: Man of Hope*, 2013, directed by Andrzej Wajda); *Miasto 44* (*Warsaw '44*, 2014, directed by Jan Komasa); and *Jack Strong* (2014, directed by Władysław Pasikowski), among others. This group of movies is being labelled “the second wave of national historical epics,” in contrast to earlier movies from the turn of the century. Historical movies of the first wave reconstructed the world created by great Polish writers in their historical novels.¹ The second wave deals with historical events in most cases not mediated by literary works. Those movies not only belong to the Polish national cinema (in a narrow sense of the term), but also support the discussion about Polish history of the twentieth century, forming the so-called politics of historical discourse. Due to the nature of the vision of Polish history being promoted, I will use Magdalena Nowicka and Witold Mrozek’s label for these movies, namely “cinema of national remembrance.”² In my chapter I would like to look more closely at this strand of Polish cinema (the only one currently critically recognized and acclaimed), drawing attention to the context of its birth and development, as well as the worldview that informs it and the values it promotes. For my analysis I will use Andrew Higson’s concept of national cinema in both its descriptive and its evaluative dimension. This will allow an examination of the weaknesses of the vision of society and

1 Marcin Adamczak, “*Katyń* i *Generał «Nil»* a (długi) zmierzch paradygmatu,” *Kwartalnik Filmowy*, 77–78 (2012): 72; Marek Haltof, “Adapting the National Literary Canon: Polish Heritage Cinema,” *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature/ Revue Canadienne de Littérature Comparée* 34, no. 3 (September 2007): 298–306.

2 Witold Mrozek, “Kino pamięci narodowej: Najnowsze kino polskie w dyskursie polityki historycznej,” in *Kino polskie jako kino narodowe*, ed. Tadeusz Lubelski and Maciej Stroński (Cracow: ha!art, 2009), 295–320.

nation implied by the cinema of national remembrance and, as a result, pinpoint the problems faced by Polish democracy.

Despite ongoing discussion about the changes in world cinema caused by globalization and the evolution of dominant cultural paradigms, Polish film theory and criticism are dominated by the concept of national cinema. This concept seems to be at the very centre of Polish film history and analysis. Out of the two methods of identifying the specificity of national cinema mentioned by Higson, its "imaginary coherence"—firstly through external references (mainly to Hollywood as an institution, other national cinemas, or participation in the festival circuit), secondly through internal references, which is to say, "its relationship to an already existing national political, economic and cultural identity (in so far as a single coherent identity can be established) and set of traditions"³—Polish film studies are dominated by the latter model. Issues related to production mechanisms, financing, exhibition, and audience⁴ are rarely considered. The crucial problem remains the same: elaborating the idea of Polishness in Polish cinema.

The traditional method of approaching history, constructing national discourse or, even more importantly, constructing an imagined national community, was almost mechanically transferred from nineteenth-century Polish literature and art to the second wave of national epics. The cinema of national remembrance refers to the twentieth-century history of the Polish state and nation. The putative audience for those movies is "the mass public, identified with 'the whole nation.'" Explicitly declared educational purposes that stand behind the production of those movies⁵ are supported by different public and governmental institutions. The media, army, schools, the National Cultural Centre (Narodowe Centrum Kultury), supported by the Polish Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego), as well as the Catholic

3 Andrew Higson, "The Concept of National Cinema," in *Film and Nationalism*, ed. Alan Williams (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 60.

4 The problem of the audience is only addressed in the context of creating box office success.

5 It seems that one of the favorite activities of Polish filmmakers is referring to sociological surveys proving a lack of historical knowledge in Polish society. Witold Mrozek quotes data that could be found in newspapers and magazines when *Katyń* was released: "between 39 and 50 percent of Poles either do not know who stood behind it [the Katyń massacre] or think that Nazis did it, or that it has not been finally settled." Witold Mrozek, "Kino pamięci narodowej," 298.

Church (especially in the case of *Popiełuszko*)⁶ are actively engaged in promoting these films. Hence, as many critics claim, the backing by these institutions helped to assure the commercial success of those movies.

The cinema of national remembrance, even though it is intuitively easy to grasp and is recognized by the audience without any difficulties, in many respects constitutes a heterogeneous phenomenon. It uses various styles and poetics, from the definitely traditional to those defined as modern or poetic and avant-garde. *Jack Strong* is clearly situated within mainstream cinema, drawing from the classic Hollywood style, while artistic cinema is the point of reference for Wojciech Smarzowski's *Rose*. When watching *The General: The Gibraltar Assassination*, especially in the fragments where split screen is used to present the events, the spectator gets the impression of the creators' fascination with the video clip format.⁷ At the time of the premiere of *Warsaw '44* a lot was written about the computer game aesthetics used by Jan Komasa, which was supposed to be a nod toward the younger audience.

When writing about Hollywood, Thomas Schatz drew attention to the film genre's classification, taking into consideration the gender of the planned viewer. In cinema, the "masculine" and "feminine" genres can be differentiated. The masculine genres (or "genres of order") include Westerns, war films, or hardboiled detectives. In such films, as Schatz claims, conflicts are expressed and solved by means of violence. The feminine genres (or "genres of integration") include melodramas, screwball comedies, and musicals. In these films, the conflicts are translated into feelings and coded using them, then expressed and reworked on the emotional level in order to find the solution in the final scene of a cheerful hug.⁸ The cinema of national remembrance is heterogeneous also in this aspect. Among the films falling within its scope, one can find "masculine" action films (the abovementioned *Jack Strong* or *80 Millions*), as well as "feminine" melodramas (*Mała Moskwa* [*Little Moscow*, 2008, directed by Waldemar Krzystek] or *Różyczka* [*Little Rose*, 2010, directed by Jan Kidawa-Błoński]). I will return to this issue later in the chapter.

6 Witold Mrozek, "Kino pamięci narodowej," 298–303.

7 As defined and characterized by Urszula Jarecka. Urszula Jarecka, "Od teledysku do wideoklipu. Ewolucja idiomu klipowego," in *Nowe media w komunikacji społecznej w XX wieku: Antologia*, ed. Maryla Hopfinger (Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa, 2002), 293–315.

8 Thomas Schatz, *Hollywood Genres: Formulas, Filmmaking, and the Studio System*, (New York: Random House, 1981), 34–35.

The cinema of national remembrance utilizes various ways of approaching history. On the one hand, the traditional, textbook understanding of history is visible. It is then most frequently expressed in terms of crucial events or extraordinary characters. Examples of the films dedicated to landmark events are *Battle of Warsaw* or *Black Thursday*. The former took place during the Polish–Soviet war of 1919–1921, which is perceived in Poland as an event that resulted in stopping the Bolsheviks during their campaign for international revolution. The latter presents the dramatic events of December 1970, which occurred during the bloody workers' strikes. The most famous films about unusual or dissenting figures are *General Nil* (one of the leaders of the Polish Home Army during World War II, executed in 1953 by the communist government), *Popiełuszko* (the Roman Catholic priest known for his anticommunism, murdered in 1984 by internal intelligence agents) and *Wałęsa: Man of Hope* (the Solidarity movement leader). On the other hand, history is often presented from the perspective of ordinary people, emphasizing the way in which crucial events are reflected in human dramas. Examples of this trend include *Rewers* (*Reverse*, 2009, directed by Borys Lankosz), *Rose*, *Little Rose*, or *Ida*.

Films falling under the category of cinema of national remembrance use different sources of financing. The Polish Film Institute (Polski Instytut Sztuki Filmowej, hereafter PISF) has been the main sponsor since its establishment in 2005. This is not surprising, considering the criteria for acceptance and evaluation of movie co-financing applications. The documents published annually by the PISF include five priorities for co-financing: screenplay scholarships; the development of movie projects; the production of feature films; the production of documentaries; and, finally, the production of animations. For each of these priorities, there is a subsection concerning historical movies. For example, Priority III, the production of feature films, specifically encourages art movies, historical movies, movies for young viewers and families, and movies with significant box office potential. The definition of a historical movie is as follows: "A movie, in which the historical background of the events significantly affects the drama, the development of the characters, and the course of action, and which is made after consulting with a historian."⁹

9 *Programy operacyjne PISF na rok 2015*, accessed March 22, 2015, https://www.pisf.pl/files/dokumenty/po_2015/programy_operacyjne_pisf_2015.pdf, 71.

If we observe the lists of beneficiaries we notice that, in 2012, out of 42 movies co-financed by PISF, eight can be classified as cinema of national remembrance: *Bitwa pod Wiedniem* (*September Eleven 1683*, directed by Renzo Martinelli); *Hans Kloss. Stawka większa niż śmierć* (*Hans Kloss: More Than Death at Stake*, directed by Patryk Vega); *Historia "Roja", czyli w ziemi lepiej słyhać* (*Swarm's Story or You Hear Better Underground*, directed by Jerzy Zalewski); *Oblawa* (*Manhunt*, directed by Marcin Krzyształowicz); *Pokłosie* (*Aftermath*, directed by Władysław Pasikowski); *Ambasada* (*The Embassy*, directed by Juliusz Machulski); and *W cieniu* (*In the Shadows*, a co-production directed by David Ondříček). A year later the proportion was even higher, as out of 29 co-financed projects 7 were considered cinema of national remembrance, namely: *Warsaw '44* (2014); *Ida*; *Baczyński* (directed by Kordian Piwowarski); *Był sobie dzieciak* (*Once Upon a Time in Warsaw*, directed by Leszek Wosiewicz); *Hiszpanka* (*Influence*, 2014, directed by Łukasz Barczyk); *Sierpniowe niebo. 63 dni chwały* (*August's Sky: 63 Days of Glory*, directed by Ireneusz Dobrowolski); and *Wałęsa: Man of Hope*. It is no surprise, then, that the PISF has a reputation of an institution supporting historical projects.

However, the PISF is not the only institution that contributes, with subsidies, to the development of cinema of national remembrance. There is another serious player on the Polish market—the ITI Company—which takes up historical subjects. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the movies financed, produced and distributed by the ITI have been considered controversial. A case in point was the movie *The General: The Gibraltar Assassination*. A key facet in its making and marketing was an attempt to debunk one of the conspiracy theories concerning the tragic death of general Władysław Sikorski. On the other hand, *Tajemnica Westerplatte* (*1939 Battle of Westerplatte*, 2013, directed by Paweł Chochlew) was criticized even before its premiere, as the movie supposedly aimed at attacking the good name of the Polish Army soldiers defending the Westerplatte peninsula in September 1939.

The cinema of national remembrance has also developed some sub-trends that can be differentiated using, for instance, a thematic criterion. The most visible sub-trend of movies is the one about the Warsaw Uprising (August 1–October 3, 1944)—considered by the Polish people as one of the most traumatic events of World War II. Barbara Szczekała uses a separate term for this sub-trend, describing it as a “new insurrectionary cinema” and includes six movies into this group: *Once Upon*

a Time in Warsaw, August's Sky: 63 Days of Glory, Baczyński, *Powstanie Warszawskie* (Warsaw Uprising, 2014, directed by Jan Komasa), *Warsaw '44*, and *Kamienie na szaniec* (Stones for the Rampart, 2014, directed by Robert Gliński). Interestingly, these films appeared relatively late and had their premieres in a very short period of time (2013–2014).¹⁰

Let us return for a moment to the year 1989, since—it seems to me—one of the reasons for the formation and development of the cinema of national remembrance lies in discussions emerging after the fall of communism. Until the 1980s, the communist authorities pursued a specific policy towards the cinema, both on the internal level and with respect to external productions. However, despite the existence of state censorship of a mainly political character, a relatively large number of movies were released in Poland which were skeptical of the authorities—if not explicitly, then at least in a veiled manner criticizing the existing political system. This was particularly visible during the period of the cinema of moral anxiety (“kino moralnego niepokoju”), occurring at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Such a polemic, even if not directly opposing the authorities, constituted one of the causes of the great popularity of Polish cinema domestically.

With respect to international productions, having limited resources at their disposal, the communist government applied the criterion of artistic value during the purchase of the movies. A well-developed and state-subsidized system of Dyskusyjny Klub Filmowy (Film Discussion Clubs), as well as the annually organized “Konfrontacje” (a film festival with the year’s best international productions) enabled cinema enthusiasts to become familiar with selected productions. As such, Polish people were up to date with the most important contemporary achievements of world cinema. After the abolition of martial law in 1983 and domestic economic collapse, the authorities changed their policy, predominantly bringing blockbuster movies to Poland, probably with the aim of placating public opinion after the so-called carnival of freedom and the deeply unpopular introduction of martial law (December 13, 1981). Financial restrictions did not allow this to become a significant turning point; however, a lot of blockbusters hit Polish cinemas at that time.

10 Barbara Szczekała, “Nowe kino powstańcze?,” *EKRANY* 21, no. 5 (2014): 46–49.

The situation changed after 1989, when censorship was abolished and international distribution companies were allowed to enter the market. However, the subsequent deluge of simplistic entertainment did not satisfy the Poles for long. In the media, ever greater numbers of disappointed viewers expressed their opinions, demanding legitimately artistic cinema, or at least cinema dealing with important social problems. With regard to Polish cinema, such a demand was difficult to satisfy, due to the desperate financial situation, along with a lack of legal and systemic solutions concerning the financing of the country's film industry. The state, facing economic collapse and galloping unemployment, withdrew from the financing of movie productions. Poles had to wait until 2005, when the passage of a new cinematography act created new opportunities. The solutions adopted in it enabled Polish cinema to revive itself.

Since the establishment of the PISF—the aforementioned state organization whose objective is to finance and promote Polish cinema—an incredible increase in the number of produced movies has been visible.¹¹ In spite of constant complaint regarding the level and quality of many films, Polish movies are regularly watched and discussed in the media. They are also granted awards at festivals; at this point, it would be inappropriate not to mention that Paweł Pawlikowski's *Ida* was awarded an Oscar—the first in the history of Polish cinema—for best foreign movie. When observing these changes, one may be surprised about the prolonged, tempestuous discussions that preceded the passage of the new cinematography act. We should consider these discussions presently, as the vision which prevailed at that time resulted in the values promoted currently by Polish cinema.

After the breakthrough of 1989 in Poland, there was a clash between two visions of cinema in the cultural system and cinema's relation to the state. On one side were supporters of the free market and the distributors' *diktat*. Starting from the assumption that cinema is, predominantly, a form of entertainment, they applauded the lack of state support. They gained acclaim from Poles intoxicated by free market transformations and demurred at the organizational aspect of Polish cinema during the

11 In 2014 PISF allocated €31 million to investment in movie projects (predominantly focused on screenplays), productions, and co-productions. See "Polish Film Institute," Film Commission Poland, accessed March 29, 2015, <http://filmcommissionpoland.pl/funding/polish-film-institute/>.

communist era. On the other hand, some people emphasized the role and importance of cinema in the national culture system, downplaying cinema's function as entertainment. As such, they argued that it required support from the state. The advocates of this vision—less numerous, but highly influential—referred to the European tradition. However, they were frequently accused of appropriating their solutions from the communist era, which resulted in incredibly negative reactions.

The fifteen-year long debate was finally concluded by the adoption of the new cinematography act in 2005. The regulations themselves definitively pointed to the victory of the latter vision. Thanks to the establishment of the Polish Film Institute, a stable means of subsidizing Polish movie production and promoting Polish movie work abroad was guaranteed. Driven by the directives found in the operational programs, the PISF places particular emphasis on historical cinema—aside from artistic cinema, it is the only kind of cinema mentioned in all five priorities (screenplay scholarships, the development of movie projects, the production of feature films, the production of documentaries, and the production of animated movies). The support from the PISF overlapped with the crystallization of interests among the Polish people themselves. 2007 is recognized as marking the beginning of one of the most noticeable trends in Polish cinematography after 1989—the cinema of national remembrance.

The emergence of the cinema of national remembrance should also be seen in the context of the unprecedented revival of historical discussion in Poland after 2000. Several factors contributed to that phenomenon. I have already mentioned the Polish people's characteristic orientation toward the past, and the mental paradigm that causes them to perceive and explain present events through reference to historical ones. The collapse of communism in 1989 resulted in profound changes not only in economy and politics, but also in the official version of history. The abolition of censorship allowed people to learn about and discuss many facts which had been either falsified or passed over in silence until then. Examples include the Soviet Union's secret assault on Poland on September 17, 1939, the Katyń massacre of 1940, and the pacification of members of the underground who did not want to cooperate with the communist government, after the end of World War II.

However, the real breakthrough in historical interest commenced, according to historian Paweł Machcewicz, after 2000. Machcewicz claims that three factors contributed to this. Firstly, facing everyday hardships

during the economic crisis after the fall of communism distracted Polish people from historical debates. Economic stabilization reversed that trend and resulted in an increase in interest in the recent past. Secondly, in 2000 the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, hereafter IPN) was officially founded. Its aim is to investigate crimes against the Polish nation committed by both Nazis and Soviets in the period 1939–1989, and crimes of the communist regime in Poland during that period.¹² Subsequently, the secret police files (or, at least, what was left of them) were opened to the public. It must be noted that the historians working for IPN have been extremely active in the media, especially the right-wing media. Very often, they do not content themselves merely with providing an account of the facts on the basis of available resource materials. On the contrary, they have become involved in public debates, usually supporting a right-wing position. As a result, government and conservative-rightist actors have started promoting the so-called politics of history.¹³

The term “politics of history” has been adopted from German journalism (German *Geschichtspolitik*). Developing historical awareness in Polish society, according to its supporters, had to be rooted predominantly in revealing the truth about twentieth-century Polish history. However, the study of the past quickly evolved. In an article published in 2011, historian Anna Wolff-Powęska pinpoints elements informing the discourse of Polish politics of history. These include support for the nineteenth-century, ethnic vision of a nation, construction of a dominant national narrative based on the history of Poland as both victim and hero of the liberation struggle, and presenting Poland as a country whose dedication helped to save Europe, if not the world, from the deluge of communism, for which we deserve both moral and material compensation.¹⁴ All of these characteristics are also revealed in the cinema of national remembrance.

12 The full name of the Institute is “Institute of National Remembrance—Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation.” The IPN was established by the Polish Parliament in December 1998, and started its work in July 2000.

13 Paweł Machcewicz, *Spory o historię 2000–2011* (Cracow: Znak, 2012).

14 Professor Wolff-Powęska is very critical towards proponents of what she labels “politics of history propaganda” (“propaganda polityki historycznej”). Nevertheless, she indicates a positive vision of approaching Polish history. By that she means the honest examination of facts and documents, not repressing the negative behavior of Poles, especially towards minorities, incorporating criticism and dialogue. In one of her interviews she says: “We will achieve normality when we meet less often at the cemeteries and battlefields, and more often in lecture rooms and European

Another significant factor in the emergence of cinema of national remembrance was the success of the first wave of historical movies. I will take a closer look at this phenomenon for two reasons. Firstly, it brought about a return to a romantic paradigm, highly typical within Polish culture, in cinema. Initially this return took place on a somewhat mechanical level—through ultimately unsuccessful references to the literary canon constituting the basis of the romantic Polish mentality. Secondly, it restored some of the symbols and solutions developed by this canon, which had previously functioned during the creation of the Polish national community. These included the incorporation of a fascination with heroism and “Sarmatian” culture, renouncing Poland’s peasant background, binding it with Catholicism, and a fascination with strong personalities able to unite the community under the banner of liberation. This culture also fostered a reluctance to blind obedience and an ability to constantly strain at the limits of the law. Moreover, a characteristic feature of these movies is their staunchly patriarchal overtones. The inability to treat women objectively, casting them as mere victims of violence will become, as the younger generation of critics claims, an element exposing the inexperience of Polish democracy and a litmus test for every subsequent ideological project.¹⁵

An extremely thorough analysis of the phenomenon of the first wave of historical movies, also described as “the cinema of school canon,” was carried out by Ewa Mazierska. A Polish scholar, living and working in the United Kingdom, she described this group of movies as examples of “heritage cinema” (a term introduced by Andrew Higson). The term referred to the wave of historical and costume movies created in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s, relating—with visible nostalgia—the past of the British Empire, while at the same time idealizing the social relations and approvingly relating to the policies conducted by the upper class. Researchers empha-

projects.” Filip Gańczak, “Wyrwać się z niewoli historii,” *Newsweek Polska*, June 20, 2011, accessed September 7, 2012, <http://m.newsweek.pl/polska,wyrwac-sie-z-niewoli-historii,78439,2,1.html>. See also Anna Wolff-Powęska, “Polityka polityczna. Polskie spory o historię i pamięć,” *Transodra Online*, accessed September 6, 2012, <http://www.transodra-online.net/pl/node/1256>.

15 Błażej Hrapkiewicz, “Kino bez kobiet,” *Dwutygodnik*, no. 42/2010, accessed April 6, 2015, <http://www.dwutygodnik.com/artukul/1553-kino-bez-kobiet.html>; Bartosz Żurawiecki, “Boginki,” *Dwutygodnik*, no. 144/2014, accessed April 6, 2015, <http://www.dwutygodnik.com/artukul/5512-boginki.html>.

size the spectacular aspects of this cinema, resulting from their meticulous approach to recreating the realities of ruling class life. They claim that the indirect objective of these movies was to lull critical thinking, taking into account the historic context and those areas of people's lives (including whole social classes and ethnic and national groups) which had been purged from this vision. Such a presentation of British "heritage cinema" can be, according to Mazierska, easily translated into the description of the Polish first wave of historical movies.

Compared to the British case, the Polish oeuvre of heritage cinema seems quite small. Mazierska points out only eight movies that were made in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. However, it should be remembered that this period was particularly difficult for Polish cinema. Total yearly production frequently did not exceed twenty movies. Most graduates of Polish film schools did not have a chance to make a feature-length debut at this time, waiting for many years for the possibility to shoot a story. Moreover, film creators previously cherished by viewers seemed to be losing their resonance with the audience. The box office successes of movies such as *Psy* (*Pigs*, 1992, directed by Władysław Pasikowski) or *Jańcio Wodnik* (*Johnny Aquarius*, 1993, directed by Jan Jakub Kolski) only deepened the feeling of lack of understanding that had been growing since the 1980s. The sudden return of viewers to the cinema for adaptations of the classics pleased filmmakers such as Wajda and Jerzy Hoffman, both of whom felt that the promotion of higher values and the corresponding romantic paradigm was precisely what Polish cinema should strive for.

When analyzing these movies, Mazierska states that the definition of British heritage cinema suggested by Higson, submitted to slight modifications, can constitute the starting point for the aforementioned trend: "based on respectable literary sources, shot on location, pastoral in ambience, usually concerned with the upper classes, shot in a tradition of Victorian pictorialism [which Mazierska asserts can be replaced in the Polish context by Sienkiewicz's pictorialism] and thus slow in pace and cutting, and stately in feel."¹⁶ Furthermore, "Polish heritage films, in common with their British counterparts, reveal, encourage and reinforce

16 Ewa Mazierska, "In the Land of Noble Knights and Mute Princesses: Polish Heritage Cinema," *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 21, no. 2 (2001): 167–68.

popular fascination with the past. Similarly, the past . . . is not restricted to history 'per se,' but the relationship of the past to the present day."¹⁷ Compared to the literary prototypes, a less xenophobic attitude toward other, neighboring nations can be seen in the film adaptations. They continue to present the polarized figures of enemy and ally; however, generally, as Mazierska states, their chauvinism is less ostentatious, and this was noted by the critics, especially after the premiere of *Ogniem i mieczem* (*With Fire and Sword*, 1999, directed by Jerzy Hoffman). A negative approach toward the Other was coded using the contradistinction of Christians/non-Christians. The movies representing Polish heritage cinema are filled with Christian symbols (crosses and icons of the Holy Mother in *With Fire and Sword*), and the protagonists are presented as trusting in God's care and guidance. Additionally, as Mazierska highlights, the non-Christians are "portrayed as decadent and 'un-masculine,' more concerned with their own pleasure than with any higher cause."¹⁸

What can be noticed in these films is a departure from using ethnicity to construct Polishness. However, using the figure of the Other is not abandoned; rather, the ethnic Other is replaced by the female Other. In those movies, as Mazierska puts it: "Metaphorical 'familiarisation' and 'disarmament' of Poland's traditional enemies—those living on her eastern and western borders, left a gap in the narrative and ideology of *With Fire and Sword* and *Pan Tadeusz*. New aliens and enemies had to be found and this function is given to women or, more precisely, certain types of women: active, independent of men, and intellectually their equal."¹⁹ Mazierska demonstrates this by examining the characters of Princesses Kurcewicz, Horpyna (in *With Fire and Sword*), and Telimena (in *Pan Tadeusz*), all of whom fit the pattern of "enemy" women as outlined above, and, by contrast, the passive and diminutive Helena (in *With Fire and Sword*) and Zosia (in *Pan Tadeusz*). She claims that here meanings are conveyed through "the narrative, construction of characters and casting, but also through the cinematography and *mise-en-scène*."²⁰ Mazierska concludes her deliberations by observing that

17 Ibid., 168.

18 Ibid., 173.

19 Ibid., 175.

20 Ibid., 178.

Polish heritage films typically create an image of Poland in days gone by as a feudal and patriarchal country, where loyalty to one's motherland and the Catholic faith was regarded as of the highest value. This Poland is idealized by the films' authors and thus (albeit indirectly) they elevate the political forces that facilitate and strengthen nationalism, Catholicism, patriarchy, sexism, and elitism. On the whole, Polish heritage cinema, in common with the majority of artefacts and institutions which are born out of nostalgia, promotes a conservative, reactionary ideology.²¹

Her diagnosis concerning the first wave of historic movies can be, almost without any modification, transferred to the second wave.

Witold Mrozek draws attention to the persistent usage of Polish romantic myths in the cinema of national remembrance. He closely analyses three of them: the messianic/sacrificial myth, the idealization of characters, and their polarization. The loss of statehood, and the subsequent 123 years of subjugation by foreign powers, were perceived by Polish elites as the main focus. The inability to come to terms with this situation resulted in two major insurrections, and the engagement of many Poles in the struggle for independence. The failures of these insurrections caused Polish people to easily accept a symbolic explanation for that situation provided by one of the nation's greatest romantic poets, Adam Mickiewicz, who suggested that "Poland was the Christ of Nations" (*"Polska Chrystusem narodów"*). Its suffering and persecution, according to this narrative, were not fruitless; in the future it would bring salvation to other nations, just as the suffering and persecution of Jesus Christ brought redemption to mankind. This messianic/sacrificial idea was fully elaborated, as Mrozek proves, in *Katyń* and *Popiełuszko*.²² But the same mechanism was also employed in other movies of the era, particularly in *General Nil*, *80 million*, and *The Battle of Warsaw 1920*.

In these movies, the characters are delineated by their attitudes and values. The world can be simplistically divided into good (those who fight the system, or are its victims) and bad (members and supporters of the totalitarian system). The majority of the good ones are allegedly believers. If they do not practice their Catholicism, or rebel against the Church, in the

21 Ibid., 180.

22 Mrozek, "Kino pamięci narodowej," 303–307.

face of death they find the path back to God (as Lt. Piotr does in *Katyń*). Mrozek stresses the fact that even the rabbi presented in one of the prison scenes in *General Nil* refers to Jesus' preaching, and uses it as an argument against despair. None of the characters is suffering from doubts; on the contrary, all of them are enduring their fate with courage.²³

There were specific roles elaborated for both men and women in the dominant Polish national narrative. While men should be conspirators and warriors, eager to devote their lives for the freedom of their country, women were expected to become Mothers. The Polish Mother myth, as Joanna Szwejowska explains,²⁴ emerged in the nineteenth century in partitioned Poland, together with many other Polish national myths.²⁵ The lack of statehood, restrictions on education in the mother tongue and on education in Polish history and culture caused the people to take over those duties. Women were especially responsible for the private sphere and family life at that time and carried that burden, raising subsequent generations with patriotic spirit. Further persecutions and restrictions imposed by partitioning powers caused the opposite effect to that which was intended. The Polish home was strengthened as the oasis of Polishness.

The role of transmitters and cultivators of Polishness was accompanied by two other elements. Polish women were active in conspiracies, providing assistance and support. They even engaged in the fight against the partitioning powers (Austria, Prussia/Germany, and Russia), taking up arms during several uprisings in the nineteenth century. Finally, they became dramatic figures. Bringing up children in the spirit of patriotism and resistance made them mothers of the doomed, whose children engaged in fatal fights for a non-existent motherland. They gave their lives, aware that raising a responsible citizen means raising a person eager to sacrifice his or her life for the country at any single moment. Szwejowska also emphasizes the tight bond of womanliness with the cult of the Virgin Mary.²⁶ That bond coexisted with the denial of individuality—for a woman, being Polish

23 Ibid.

24 Joanna Szwejowska, "The Myth of the Polish Mother," in *Women in Polish Cinema*, ed. by Ewa Mazierska and Elżbieta Ostrowska, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 15–33.

25 Among others, one can find the messianic and martyrological myth, the myth of individual action, and Poland as the Christ of nations.

26 Mainly on the level of motherhood, suffering and raising a child for sacrifice (incorporating an element of messianic/sacrificial myth).

meant being a Polish Mother. There was no other role model for a Polish woman to follow. What is more, there was no space for a real person with desires, feelings, and personal views behind the myth.²⁷

In Kazimierz Kutz's historical movie, *Śmierć jak kromka chleba* (*Death as a Slice of Bread*, 1994), the following scene emerges. During the night, a woman can be seen at the gate of a coal mine where miners are striking against the unlawful detention of their union president by police, and against the implementation of martial law on December 13, 1981. The woman looks broken and desperate. Her face is contorted, hair dishevelled, and clothes rumpled. She turns out to be the wife of one of the men on strike. She starts yelling: "Joe, Joe, your mom is calling you! Come! Your kids are without their father! Joe, I am cold! Your wife is cold! Can you hear? Joe, come, show mercy! I won't hit you! Don't be afraid!" Shortly after that she bursts into tears, gives up and walks away. Although the movie was made in 1994, fifteen years prior to the wave of cinema of national remembrance, it seems to be not only a perfect example of the trend, but also paradigmatic in terms of women's representation. Female characters are portrayed as wailing wives who try as much as they can to distract their husbands from serving higher causes. The only activity in which they passionately indulge themselves in their houses is peeling potatoes.

Wajda's *Katyń* is characterized as the movie which began the cycle of the cinema of national remembrance. For a long time, *Katyń* was also one of the most critically acclaimed movies of this wave. Wajda's point of departure was the Katyń forest massacre, a secret mass execution of Polish nationals ordered by the Soviet Politburo and performed by the NKVD (the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs or secret police). In many different places across the territory of today's Ukraine and Belarus, Katyń among them, it is estimated that altogether 22,000 Poles were shot in the head and buried by the Soviets in April and May 1940. Many of them were members of the Polish Officer Corps and police officers imprisoned after the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939, but the majority were members of the intelligentsia: doctors, lawyers, city, town and gov-

27 Szwajcowska, "The Myth of the Polish Mother," 15–33. Mary's virginity had its antinomy in anti-myth. In European culture it was Biblical Eve, especially in the eyes of early Fathers of the Church, who was the nest of sin and evil. Communist censorship, of course, did not allow these kinds of female figures. They began to appear after 1989, even coming to dominate in Polish cinema. See also Grażyna Stachówna, "Suczka, Cycofon, Faustyna i inne," *Kino* 7–8 (2001): 38–43.

ernment officials, priests, factory owners and landowners. For decades, the Soviets denied their guilt and insisted on the official version of events, announced in 1943, that the Nazis were responsible for the massacre. Only in 1990 did Mikhail Gorbachev admit that the executions had been ordered by the Politburo and performed by the Soviet secret police.

For Wajda, this project had a personal dimension. His father, Captain Jakub Wajda, was a victim of the Katyń massacre, killed in the NKVD prison in Kharkov. In the movie, Wajda concentrates on the stories of several Polish officers and their families. If we use Evan Smith's distinction between "thread structure" and "ensemble film," *Katyń* can serve as an example of the latter. The "main story, a single dramatic journey," shared by multiple characters, is the massacre in this case.²⁸ What is interesting here is the fact that male and female characters are given more or less equal screen time—indeed, women have a little more. While men are shown as innocent victims of the Katyń massacre, women are shown as victims of the so-called Katyń lie. For years, they were denied the truth about the deaths of their loved ones, and any attempt at revealing the truth ended with severe repercussions from the Polish communist government. At first glance, Wajda may seem even pro-feminist in a sense, since he concentrates, as one of my friends put it, on "daughters instead of sons" who had to carry the burden of the Katyń lie. But, as many critics claim, Wajda again referred to and utilized the old stereotypes to show their fate. "Deprived of subjectivity and subservient to the national cause,"²⁹ women had only one possibility left: to become Polish Mothers. Małgorzata Sadowska writes that *Katyń*

is not a movie about women of flesh and blood; mothers, wives, and sisters of murdered officers here are clearly romantic figures, suffering Grottgrian widows, guardians of national memory and Polish tradition.... But, fifty years earlier, Polish school filmmakers did have the courage to challenge national mythology. Meanwhile, today it seems unthinkable to see a movie like Kazimierz Kutz's *Krzyż Walecznych* (*Cross of Valor*, 1959), in which a woman widowed by

28 He defines the ensemble film as featuring "only one main story, a single dramatic journey" which is shared by multiple characters, whereas "thread structure" involves "several bona fide protagonists, each the hero in his or her own story" (90). Evan Smith, "Thread Structure: Rewriting the Hollywood Formula," *Journal of Film and Video* 51, nos. 3–4 (Fall/Winter 1999/2000): 88–96.

29 Mrozek, "Kino pamięci narodowej," 306.

a brave Captain runs away from the town where people want her to be preserved in mourning forever.³⁰

Another very emblematic example, made two years later, is *General Nil*. This movie is also based on historical facts, and takes place in the 1940s and early 1950s. It tells the tragic story of one of the most distinguished leaders of the Polish Home Army, August Emil Fieldorf—nom de guerre “Nil.” After the end of World War II, encouraged by the communist government’s declarations, the general decided to come out of hiding. Falsely accused of betrayal and terrorism in a show trial, he was sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out in February 1953, after the appeal to a higher court had failed and the family’s plea for a pardon had been denied.

In the movie, the way General Nil is portrayed depends on the sex of the people by whom he is surrounded and with whom he interacts in particular scenes. He is strong, determined, and dignified among men. Toward the youth, especially soldiers of the underground, he shows responsibility and care, acting as a father figure. He faces his fate with dignity and never loses his fortitude. However, shown among the members of his family (dominated by women, namely his wife, two daughters, and a granddaughter) he becomes silent and helpless. He lost a common language with both his wife and one of his daughters. The only person accompanying him in his small workshop, where he spends his days on carpentry, is his granddaughter Zosia, still a child who accepts him unconditionally and is merely grateful for his presence.

The typical manner of presenting female characters is emblematic in *General Nil*. Limited to the home and family realm, women are shown preparing food or doing trivial things (dancing, listening to music, or reading French journals for women). Although they belong to the intelligentsia and come from Vilnius, where they used to live before the war, and from where they brought books and paintings, we never see them reading or discussing the current situation. If they open their mouths, they accuse Nil of ignoring their marriage crisis (his wife), of being passive (his daughter), or of not wanting to live for them (all of them while visiting him in prison). Helpless, defenseless, lost, and naïve, they are emblematic of the conservative woman-as-child pattern. It surprises the viewer even more when one

30 Małgorzata Sadowska, “W niewoli romantycznych mitów,” *Przekrój*, no. 38 (2007): 61; quoted by Witold Mrozek, “Kino pamięci narodowej,” 306.

becomes familiar with the memories of Janina Fieldorf, the general's wife,³¹ or looks into the lives of the general's daughters, especially Maria Fieldorf-Czarska. This brave woman not only was engaged in resistance during the war as a Home Army Soldier and took part in the Warsaw Uprising as a nurse and courier, but also fought for years to clear her father's name and bring his murderers to justice.³² So, this movie, which was declared by its makers to be a testimony for historical truth, denies women their roles, concurrently showing them as helpless wailing creatures.

Another very interesting example of the cinema of national remembrance is *Black Thursday: Janek Wisniewski Fell*. The historical background for the movie was the protests in December 1970. Severe increases in food prices announced by the communist authorities triggered defiance and riots in many cities, especially in the north of Poland. On December 17, in Gdynia, people called back to work by the communist leaders were greeted with shots ordered by the same leaders' military forces. In Gdynia alone, about 18 people were killed and 233 wounded. Antoni Krauze, director of *Black Thursday*, intertwines historical reconstruction of the events with a reconstruction of a real-life story of one of the victims, the port worker Bruno Drywa and his family. This type of construction not only shows how history influences the lives of those people existing on its peripheries, but also enables the viewer to realize the enormity of the communist system. The movie forces viewers to acknowledge that the party, which called itself the Polish United Workers' Party, was actually directed *against* the workers.

Stefania Drywa is a housewife and a mother of three. In the movie, she is presented as a cheerful, obedient and passive creature. Confined to a limited space, she shows little interest with the outside world and politics. Like many people in those days, she dreams of having a small apartment in a block of flats, some furniture, and maybe, at some point in the future, a washing machine. Confronted with the unexpected and accidental death of her husband, she at first rejects the truth, is subsequently unable to push doctors in the hospital to explain it to her, and finally uses her brother-in-law to find out what really happened, since she is unable

31 "W pięćdziesięciolecie zamordowania Generała Emila Fieldorfa—'Nila,'" accessed September 1, 2012, <http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje34/text02p.htm>.

32 The Deputy Director of Justice at the General Prosecutors Office, Alicja Graff, the Prosecuting Attorney, Wiktor Gattner, and the Interrogator, Kazimierz Gorski.

to do this herself. Like many other female protagonists in the cinema of national remembrance, Stefania appears most fond of peeling potatoes.

There are two very emblematic scenes in *Black Thursday* which are highly illustrative of the perception of women in Polish culture. In one of them, we can see a line in a butcher shop. Women standing there become very nervous after hearing the new prices for meat. One of them says: "Not only is it all so expensive, but also there is nothing to buy." Another joins her complaint and adds: "If our husbands don't do anything about that, I won't let mine in our bed." The first one agrees and says: "Me neither! He can do whatever he wants!" Here, again, the typical patriarchal pattern emerges. Feeling no real power to express their discontent openly, women want their husbands to express it for them, and they blackmail men with deprivation of sex.

Another very powerful scene takes place at the end of *Black Thursday*. After the burial of her husband, performed secretly and unexpectedly by the secret police, Stefania sinks into stupor. She stays in bed motionless, staring at the ceiling. She is brought to life by a doctor who uses shock therapy and threatens her with taking her children away. Hearing the threat, Stefania starts breathing very loudly, focuses her gaze and recovers the ability of speech. The first words she says are the names of her children. The reconstructed cause-and-effect chain for this sequence can be read as follows: the humiliating funeral of her husband (Bruno Drywa was put in the coffin barefoot and only in his pajamas; there was no traditional ceremony or prayers and the priest was probably fake) caused Stefania to lose her humanity and retreat to an almost animalistic state. Only the perspective of losing not just her husband, but also her children, makes her regain her human traits.

A few films that can be included in the cinema of national remembrance attempt to overcome the aforementioned persistent thought patterns, rooted in the Polish tradition. It is appropriate at this point to mention *Rose*,³³ *In Darkness*, and *Aftermath*. What is interesting is that the characters in these movies are either representatives of a minority, formerly inhabiting the territory of present-day Poland (Mazurians in case of

33 I analyse the subversive aspects of *Rose* (and *Joanna* [2010, directed by Feliks Falk]) in the following chapter: Elżbieta Durys, "Joanna i Róża—subwersywny wymiar macierzyństwa a filmy pamięci narodowej," in *Konteksty feministyczne: Gender w życiu społecznym i kulturze*, ed. Patrycja Chudzik-Dudzik and Elżbieta Durys (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2014), 235–52.

Rose, and Jews in *In Darkness*), or their experiences constitute the point of reference for the events presented (as in *Aftermath*). The last one of these, a movie directed by Władysław Pasikowski, invoked the topic of murders committed by the Poles during World War II, provoking incredibly stormy discussions and debates in the Polish media. Moreover, it led to the polarization of viewers and critics; right-wing circles considered the movie staunchly anti-Polish, while left-wing circles saw it as significant for the further proper functioning of the Poles, forcing them to face a hurtful historic truth and hence to debunk persistent romantic myths.³⁴

Higson introduced and problematized the previously obvious concept of national cinema. He also pointed out its weaknesses, since the essence of national cinema is hegemonic. Presenting specific events and characters as important for the community, he determined the appropriate way of perceiving history that results in expunging or passing over events or characters which either do not fit into the specified frames, or worse, do not suit or undermine them. Therefore, it also leads to a standardization that, according to Higson, does not convey the essence of contemporary societies, as diversity constitutes a more adequate category for describing them. It results from a specific, frequently unquestioningly adopted concept of nation. This concept is based on an ethnic, not civil understanding and leads to the construction of what was described by Benedict Anderson as "imagined communities."³⁵ All of those accusations apply also to the cinema of national remembrance. It promotes a staunchly traditional, nineteenth-century vision of nation understood in the ethnic (and not civil) sense. Additionally, it connects this vision with Catholicism, leading to a strengthening of the concept of Pole-Catholic. The patriarchal vision of gender relationships, very often simply indicating the polarization of sexes, causes the symbolic exclusion of women from the public space, depriving them of subjectivity and leaving the role they played in the history of the country unspoken.

34 Polemics and discussions that broke out after the premiere of *Aftermath* are critically reported on by Piotr Forecki. See Piotr Forecki, "Pokłosie, poGrossie i kibice polskości," *Studia Litteraria et Historica* no. 2 (2013): 211–35, doi:10.11649/slh.2013.009.

35 Andrew Higson, *The Limiting Imagination of National Cinema*, in *Cinema and Nation*, ed. Mette Hjort and Scott Mackenzie (London: Routledge, 2005), 59–68.

CHAPTER 13

Poland's Media: Learning from the Past and Fitting a New Mold

JANE LEFTWICH CURRY

The transformation of the media in Poland was one of the critical topics at the 1989 Round Table talks. Indeed, ending censorship and government control over information was the topic of one entire subtable. Ultimately, the changes in both the nature of the media and the world of journalism, as well as in journalists' political roles, have gone far beyond the legal changes called for in the Accords and proved to be much more complex than simply creating a "free" (commercial) media

After the victory of the Law and Justice Party in 2015, the freedoms the media got after the Roundtables have been dramatically cut back. With the passage of new legislation governing the media, the Law and Justice Party has scored at best a pyrrhic victory and controls the key media. Within a year of the election, the Law and Justice government transformed the public media model for radio and television back into channels which, even more openly than in the last decades of communism, parrot the rulers' lines. For print journalism and private radio and television channels, the pressures have been different but no less restrictive. All of this has further weakened the opposition's ability even to get its word out to the public.

In the quarter of a century since the Round Table Accords were signed in 1989, the media grew both in number and diversity. Journalists came to see themselves as professionals who reported on politics as independent actors, not advocates for any one political grouping. As noted by some experts, postcommunist Poland's media system initially followed a West

European model, comparable to the Spanish and Italian media,¹ but one in which few media either took strident political lines themselves or parroted the government line. As a result, readers and viewers shifted from largely “reading between the lines” (as they had in the communist era) to assuming that individual media had their own political lines but were not controlled by the rulers.

Soon after the victories of the rightist Law and Justice Party (PiS) in both the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2015, the parliamentary majority passed a new broadcast law giving the government, through the Minister of Treasury, greater control of the public broadcast media so that it would reflect “Polish patriotism” and other government positions.² The Polish Radio and Television Board lost its powers and resigned with the passage of the law, and the media community was split as it had not been before. After all, even at the end of the communist era when there were “journalists” from the old communist media, writers and producers of the “underground” opposition media, and newcomers anxious to break in and make profits, all agreed that media freedom was an imperative part of the democratic transition. At that time, the conflict related to how that freedom was defined by the media’s producers and its users. Now, the conflict has been politicized, and the voices of journalists and others who do not support the government have been significantly circumscribed. As a result, the media that is readily available to the average reader offers fewer and fewer views of groups that do not follow the Law and Justice line.

The Media’s Initial Transformation

In no country in the postcommunist world was changing the media simple. Ironically, it was more complicated in Poland because Poles had long experienced, as a result of their government’s weakness, a more diverse media than elsewhere in the communist world. This meant

1 Gunnar Nygren and Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, *Journalism in Change: Journalistic Culture in Poland, Russia, and Sweden* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2015), 49.

2 “Polish President Signs a Bill Putting State Media under Government Control,” *The Guardian*, 7 January 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/07/poland-president-signs-bill-putting-state-media-under-government-control> [last accessed on 17 April 2017].

that there were higher expectations to be met and more pieces to put together. Journalists who had worked in the legal media during the communist period had to learn to tell the story directly rather than “hiding” critical information and analyses “between the lines” of complicated writing.³ Journalists who had worked in the prolific underground press in the final decade and a half of communist control had to learn how to focus on the direct news rather than producing essays and opinion. Those who came in to the profession either from having lived and worked in the West or, when the transition happened, were too young to remember communism, learned their craft “on the job” in the new press and broadcast media—both of which were pressed to make money because they were commercial rather than propaganda instruments. At the same time, all media enterprises and their producers immediately had to compete for readers and funding just to survive. Readers, too, learned to make different assumptions about what they read: what had been forbidden suddenly became the stuff of everyday. Their responses were critical in deciding which media survived and which were lost.

To be sure, the initial core of the postcommunist profession was still the men and women from the old journalism and underground press establishments, who brought with them experiences very different from those of the average Western journalist. Readers, at first, wanted what they had not had: to hear and see bad things reported about their system as well as the good. Both new and old media entrants had to work to get readers and make enough money to survive. To do this, each tried to draw readers or viewers by doing, in some way, what had not been done before, often pushing the boundaries of what was acceptable. Old-style veiled political critiques gave way to out-and-out attacks, even as journalists objected to both political pressure and new commercial pressures. The Church media expanded and fragmented as well, reflecting both the new power of the Catholic Church and the emerging divisions within it. Western media, once a treasure to be passed around secretly or viewed when abroad, joined in the competition for market share. State radio and television no longer had a monopoly on broadcasting.

3 Nygren and Dobek-Ostrowska, *Journalism in Change*, 194.

While these changes appealed to what readers thought they wanted, the new negativity often made the system look worse than it was. Politicians objected to being criticized by the media and attempted to ingratiate themselves or put pressure on editors and journalists. The entrepreneurs who had gone into publishing and broadcasting to make money were not happy when they or their products were criticized, or when they took unpopular stands and lost their audience. Readers shifted from one journal or program to the other, often deserting the old media that had been “good” or politically correct in the communist era, while they looked for “excitement” in new media they used. And, at least in the early years, they were drawn to what had once been too scandalous, critical or “off-beat” to pass through even the most liberal censorship. In the process, the “footprints” and customs of the communist era influenced the assumptions readers and journalists took to the media market. But, a quarter of a century later, those “footprints” are, at best, mere shadows.

All this was played out as the media (and the entire economy) were privatized. This encouraged the growth of the media; but, given the economic crisis that resulted after the Balcerowicz Plan was put into effect, it also contracted the media market. People simply could not afford buying newspapers when the cost of basic food had risen dramatically. As such, much of the media’s long-term growth was delayed and then dependent on outside money.

Once the economy stabilized by the mid to late nineties, a new media had appeared: the Internet and social media. By the end of the century, print and even broadcast media had begun to shift to a dual presentation of standard media and new Internet sites. This required of journalists a multi-tasking to which they were not accustomed, and threatened some of the less-entrenched print media. Simultaneously, the organizational leadership of the journalistic profession weakened. The national journalists’ organization, the Association of Polish Journalists (SDP), grew weak. The division between the SDP, which had fought behind the scenes for journalistic independence since the mid-fifties, and the Association of Polish Journalists of the Polish People’s Republic (SDPRL), which had been created after martial law was imposed in 1981, remained. Neither organization played the kind of leadership role the SDP had played in the communist period. This left professional journalists relatively powerless once the Law and Justice government took over in 2015 and took actions to control the media.

The Communist-era Media Base

Poland, in the communist era, had three different kinds of media, namely state media, Catholic media, and the prolific “underground” samizdat media. The “state” media ranged from dailies and weeklies to radio and television. Some were targeted at broad audiences, while others aimed at specific audience segments, incorporating everything from individual professional groups to special interest groups. There were also so-called thick journals, which often were intellectual publications with little real audience draw; as such, their production cost far more than they earned from subscriptions. None of the media considered profits and the number of users of any importance. What mattered was that they had a role that would serve the communist state or, at least, some part of its political structure. Until the end of the eighties, all of the legal publications and programs were monitored and censored before they were published or, in the case of live television and radio broadcasts, while they were being broadcast. Moreover, their budgets and allocations of everything from airtime and printing to staff salaries were determined by the state, under guidance from the Press and Ideology Departments of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). Relative freedom and support were not immutable: they depended on the politics of the time and the relations between editors and the authorities.

The transition out of communism meant, for most established media, a need to become self-supporting and compete for their share of an audience that was suddenly able to select from both Western and new Polish programs and periodicals, none of which had the baggage of having been part of or “under” the old regime. To compensate, many sought to change enough that their old images would be just that, old, or to find other ways of making money. For instance, *Trybuna Ludu*, the PUWP’s national newspaper, which had once been required reading for all Party members and those who wanted to make sure they were following “the Party line,” found itself without a Party sponsor when the PUWP disbanded in 1990. It had access to very few of its old resources since virtually all of the Party’s assets had been confiscated, leaving only a limited “inheritance” and a negative image that could not be erased. In its wake, *Trybuna* was formed as a left-wing paper out of what remained; nonetheless, it was never able to attract enough readers to continue. Other publications, less identified with the

ancien régime, were successfully able to transform themselves. Journalists across the Polish media landscape, from *Polityka* (the premier weekly in Eastern Europe) to some of the women's magazines, were able to "jazz up" their layout and printing while shifting to a much more open politics, and maintained or expanded their audience share, even with the competition from new publications. Some of their long-time staff members stayed, while others returned after leaving during Poland's martial law period. They did journalism they had not dreamed possible before. Others went on to start or staff other journals.

From the mid-fifties on, Catholic print media were also published, ranging from small Church publications to a daily published by PAX, a Catholic group that supported the communist party, and a number of weeklies and monthlies, all of which claimed to be "Catholic" but reflected different positions in and on the Church and the political system in Poland. All were dependent on the state for their access to paper and distribution channels, even if they were small publications issued by specific congregations. The state censors also censored them, although typically, censorship of religious journals was less strict than it was for other publications. As a result, some religious publications such as *Znak* and *Tygodnik Powszechny* were able to publish, in largely veiled ways, ideas and concerns that would not have been possible elsewhere. In the process, their circle of journalists and writers was key to the linkages that developed between the Church hierarchy and the dissident community.⁴

Finally, from the mid-seventies on, Poland had a burgeoning "underground" press that began, after the Radom and Ursus demonstrations in 1976, as a series of letters of protest to the government and a newsletter put out by a small group of intellectual activists, the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR). These were initially typed with multiple carbon copies and passed from hand to hand. But the KOR publications rapidly became NOWA, a whole media empire in itself, releasing books by banned Polish writers and translations of Western authors censored in Poland, regular journals and, in the eighties, a weekly, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*. In the process, the readership grew dramatically as "publication" shifted from typed carbon copies to silkscreen printing and then, in the eighties, to computerized printers. Although writing for and producing these publications

4 Adam Michnik, *The Church and the Left*, trans. David Ost (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991).

were never full time jobs, some who had been involved did cross over to the new, legal media in Poland. The most prominent case of this was the leadership of the largely female-staffed *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, which had published news of Solidarity almost weekly beginning in 1982. Some of the women shifted from their volunteer work as writers and producers of this "underground" weekly to positions on the staff of the daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Election Gazette). This publication was opened in response to Solidarity's demand that, in the run up to the election, it have its own journal to report from the "Solidarity side" during the Roundtables and prior to elections in 1989.⁵

Finally, while none of the non-state organizations had a foothold in radio and television, by the seventies, and for most of the eighties, Western broadcasts including Radio Free Europe had such credibility, both with the general population and the communist leadership, that a daily transcript of everything said on Radio Free Europe was circulated among the top elite (with lower level media officials sent less complete versions). These stations were also accessible to the Polish public as they were not jammed, nor were there real sanctions for listening to them. For the elites, these broadcasts were important not only as indicators of what the population heard and believed, but also of the policy of the United States and its allies.⁶ RFE and some other foreign stations would, in the initial years of the transition, set up offices in Poland and serve as training centers for the new generation of Polish journalists.⁷

The Poles' access to alternative information sources increased their alienation and lack of faith in what they were told by the elites. At the request of the Polish leadership, the Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) did a major survey in 1987 on what media Poles used for information and what sources they believed. The vast majority said they used state media as their main source of news (95% in 1987 identified television as their main source, and 72% the legal press, while 10% admitted to also using Western radio broadcasts, down from 46% in 1985, two years after

5 Peggy Simpson, "In Poland, Women Run the Largest Newspaper Organization," *Nieman Reports*, <http://niemanreports.org/articles/in-poland-women-run-the-largest-news-organization/> [last accessed July 30, 2016].

6 See Jane Curry, *Poland's Journalists: Professionalism and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

7 Walter Wisniewski in interview with Jane Curry, 1992.

the suspension of martial law).⁸ But only 13.7% said they believed what they read.⁹ A vast number of the respondents said that they used Western broadcasts or got information from "people they knew" in conjunction with Western sources.¹⁰ Another major source for 35% of those surveyed was, ironically, the government press spokesman, Jerzy Urban. He was a former journalist known for pushing the boundaries of the "acceptable," and would often break the censorship rules in his live press conferences with, for the first time, a mix of Polish and foreign journalists. By going well beyond what had been officially said before in what he discussed and said about government policy, he also demonstrated that the regime and its media were either disingenuous or ready to give in. In the end, as the government's public opinion agency, CBOS, put it:

The mass media do not play a positive role in informing the public. The lack of knowledge of important events, important for the society, is significant. And, at least partly, this is a result of the lack of faith in the official media, mainly in the way they work.... their emphasis on propaganda rather than factual and rapid information and commentary.¹¹

Given this alienation and disbelief, as well as the failing economy and international pressure, the regime had no choice but to openly engage the public and open the media to much more honest and full discussions. In doing so, they then had to move forward with change. So, by 1988, the leadership of Solidarity, then still illegal, and the intellectual opposition (many of whom were journalists), were sought out as partners in making change.

Journalists themselves played major roles in initiating the transformation process. When top communist leaders decided to seek contact and negotiations with leaders in the opposition, it was journalists and former editors who comprised one of the prime channels of communication. Because many in the profession had formed close ties that often overrode

8 Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, "Środki Masowego Przekazu (Zasięg, popularność, wiarygodność)," Report 240/15/87 (September 1987), 5.

9 Ibid., 17.

10 Ibid., 5.

11 Ibid., 19.

their political differences during the communist period, most sharply after the declaration of martial law in 1981, some prominent professionals were able to make contacts with their former colleagues and friends who were, in the post Solidarity period, "on the other side." People on both sides then moved, during and after the Solidarity period, into high-level political positions. The most prominent of these were the Deputy Prime Minister in the Jaruzelski regime, Mieczysław Rakowski, who had been the editor of the most respected journal in Poland, the weekly *Polityka*, and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first postcommunist Prime Minister who had been Lech Wałęsa's chief advisor in the eighties and editor of the Catholic intellectual weekly *Więź* for much of the communist period. Other leaders had been involved at other levels, either in the establishment press or in the underground press. Out of their contacts and those of other, less visible actors came the Polish Round Tables of 1989 where agreements on changes in the system, including its media system, were made that ultimately led to semi-free elections and the end of communist rule.

The Round Table Accords: Resetting the boundaries

The nature of the media and its rights in the new system were valued enough for there to be a "subtable" on the media in the negotiations themselves. This subtable spawned a set of laws establishing a free press in the weeks and months before and after the elections. The report of the subtable served as the basis for overriding key sections of the 1984 Press Law [that] were passed as parts of the Press Act in April 1990.¹² It ended government control of what print media could be published, through moving from "licensing" by the government to "registration," and called for a law ending censorship to be passed at the same time. This happened in the first session of parliament after the 1989 elections. Moreover, in the initial changes to the constitution, an amendment was put through ensuring full press freedoms.¹³

At the same time, a law was passed on "The Relationship Between the State and Catholic Church Act," ensuring that religious organizations

12 Michał Kaczmarczyk, *The Mass Media in Poland Between the Mission and the Market* (Sosnowiec: University of Ss Cyril and Methodius in Trnava, 2012), 50.

13 *Ibid.*, 51–52.

could have their own publications and that Catholic social mores would not be violated in the broadcast media.¹⁴ This, coupled with the revised Concordat between the Vatican and Poland, allowed Catholic media to function without any possibility for the government to monitor their funding, a privilege non-Catholic private stations do not have. An amendment to the broadcast law passed in 2001 under pressure from the right went further: it established a category of “social media,” nonprofit media focusing on programming that has “didactic, educational, and charity activities and is based [on] as well as respecting Christian values . . . and tends to reinforce the national identity.”¹⁵ As a result of this provision, the conservative Catholic television and radio station TRWAM and other Catholic stations were able to begin broadcasting.

The first postcommunist Prime Minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, moved beyond what had been imagined in the Round Tables. He appointed new officials to the Polish Radio and Television Commission, replacing the old communist-era officials with scholars and activists committed to a free media. New broadcast media simply appeared, even before a new law was passed, beginning with Radio Małopolska in Kraków and other self-declared private stations. The subsequent passage of the Broadcasting Act in 1992 formally opened up the broadcast media to private, as well as state or “public” ownership, and foreign ownership of radio and television stations.¹⁶ In the end, Polish Radio and Television remained state-owned, but lost their control of the market when commercial stations, with both domestic and foreign owners, were also permitted. According to the law on the state-owned media, it was to be “public,” not state media. This meant it had to present all sides to an issue. Private stations, on the other hand, were free to take sides.

Media Development: Startups, Transformations, and Deaths

The media landscape itself had begun to change even before the first semi-free election was held after the Round Table talks. As the preparations for the Round Tables between the government and Solidarity

14 Ibid., 52.

15 Janina Fras, “Catholic Media in Poland after 1989,” unpublished paper, 2011, 2.

16 Kaczmarczyk, *The Mass Media in Poland*, 90.

began, established journals lost interest in what the censors said, while the censors essentially stopped even minimal censoring. In addition, as part of the agreement for the Round Tables, Solidarity was granted its own broadcast time on state owned television and its own daily paper, *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Initially, it was a legal publication issued, with the support of the government but without the strictures of censorship. Within less than a decade, it would be the most popular paper in Poland and part of a multi-million dollar media conglomerate, Agora.

After the communists essentially handed over power, a plethora of new journals emerged. Some were funded by private interests, some by groups, and others by foreign media companies. Old, communist era journals also tried to transform themselves to fit in the newly competitive market. Polish versions of everything from *Men's Health* and *National Geographic* to *Playboy* and *Newsweek* appeared as well. At the same time, new radio and television stations opened with either domestic funding or, most often, as outgrowths of foreign broadcast companies. All of these new media competed for their market share both with new layouts and design, and with increasingly "new" kinds of coverage, approaches, and topics. The values they expressed were far more varied than Poles had seen in the public sphere before.

The initial practical difficulties for *Gazeta Wyborcza* illustrate some of the issues with which those entering the new media marketplace had to deal. They also highlight some of the reasons Poland's new parties, other than Solidarity, did not follow the European model and establish their own papers, instead relied on personal connections with editors and writers. Staffing and funding were basic problems for virtually all the entrants into the media field. *Gazeta Wyborcza* was one of the only new papers that had an established "staff" because it was the legal version of the underground weekly, *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, which had been produced and distributed since the imposition of martial law. Its staff had been small, accustomed primarily to producing reports on Solidarity's activities and government responses on their own hidden printing presses, based on their contacts and "street sources." To produce a "legal" paper, they needed to increase their staff size and assemble an editorial board, hiring staff members who knew how to lay out stories and distribute the paper effectively. They also needed an office and enough money to pay for the initial expenses of paper, printing, and salaries. Office space was in short supply in Warsaw, and the spaces the government offered were much too small, so the old

staff ultimately found its own "office" in a former kindergarten. There were no independent printers, as such; thus, the government gave them access to the printing house that published the communist party daily, *Trybuna Ludu*. This printing house used old fashioned printing presses which produced a lower quality product than the computers and printers smuggled in from the West for the more limited print runs of *Tygodnik Mazowski*.¹⁷

Gazeta Wyborcza had begun as a project permitted by the communist government in response to Solidarity's demand that, if it was to participate in the semi-free elections, it had to have its own journal. The initial financial support came from the film director Andrzej Wajda, as well as from the editor of émigré journal *Kultura*, based in Paris, and other Solidarity funds.¹⁸ Even with this funding, although it benefitted from being Solidarity's "designated publication" for the election, it still had to deal with the lack of its own financial base and the lack of journalists experienced in publishing a regular daily paper with wide distribution. These problems were solved both by subsidies from foreign NGOs and by the excitement many experienced journalists and editors felt about being part of the first independent paper. Its staff was a mix of journalists and editors who had worked in media during the communist era and writers such as its editor-in-chief, the long time dissident Adam Michnik, whose experience was in producing political articles to circulate in the underground. He was formally appointed by Lech Wałęsa, who was then head of its sponsor, Solidarity.

By the fall of 1990, political realities had intervened and, in response to *Gazeta Wyborcza*'s support for Tadeusz Mazowiecki over Lech Wałęsa when they competed in the early presidential elections, *Gazeta Wyborcza* became a pawn in internal Solidarity affairs. Following this declaration of support for Mazowiecki, Wałęsa, as head of Solidarity, ended its affiliation with Solidarity. At that point, *Gazeta Wyborcza* became an independent publication, eschewing all political ties even though its editor and a number of those around him maintained personal ties with Mazowiecki and others who had been dissidents and advisors to Solidarity.¹⁹ Financially, it was able to do this as it was already profitable: in less than a year,

17 John Tagliabue, "For Paper: Jungle (and Censors) Await," *New York Times*, April 26, 1989, <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/26/world/warsaw-journal-for-paper-jungle-and-censor-await.html> [last accessed August 25, 2015].

18 Kaczmarczyk, *The Mass Media in Poland*, 94.

19 Interview data.

its readership had increased from an initial 15,000 to nearly half a million a day; it had local editions in all the major cities in Poland that published copy from the national daily along with locally generated news; and the conglomerate, *Agora*, that had been built around *Gazeta Wyborcza*, grew to incorporate an increasing number of other publications and media.²⁰

In the initial years after 1989, other, less political, print media startups appeared regularly. Those that were based on domestic funding were often short-lived, because the startup costs were difficult to recoup when a journal introduced itself simultaneously to both potential readers and the advertising market. To save money, publishers and editors often relied on freelancers for copy and photographs, while introducing scandal and horror stories to “catch” readers. This yellow journalism drew readers initially, but most of those media did not develop the credibility and trust necessary to keep them. This weakened the ability of politicians and the new political system on which they reported to get public trust. After all, their readers were not used to negative reporting on political leaders. They had been schooled in the communist era to believe that, if someone or something was attacked in the press, whatever he or she did was certainly much worse than even the negative reports. And, in the end, given that their staffs were stretched and little if anything was spent on correspondents, wire services, or fact checking, few developed credibility or a loyal following.

One of the ironic exceptions to this fate was the journal, *Nie*, published and edited by former press spokesman and journalist, Jerzy Urban. It has offered a combination of pornography, scandal, and challenges to Poland's traditional institutions such as the Church, both in what it publishes and in the activities it sponsors. In spite of this (and a number of court cases over charges of libel and pornography, all of which it has won), *Nie* has been a profitable enterprise because its editor has so clearly challenged the establishment with reports that would normally not be part of the mainstream political conversation. It has not, however, spawned other comparable media. Instead, it remains very much the organ of its editor, once the most censored journalist in Poland and one of the most respected before he joined the martial law government as its spokesperson. Politically, its charges and reports have had little effect.

20 Interview data.

Former communist-era journals had a readership base going into the transition, but few managed to maintain it. For some special interest and art journals, this base was not large enough to keep the journal going without continuing large state subsidies. These totally dried up as the government privatized what it had and was pushed to provide more social support at a time when its budget was shrinking. The PUWP daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, and most of the dailies associated with its satellite parties, both local and national, disappeared. This was a result of their own loss of readership and sponsorship, as well as the appearance of new, more attractive journals.

Foreign interests both invested in and created Polish versions of their journals. Some publishers, such as Axel Springer, bought existing Polish journals. Western publications including *National Geographic* and, initially, some of the special interest journals such as *Cosmopolitan*, *Playboy*, and *Men's Health*, began by translating what had been published in English or French into Polish. Others attempted to create publications that would bear the same name as respected Western journals, such as *Newsweek*. To do this, their foreign owners hired local editors who spent months retraining their staff writers to Western norms, then having them produce "dummy" editions assessed by external reviewers who were familiar with both Western standards and the situation in Poland.²¹ These publications were initially impacted, in their design, by Western training; later, as they became more embedded in the market, they had to adapt to the expectations of Polish readers, who read with the assumption of an inherent bias in what they read, and also their Western publishers' focus on profit over journalistic standards. As a result, they evolved into Polish publications with Western names. They, coupled with the traditions of journals such as *Polityka*, provided the initial models for independent journals like the weekly *Wprost*. These models allowed for, and even assumed, a variety of different political stances.

Some established Polish media and other "startups" also benefited from external ownership. Many were incorporated into various Western media conglomerates. This, initially, gave them resources to become more competitive and also put pressure on them, in most cases, to avoid getting dragged into partisan battles, as that could decrease their readership and

21 Interview data.

result in accusations of foreign interference. About half of Poland's top periodicals are in conglomerates which often include various types of media from a variety of countries.²²

There have always been visible Catholic media in Poland. This is a reflection not only of Poles' strong Catholicism, but also of the political power of the Church even during the communist period, magnified as it was by the election of the Archbishop of Kraków, Karol Wojtyła, as Pope in 1978. As a result, the Church took the position that it was owed a primary place in Polish politics and media because it had offered the most prolonged opposition to communist rule. In the communist period, the most prominent and powerful of these were the intellectual weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny* and the monthly *Znak*. In the postcommunist period, these two continue alongside not only small-scale local diocesan journals and largely intellectual periodicals, but also newspapers and periodicals aimed at various segments of the population and published by "Catholic" groups of very different ideological positions.

In addition, there are now 43 religious radio stations that are run by different regional groups, 24 of which are united in an umbrella group, PLUS, under the Polish episcopate. Others have maintained their independence. One Polish media specialist characterized them as adhering to the "four Cs": "Catholic, commercial, competitive, and also competent."²³ In fact, many of these stations are both comparable to, and competitive with, well-funded state-owned and private channels. Moreover, most also bear similarities to non-religious broadcasters in their listenership, general programming, and advertising income. Six of the PLUS stations elected to renew their licenses as "social broadcasters" after beginning as religious stations.

Perhaps the station with the most influence on its listeners, and the most open political role, is Radio Maryja. This station, an earlier radio station, TRM, and the Higher School of Social and Media Culture were all founded by the Redemptorist priest, Tadeusz Rydzyk, at the end of 1991. Radio Maryja initially broadcast to the area around Toruń. It then expanded to national broadcasts in 1994. An ostensibly religious broadcaster, its programming combines religion with radical right-wing politics. The station regularly broadcasts various Catholic liturgical ceremonies, as

22 Kaczmarczyk, *The Mass Media in Poland*, 95.

23 Fras, "Catholic Media," 2.

well as attacks on Poland's materialist culture, anti-Semitic statements,²⁴ and support for right-wing Polish parties including PiS (Law and Justice), Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families), and the late Andrzej Lepper's Samoobrona (Self-Defense Party). Beyond this, the radio station has led activities such as pilgrimages and running local clubs. Many listeners, particularly those outside the major cities, are engaged regularly in small Radio Maryja groups in parishes across the country. The foundations funded by Radio Maryja listeners also produce a number of newspapers, as well as constructing an Institute of National Education, a Higher School of Social and Media Culture, and a television station (TWT). Listeners are also encouraged to join the organization's pilgrimages to the Polish religious shrine of Częstochowa. Rydzyk's own program, "Unfinished Lectures," is a core element of the station's drive to connect religion and culture.

Its support is predominantly concentrated among the elderly, rural, and less educated population, although it also has a strong foothold in urban areas. Naturally, most of its listeners, as well as those involved in its other activities, are devout Catholics. Rydzyk and Radio Maryja supported the right-wing Liga Polskich Rodzin until its electoral demise in 2007, when its support shifted to the equally right-wing PiS. Rydzyk and the station have been widely criticized, both at home and abroad, for their anti-Semitism and nationalist rhetoric. While these topics are fertile ground for the right in Poland, it is also clear that Rydzyk's charismatic presentations, as well as the broader engagement of his audience, have made the station a powerful media force in right-wing politics.

Although the state Radio and Television Board has not taken any action against Radio Maryja, top Catholic officials, including Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, as Secretary General of the Episcopate, attacked the station for its politics in 2007. There is, however, little that the state could do about the station even if it wanted to. Radio Maryja and the organization around it are well funded by members of its "Family" (Rodzina) and conservative actors abroad. Moreover, a law passed in 1991 to ensure that the state could not step in and control Church broadcasts, exempts Church-based stations from public supervision. Indeed, a case was taken to the Toruń court against Radio Maryja for illegally raising funds for its

24 See, for instance, "Radio Maryja: 25 Years of Anti-Semitism," Anti-Defamation League, January 26, 2017, <https://www.adl.org/blog/radio-maryja-25-years-of-anti-semitism> [last accessed on 17 April 2017].

television station in 2007, and the court subsequently found Radio Maryja liable to pay a fine of 3500 złotych; however, the station simply refused to pay the fine, and no further action was taken.

When PiS was in power for the first time, from 2005 to 2007, the Kaczyński brothers gave credence and support to Radio Maryja, allowing its reporters access to public events and even speaking on the station.²⁵ Then, in 2010, shortly before the end of his presidency, Lech Kaczyński died in a plane crash in Smolensk, Russia along with 95 other dignitaries, including the former President of Poland in exile Ryszard Kaczorowski, the chief of the Polish General Staff, other senior military officers, various bishops, and eighteen members of parliament. Without his support, Radio Maryja then lost its national government support when the more liberal Bronisław Komorowski won the election to replace Kaczyński later in 2010.

Nevertheless, Radio Maryja and Fr. Rydzyk continued to establish a media "empire" with control of local officials as well as its own television channel, a school and numerous businesses. Its Rodzina Radio Maryja (Radio Maryja Family) has provided a social base for the station, with weekly meetings and activities for the over 200,000 people who belong to it.²⁶

In 2015, when PiS returned to power after winning both the presidency and the dominant position in parliament, it did not need Radio Maryja as much as it had earlier. But, the station nevertheless benefited, because its rhetoric parallels that of the dominant party. It has also benefited from the fact that the Church leadership has strengthened its commitment to ensure that Catholic social values are promoted and protected. As a result, the commercial Catholic radio station appealing to youth, Radio Plus, was allowed to die out, replaced with more right wing Catholic discourses.

Journalists and Media Politics: New Values and Relations

While significant changes have occurred in the Polish media landscape, there were few dramatic and visible changes in either its producers or their professional approach to politics until the PiS secured its dual electoral victory in 2015. By that point, the Association of Polish Journalists

25 Fras, "Catholic Media," 2.

26 Fr. Kazimierz Sowa in interview with Jane Curry, 2016.

(SDP), founded to aid journalists in the communist era, had been taken over by PiS supporters in the profession. As a result, once PiS moved to control the media, there was no existing journalists' institution to speak for a free press. This, coupled with the speed and manner in which media changes were made, has weakened the ability of professionals to protect their interests.

In the communist era, top journalists and editors often held political positions or took political stances, whether they belonged to the establishment media or were in the underground opposition media. But many, especially those in the most respected media, saw themselves as a "loyal opposition party," in the British sense of questioning and pressing the political regime to revise or change policy.²⁷ While they reluctantly accepted communist-era censorship, they also used it: the censors produced a journal for the political elite that was made up of articles that were seen as too critical to be published but too important and telling not to be seen by the elite.²⁸

In the communist period, journalism developed into a closely knit occupation with the SDP as its professional organization that provided journalists with healthcare, various travel and other benefits, along with opportunities to gather and hear presentations which were more open than those at public fora. In addition, the requirements of the professional association ensured that journalists had secure jobs, unless they were sanctioned for what they wrote, and that there were few, if any, freelancers.²⁹ This, in the communist period, meant that professional work was stable.

That began to change even before political transition began. When martial law was declared in 1981, many journalists who had sided with Solidarity were interned or quit their jobs in protest. In addition, journalists and editors who stayed were subject to "verification" by the authorities, and many were removed from their positions because of their apparent opposition to martial law.³⁰ In addition, the SDP was closed down and its building and position were taken over by a far less independent group of journalists, the Association of Polish Journalists of

27 See Curry, *Polish Journalists*, passim.

28 Jane L. Curry, "Secret Bulletins," working paper (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1980).

29 See Curry, *Polish Journalists*, passim.

30 Jane L. Curry, "Poland's Press: After the crackdown," *Columbia Journalism Review* (September–October 1984).

the Polish People's Republic (SDPRL). So, when the initial Round Table Negotiations began in late 1988, the journalists who negotiated did not come from the formerly well-established professional association, but were appointed as individuals with ties to Solidarity and reputations as independent professionals.

In the midst of the transitions, the two professional associations fought a legal battle over ownership of the building that had been allocated to the SDP and then handed over in 1991 to the SDPRL, along with ownership of the library and other resources that the SDP had accumulated. This meant there was no commonly recognized group to take the lead in protecting journalists' interests as new media opened and owners sought to save money by hiring freelancers. Even a quarter of a century later, there was no real professional association for journalists. The two organizations still exist, but neither played a significant role in advocating for journalists or serving as a force for professional interests and ethics. Moreover, few journalists (a 2012 survey suggests a mere 30%)³¹ belong to any professional organization, including the Catholic Journalists Association.³²

In the initial post-transition period, this left those who worked in the media extremely vulnerable to external pressures. In the early post-communist era, not only was the media market extremely unstable, with media constantly at risk of going under, but the burgeoning media turned to freelancers, hired and paid often on a piecemeal basis, who were even more vulnerable and isolated. Most were young and had no education in journalism, and most of their positions were ephemeral. As such, no sense of professional commitment developed among journalists.

As the media market contracted and settled, so too did the profession. The early experiences of the transition, and the experience of communist rule, left their "stamp" on perceptions of the profession, its role, and its relationship to politics. It was not, however, a stamp of subservience. Rather, it was a stamp of resentment of either commercial or political interference, and a commitment to well researched and verified stories that would prevent journalists and their media from being sued or harassed.

31 Nygren and Dobek-Ostrowska, *Journalism in Change*, 261.

32 Interviews by the author, 2015.

Yet, Polish journalists in a 2012 survey claimed to be as committed to “telling the truth regardless of the consequences” as Swedish journalists.³³ They appear as committed to being “neutral reporters” as to playing the “social activist” roles of representing all groups in society, raising new ideas, and, more than either Russian or Swedish journalists, “motivating people to act.”³⁴ At the same time, 86.8% said they had no desire to become “politicians,”³⁵ a positive career track for journalists in the communist period. Moreover, although they are less proud of being journalists than their Swedish counterparts in the 2010 study, 67% expressed pride in belonging to the profession.³⁶

The outcome of the conflicting pressures on the profession of journalism over the last seventy years, covering Poland’s political shift from communism to democracy (and the transition between the two), has resulted in a media landscape heavily influenced by the West European tradition, but nevertheless maintaining specifically Polish characteristics. The media landscape is composed of four distinct currents: firstly, sets of journals tied to specific political orientations; secondly, publications aimed at a broad spectrum of special interest groups; thirdly, dominant state-owned broadcast media; and finally, the American tradition of a less politicized commercial press.³⁷

This does not mean that editors and journalists did not, and do not today, have political ties or see political scandals as valuable stories. Indeed, the opposite is true, as the cases of two of Poland’s major political scandals demonstrate. In the “Rywin affair” in 2002, long-time *Gazeta Wyborcza* editor Adam Michnik was asked to pay a bribe by film producer Lew Rywin, who was tied to the top leaders of the communist legacy party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). The bribe was to prevent a proposed media law that would have made it illegal for a newspaper and broadcast station to be co-owned, as was the case with *Gazeta’s* Agora foundation. Months later, after much public discussion, Michnik pub-

33 Nygren and Dobek-Ostrowska, *Journalism in Change*, 170.

34 Ibid., 169.

35 Ibid., 157.

36 Ibid., 152.

37 Fred Siebert, Fred Thompson, and Wilber Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press: The authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility and Soviet communist concepts of what the press should be and do* (Urbana-Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1963), chapter 2.

lished a partial transcript of the conversation that triggered a parliamentary hearing. Although the Sejm commission was divided, the hearing did increase the visibility of, and support for, right-wing politicians. Moreover, it also was seen by some as exposing the fact that Michnik, an editor and former leading dissident, was part of the same wealthy social circles as the top politicians in the SLD. This, many commentators have claimed, increased the cynicism of Poles about their politicians and top journalists by exposing their wealth, their social connections, and their lack of commitment to the ideology they espoused. In the second case in 2014, the weekly *Wprost* published illegally taped conversations between top politicians in expensive restaurants. When the government security forces went to the journal's office, demanding the tapes and their source, the editors initially refused to give them up. Accusations were made on both sides, and the source and validity of the tapes was never established. Ultimately, these tapes sullied the image of the leading politicians in the ruling party, Civic Platform, harming its public reputation sufficiently that, even when the Ministers involved were fired a year later, the party could not reclaim its prestige and maintain its majority in the parliament. The party's nomination for President, Bronisław Komorowski, also failed to secure a second term in spite of his early popularity.

The Law and Justice party's victory in October 2015 was followed by moves to control the courts and the media, as well as sharp attacks on the Civic Platform and politicians not in its grouping as "agents" and "corrupt." Prior to this, however, it appeared that the role of the media in politics in Poland had become akin to that of Western European countries. Journalists valued the separation between government and the media—and resented the instances on state radio and television when the government stepped in. Essentially, the Polish journalistic traditions of aiming to be a "loyal opposition party," alongside the negative experiences during the economic transitions, provided the background for media that reported the "news" in a much less ideological sense than today, while guarding against what they viewed as external interference. Furthermore, the quarter century since the communists had turned over power seemed to have taught both readers and politicians to see reporting in the media not as inherently biased and untrustworthy, but as a legitimate source of information about what is happening in the world, their country, and their local area.

Unsure Conclusions in an Unsure Time

The situation for the media in Poland disintegrated in the months after the Law and Justice party won the presidency and captured a strong majority in the parliament. During the election, the party did not directly attack the independence of the media and other public institutions in Poland. However, in the early months of its “reign,” not only did it attack the Constitutional Court, but it also passed a law which ended Polish Radio and Television’s “public” status and established direct governmental control over its board.

From the initial days after the law was passed, there have been dramatic changes in the national, noncommercial radio and television. Even before it was signed into law, the five top editors of the Polish Radio and Television’s major national station resigned. Professional organizations turned on each other. The SDP had been essentially taken over by journalists and political activists loyal to Law and Justice so it supported the legislation as a way to rid the media of what it claimed was the “one sided control of Civic Platform” that had prevented “pluralism” and, further, led to “manipulation and an improper picture of Poland.”³⁸ While liberal papers such as *Gazeta Wyborcza* took strong stands against the law, some of the journals identified with the right published lists of journalists who were too “Civic Platform”-oriented and should be barred from the journalistic profession.³⁹

This law has resulted in the firing of all the major presenters on Polish Radio and Television, including all of the non-Polish journalists who had worked on its broadcasts abroad.⁴⁰ The resulting programming has been dominated by supporters of Law and Justice and its political stances, affecting coverage at all levels. Perhaps the most visible example was the reporting of President Barack Obama’s remarks after his meeting with Polish President Duda during a NATO summit in Poland, where he said that “More work needs to be done [in building Polish democracy]. As your

38 Interviews Board members of SDP, July, 2016.

39 “Dyrektorzy z TVP odeszli przed przyjeściem Jacka Kurskiego. ‘Brutalne ataki,’” January 4, 2016, <http://www.wirtualnemedi.pl/arttykul/dyrektorzy-z-tvp-odeszli-przed-przyjsciem-jacka-kurskiego-brutalne-ataki> [last accessed on 17 April 2017].

40 The Board for PRTV. The author was present when the dismissals were announced.

friend and ally, we've urged all parties to work together to sustain Poland's democratic institutions." Then, in translating and dubbing over another section of his remarks, that "Poland stands and needs to continue to stand as an example of democratic practices for the world," the government station reported that he had said that "Poland is and will be an example of democracy for the world."⁴¹

In response, a group of liberal journalists has been established, the Society of Polish Journalists (Towarzystwo). It has not been given legal status but attempts to push back on the government's moves. Nevertheless, the profession remains both divided and also impacted by an increasingly poor economic base.

While commercial television, radio stations, and the print media have not been "taken over," many feel their positions and ability to be independent voices have been threatened. All, of course, have been challenged by the rise of Internet use, resulting in fewer people buying newspapers or relying on radio and television for information. At the same time, ownership of radio stations and Internet portals is now dominated by foreign firms that also have a significant presence in the television market as well.⁴² This decreases their financial bases in terms of both subscriptions and advertising and it also increases the pressure on individual entities not to challenge the system and risk financial losses.

Government financial entities, known as *spółek*, have bought large amounts of stock in private stations and print media and used their power to control them. Government entities were also instructed in the late summer, 2016, not to advertise or subscribe to journals like *Gazeta Wyborcza* that did not toe the government's line. On a more informal basis, there are increasing numbers of print media retailers that put pro-Law-and-Justice and religious publications on the newsstand, while selling once leading journals like *Gazeta Wyborcza* from behind the counter, so that readers cannot easily see what their lead stories and offerings are. Moreover, the regime has taken to attacking individual journalists and public speakers as foreign "agents." All of these factors have led to a dra-

41 Michael Birnbaum, "Obama Slammed Polish Democracy on Friday. Here's How Polish Television Proved Him Right," *Washington Post*, July 17, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/09/obama-slammed-polish-democracy-on-friday-heres-how-polish-tv-proved-him-right/> [last accessed July 18, 2016].

42 Data from the Związek Kontroli Dystrubucji Prasy, Wirtualnemedial.pl, 2015.

matic drop (21%) in the sales of *Gazeta Wyborcza* and other periodicals that do not take the government's line. This has left them unable to spend money on regional staff and correspondents.⁴³

All of this helps explain the high levels of support Law and Justice holds as of August 2016. The financial risks of its policies, such as monthly allowances of 500 złotych for any children after the first child in a Polish family, or promises of apartments for all young people, are simply presented by the regime as made up by its opponents and "agents." Readers and viewers of the local press, which is even weaker than the national press, hear and see very little about the protests and demonstrations that regularly occur. The Polish case serves to demonstrate that media freedoms are not set in stone, but remain fragile.

43 <http://www.wirtualnemedial.pl/artykul/sprzedaz-gazet-codziennych-luty-2017-gazeta-wyborcza-najwiekszy-spadek> [last accessed on 17 April 2017].

CHAPTER 14

Past and Present in the Struggle for Polish Democracy: A Postscript

SABRINA P. RAMET¹

In most societies of any size, in most historical eras, values have been in contention. Sometimes—as in the case of Germany in the 1930s or in the case of ISIS/ISIL today—the struggle has pitted a brutally intolerant party seeking to build a society founded on a forced unanimity of values against those standing in the way of the realization of the intolerant party's dystopic dream. More usually, as in the case of Poles in the nineteenth century, in the interwar republic (1918–1939), and again since 1989, advocates of secular values such as tolerance and the principle of equality have found themselves pitted against advocates of conservative religious values, who typically narrow the range of behaviors they are prepared to accept as “normal.”

Nations, Narratives, and Mythologized Figures

Józef Chałasiński has defined the *nation* as “a community of values.” He adds, however, that modern society is founded not only on the nation, but also on classes and class structure.² The reference to class is already a con-

1 I am grateful to Maciej Potz for correcting several errors on a previous draft of this chapter, to Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak for her comments on that same draft as well as for correcting a small typographical error which I had not noticed, and to Michał Słowikowski for checking the revised draft.

2 Józef Chałasiński, *Kultura i Naród: Studia i szkice* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1968), as summarized in Feliks Gross, “The State, the Nation, and the Party in Poland,” *Slavic Review* 32, no. 1 (March 1973): 136–37.

cession to the fact that class difference involves different perspectives on values, not to mention conflicting interests; the existence of class differences also opens the way for one or another regime to court the working class; for example, for support for its value agenda, by making certain strategic policy concessions. In June 2016, for example—while tens of thousands of Poles were marching in protest against the regime's efforts to strangle the media and take control of the Constitutional Court, subordinating it to the executive—Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced that the government was launching a program to provide affordable rental housing for all Poles.³ But returning to Chałasiński, how should we interpret his claim that a nation is a community of values, given that we see rival values being advanced in Poland and, for that matter, also in the USA, Russia, Germany, Britain, Austria, and, farther afield also in Serbia, Egypt, Nigeria, and any number of other countries across the planet? Adopting a comparative approach for a moment and looking at the USA, we see that there are some common reference points, such as liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to bear arms, which are taken for granted by most people, and continually stressed. The USA, one might say, is a country where the dominant narrative has always emphasized liberty over equality, and where no number of mass shootings has been sufficient to create a working consensus to pass effective gun control legislation. And the USA also has its commemorations and mythologized figures—thus, the Fourth of July (Independence Day) and Thanksgiving, George Washington⁴ and Abraham Lincoln⁵ or, for those seeking to promote racial equality, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X. And yet, as Bernie Sanders's call for a "revolution" during the 2016 US presidential

3 "Poland announces universal housing program," *The Warsaw Voice*, June 6, 2016, accessed June 6, 2016, <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/articlePrint.php/35642/news>.

4 See Robert Strauss, "In Philadelphia, George Washington Slept Here—and There," *New York Times*, March 16, 2016, accessed June 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/arts/design/in-philadelphia-george-washington-slept-here-and-here.html?_r=0; and Barry Schwartz, "Social Change and Collective Memory: The democratization of George Washington," *American Sociological Review* 56, no. 2 (April 1991): 221–26.

5 Barry Schwartz, "Postmodernity and Historical Reputation: Abraham Lincoln in late twentieth-century American memory," *Social Forces* 77, no. 1 (September 1998), 63–103; and Barry Schwartz and Howard Schuman, "History, Commemoration, and Belief: Abraham Lincoln in American memory, 1945–2001," *American Sociological Review* 70, no. 2 (April 2005): 183–203.

election showed—a campaign in which he won the Democratic primaries in 22 of the country's 50 states—there are Americans who believe that equality and social justice are at least as important as liberty, and recognize that liberty for the super-rich easily trumps the “liberty” enjoyed by the homeless.

In Serbia, to take another example, the dominant narrative in the past century has emphasized Serbia's alleged historical suffering, and thus the values of justice for the nation and the collective good. In communist times, November 29, commemorating the formation in 1943 of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, was arguably the most important commemorative day. Before communism, and for the decade and a half which followed the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, it was June 28, commemorating the 1389 Battle of Kosovo in which the multiethnic army led by Serbia's Prince Lazar was defeated, which served as the major feast-day in Serbia.⁶ The “martyrdom” of Prince Lazar—or “Tsar Lazar” as he is recalled on the label of a bottle of local red wine—could be used to justify revenge against the Albanians of Kosovo, even though, in 1389, there were Albanians in Lazar's army, fighting shoulder to shoulder against the Turks. But here, too, there have always been conflicts over values, with liberals rejecting the theme of Serbia's eternal suffering, noting how that theme has been exploited in the past to promote a nationalist-irredentist-patriarchal agenda.⁷

Returning to Poland, the figures of the national poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), the father of modern Poland Marshal Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), and Pope John Paul II (1920–2005) tower over all others, including former Polish president Lech Wałęsa. Respectively, they symbolize romanticism and the spirit of rebellion, tolerance and stabilization, and traditionalism in family values and sexuality, as well as the struggle against communism. There are three major national holidays in Poland. The first is Constitution Day, on the anniversary of the constitution of May

6 See Sabrina P. Ramet, “Dead Kings and National Myths: Why Myths of Founding and Martyrdom are Important,” in *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the post-Milošević era*, ed. Ola Listhaug, Sabrina P. Ramet, and Dragana Dulić (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, 2011), 281–92.

7 See Žarana Papić, “Women in Serbia: Post-Communism, War, and Nationalist Mutations,” in *Gender Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 153–69.

3, 1791. This holiday is celebrated with military parades, outdoor concerts, and picnics, and recalls the era of partitions and the birth by fire of Polish national consciousness. The second is Independence Day, celebrated each year on the anniversary of the rebirth of the Polish state on November 11, 1918. Because of Marshal Piłsudski's pivotal role in bringing about the rebirth of Poland and in bringing stability to the country during the ten years he ruled the country (1926–1935), November 11 has long been associated with the Marshal. A third holiday worth mentioning is both a religious feast and a national holiday—August 15. Celebrated as the feast day of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary into Heaven, the date is also linked to the Battle for Warsaw which was fought from August 12–25, 1920, when troops led by Piłsudski repelled the Red Army forces led by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and General Semyon Mikhaylovich Budenny.⁸ The day on which the tide turned against the Soviets was August 16, only one day after the feast of the Assumption. Hostile to Piłsudski, the Church promoted the story that the Blessed Virgin Mary had appeared in the sky over Warsaw during that fateful battle and that it was her intervention that turned the tide, not Piłsudski's military genius.⁹

On November 11, 1968, the Polish Episcopate marked the fiftieth anniversary of the refounding of the Polish state, among other things by issuing a lengthy proclamation. This document included the names of both cultural figures and political figures active in the nineteenth century, such as General Józef Sowiński, who made a name for himself in the uprising of 1830–1831, and General Romuald Traugutt, who commanded Polish insurrectionary forces against Russia during the uprising of 1863–1864. But while recalling these not so often remembered heroes, the hierarchy's proclamation made no mention of Piłsudski!¹⁰ Why was this?

In the era of the Second Polish Republic (1918–1939), three rival value systems contended for supremacy. In Piłsudski's view, the state should

8 This is the spelling of the general's name found in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s.v. "Semyon Mikhaylovich Budenny," accessed June 16, 2016, <http://global.britannica.com/biography/Semyon-Mikhaylovich-Budenny>. Wikipedia offers a different spelling: Semyon Mikhailovich Budyonny. *Wikipedia*, s.v. "Semyon Budyonny," accessed June 16, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semyon_Budyonny.

9 See Daniel Beauvois, "The Polish National Idea," *The International History Review* 7, no. 1 (February 1985): 150.

10 M. B. B. Biskupski, *Independence Day: Myth, Symbol, & The Creation of Modern Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 125.

be superior to the nation, as the primary locus of loyalty and obedience. Consistent with this logic, Piłsudski embraced the concept of a commonwealth of nationalities, in which Poles, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Germans, and others could live in their common state side by side, cooperating and enjoying equal rights.¹¹

Piłsudski's major rival, both in the era of the partitions and in the interwar period, was Roman Dmowski (1864–1939), founder and leader of the National Democrats (commonly known in Polish as the *Endecja*, a play on the acronym of the party's name).¹² In direct contrast to Piłsudski, Dmowski believed that the nation should be superior to the state, as the primary locus of loyalty and obedience. For him, "the nation" meant Poles—not Ukrainians, not Germans, and definitely not Jews. While the *Endecja* was known for its anti-Semitism, this was not its only exclusionary feature. Dmowski also wanted to expel Germans, Lithuanians, and Jews from Poland, and to assimilate non-Polish Slavs (meaning mainly Ukrainians and Belarusians) into the Polish national body.

But there was a third value system at play in the interwar years, a third vision to be considered. That the Catholic Church has promoted a value system should scarcely be doubted. The Church's admonitions, as expressed in the Book of Exodus, to respect one's elders (the fourth commandment), respect human life (the fifth commandment), respect marital fidelity (the sixth commandment), and be honest (the seventh and eighth commandments) are the foundation of a more comprehensive value system, which includes also "[t]he common good, a central idea in Catholic thought."¹³ This Catholic value system underpinned the insistence by the Polish Catholic hierarchy that the Church should be superior to both the state and the nation, as the primary locus of loyalty and obedience. In practical terms, this meant that the laws of the state should be

11 Among the sundry biographies of Piłsudski, see Holger Michael, *Marschall Józef Piłsudski 1867 bis 1935. Schöpfer des modernen Polens* (Bonn: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag Nf. GmbH, 2010); and Peter Hetherington, *Unvanquished: Joseph Piłsudski, Resurrected Poland, and the Struggle for Eastern Europe*, 2nd ed. (Houston, Tex.: Pingora Press, 2012).

12 Alvin Marcus Fountain, *Roman Dmowski: Party, Tactics, Ideology 1895–1907* (Boulder, Co.: East European Monographs, 1980); and Stanisław Kozicki, "Roman Dmowski 1864–1939," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 18, no. 52 (July 1939): 118–28.

13 "Catholic social teachings," in *The HarperCollins Encyclopedia of Catholicism*, ed. Richard P. McBrien (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 281.

in harmony with divine law as interpreted by the hierarchy, that Catholic religious instruction should be included as part of the curriculum at state schools, that Catholicism should be declared the official state religion of Poland, and that there should be neither civil marriage nor civil divorce. The interwar republic died in 1939, when the country was partitioned between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

Fast-forward fifty years to the “Great Transformation” of 1989, when a *de facto* alliance—or collaboration—between secular liberal intellectuals, shipyard and industrial workers, underground oppositionists, and courageous clerics such as Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński (1901–1981) and Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko (1947–1984), not to mention the “Polish pope,” together brought down the communist regime, or what remained of it.¹⁴ As long as they shared a common communist enemy, these “alliance” partners could set aside their deep-seated differences concerning values and the future of Poland. But once communism was dead and buried, it became clear that, even within the Solidarity Trade Union, which gave birth to the political organizations the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) and the Freedom Union (UW), active from 1994 to 2001, there were both more or less centrist and very conservative currents. The most important center-left party to have emerged onto the political stage after 1989 is the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). This party, formed from the ruins of the communist party but adopting a moderate social-democratic program, was the dominant party in the years 1993–1997 and 2001–2005. Another organization worth mentioning from the center-left is the Palikot Movement, established by Janusz Palikot in 2010. As Michał Słowikowski and Michał Pierzgałski pointed out in their chapter for this volume, Palikot’s movement “hoped to obtain support from the growing number of Poles who are pro-European, socially tolerant, skeptical of the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in political life and dissatisfied with the politics pursued by existing parties.” The Palikot Movement merged with a few other small parties in 2013 to form a new party called Your Movement, which failed to achieve representation in the parliament elected in October 2015. In fact, in the current Sejm, no

14 See Sabrina P. Ramet, *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation*, 2nd ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995)—chapters 2 (“Social Currents and Social Change”) and 4 (“Underground Solidarity and Parallel Society in Poland”); and Maryjane Osa, *Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

center-left parties have any seats, although the SLD still has four deputies in the European Parliament, alongside one deputy from Labor United.

The Continued Influence of the Past

On the center-right and right wing of the political spectrum, there are currently four parties represented in the Sejm and Senate. Leaning to the center are the Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*, or PO), with 138 seats in the Sejm and 34 in the Senate, Nowoczesna (Modern), with 28 seats in the Sejm, and the Polish People's Party, a socially conservative party championing agrarian interests, with 16 deputies in the Sejm and one in the Senate. Tilted clearly to the right are Kukiz '15, a right-wing populist party led by rock singer Paweł Kukiz¹⁵ with 41 seats in the Sejm, and the nationalist and socially conservative Law and Justice party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, or PiS), with 234 seats in the Sejm and 55 in the Senate.¹⁶ Nowoczesna and Kukiz '15 are new additions to the Sejm. Even before taking office in November 2015, PiS had established its credentials as a champion of the Catholic Church's agenda and what, in the United States, has come to be called "family values," namely hostility to sexual minorities, contraception, and abortion.

Piłsudski, upon seizing power in 1926, put his socialist past behind him, endeavoring to satisfy most of the Church's desiderata. The SLD, in its two terms at the helm, did likewise, trying to meet the Church at least halfway. Among other things, the party supported the Concordat, which had been signed in 1993 when Hanna Suchocka was prime minister but ratified only in 1998, during the prime ministership of Jerzy Buzek, who headed a center-right coalition of the AWS and Freedom Union.¹⁷ But in

15 Listen to Paweł Kukiz performing his song "Patriotic Bunch": "Paweł Kukiz wiązanka patriotyczna," YouTube video, 3:24, from a performance on Polish TVP, posted by "paulinalina100," February 18, 2011, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=duyLJUuu38U>.

16 For the complete results of the October 2015 parliamentary elections, see Kamil Marcinkiewicz and Mary Stegmaier, "The parliamentary election in Poland, October 2015," *Electoral Studies* 41 (March 2016), 221–24.

17 For a detailed account of negotiations for the Concordat, see Sabrina P. Ramet, "Controversies in the social and political engagement of the Catholic Church in Poland since 1988," in *Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Irena Borowik (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 19–40.

the cases of both Piłsudski's Sanacja regime and the SLD, the Catholic hierarchy understood that these politicians were not *their* politicians, and there was always going to be distance between the Church and each of these political formations.¹⁸

Jarosław Kaczyński's PiS, by contrast, has embraced the legacy of Roman Dmowski who, in his later career, gravitated toward fascism.¹⁹ Like Dmowski, Kaczyński is suspicious of democracy and embraces authoritarian politics. Since at least 2009, there have been ongoing debates in the Polish press about the degree to which Kaczyński embodies the spirit of Dmowski. In an article published in the Polish edition of *Newsweek* in February 2009, Professor Marek Safjan cited Jarosław Kaczyński's comment that "there is no contradiction between the individual and the community and state," adding that this statement resonated with the ideas of Roman Dmowski²⁰ (as it does also, for that matter, with the ideas of Benito Mussolini). *Konserwatyzm* rejected the equation of Kaczyński with Dmowski, blaming liberal columnists for drawing the comparison, and cited one Professor Wiesław Chrzanowski, who was of the opinion that PiS should be seen as "a contemporary variation of Piłsudski's Sanacja, not of Dmowski's Endecja."²¹ But the debate over parallels with, and reincarnations of, the past has continued up to the time of this writing,²² with TOK FM declaring, "Today Dmowski rules, and has in front of him only one opponent—KOD [the opposition Committee for the Defense of Democracy]."²³ *Wprost* was of the same mind and reaffirmed the equation of Kaczyński with Dmowski (adding, without explanation, that Donald Tusk, at the time the head of the PO and prime minister of Poland,

18 Regarding the SLD, interviews conducted in Poland by the author in June–July 2004.

19 Ronald Modras, *The Catholic Church and Antisemitism: Poland 1933–1939* (London: Routledge, 1994), 33.

20 "Kaczyński jak Dmowski," *Newsweek Polska*, February 13, 2009; last modified August 9, 2011, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://opinie.newsweek.pl/kaczynski-jak-dmowski,36476,1,1.html>.

21 Jan Engelgard, "Kaczyński to nie 'późny' Dmowski," *Konserwatyzm*, April 12, 2012, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://www.konserwatyzm.pl/artukul/4177/kaczynski-to-nie-pozny-dmowski>.

22 "Kaczyński wciela idee Dmowskiego przy pomocy usłużnego kleru. Z tym trzeba walczyć głową," *TOKFM.pl*, last modified April 11, 2016, accessed June 11, 2016, http://www.tokfm.pl/blogi/cola/2016/04/kaczynski_wciela_idee_dmowskiego_przy_pomocy_usluznego_kleru_z_tym_trzeba_walczyz_glowa/1.

23 Ibid.

might be Piłsudski reincarnate).²⁴ Along the same lines, Marcin Makowski blogged in January 2016 that Kaczyński's style of rule, as the *éminence grise* pulling the strings from behind the curtain, while PiS members Andrzej Duda and Beata Szydło occupy the offices of the president and prime minister respectively, evokes memories of Piłsudski's style.²⁵

The persistence of discussion about parallels with the past, whether one considers the parallels to be close or merely approximate, is telling and not without significance. There are three reasons for this. First, the lively discussion about whether Kaczyński embodies the spirit of Dmowski—with most writers claiming that he *does*—alerts us to the fact that many Poles continue to look to the interwar era to help them understand the present. Second, the similarity in political alignments and rhetoric between then and now suggests continuities in value configurations over time. And third, each generation constructs its values, understandings, and aspirations on the foundations of what came before. The past influences the present; we do not invent ourselves *ex nihilo*.

A Political Earthquake

The October 2015 elections resulted in a political earthquake in Poland. For the first time since 1989, a single party, the conservative PiS, managed to gain an absolute majority in both chambers of the Polish parliament. Since it also controls the presidency (the party's candidate Andrzej Duda was elected in May 2015 and took office on August 6, 2015), PiS has been in a position to carry out far-reaching legislative changes. Meanwhile, the centrist PO, which had ruled for eight years, lost over a third of its parliamentary seats.

Unquestionably the biggest winner of the October 2015 elections was PiS, which advocates a strong state based on economic interventionism, maintains a socially conservative stance, is known for its close bonds with the Catholic Church and, as noted above, is thought by many

24 "Nałęcz: Tusk i Kaczyński jak Piłsudski i Dmowski," *Wprost*, October 31, 2012, accessed June 10, 2016, <https://www.wprost.pl/354671/Nalecz-Tusk-i-Kaczynski-jak-Pil-sudski-i-Dmowski>.

25 Marcin Makowski, "Ile Kaczyńskiego w Piłsudskim? Wywiad z Błażem Pobożym," *makowskimarcin*, last modified January 13, 2016, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://makowskimarcin.pl/1364-2/>.

Poles to embody the spirit of Roman Dmowski. According to PiS, Poland's existential Catholicism must be protected from both Brussels' secular influence, and the Islamic culture of would-be Muslim immigrants. The party stresses the homogeneity of Polish society and opposes "genderism"—a catch-all term for feminism and LGBT rights.²⁶ The controversial, independent Catholic radio station Radio Maryja, run by Redemptorist Fr. Tadeusz Rydzyk—a station which has promoted conspiracy theories, such as the notion that the plane crash which killed Poland's then president Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław's brother, in 2010 was the result of a plot by PiS's political rivals—has been an enthusiastic supporter of PiS.²⁷ For its part, PiS wants to remove communist-era secret police collaborators from all spheres of public life including government, universities, the media, the military and public companies.

In international relations, PiS has been Atlanticist rather than European although the party supported integration with the EU—but even that only on terms directly beneficial for Poland. It has been in favor of economic integration and close cooperation with other EU countries in the areas of energy security and the military, but it has been skeptical about closer federalist actions. PiS has emphasized the role of bilateral relations with other European states, while building up Warsaw's influence in East Central Europe. This is a shift from the stance of the former Civic Platform government, which had sought to develop its association with the Western alliance and developed a deep trust with Germany that resulted in it gaining access to core decision-making competencies in the EU, including the post of the President of the European Council for the Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk. PiS, however, seeks distance from both Berlin and Moscow.

26 For further discussion of the Catholic Church's hostility to sexual minorities, specifically in Poland, see Anna Szwed and Katarzyna Zielińska, "A War on Gender? The Roman Catholic Church's Discourse on Gender in Poland," in *Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Irena Borowik (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 113–36.

27 See Ireneusz Krzemiński, "Radio Maryja and Fr. Rydzyk as a creator of the National-Catholic ideology," in *Religion, Politics, and Values in Poland: Continuity and Change since 1989*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet and Irena Borowik (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 85–112. It should be stressed that the Catholic hierarchy has scolded Rydzyk repeatedly, but has never repudiated him altogether.

Reasons for the Victory of Law and Justice

One may ask why PiS managed to win both the presidential and the parliamentary elections in 2015. According to political scientists Hubert Tworzecki and Radosław Markowski, there were five main factors at play. First, many voters simply wanted to replace the liberal Civic Platform, which had ruled the country for eight years. Despite a very high growth rate, far exceeding the EU average, many voters felt that the Civic Platform, with its aura of complacency, represented a remote, arrogant, and affluent political establishment that had lost touch with reality. Moreover, as Tworzecki and Markowski note, "[t]his tendency to vote against incumbents, no matter how well or poorly they govern, has also been observed in other postcommunist countries. It persists because the region's political parties still aren't very good at representing their constituents' interests." Second, PiS wisely ran moderate candidates Andrzej Duda for president and Beata Szydło for prime minister. Jarosław Kaczyński, who is the sole leader of the party, was not present in the campaign as the last victory under his name was in 2005 and he has since been perceived as unelectable. The party also restricted its campaign promises to things calculated to be attractive to the broader public: greater public spending; an increase in the minimum wage; new child support subsidies; housing subsidies; free prescription drugs for the elderly; wider state interventionism; and building up communities in a spirit of inclusion. In fact, these promises ensured that the PiS could attract more socially sensitive left-wing voters than ultra-conservatives. For many, this apparently kinder and more gentle conservative government was a promise of real change and a better life. Third, despite Poland's massive economic growth in recent years and promising convergence with the EU, many Poles feel that they have been excluded from the benefits of this fundamental transformation to market democracy, which they see as predominantly favorable to a dynamic, liberal, secular, urban elite. This feeling is particularly strong in rural Poland, and in poorer regions of the east and south-east of the country. The unemployed, pensioners, young people, and Polish immigrants to other EU countries all wanted to see a strong, supportive state that would protect them from the economic and social uncertainties of liberalism. Fourth, like other countries in the region, PiS played on national fears of being overrun by Middle Eastern and African refugees,

taking a firm stand against the EU proposal that its members agree to a quota system to distribute refugees. And fifth in the list provided by Tworzecki and Markowski, the incumbent PO ran “a lackluster campaign” and failed “to articulate effectively what it stood for and what it would do if reelected.”²⁸

The Constitutional Crisis

During its first three months in office, however, the new PiS government focused on consolidating its power and taking advantage of its control of the executive and legislative branches of government. Moreover, by the beginning of 2017, PiS was able to gain control of the judicial branch, and taking control of this third branch was a high priority for the ruling party all along. The main target was the Constitutional Tribunal, established to supervise the compliance of statutory law with the constitution and resolve disputes on the constitutionality of activities of state. It also protects individuals against extensive state powers, giving a genuine guarantee of individual rights. The Tribunal can trace its prehistory back to 1981, when Solidarity used the occasion of its Congress that year to demand the establishment of such a Tribunal.²⁹ In 1986, its powers were expanded and since the transformation of 1989 it has been a cornerstone of the Polish constitutional order, a vital element of the checks-and-balances power structure. The Tribunal’s fifteen judges are elected by the parliament to nine-year terms. Before the October 2015 elections, the previous Sejm had elected five new judges to replace: three judges who were set to retire in November and two judges who were set to retire in December, by which point a new government was to take office. On December 3, 2015, the Constitutional Tribunal overruled the latter two appointments, but held that the three judges appointed in November had the right to take their seats.

28 Hubert Tworzecki and Radosław Markowski, “Did Poland just vote in an authoritarian government?” *The Washington Post*, November 3, 2015, accessed June 10, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/03/did-poland-just-vote-in-an-authoritarian-government/>.

29 George Sanford, *The Solidarity Congress, 1981: The Great Debate* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 47.

Rather than accept the Constitutional Tribunal's ruling, the PiS-dominated parliament elected five new judges; furthermore, President Duda had sworn in these replacements even before the Constitutional Tribunal had decided on the validity of the originally appointed judges. The Sejm then revised the procedure by which the Tribunal makes decisions, requiring a two-thirds majority for judicial rulings, instead of the simple majority used before, the presence of at least 13 (instead of nine) of the 15 judges for a decision to be taken, and requiring the handling of cases according to the date of receipt. The new procedures also stipulate that the Tribunal must wait six months before considering a case, instead of the previous two weeks, thus allowing new laws to be enforced for months without the possibility of a legal challenge before the Tribunal. All these modifications threaten not only the position and efficiency of the Tribunal, but its very existence.

During a mid-December 2015 rally, the party leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, openly admitted that the Tribunal might potentially impede the honoring of some electoral promises, such as certain social benefits which PiS had pledged. In March 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal declared the changes which PiS had rushed through parliament in a December late-night session to be unconstitutional. Andrzej Rzepliński, the president of the Tribunal, said that the changes undermined the Tribunal's independence. Under Polish law, rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal become effective when they are published. However, the PiS prime minister, Beata Szydło, blocked publication of the Tribunal's March ruling. Nonetheless, alongside the Constitutional Tribunal, Poland also has a Supreme Court, and this second judicial body ruled in late April that the rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal had to be respected whether published or not—even in the face of Szydło's effort to achieve a back-door veto.³⁰ In the meantime, the European Parliament passed a resolution demanding that Poland's right-wing government respect the law and end its defiance of the Tribunal. By this point, according to a survey published in the daily

30 "Poland's Supreme Court opposes government in constitutional wrangle," *Radio Poland*, last modified April 27, 2016), accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/250415,Polands-Supreme-Court-opposes-government-in-constitutional-wrangle>; and "Constitutional Tribunal's ruling binding even if it not published," *The Warsaw Voice*, last modified April 27, 2016), accessed April 27, 2016, <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/35271/news>.

newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*, 63% of Poles felt that democracy in Poland was endangered.³¹ Six weeks later, with the regime showing no sign of relenting, the European Commission reprimanded the Polish government for trying to undermine the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal. Warsaw in turn dismissed this reprimand as “unauthorized and non-binding,”³² while setting to work drafting a new bill on the Tribunal, promising that it would satisfy “90% of the demands of the Venice Commission,” the Council of Europe’s advisory body.³³ In the meantime, amid warnings that the country was sliding toward one-party dictatorship, hundreds of thousands of people marched in protest on the streets of Warsaw on May 3, Constitution Day. In April 2016, a number of municipalities, including the city of Warsaw, joined the Supreme Court in declaring that they would continue to recognize the validity of the Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings, even if the PiS-controlled government refused to do so.³⁴ On June 1, the European Commission issued a stern warning to the Polish government,

31 As cited in Nick Ottens, “Poland’s Government Steps Up Battle with Court,” *Atlantic Sentinel*, last modified April 22, 2016), accessed May 16, 2016, <http://atlanticsentinel.com/2016/04/polands-government-steps-up-battle-with-court/>. See also “A Challenge to Poland’s Anti-Democratic Drift,” *The New York Times*, April 16, 2016), accessed April 17, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/opinion/sunday/a-challenge-to-polands-anti-democratic-drift.html?_r=0; and Maïa de La Baume, “European Parliament Scolds Poland,” *Politico*, April 13, 2016), last modified April 15, 2016, accessed April 15, 2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/european-parliament-scolds-poland-constitutional-tribunal-probe-rule-of-law/>.

32 Monika Scislowska, “Poland downplays EU criticism as merely an ‘opinion,’” *Salon*, last modified June 2, 2016, accessed April 10, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/poland-downplays-eu-criticism-as-merely-an-opinion/2016/06/02/620b50d6-28a1-11e6-8329-6104954928d2_story.html.

33 “New rules on Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal in July?” *Radio Poland*, last modified June 9, 2016, accessed June 11, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/256408,New-rules-on-Poland%E2%80%99s-Constitutional-Tribunal-in-July>. See also Jo Harper, “Polish Supreme Court chief attacks government over stance on EU,” *Deutsche Welle*, last modified June 10, 2016), accessed June 11, 2016, <http://www.dw.com/en/polish-supreme-court-chief-attacks-government-over-stance-on-eu/a-19320872>.

34 Wiktor Szary, “Poland could face legal chaos as authorities defy government,” *Reuters*, last modified April 29, 2016, accessed May 20, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-court-idUSKCN0XQ0J3>; and Martin M. Sobczyk, “Pressure Mounts on Polish Government Over Top Court,” *Wall Street Journal*, April 29, 2016, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/pressure-mounts-on-polish-government-over-top-court-1461952946>.

demanding that it reverse its moves to end the independence of the judiciary. In response, the Sejm adopted a new bill on the Constitutional Tribunal in early July, softening some clauses but failing to address any of the central concerns of the Venice Commission. After reviewing the new legislation carefully, the European Commission announced on July 27 that it had identified “a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland,”³⁵ and called on Polish authorities to swear in the three judges appointed by the previous parliament. Kaczyński shrugged off the criticism, having already set his team to work preparing a new, presumably authoritarian, constitution for Poland.³⁶ The following month, the PiS government raised the stakes by initiating an investigation into Chief Justice Andrzej Rzepliński “to determine if he abused his power in preventing judges appointed by the ruling party” from participating in the work of the Tribunal.³⁷ Then, in early September, the National Judiciary Council, a body consisting of approximately one thousand judges, met and called on the government to respect the independence of the judiciary. Andrzej Zoll, a former chief justice of the Constitutional Tribunal, told the gathering that the steps already taken by PiS were tantamount to a “creeping constitutional coup.”³⁸ Shortly thereafter, deputies to the European Parliament voted 510 to 160, with 29 abstentions, to call on Polish authorities to approve the three judges appointed by the previous *Sejm*.³⁹

35 As quoted in Jennifer Rankin, “Poland’s rule of law under systematic threat, says EU executive,” *The Guardian*, July 27, 2016, accessed July 30, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/27/poland-rule-of-law-systematic-threat-european-commission>.

36 “Kaczyński confirms work on new constitution for Poland,” *Radio Poland*, last modified July 2, 2016, accessed July 16, 2016, <http://thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/259953,Kaczynski-confirms-work-on-new-constitution>.

37 Mark Casper, “Poland to investigate head of Constitutional Tribunal,” *Jurist*, last modified August 19, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/08/poland-to-investigate-head-of-constitutional-tribunal.php>.

38 Marek Strzelecki, “Polish Judiciary Warns Government Is Damaging State With Attacks,” *Bloomberg News*, last modified September 4, 2016, accessed September 5, 2016, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-04/poland-escalates-standoff-with-judges-who-fear-creeping-coup>.

39 “European Parliament Urges Poland to Observe Rule of Law,” *Voice of America*, last modified September 14, 2016, accessed September 29, 2016, <http://www.voanews.com/a/european-parliament-urges-poland-observe-rule-law/3509476.html>.

As president of the Constitutional Tribunal, Rzepliński,⁴⁰ tried to block those laws he considered unconstitutional, but, in December 2016, his term on the Tribunal came to an end. Julia Przyłębska, seen as friendly to PiS, was now named to serve as his successor on the Tribunal.⁴¹ With that, PiS completed its takeover of all three branches of the government. There were, however, claims that the constitution stipulated that Stanisław Biernat, the vice chairman of the Constitutional Tribunal, should have inherited the post.⁴² In response, the European Commission, which had already scheduled a meeting to discuss the situation in Poland, decided to meet a week earlier than planned, in a clear signal of the gravity with which the Commission viewed this latest development.⁴³

The Media

The new government's next target was the media. Like other European countries, Poland has both public and private media broadcasters. The public sector includes thirteen television channels and five radio channels, which cover large and various market segments. Until the most recent changes, the public media were under the supervision of the National Broadcasting Council, whose members were elected by the Sejm to six-year terms and could not be politically active. With the passage of a new media law that entered into force on January 7, 2016, and which

40 This paragraph is paraphrased from Sabrina P. Ramet, *Alternatives to Democracy in Twentieth-Century Europe: Collectivist visions of modernity* (Budapest–New York: Central European University Press, forthcoming)—chapter 6, “Epilogue: In defense of liberal democracy—and a warning”.

41 Christian Davies, “Poland is on ‘road to autocracy’, says constitutional court president”, *The Guardian* (December 18, 2016), last accessed on May 7, 2017, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/18/poland-is-on-road-to-autocracy-says-high-court-president> and “Polish ruling party passed unconstitutional laws. Now controls Constitutional Tribunal”, *Foreign Policy* (December 19, 2016), accessed on February 3, 2017, at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/19/polish-ruling-party-passed-unconstitutional-laws-now-controls-constitutional-tribunal-trump-law-justice/>.

42 “Kritik an neuer Leitung von Polens Verfassungsgericht”, DPA (December 20, 2016).

43 Maïa de la Baume, “Commission meets on Poland after court takeover”, *Politico* (December 20, 2016), accessed on May 7, 2017, at <http://www.politico.eu/article/commission-meets-on-poland-after-court-takeover/>.

was denounced by the European Union and media rights organizations, the finance minister was made responsible for choosing senior officials in public broadcasting services. This resulted in the dismissal of many managers, journalists, reporters, and supervisory board members of Poland's public broadcasters with immediate effect. Between October 2015 and May 2016, "a total of 141 journalists [were] dismissed, forced to resign or transferred to lesser positions."⁴⁴ By the latter date, Reporters Without Borders had issued its latest World Press Freedom Index, downgrading Poland from 18th place in 2015 to 47th place in 2016, below 42nd place Burkina Faso and 43rd place Botswana.⁴⁵ By July 2016, the number of news anchors and other journalists who had been peremptorily dismissed or been forced to resign had risen to 164.⁴⁶ "Newscasts are now unapologetically pro-government," *Politico* reported at the time.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, the government has been applying financial pressure on independent media. Soon after taking office, the PiS government terminated subscriptions to *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Polityka*, and the Polish edition of *Newsweek*, previously supplied to buildings of the judiciary as well as to many ministry buildings, a measure which made it less easy for judges and government workers to read views other than those approved by PiS. The government has also withdrawn advertising for state-owned companies in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, causing that newspaper's advertising revenue to decline by 15% by May 1, 2016.⁴⁸

44 Martha Otwinowski, "Poland's 'political cleansing' of journalists," *Index on Censorship*, last modified May 9, 2016, accessed May 9, 2016, <https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2016/05/polands-political-cleansing-of-journalists/>.

45 "Media freedom and pluralism in jeopardy," *Reporters Without Borders*, accessed June 11, 2016, <https://rsf.org/en/poland>; "2016 World Freedom Press Index," *Reporters Without Borders*, accessed June 11, 2016, <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>.

46 Alison Smale and Joanna Berendt, "Poland's Conservative Government Puts Curbs on State TV News," *New York Times*, July 3, 2016, accessed July 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/04/world/europe/polands-conservative-government-puts-curbs-on-state-tv-news.html?_r=0.

47 Jan Cienski, "Polish media veers back to pre-1989," *Politico*, July 11, 2016, last modified July 14, 2016, accessed July 31, 2016, <http://www.politico.eu/article/polish-tv-viewers-turn-off-tune-out-drop-out-poland-kaczynski/>.

48 Henry Foy and Zosia Wasik, "Poland: an inconvenient truth," *Financial Times*, May 1, 2016, accessed May 5, 2016, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4344ca44-0b94-11e6-9cd4-2be898308be3.html#axzz4BIWyDHXB>.

Sex, Lies, and Wire-tapping

Besides changes in the country's judiciary and public media, there have been other decisions putting Polish democracy and the rule of law at risk. For example, PiS lawmakers decided to increase the government's ability to wiretap and spy on Polish citizens. Specifically, with the passage of a new counterterrorism law in June 2016, the government put in place

security regulations that limit freedom of assembly in vaguely defined crisis situations and allow for the arbitrary detention and surveillance of foreign citizens. In the digital realm, it gives the country's powerful intelligence service, the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the mandate to block websites deemed a threat to national security... The law also grants intelligence operatives unencumbered access to key data on Polish citizens—all this in a country that hasn't seen a major act of terrorism since 1939.⁴⁹

The Venice Commission condemned the new laws, finding that there were insufficient safeguards "to prevent excessive use [of the powers granted to intelligence operatives] and unjustified interference with individual privacy."⁵⁰ On another policy front, major changes have also been introduced within the civil service, allowing the abolition of open contests for posts and giving the government the right to fire civil servants at will. There are also numerous examples of the strongly conservative orientation of the new government, extending even to transphobia, with President Duda, for example, vetoing a sex-change law which would have granted transgendered persons legal recognition of their acquired gender. Under Duda, public funding for in-vitro fertilization programs was also terminated.

49 Jan Rydzak, "Now Poland's Government is Coming after the Internet," *Foreign Policy*, June 10, 2016, accessed June 12, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/10/now-polands-government-is-coming-after-the-internet/>.

50 Lewis Sanders IV, "European rights body slams Poland over new surveillance powers," *Deutsche Welle*, last modified June 10, 2016, accessed July 4, 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/european-rights-body-slams-poland-over-new-surveillance-powers/a-19322046?maca=en-handelsblatt_en_euro-1597-rdf.

With regard to economic policy, PiS capitalized on economic discontent and offered voters what amounted to leftist (or, rather, Christian-socialist) proposals. In addition to those promises itemized above, PiS had also promised: to cancel pension privatization; to create more jobs, in part by limiting central bank independence and stimulating the economy; to roll back increases to the retirement age, especially for women; to liquidate short-term contracts and fake self-employment; to tax foreign banks' assets; to wage a special tax on foreign retailers' megastores; to encourage larger families through more generous social payments; and to convert some mortgages denominated in Swiss francs into złotych. The last three proposals were already discussed during the party's first months in power. Notwithstanding the fact that some of these changes may be beneficial for society, it should be stressed that such vast public spending needs to be secured in the country's income. The immediate aim was to keep the promises made during the election campaign. The Civic Platform government had already moved toward a more statist economic approach (mainly in the banking sector), but without harming foreign investors' trust. The new fiscal trajectory raised concerns and uncertainty among foreign investors, causing a depreciation of the Polish currency and a drop in international credit ratings for the first time in the country's postcommunist history. By June, with the dispute between the EU and the government in Warsaw still unresolved, foreign fund managers began to reduce their investments in Poland.⁵¹

The "big lie" is the PiS regime's endeavor to rewrite the history of Poland. This effort has several dimensions, including an effort to abandon a projected museum devoted to World War II because of its global (rather than purely national) perspective,⁵² and the manipulation of films, documentaries on public television, and other venues.⁵³ But perhaps the noisiest controversy, at least internationally, has been the new Polish govern-

51 Aliya Ram, "Foreign fund managers retreat from Poland," *Financial Times*, June 12, 2016, accessed June 12, 2016, <https://next.ft.com/content/57f9a536-2bf6-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc>.

52 Adam Easton, "Poland in row with historians over landmark war museum," *BBC News*, last modified May 5, 2016, accessed May 7, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-36212722>.

53 "New Polish historical policy could silence Holocaust debates," *Mail Online*, last modified March 22, 2016, accessed June 11, 2016, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3504223/New-Polish-historical-policy-silence-Holocaust-debates.html>.

ment's persecution of Princeton University Professor Jan Tomasz Gross. Already controversial in Poland because of his 2001 book, *Neighbors*, in which he documented the murder of Jews of the town of Jedwabne during World War II by their Polish neighbors,⁵⁴ Gross wrote an opinion piece in September 2015 that was picked up by the Berlin newspaper, *Die Welt*. In this article, Gross asserted that the number of Jews killed by Poles was greater than the number of Germans killed by Poles.⁵⁵ The following month, the new Polish government launched libel proceedings against Gross, who was subsequently summoned to Katowice for five hours of interrogation to ascertain whether or not he had insulted the honor of the Polish nation—an offense which carries a sentence of up to three years in prison. At this writing, no decision has been taken concerning whether to try to arrest Gross or not. In the meantime, the Polish government began discussing whether to strip Gross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland, conferred on him in 1996. *The Guardian* reported that "Academics have rallied to the defence of one of the world's leading Holocaust historians after reports that Poland intends to strip him of a national honour because he claimed that Poles were complicit in Nazi war crimes."⁵⁶ An unspecified number of intellectuals sent two open letters to the Law and Justice government in early February 2016, defending Gross and claiming that "the Law and Justice government wants to rewrite history, expunging any suggestion of Polish complicity in past horrors."⁵⁷

54 Jan T. Gross, *Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). For a brief discussion of the book, see Janine P. Holc, "Working through Jan Gross's *Neighbors*," *Slavic Review* 61, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 453–59; for a review including a summary of the initial reaction to the book in Poland, see George Steiner, "Poland's willing executioners," *The Guardian*, April 8, 2001, accessed June 12, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/apr/08/historybooks.features>.

55 Jan T. Gross, "Die Osteuropäer haben kein Schamgefühl," *Die Welt*, September 13, 2015, accessed June 11, 2016, <http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article146355392/Die-Osteuropaer-haben-kein-Schamgefuehl.html>.

56 Alex Duval Smith, "Polish move to strip Holocaust expert of award sparks protests," *The Guardian*, February 14, 2016, accessed June 16, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/14/academics-defend-historian-over-polish-jew-killings-claims>.

57 Ibid. The number of signatories was not specified in the article in *The Guardian*. That number may have been reported elsewhere.

Abortion

Since 1993, abortion has been illegal, with exceptions only for rape, incest, serious damage to the fetus, or in such cases where continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the woman's life. Although Poland's law on abortion is one of the most restrictive in Europe, Poland's bishops have never reconciled themselves to the stated exceptions. In late March 2016, the Polish Episcopate issued an open letter, describing the 1993 law as a "compromise" and demanding the elimination of the exceptions. The Law and Justice MP Arkadiusz Czarotorski asked provocatively, "What difference is there if a child is conceived through rape?" When Prime Minister Szydło confessed that she favored a complete ban on abortion, anti-abortion groups felt encouraged to take to the streets in support of a total ban, and liberals outraged by this pandering to the Church took to the streets themselves in protest. An opinion poll published in March 2016 found that 87% of Poles favor allowing access to abortion when continuation of the pregnancy threatens a woman's life. Finally, in early April, the government yielded to public protest and shelved the proposal to introduce a total ban on abortion—at least for the time being.⁵⁸

58 "Polish PM favours complete ban on abortion," *Radio Poland*, last modified March 31, 2016, accessed May 9, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/246764,Polish-PM-favours-complete-ban-on-abortion>; on Arkadiusz Czarotorski, "Polish MP: 'What difference is there if a child is conceived through rape?'" *Radio Poland*, last modified April 5, 2016, accessed May 9, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/247379,Polish-MP-What-difference-is-there-if-a-child-is-conceived-through-rape>; on anti-abortion groups, "Protesters call for near-total ban on abortions in Poland," *The Guardian*, last modified May 15, 2016, accessed May 15, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/15/abortions-poland-demonstrators-call-near-total-ban>; on protests against a total ban, Martin M. Sobczyk, "Protesters Rally Against Poland's Proposed Ban on Abortions," *The Wall Street Journal*, last modified April 3, 2016, accessed April 6, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/protesters-rally-against-polands-proposed-ban-on-abortions-1459711371> and "Protests in Poland against potential abortion ban," *Radio Poland*, last modified April 9, 2016, accessed May 9, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/248070,Protests-in-Poland-against-potential-abortion-ban>; for the 87% figure, see Alex Duval Smith, "Street protests over abortion law are latest skirmish in battle for Poland's soul," *The Guardian*, April 10, 2016, accessed April 11, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/10/poland-abortion-ban-petition-women-streets-law-justice>; on the government abandoning its idea, Henry Foy, "Protests prompt Poland to retreat on plans to ban abortion," *Financial Times*, April 8, 2016, accessed April 8, 2016, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3d-5315da-fce6-11e5-b5f5-070dca6d0a0d.html#axzz4BIWyDHXB>.

However, the PiS government's commitment to move toward a total ban remained undiminished; throughout spring, summer, and early autumn of 2016, there were both pro-choice and pro-life marches in various Polish cities. In June, the Human Rights Commissioner of the Council of Europe called on Warsaw to assure women of unhindered access to contraception and abortion, and to introduce mandatory sex education in schools.⁵⁹ About the same time, Amnesty International called on Warsaw to desist from adopting a total ban on abortion.⁶⁰ As of summer 2016, 45% of Poles were reported to believe that abortion should be "readily available," and objections to any proposed total ban on abortion were registered by Kazimierz Cardinal Nycz of Warsaw, Primate Wojciech Polak, and some junior bishops. In spite of this, by July 2016, the PiS-dominated government was once more debating a bill to ban all abortions, even in cases of rape or where continuation of the pregnancy endangers the woman's life.⁶¹

59 Romeo Hontiveros, "Human Rights Commission Condemns Poland's Strict Abortion Laws," *PagadianDiocese.org*, last modified June 17, 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.pagadiandiocese.org/2016/06/17/human-rights-commission-condemns-polands-strict-abortion-laws/>; "Thousands protest in Warsaw against proposed abortion ban," *The Guardian*, last modified April 3, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/03/warsaw-protest-against-proposed-abortion-ban>; "Pro-life marches across Poland," *Radio Poland*, last modified May 15, 2016, accessed September 29, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/252880,Prolife-marches-across-Poland>; "Women and young doctors protest in Warsaw," *Radio Poland*, last modified June 18, 2016, accessed September 29, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/257841,Women-and-young-doctors-protest-in-Warsaw>; "Hundreds demonstrate against proposed abortion ban," *Radio Poland*, last modified September 18, 2016, accessed September 29, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/271542,Hundreds-demonstrate-against-proposed-abortion-ban>; "Opponents of stricter abortion law stage 'black protest' in front of Polish parliament," *The Warsaw Voice*, last modified September 23, 2016, accessed September 23, 2016, <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/36724/news>; and Nika Knight, "Protesters Decry Poland's Proposed Near-Total Ban on Abortion," *Common Dreams*, last modified September 26, 2016, accessed September 28, 2016, <http://www.commondreams.org/news/2016/09/26/protesters-decry-polands-proposed-near-total-ban-abortion>.

60 "Amnesty International opposes anti-abortion effort in Poland," *Salon*, last modified June 14, 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, http://www.salon.com/2016/06/14/amnesty_international_opposes_anti_abortion_effort_in_poland/.

61 "A divided Poland mulls total abortion ban," *Inquirer.net*, last modified July 3, 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/794015/a-divided-poland-mulls-total-abortion-ban>; Donald Snyder, "Poland debates proposal to ban all abortion," *National Catholic Reporter*, last modified July 13, 2016, accessed July 13, 2016,

In September 2016, the Sejm considered two rival bills: a proposal by the pro-life "Stop Abortion" group, backed by 450,000 signatures, calling for a total ban on all abortions, even in the case of incest, rape, or risk to the pregnant woman's life; and a proposal by the pro-choice "Save Women" group, backed by 215,000 signatures, calling for abortion to be available on demand up to the twelfth week of pregnancy.⁶² On 23 September, the Sejm voted down the pro-choice bill and, on the first reading, approved the anti-abortion bill, which enjoyed the backing of Prime Minister Szydło and Deputy Justice Minister Patryk Jaki. The bill would have allowed for terminations only in cases where continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the woman's life; it also would have increased the maximum prison term for physicians violating the law from two years to five. Yet, according to a poll conducted by TNS Polska at that time, 42% of Poles did not want the law regulating abortions to change, while 25% wanted to see the law liberalized; only 14% of Poles wanted legislation to be more restrictive than it had been since 1993.⁶³ Then, on October 3, tens of thousands of women dressed in black took to the streets in cities across Poland—30,000 in Warsaw alone—to demonstrate against the proposed bill, which would have required women who

<https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/poland-debates-proposal-ban-all-abortion>; and "Polish Episcopate unlikely to support total abortion—daily," *The Warsaw Voice*, last modified July 15, 2016), accessed July 15, 2016, <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/36045/news>.

- 62 "Two proposals on abortion rules in Polish parliament," *Radio Poland*, last modified September 22, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/6/Artykul/272176,Two-proposals-on-abortion-rules-in-Polish-parliament> and "Poland still considering controversial abortion ban," *Radio Poland*, last modified September 23, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/272309,Poland-still-considering-controversial-abortion-ban>.
- 63 "Polish lawmakers push on with near-total ban on abortion," *The Guardian*, last modified September 23, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/23/polish-lawmakers-anti-abortion-bill>; Rose Gamble, "Poland moves one step closer to complete ban on abortion," *The Tablet*, last modified September 27, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.thetablet.co.uk/news/6180/0/poland-moves-one-step-closer-to-complete-ban-on-abortion>; Siobhan Fenton, "Polish women to stage all-out strike to protest abortion ban," *The Independent*, last modified September 30, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/polish-women-strike-abortion-laws-restrictions-changes-economy-a7339141.html>; and "Poland still considering controversial abortion ban," *Radio Poland*, last modified September 23, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/272309,Poland-still-considering-controversial-abortion-ban>.

had been raped, whose fetuses were irreparably damaged, or whose own lives were endangered by continuation of the pregnancy, to carry the baby (or attempt to carry the baby) to term. Even women who were not taking any direct part in the marches wore black on that day, as a token of their support; some men also helped, serving soup and sandwiches to the marchers.⁶⁴ By October 5, Polish MPs voted 352 to 58 against the tougher anti-abortion bill. Liberal MP and former prime minister Ewa Kopacz told *The Guardian* that PiS had “backtracked because it was scared by all the women who hit the streets in protest.”⁶⁵

Fighting with the EU

Although the results of an opinion poll published in July 2016 showed that 81% of Poles supported Poland’s membership of the EU, with only 13% opposed,⁶⁶ Britain’s vote to leave the EU prompted the Polish government to demand a “new European treaty” and to call on Jean-Claude Juncker to step down as president of the European Commission.⁶⁷ Meanwhile, the EU Commission threatened to impose sanctions on Poland unless the government retreated on its changes to the Constitutional Tribunal;

64 “Polish women protest over anti-abortion initiative,” *Radio Poland*, last modified October 4, 2016, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/6/Artykul/273884,Polish-women-protest-over-antiabortion-initiative>; and “Black Monday: Polish women strike against abortion ban,” *BBC News*, last modified October 3, 2016, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37540139>.

65 Christian Davies, “Poland’s abortion ban proposal near collapse after mass protests,” *The Guardian*, last modified October 5, 2016, accessed October 6, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/05/polish-government-performs-u-turn-on-total-abortion-ban>; “Poland’s parliament rejects near-total ban on abortion after protests,” *The Guardian*, last modified October 6, 2016, accessed October 10, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/06/polands-parliament-rejects-near-total-ban-on-abortion-after-protests>; and “Poland abortion: Parliament rejects near-total ban,” *BBC News*, last modified October 6, 2016, accessed October 10, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37573938>.

66 “Majority of Poles happy about EU membership,” *The Warsaw Voice*, last modified July 1, 2016, accessed July 3, 2016, <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/articlePrint.php/35896/news>.

67 Georgi Gotev, “Poland urges ‘new EU treaty’ based on nation states,” *EurActiv*, last modified June 24, 2016, accessed June 24, 2016, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/poland-urges-new-eu-treaty-based-on-nation-states/>.

Kaczyński told the boulevard tabloid, *Bild-Zeitung*, that the EU Commission was exceeding its authority and that he found the threat of sanctions “amusing.”⁶⁸ As this dispute continued to escalate, there was increasing skepticism among ruling circles in some countries about the future of the EU in the wake of Britain’s exit—especially among the political elites in Czechia, France, and Hungary, as well as in Poland itself.⁶⁹ While Polish Prime Minister Szydło demanded changes to the EU, the EU in turn warned that the Polish government’s continued stonewalling where the Constitutional Tribunal was concerned ran the risk of Poland losing its voting rights in EU institutions.⁷⁰

Internal Resistance and Anti Regime Demonstrations

The initiatives discussed above met with internal resistance from many institutions, organizations, and ordinary citizens. The changes in the Constitutional Tribunal were loudly criticized as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Poland, the Polish Lawyers’ Association, the Commissioner for Human Rights, many universities, and even the Legal Department of the Sejm. Citizens showed their discontent by participating in massive demonstrations organized by a new civic movement, the Committee for the Defense of Democracy (*Komitet Obrony Demokracji*, KOD). This new organization was founded in November 2015 and is led by Mateusz Kijowski, who had been active in the anticommunist oppo-

68 On the threat of sanctions, “EU stellt Polen im Streit um Rechtsstaat Ultimatum,” *Die Welt*, last modified July 27, 2016), accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.welt.de/politik/article157329007/EU-stellt-Polen-im-Streit-um-Rechtsstaat-Ultimatum.html>; Kaczyński amused, “Kritik aus Brüssel ‘belustigt mich’” *Die Welt*, last modified July 28, 2016, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article157348288/Kritik-aus-Bruessel-belustigt-mich.html>.

69 “Diese Länder könnten die nächsten Exit-Kandidaten sein,” *Die Welt*, last modified June 25, 2016), accessed August 1, 2016, <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article156551217/Diese-Laender-koennten-die-naechsten-Exit-Kandidaten-sein.html>.

70 On Szydło, “Die EU muss sich ändern,” *Die Welt*, last modified September 13, 2016, accessed September 13, 2016, <https://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article158119918/Die-EU-muss-sich-aendern.html>; on risk of losing voting rights, “Poland constitution: EU warns over threat to rule of law,” *BBC News*, last modified June 1, 2016, accessed October 2, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36429325>.

sition in the 1980s.⁷¹ The Committee has no affiliation with any political party, although it is supported by opposition parties including the Civic Platform, Nowoczesna, and the Polish People's Party. Marches organized by KOD initially took place only in major cities, but with time they spread to minor towns as well as major European capitals such as Brussels, Paris, and London. One of the largest protest marches took place in Warsaw on May 7, 2016, when a quarter of a million people turned out for a peaceful march to register their opposition to the various moves taken by PiS since the previous October.⁷² Subsequently, on June 4, 2016, former presidents Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Bronisław Komorowski led 50,000 people in a march through Warsaw's streets to protest the policies of the right-wing government.⁷³

Can Polish Democracy be Rescued?

In late April 2016, former Polish presidents Lech Wałęsa, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, and Bronisław Komorowski signed an open letter accusing the government of destroying democracy in Poland. Published in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the letter called on society and opposition parties to develop a plan to rescue democracy.⁷⁴ Not long thereafter, Wałęsa said that he considered it "likely" that there would be a "revolution" against the Law and

71 Jan Puhl, "Lurching Right: The Escalating Fight for Poland's Future," in *Spiegel Online*, last modified January 27, 2016, accessed June 17, 2016, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/opposition-to-right-wing-polish-government-grows-a-1073775.html>.

72 See details in "Hunderttausende demonstrieren gegen die Regierung," *Die Welt*, last modified May 7, 2016, accessed May 8, 2016, <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article155134435/Hunderttausende-demonstrieren-gegen-die-Regierung.html>. See also "Democracy under threat in Poland!", a press release from KOD, last modified December 8, 2015, posted at *internationalfreethought.org*, accessed June 17, 2016, <http://www.internationalfreethought.org/spip.php?article512>.

73 "Poland: former presidents lead 50,000 marchers in anti-government protests," *The Guardian*, last modified June 5, 2016, accessed June 12, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/05/poland-former-presidents-lead-50000-marchers-in-anti-government-protests>.

74 "Former presidents accuse government of destroying democracy," *The Warsaw Voice*, last modified April 26, 2016, last accessed April 26, 2016, <http://www.warshawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/35257/news>.

Justice regime.⁷⁵ Unfazed by the sharp criticism from the former presidents, or by rising public discontent with what Judy Dempsey has termed the country's "politics of revenge,"⁷⁶ Kaczyński, addressing the Sejm on May 2, in his capacity as chair of the Law and Justice party, announced his intention to change Poland's constitution. Referring to the resistance offered by the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Court, he told the assembled deputies, "We are going to settle this matter. We will not permit anarchy in Poland, even if it is promoted by the courts."⁷⁷ Perhaps oddly, while the results of an opinion poll published on May 25 showed that 54% of Poles believed Poland was heading in the "wrong direction," the results of another poll, published just two days earlier, had found that 57% of Poles trusted President Duda—making him the most trusted politician in Poland. Prime Minister Szydło was found to be trusted by 48% of Poles.⁷⁸

In an interview with *Parlamentarny* published on May 25, 2016, the University of Warsaw professor of sociology Ireneusz Krzemiński pointed to the fragility of new democracies, warning that "we are dealing with a very strong attack on basic democratic institutions... The effort to suffocate the independence of the judiciary and its control function over the executive and legislative powers clearly violates the Constitution of the Republic of Poland." He added pointedly, "The separation of powers is the foundation of democracy."⁷⁹ Will popular resistance sustain itself

75 "Poland likely to face 'revolution': Wałęsa," *Radio Poland*, last modified April 24, 2016), accessed May 26, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/254138,Poland-likely-to-face-%E2%80%98revolution%E2%80%99-Walesa>.

76 Judy Dempsey, "Can Poland resist returning to one-party oppression?" *Newsweek*, last modified May 11, 2016, accessed May 25, 2016, <http://europe.newsweek.com/can-poland-resist-returning-one-party-oppression-457582>.

77 "Kaczyński announces aim to change Polish constitution," *Radio Poland*, last modified May 2, 2016, accessed May 16, 2016, <http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/251137,Kaczynski-announces-aim-to-change-Polish-constitution>.

78 Damien Sharkov, "Majority of Poles Fear Poland Headed in 'Wrong Direction,'" *Newsweek*, last modified May 25, 2016, accessed May 25, 2016, <http://www.newsweek.com/majority-poles-fear-poland-headed-wrong-direction-463313>; on trust, see "Polish President trusted by 57pct of Poles," *The Warsaw Voice*, last modified May 23, 2016), accessed May 24, 2016, <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/articlePrint.php/35510/news>.

79 Włodzimierz Kaleta, "Ireneusz Krzemiński o PiS, Trybunale i 500+: Demokracja w niebezpieczeństwie!" *Parlamentarny*, last modified May 25, 2016), accessed June 11, 2016, <http://www.parlamentarny.pl/spoleczenstwo/ireneusz-krzeminski-o-pis-trybunale-i-500-demokracja-w-niebezpieczenstwie,9067.html>.

and be strong enough to stop PiS, or even to reverse such an undermining of democracy as has already occurred since October 2015? Krzemiński thought that, in the future, there could be “drastic situations that [will] induce average citizens to change their minds. But already by then a system of control over society will be so powerful that little can be done.”⁸⁰ And Jarosław Kaczyński, who talks of wanting to bury the Polish Third Republic and establish a Fourth Republic, takes his cue, according to Krzemiński, from none other than Roman Dmowski.⁸¹ As Elżbieta Durys noted in her chapter for this volume, “Poland is a past-oriented country. The prevalence of arguments referring to the past in discussions of contemporary political and social issues is a clear indication of this.” Be that as it may, Dmowski’s political “map” is not the only available model from the past which might guide Poles in the future. And whether Poles choose to look to past politicians such as Piłsudski, or to the heroism of living political figures such as Wałęsa, or to chart new paths without referring to past political models and examples, it is clear enough that the struggle to defend democracy in Poland is just beginning. And in the process of confronting the PiS regime, some Poles may break with the Catholic Church, whose conservative teachings provide the ideological underpinning for PiS and which has figured as a *de facto* ally of the authoritarian party.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

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Poland, like many societies across the world, is becoming more polarized in diverse areas of life, as contending forces seek to advance incompatible agendas. The polarization over values in Polish politics was evident already before communism collapsed but became more obvious in the following years and reached a crescendo after the October 2015 parliamentary elections, which brought a right-wing party into power.

This volume focuses on the years since 1989, looking at the clash between civic values (the rule of law, individual rights, tolerance, respect for the harm principle, equality, and neutrality of the state in matters of religion) and uncivic values (the rule of a dictator or dictatorial party, contempt for individual rights, bigotry, disrespect for the harm principle, unequal treatment of people whether through discrimination or through exploitation, and state favoritism of one religion over others). The authors address voting behavior, political parties, anti-Semitism, homophobia, the role of the Catholic Church, and reflections in history textbooks, film, and even rock music. This volume makes clear that for the foreseeable future the conflict in Poland between traditional, conservative values and liberal, civic values is likely to continue, provoking tensions and protests.

Civic and Uncivic Values in Poland is a collection, in one volume, of a host of articles that give us the basic “lay of the land” of contemporary Polish society. As its chapters are full of vital information on the most basic aspects of Polish society—including political parties, religion, minorities, attitudes, education, textbooks, music, cinema, media—this book will be of considerable use to scholars looking for one source on contemporary Poland.

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